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“Resisting Ethnic Cleansing: Crimean Tatars Against and Within the Soviet 
Union, 1944-1991,” examines Stalin’s multifaceted ethnic cleansing of the Crimean 
Peninsula and how the region’s largest ethnic group, Crimean Tatars, created a decades-
long protest movement to resist each aspect of Stalin’s policy.  First, I argue that Stalin’s 
deportation and exile of Crimean Tatars amounted to a bureaucratic genocide: a Soviet 
iteration on state violence that used inefficiency, irresponsibility, confusion, and loyalty 
to the system to destroy the national and class “enemies” of the Soviet Union.  Second, 
this study emphasizes how ethnic cleansing in Crimea was extraordinary in the way 
Soviet power transformed Crimea after the deportations.  From 1944 to 1954, this 
transformation created a “new Russian Crimea” through policies of mass settlement, land 
redistribution, and renaming geographic locations and rewriting history.  Third, having 
revealed the full extent Stalin’s project, I explore how Crimean Tatars created the largest 
protest movement in the postwar Soviet Union. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 
Crimean Tatar activists and everyday citizens established contacts with Soviet dissidents 
and Western human rights activists to create a transnational protest movement.   Through 
this network, a small, repressed nation demanded specific changes from what was one of 
the world’s most complex state bureaucracies and framed their arguments within the 
international language of protest and human rights.  They accomplished their main goal, 
and returned to Crimea as the Soviet Union collapsed.  Overall, this project highlights 
how activists can incorporate the ideas and language of post-Nuremburg human rights 
into practical actions and how ordinary citizens can work simultaneously within and 
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Resisting ethnic cleansing in the Soviet Union was a difficult task.  In April of 
1974, Crimean police denied Halich Diliara residency registration in Crimea.  Diliara was 
a Soviet citizen, a “mother-hero,” and a Crimean Tatar.  Crimean authorities violated her 
rights for the lone reason that she was Crimean Tatar.  Without registering her internal 
passport, she could not legally own her house or work, and Crimean officials “banned” 
her children from school.  Crimean police deported her and thousands of other Crimean 
Tatars from Crimea in the 1960s and 1970s.1  Per Leninist internationalism and the 
Soviet brotherhood of nations, Crimean Tatars or any Soviet minority should never have 
had to fight ethnic discrimination.  However, Joseph Stalin gave Crimean Tatars no 
choice.  From 1944 to 1953, the Soviet Union committed one of the most extreme 
examples of ethnic cleansing of the twentieth century.2  This study reveals the full extent 
of Stalin’s ethnic cleansing in Crimea, and how Crimean Tatars resisted this ethnic 
cleansing from 1944 to 1991.  By doing so, this is the first work to detail how Soviet 
ethnic cleansing under Stalin’s regime translated into systemic ethnic discrimination in 
the post-Stalin Soviet Union.  This study also argues that during World War II Stalin 
divided Soviet nationalities into two groups, those that retained their place in Soviet 
                                                
1 Halich Enanovna Dilyara, letter to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, ca. 1976, Radio Free Europe- 
Russian Language Broadcast Archive: Azeri Language Service (hereafter RFE-RLBA: ALS), box 270, 
folder 2, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, CA (hereafter HIA). 
2 While small in scale, the scope of the ethnic cleansing was astonishing.  As chapter 2 discuses, within a 
week, the Soviet Union removed all Crimean Tatars remaining in Crimea (around 180,000 people).  
However, what really distinguishes the Crimean example from other Soviet example are the long-term 
policies to maintain the demographic annihilation of non-Slavs on the peninsula and create an ethnic 




republics and autonomous regions, and those that Stalin intentionally sought to destroy.  
In fact, by 1944 the only radical or revolutionary aspect of Soviet nationalities policy 
concerning Crimean Tatars and Crimea was the Soviet capacity and willingness to 
commit ethnic cleansing and its own version of genocide.   
Stalin justified Crimean ethnic cleansing in the short-term by forcing some 
Crimean partisans to lie about World War II.  Together, they fabricated a charge of mass 
treason against Crimean Tatars. Activists easily disproved and the Soviet government 
later denounced these allegations, but the myth has endured among some Russian 
nationalists.3  Instead of “mass-treason,” many Crimean Tatars undertook “mass” service 
in the Soviet armed forces during World War II.4  In reality, Stalin acted on the 
geopolitical impulses of creating ethnic homogeny in strategic regions.  His lieutenants 
understood the lie and geopolitical rationale, and supported policies that were anathema 
to official Marxism-Leninism and the policies of “affirmative action” for Soviet 
minorities.5   As the next sections explains, the totality of Stalin’s plan to expel minorities 
and transform Crimea was an intense variant of Soviet ethnic cleansing, and the 
intentional mass-death of Crimean Tatars is best described as a “bureaucratic genocide” 
that was part of the larger ethnic cleansing process.  
                                                
3 Lying about wartime treason to justify genocide and ethnic cleansing is not unique to Stalin.  For 
example, Ronald Suny argues that the Young Turks and Turkish state implemented the Armenian genocide 
and controlled information about the atrocities with “deliberate, sustained falsification” of facts and general 
narrative surrounding the event.  This included lying about “Armenian treachery” during the First World 
War: see Ronald Grigor Suny, They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else: A History of the Armenian 
Genocide (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), xvii, xix. 
4 Chapter 1 argues that around 40,000 Crimean Tatars served in combat and around 20,000 more worked in 
Soviet industry during the war.  In comparison, evidence suggests that no more than around 6,000 Crimean 
Tatars fought for Nazi units or volunteered with the occupation authorities.  This was in spite of Nazi plans 
for a much more robust collaboration numbers. 
5 As discussed below, this study concurs with Terry Martin’s argument about Soviet nationalities policy.  
Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939.  




Meanwhile in Crimea, Soviet authorities created a “new Russian Crimea” through 
policies of mass settlement and land redistribution.6  Crimean administrators redistributed 
land and homes and renamed Tatar villages after Lenin, Marx and ordinary Russian 
words such as “Sunny.”  To repopulate the peninsula, Stalin forced over a hundred 
thousand Slavic farmers to move to Crimea.  While this repopulation included both ethnic 
Ukrainians and Russians, around three-fourths of the new settlers were Russian and the 
Crimean government and party expected and encouraged the Russification of all new 
Crimeans.  Moreover, Stalin ordered Soviet historians to engineer a new historical 
narrative for Crimea that justified policies antithetical to Leninist internationalism.  This 
“new Crimean narrative” argued that all non-Slavs were occupiers of Crimea and that 
their deportation was liberating Slavic populations.  In short, the Soviet state created an 
“alternate Russia” that championed a chauvinist and imperialistic strain of Russian 
nationalism in an official capacity that was not possible in central Russian regions from 
1917 to 1991.7 
As the transformation of Crimea neared completion, Stalin died.  Khrushchev 
then “gifted” Crimea to the Ukraine SSR.  However, this transfer did not originate with 
Khrushchev.  Stalin realized that Crimean economic growth and stability required water 
and electricity.  As early as 1947, he began placing Ukrainian enterprises in charge of 
Crimean infrastructure because it was the most expedient and geographically logical way 
                                                
6 Chapters 3 and 4 reveal that a “New Russian Crimea” was the actual title of the Crimean transformation 
project that Stalin ordered and forced the Crimean communist party and government to adopt in November 
1944.  Moreover, as the rest of this study underlines, no order from Moscow, even after Crimea became an 
oblast of the Ukraine SSR, ever rescinded this stated goal of creating and maintaining a unique Russian 
identity in Crimea. 
7 Nicholas B. Breyfogle coined the term “alternate Russias” to refer to the recreation of Russian social, 
cultural and economic systems on the new territory of the Russian Empire in the Caucasus and elsewhere.  
While Stalin’s Crimean resettlement did not include overt religion, the social and cultural transformation of 
Crimea was quite similar: see Nicholas B. Breyfogle, Heretics and Colonizers: Forging Russia’s Empire in 




to ensure these resources.  Khrushchev merely finished the transfer that Stalin began.  
The fact that the “new Russian Crimea” and the Russification of the peninsula seemed to 
contradict the 1954 transfer mattered little to Soviet leaders until the 1980s.  In fact, they 
argued that a “Russian Crimea” within the Ukraine SSR was a positive example of Soviet 
nationalities policy extinguishing the reactionary strains of Russian and Ukrainian 
nationalism.  In practice, this study underlines what many Ukrainian officials admitted in 
the 1980s: that the Russification of the peninsula was so complete during the postwar 
period that, Ukrainian-speaking settlers who relocated to the peninsula after 1954 
continued to undergo Russification.8 
Despite the extensive program of ethnic cleansing and the resulting bureaucratic 
genocide, Crimean Tatar resistance and resilience ensured that Stalin’s policies were not 
a complete success.  One irony of Stalin’s policy was that, because Crimean Tatars were 
not actually guilty of mass treason, the Soviet state allowed many Crimean Tatars to 
remain party members and even began assigning them to party and managerial posts in 
exile as early as 1944.  Beginning in late-1944, some Crimean Tatar elite protested 
Moscow’s policy as mass death consumed the small nation.   What began as individual 
acts of defiance and survival morphed into the most coordinated, and longest lasting, 
protest movement in the postwar Soviet Union.  For four decades, a small and devastated 
minority challenged Soviet policy on both the domestic and international stage.  Crimean 
Tatars overcame small numbers and exile with a stubborn sense of purpose that baffled 
                                                
8 As Yaroslav Hrytsak argues, Khrushchev and Brezhnev believed that Ukraine was the “younger brother” 
to Russians in administering the Soviet Union.  As such, overseeing Crimean resources and economics was 
a reasonable role for the Ukraine SSR and should not undermine the autonomy of Russian speakers on the 
peninsula. Besides, the Ukraine SSR already included large Russian-speaking populations such as the 





and impressed Soviet authorities.  They embraced non-violent methods.  They argued 
with, not against, Leninist internationalism and demanded political representation in 
Crimea.9  They did not condemn the postwar Soviet state, but demanded access to the 
welfare state in their homeland.10  When reforms stalled, activists criticized the post-
Stalin leadership, from Nikita Khrushchev to Mikhail Gorbachev.  When Crimean police 
violated their rights or Soviet historians called them “traitors,” activists sent detailed 
reports to both the Soviet government and international observers.  On two separate 
occasions during Leonid Brezhev’s rule, Crimean Tatars forced the “stagnant” state to 
respond to popular activism with unprecedented reforms and repressions.  While during 
the 1960s and 1970s the Crimean Tatar nation did not succeed in returning to Crimea en 
masse, tens of thousands of Crimean Tatars attempted to return and thousands succeeded, 
creating a series of crises in one of the Soviet Union most strategic and cherished regions.    
In other words, Crimean Tatars never accepted the end of “de-Stalinization” and they 
perfected, as best they could in the circumstances, resistance and protest in the Soviet 
Union.    
Crimean Tatars compared their situation to other instances of ethnic cleansing, 
genocide, and ethnic and racial discrimination across the globe.  This rhetoric was a 
deliberate attempt to embarrass the Soviet Union into reversing one of the crimes that de-
Stalinization had failed to undo.  Crimean Tatars were not just conversing with 
                                                
9 The Crimean Tatar method of engaging Leninist self-determination to argue for national rights is 
strikingly similar to Armenian nationalists arguing for the return of Armenian lands in Turkey and the 
recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Maike Lehmann, “Apricot Socialism: The National Past, the Soviet 
Project, and the Imagining of Community in Late Soviet Armenia.”  Slavic Review (Vol. 74:1, Spring 
2015), 9-31. 
10 As Sheila Fitzpatrick argues, “welfare-state paternalism” became an expectation of Soviet citizens in the 
postwar period, and they already “perceived” the state obligation before the war, despite near-constant 
economic turmoil and human misery: see Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism- Ordinary Life in 




themselves and the Soviet state, but their situation and energy attracted support from 
Moscow-based Soviet dissidents.  At times in the 1960s and 1970s, the work of Slavic 
dissidents and Crimean Tatar activists was intimately interconnected and the Soviet 
police state attacked their efforts.  Through this cooperation, international human rights 
activists from Moscow’s Cold War adversaries also interacted with this durable protest 
movement.  While involved to varying degrees, each of the above groups did not just 
support Crimean Tatars, but also learned from them.  Crimean Tatars pioneered the 
language of international human rights by recalibrating Leninist self-determination for 
use by ethnic minorities in the empire Lenin founded.  After the Holocaust, they were one 
of the first ethnic groups to hold a state besides Nazi Germany accountable for having 
violated Article II of the United Nations Convention on Genocide.11  
When Mikhail Gorbachev began his economic and political reforms in 1986, 
Crimean Tatars activated the full force of their national network.  From Tashkent to 
Moscow to Simferopol, lifelong activists and everyday Crimean Tatars pressured the 
Soviet state to acquiesce to their mass return to Crimea.  When Gorbachev waffled or the 
bureaucracy stalled, Crimean Tatars persisted. With thousands of Crimean Tatars 
returning to Crimea on their own and thousands more protesting, beginning in July 1990 
the Soviet Union attempted to reverse-engineer ethnic cleansing in Crimea.  One of the 
most radical political projects during an era of unprecedented Soviet reform, Soviet of 
Ministries Order 666 was a repudiation of Stalin’s 1944 deportation of Crimean 
                                                
11 In particular, this study highlights that Crimean Tatars, Soviet dissidents and international human rights 
activists argued that the Soviet Union violated Article II, Section C, which forbids a state from 
“Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part”:  see “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” Treaty 
by the United Nations General Assembly (New York: December 9, 1948), 278-280.  Available at https:// 





minorities and an acknowledgment that Crimea’s largest indigenous population, Crimean 
Tatars, had the right to return to Crimea en masse.  However, Order 666 created a 
political crisis in Crimea because the Soviet Union did not have the power or assets to 
implement many of the practical structural and political parts of the return plan.  There 
was immense opposition to Crimean Tatar return by Crimean authorities and many Slavic 
Crimeans, and the plan caused deep resentment towards Gorbachev and reform in 
Crimea.  Although the plan had insurmountable problems and collapsed with the Soviet 
state in 1991, the policy shift meant Crimean authorities had lost the support of Moscow 
in discriminating against Crimean Tatars.   
Desperate to undermine Crimean Tatar political, housing, and economic demands, 
Crimean leaders reinvigorated the anti-Tatar Russian nationalism of the new Crimean 
narrative.  They reacted to liberalizing state control by indulging in anti-Tatar 
discrimination, and encouraging Crimean residents to follow their lead.12  In 1991, 
Crimean authorities held a referendum that ensured Crimean Tatars could not recreate the 
Crimean ASSR’s power-sharing dynamic.  They recreated the Crimean ASSR without 
meaningful Crimean Tatar participation. As a result, after the Soviet collapse Crimea 
became a strategic region where one state (Ukraine) controlled land with a majority 
population that believed themselves to be connected to another state (Russia).  At the 
same time, a long-exiled indigenous population continued to return, but remained 
disenfranchised.  This outcome created political conflicts between Russians, Ukrainians 
and Crimean Tatars after the 1991 Soviet collapse and shaped the events of 2014.   
                                                
12 This trajectory towards “overt” discrimination is in contrast to the racial dialogue in the United States 
with the advent of “dog whistle” attacks on the welfare state and federal law that developed during late 
Cold War period: see Sean P. Cunningham, Cowboy Conservatism: Texas and the Rise of the Modern Right 





Defining Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide in the Crimean Context 
 
 
On March 17, 2014, the overwhelming majority of Crimeans voted to leave 
Ukraine and join the Russian Federation.  Most international observers noted that the 
2014 referendum, no matter how coerced, was fair in the sense that the majority of 
Crimean residents considered themselves Russian.13  This study does not dispute that 
sentiment.  However, the referendum results were the product of ethnic cleansing.  The 
political, economic, and demographic results of Stalin’s ethnic cleansing policies 
destroyed the role that Crimean Tatars had had in the governance of Crimea during both 
Tsarist colonization and the Crimean ASSR until World War II.  As such, this study 
explores how a landmass that Crimean Tatars, Lenin and many Bolsheviks considered to 
be the Crimean Tatar homeland in 1922 is today a primarily Russian-speaking region 
with a majority population that considers Crimean Tatar autonomy to be a threat to their 
Russian identity.  
Most historians employ the definition of “ethnic cleansing” that emerged after the 
Yugoslavian civil wars during the 1990s.  Terry Martin describes the crime as “the 
forcible removal of an ethnically defined population from a given territory.”14 As Martin 
argues, the same nation and state building policies that created Soviet ethnic “affirmative 
action” (as explained in the next section) eventually, in “certain conditions,” led to ethnic 
cleansing.  The certain condition in the case of Crimea was Stalin’s fear of ethnic 
                                                
13 The official result was 96.77 percent of residents voted to join the Russian Federation with 83.1 percent 
of eligible voters casting ballots.  The majority of Crimean Tatars refused to participate in protest: see Will 
Englund, Carol Morello, and Griff Witte, “Crimea’s parliament votes to join Russia,” The Washington 
Post, March 17, 2014.  Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/crimeas-parliament-votes-to-
join-russia/2014/03/17/5c3b96ca-adba-11e3-9627-c65021d6d572_story.html?utm_term=.3cefd181b698. 
Accessed on July 20, 2017. 
14 Terry Martin, “The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing,” The Journal of Modern History (Vol. 70:4 




diversity in a strategic region.  This fear led him to abandon Soviet nationalities policies 
in certain regions and engage in ethnic cleansing.  This “xenophobic wave” of repressing 
ethnic “fifth columns,” as Jeffry Burds argues, began in 1938 and peaked with the 
wartime deportations along the Soviet periphery.15    
 Overall, this study agrees that the defining characteristic of ethnic cleansing is 
mass expulsion.  However, even inside the Soviet Union no two instances of ethnic 
cleansing were the same.  The importance of Crimea to Soviet security and culture made 
the scope and permanence of this ethnic cleansing greater than in the other regions that 
Stalin ethnically cleansed.  So extreme in fact, that the common definition of “ethnic 
cleansing” does not encompass much of Stalin’s Crimea policy.  The events concerning 
Crimean Tatars and Crimea from 1944 to 1991 underline that a state that desires to 
maintain the results of ethnic cleansing has to rely on more than just state repression.  
Soviet authorities also had to enact long-term land, economic, language, resettlement, and 
ideological policies to complete and sustain the ethnic transformation of Crimea.  For 
Crimean authorities in the postwar period, these polices were essential in sustaining the 
changes of ethnic cleansing and undermining the ability of Crimean Tatars to reverse 
ethnic cleansing during the postwar period and beyond.  For Crimean Tatars, these 
policies became specific targets of their protest. 
Determining the intentionality of the mass death that resulted from Soviet ethnic 
cleansing is frustrating for historians because, although the Soviet call to murder was 
                                                
15 Martin, Naimark and numerous other scholars agree that the war led to a dramatic “escalation” in ethnic 
cleansing. Outside of Crimea, deportations included Kurds, Volga Germans, Meshketian Turks, Chechens, 
Ingushetians, Kalmyks, Balkars, Iranians, and smaller groups: see Jeffry Burds, “The War against ‘Fifth 
Columnists’: The Case of Chechnya, 1942-1944,” Journal of Contemporary History (Vol 42:2, 2007),16; 
Martin, “The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing,” 820; Norman M. Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides, 




never “overt,” the Soviet system ensured that much of the mass death was “intentional.”   
Martin considers Soviet ethnic cleansing to be “genocidal,” while Norman Naimark has 
recently argued that Stalin did commit “genocide,” especially against class enemies.  
However, as Naimark concedes and scholars of the Holocaust argue, taking the term 
beyond Hitler’s ideologically driven extermination of the Jewish people is fraught with 
downplaying the unique terribleness of Hitler’s “Final Solution.”16   
Keeping this issue in mind, this study proposes the term “bureaucratic genocide” 
to describe the intentional killing of a large portion of Crimean Tatars from May 1944 
until late 1946.  Bureaucratic genocide was a Soviet iteration on state violence that used 
inefficiency, irresponsibility, confusion, and loyalty to the system to destroy the national 
and class “enemies” of the Soviet Union.  The logistics and mechanics of bureaucratic 
genocide created mass death by refusing citizens food, water, housing, and medical 
treatment, killing over 40,000 Crimean Tatars.  This term separates the intentional mass 
death of Crimean Tatars from the most extreme example of genocide, the Holocaust, 
while also distinguishing the severity of the crime from the other instances of forced 
migration that the Russian imperial government and Soviet Union instigated on several 
occasions.17   This variation on “genocide” also supports Bartov’s assertion that Soviet 
“bureaucratic callousness (and inefficiency)” was a key trait that distinguished Stalin’s 
                                                
16 Holocaust scholar Omar Bartov argues convincingly that, despite commonalities in mass atrocities that 
Hitler and Stalin committed, the ideological goals of the Holocaust made Hitler’s crimes different.  At the 
same time, Bartov admits that the practice of genocide neither began nor ended with the Holocaust, even if 
it was the single event that created the term and global discussion of such crimes: see Omer Bartov, Murder 
in our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 53; Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides, 1-3; Martin, “The Origins of Soviet Ethnic Cleansing,” 819-822.  
17 As chapter 2 outlines, the hope is that “bureaucratic genocide” most accurately places the mass death of 
Crimean Tatars in Central Asia on the “continuum between genocide on the one end and nonviolent 




crimes from Hitler’s more extreme assault on the Jewish people.18  Moreover, by defining 
the bureaucratic genocide of Crimean Tatars as just one part of Stalin’s larger ethnic 
cleansing program, this study identifies the specific actors and circumstances that led a 
forced deportation to end in mass death.19  Finally, distinguishing between the crimes of 
ethnic cleansing and genocide underlines which crime Crimean Tatars could attempt to 
reverse (ethnic cleansing) and which they could not (genocide). 
 
A Break from Leninist Nationalities Policies 
 
 
In Empire of Nations, Francine Hirsch rejects the Cold War-era “Totalitarian” 
school in Western Academia that, in the words of Richard Pipes, portrayed the Soviet 
Union as “a prison of peoples” that, from the top down, repressed Soviet nationalities.  
Hirsch argues that state-sponsored “evolution,” based on Marxist ideas of modernity, 
actually consolidated and created nationalities with the participation of Soviet ethnic 
groups and Soviet ethnographers.20  Hirsch also asserts that Lenin created this policy 
based on his belief in national self-determination and the Bolshevik need to create a 
powerful state to propel a transition to communism and world revolution.  Martin 
characterizes the same system as ethnic “affirmative action” that guaranteed non-
Russians political and party positions in their respective republics, with the intention of 
                                                
18 Bartov does not believe that Soviet mass death was “industrial” in the sense that, in Hitler’s death and 
concentration camps, extermination was the one singular goal. As chapter 3 and 5 of this study argue, while 
the bureaucratic genocide of Crimean Tatars was intentional, Stalin never intended or expected that every 
single individual from any deported group would die.  Bartov, Murder in our Midst, 193. 
19 Ibid., 4. 
20 Historians such as Richard Pipes and Robert Conquest became part of the “Totalitarian School” during 
the Cold War that viewed the Soviet Union as a state with nearly total “top-down” control of policy and 
implementation. Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 5-12.  For an example of the “Totalitarian School” see Richard 
Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923, rev. ed. (Cambridge: 




controlling the massive state while avoiding the “danger” of being “labeled” an empire.21  
While this study agrees that Lenin intended to create a path to communism, the Crimean 
case reveals that, by the late-1930’s Stalin no longer depended on revolutionary ideas to 
create nationalities policy.  Instead, he believed that ethnic quotas in Crimea and 
elsewhere were a threat to Soviet stability.  Moreover, this study argues that historians 
cannot completely disregard Stalin’s desire and will to “break nations.”  In fact, Stalin’s 
ethnic cleansing of Crimean Tatars and other Soviet nationalities during World War II 
represents Stalin’s partial rejection of Leninist “self-determination” in favor of empire 
building and a permanent fracture in Soviet nationalities policy and governance in 
peripheral regions.  
Bolshevik ideas on the role of nationality in communist revolution emerged from 
a combination of imperialist and revolutionary ideas.  As a result, Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks never resolved an inherent contradiction between promoting self-
determination while managing an empire.   As Hirsch argues, on the one hand Lenin and 
the Bolsheviks hired imperialist ethnographers to clarify national and ethnic identities.22  
They sought to restructure the postcolonial world through the doctrine of “nationalist in 
form, socialist in content.”23    Moreover, Lenin believed that the Soviet state should 
counter “Great Russian Chauvinism” with a socialist state that privileged the autonomy 
of non-Russian nationalities.  On the other hand, the Bolsheviks also believed that 
national groups had to evolve through a “Marxist concept of development through 
                                                
21 Overall, Martin portrays these policies as pragmatic imperial governance, even quipping that, had he 
lived longer, Lenin would have referred to the Soviet Union as “the highest stage of imperialism.” Martin, 
Affirmative Action Empire, 19-20. 
22 Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the  
Soviet Union (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), 1-2., 53. 





historical stages.”  Lenin believed that this Soviet “civilizing mission” would help create 
communism.24  Thus, despite national self-determination, all Soviet individuals had to 
“speak Bolshevik” and organize their lives based the Marxist norms that private property 
was always exploitative and authoritarianism was justified for a workers’ state.25  These 
ideas of “self-determination” and forced “development” were contradictory, but 
Bolsheviks reconciled themselves to the belief that their empire was ultimately anti-
imperial and a vanguard of world revolution.26   The resulting policy that Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks created in the early 1920s was “korenizatsiia,” a Soviet-wide policy that 
promoted ethno-national “affirmative action” for over 170 different nationalities.27  As 
Slezkine argues, this policy created a Soviet “communal apartment” where every 
nationality was afforded its own space.28  As the next section discusses, ethnic groups 
such as Crimean Tatars received different degrees of cultural and political autonomy 
within Soviet republics or autonomous republics within the larger Soviet republics. 
Tensions resulting from the contradiction between ethnic “self-determination” and 
state control/forced modernization were evident even before Lenin’s death.  For example, 
as early as 1919 Nikolai Bukharin and Grigorii Piatikov had argued that granting national 
self-determination to “buffer republics” could undermine Soviet geopolitical stability and 
anger ethnic Russians.29  At the time, Stalin was in charge of implementing the 
nationalities policy and was Lenin’s staunchest defender on the subject.  However, the 
arguments of Bukharin and Piatikov mirrored the geopolitical calculations that drove 
                                                
24 Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 1-2, 5-7, 53. 
25 Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995), 220-221. 
26 Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 5-7. 
27 Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire, 2; Hirsch, Empire of Nations, 1-2. 
28 Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment,” 420.  




Stalin to ethnically cleanse “buffer regions” two decades later.  Moreover, Martin has 
revealed that Stalin agreed with Bukharin on the substance of his claim that ethnic 
Russians could perceive korenizatsiia as discrimination.30  Furthermore, while the 
Bolsheviks jettisoned many of the imperial tools of Tsarist Russia, such as religious 
bureaucracy and most market trade relations, Lenin embraced and strengthened other 
controls.  For example, the forced requisition of grain, livestock, and property during 
collectivization replaced the Russian imperial tribute (iasak) and often undermined the 
political, economic, geographic, and cultural “autonomy” of Soviet nationalities.  As the 
Bolsheviks enforced these policies, the Cheka-GPU-NKVD-KGB police state eclipsed 
the authoritarian, but limited, policing of the Tsarist Okhrana and orchestrated mass terror 
and systematic repressions.  This Soviet police state created an internal passport and 
registration (propiska) system that eventually restricted all Soviet citizens.31  As this 
study underlines, “passportization” would become a key method in implementing and 
preserving Crimean ethnic cleansing.  
After Lenin’s death in 1924 and Stalin’s consolidation of power, there was not an 
immediate change in Soviet nationalities policy.  However, the increase in state 
repressions during collectivization and industrialization foreshadowed Stalin’s 
willingness (as well as the Soviet state’s ability) to violently restructure the Soviet 
population to meet economic and ideological goals, all with the hope of overtaking the 
                                                
30 Martin, Affirmative Action Empire, 17. 
31 Although Soviet internal registration was similar to “passportization” in other states, experts on Stalinist 
policing such as Paul Hagenloh, Sven Simonsen, and David Shearer argue that the Soviet use of residency 
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capitalist West with a “revolution from above.”32  These Stalinist policies of forcibly 
reshaping society, economy and demographics were extreme examples of the “trans-
European” story of population manipulation that nationalist, revolutionary, and liberal-
democratic regimes pursued during the twentieth century.33   
As collectivization stalled and the fascist threat increased, Stalin began attacking 
peripheral nationalities.  Most importantly, as chapter 1 argues, Stalin grew increasingly 
uncomfortable with this ethnic “affirmative action,” especially in strategic and peripheral 
regions such as Crimea and the Caucuses.   At the same time, denouncing Lenin’s 
nationalities policy was never an option during peacetime, even during the height of the 
“great terror.”  After all, at the time Stalin based his legitimacy on the legacy and policies 
of Lenin, all of which he had an essential role in creating and implementing.  However, 
World War II gave Stalin an opportunity to “break” certain Soviet nations that he 
believed were a threat to Soviet geopolitics.  The following chapters describe how Stalin 
abandoned the Soviet nationalities policy based on Marxism-Leninism and created a 
project to ethnically cleanse Crimea.  Stalin based the project on an ideology steeped in 
nostalgia for Russian imperialism, a nostalgia that Stalin promoted throughout the war to 
rally support from the Soviet Union’s majority Russian population.  As chapter 4 will 
display, this imperial turn in Crimea was so extensive that even Marxist academics from 
Moscow failed to restore the position of Leninism-Marxism in Crimean historical 
literature and politics in the decades after the war. 
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Hirsch characterizes the post-Stalin Soviet nationalities policy as undergoing a 
“contraction and assimilation” as some smaller nationalities were removed from official 
nationalities lists and underwent various degrees of Russification, along with the 
development of a Soviet identity based largely on the triumph of the Second World 
War.34  This study, while focusing on Crimean Tatars, suggests a new concept for 
postwar Soviet nationalities policy.  There were two separate, but simultaneous 
trajectories for Soviet nationalities after the Second World War.  The first trajectory is the 
one Hirsch describes.  Despite some conflicts with Moscow over nationalist ideology and 
local control, the large nations such as Uzbeks, Volga Tatars and Ukrainians kept their 
Soviet republics or autonomous regions for the rest of Soviet history.  When Mikhail 
Gorbachev began Glasnost and Perestroika in the late 1980s, these nations asserted 
political and social authority to create either independent nations or sign treaties with the 
new Russian Federation to retain some local economic and political control.   
Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Meshketian Turks, Kalmyks, Volga Germans, and 
other small nationalities represent the second trajectory.  These were the nations that 
Stalin “broke,” and housed in the “prisons” of the Far East Soviet Union and Central 
Asia.   The postwar experience of these nations, to say the least, was much different.  
Instead of continuing the Soviet experiment in their republics, they found themselves 
victims of ethnic cleansing, bureaucratic genocide and extreme assimilation policies that 
Stalin hoped would extinguish the national identity of the survivors.  Moreover, the post-
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Stalin story for each these nationalities is diverse because Khrushchev’s thaw allowed 
some groups such as Chechens and Kalmyks to return to their regions while forbidding 
the return of other groups.  Of the groups that Moscow denied the right to return, 
Crimean Tatars were the largest and most important.  Regardless of returning or 
remaining in exile, the groups from this second trajectory spent the rest of Soviet history 
attempting to rebuild cultural and social institutions that the Soviet state had helped 
create, then destroyed.  While just a small fraction of the total Soviet population and 
ethnic groups, these nations’ experience was an indicator that the belief of Soviet leaders 
in Leninism as a guide to nationalities policy never fully recovered after the death of 
Stalin.   
For Crimean Tatars, Russians, Ukrainians and others in Crimea, the implosion of 
Soviet nationalities politics had many deep contradictions.  Stalin ordered Crimean 
officials, academics and others to create a “new Russian Crimea,” but at the same time 
began the process to transfer Crimea from the Russian republic to the Ukraine SSR.  
Especially after Stalin’s death, the Soviet Union showcased the Crimean tourist and 
health industry as the fruits of inter-ethic harmony and socialist progress.  Despite such 
obvious contradictions, the depth of transformation in terms of demographics, language, 
land distribution, and historical memory created a population, government and 
communist party that believed in the past, present and future “Russianess” of the Crimean 
peninsula.35    Ironically, this policy was one of the very “great power chauvinism,” that 
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Lenin and the Bolshevik party had denounced in the early years of the Soviet Union.  
Stalin intentionally created an awkward “room” for Russians in the Soviet “communal 
apartment.”   However, Stalin created this “room” of the communal apartment out of an 
imperialistic desire to stabilize the Soviet empire, and not, as Lenin had believed, to 
create a communist future.  The pronouncements, literature and rhetoric of the new 
Crimean leadership more resembled the “imperial patriots and philosophical 
conservatives” of late-nineteenth century Russian Slavophiles than Soviet communists.36  
Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgars, and other smaller minorities no longer 
existed in Crimea.  Ukrainians could remain, and the Soviet Union even forced tens of 
thousands to relocated to the peninsula from 1944 to 1991.  However, even while part of 
the Ukraine SSR Crimean authorities made no room for a separate Ukrainian identity, 
and expected everyone to speak Russian despite the pronouncement of Slavic 
brotherhood.37   
In the meantime, Crimean Tatars appropriated the ideals of Leninist nationalities 
policies for their own national identity and protest movement.  After all, as the following 
section explains, the Soviet state had actually promoted the modern Crimean Tatar 
national identity that Stalin demolished in 1944.  Crimean Tatars made the simple 
argument that their return to Crimea would be a return to Lenin’s principles and end the 
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hypocrisy of the anti-imperial Soviet project having committed ethnic cleansing and 
promoted nostalgia for Russian imperialism.   
 
Crimean Historical Background, Crimean Tatar Nationalism, and Islam 
 
 
Crimean Tatar activists deliberately excluded Islam and religious symbolism from 
their resistance movement after the end of special settlement in 1956.   Instead, Crimean 
Tatars politicized Leninist self-determination and human rights because they believed a 
secular political platform was the most practical public position for a repressed Muslim 
people seeking political rehabilitation in the post-Stalin Soviet Union.  In fact, their 
ability to divide political action from religious faith was a vital tenet to Crimean Tatar 
resistance.38  In the words of anthropologist Greta Uehling, this was how Crimean Tatar 
activists and everyday Crimean Tatars “spoke to the state.”39  Overall, during the Soviet 
period Islam became part of Crimean Tatar “ethno-national” identity. Many Crimean 
Tatars did not abandon private religious belief, but the radical transformation of the 
Crimean Tatar nation during the first-half of the twentieth century moved religion from 
the public to private sphere.  This transformation aligns the arguments of Adeeb Khalid, 
Ali Igmen, Douglas Northrop, Elizabeth Constantine and other scholars that Islam in the 
Soviet context can be understood only by exploring how Soviet rule interacted with 
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different Muslim peoples and regions.40  The Crimean Tatar perspective originated from 
a unique combination of Crimean Tatar nationalism, Soviet atheism, the Soviet 
nationalities policies discussed above and the ethnic cleansing of Crimean Tatars.  
Populations and territorial claims in Crimea and the Black Sea region have 
fluctuated for millennia.  Before the Crimean Khanate, the Crimea and Black Sea had 
shifted between being the core and periphery of different empires.41  After the Mongol 
Empire began to dissolve, Tatars ruled Crimea as part of the Golden Horde.  As Bryan 
Williams notes, the blanket term Crimean Tatar inaccurately portrays the Tatars of 
Crimea who were a diverse collection of steppe and mountain Turkic peoples with a 
mixture of more ancient Crimean inhabitants.42  Regardless, from the fourteenth-century 
on, the people who today indentify as Crimean Tatars united under the Crimean Khanate 
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USSR.  For example, Ali Igmen’s work on the Soviet transformation of the Kyrgyz SSR argues that, as a 
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and Power in Kyrgyzstan (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2012), 140-141. In contrast, Douglas 
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premise, and further argues that, while scholars should not promote nostalgia about the Soviet 
transformation for Uzbek women, they cannot “ignore how Soviet rule changed the lives of Uzbek 
women.”  Moreover, Constantine asserts that appreciation for the change of Soviet period is more 
widespread in rural Uzbek regions.  This is in contrast to urban Uzbekistan where state support for the post-
Soviet religious rebirth has been more vigorous as Uzbek elites promote conservative Islamic practices: see 
Douglas Northrop, Veiled Empire: Gender and Power in Stalinist Central Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University, 
2004), 356-357 and Elizabeth A. Constantine “Consequences of Soviet Policy and Ideology for Gender in 
Central Asia and Contemporary Reversal” in Jeff Sahadeo and Russell Zanca eds., Everyday Life in Central 
Asia: Past and Present  (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2007), 122-123. Khalid is explicit in 
arguing that scholars cannot ignore that Soviet “history matters” in regards to how Soviet Muslims view 
Islam and practice their religion.   Nevertheless, as Khalid argues, Islam became primarily a “key marker of 
ethnic identity and an aspect of national culture.” Adeeb Khalid, Islam After Communism: Religion and 
Politics in Central Asia (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007), 2, 4-11, 84-85.   
41 Charles King, The Black Sea: A History (Oxford University Press, 2005), 9. 
42 For a detailed description of Crimean Tatar ethnogenesis, see Brian Glyn Williams, The Crimean Tatars: 




with a capital at Bakchisarai, with the peninsula maintaining a diverse merchant 
population on the coast that had originated during Greek times.  Similar to Kazan, the 
Crimean Khanate had a longstanding relationship with Moscovy that included trade, but 
was more antagonistic because of Tatar raids on Russian villages as part of the Black Sea 
slave trade, and the Khanate’s periodic submission to Ottoman sovereignty.   After 
numerous military clashes, in 1774 Catherine the Great invaded to deter Ottoman 
ambitions, and in 1783 she annexed Crimea.43   
Russian imperial expansion in Crimea was an example of the empire governing 
“overlapping nomenclatures of social statuses and hierarchies of authority” on “an 
irregular map of human diversity and hegemony” as Kappeler argues.44  The place of 
Crimea in the Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union, is best thought of as an 
“assemblage point” of empire.  As Ab Imperio’s editors suggest, the Russian “imperial 
situation” in peripheral regions was highly flexible and changed at certain moments and 
“under certain circumstances, from certain building blocks.”45   
In Crimea, the strategic position of the peninsula, the fraught relationship between 
the Russian center and Crimean Tatars, and the orientalist obsession of Russian 
aristocrats and artists with the former Khanate defined the Crimean “assemblage point” 
within the Russian empire.  The primary empire-building tools in the Crimean were 
military power (specifically the creation of the Black Sea Fleet headquarters at 
Sevastopol), state-initiated deportations, unforced migration, the steady flow of Russian 
and Ukrainian settlers to the Crimean coast, and limited Crimean Tatar assimilation into 
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the Russian imperial bureaucracy.  Key to this control was Catherine’s decision to place 
the Muslim population under the oversight of the Orenburg Mufti.  This religious 
bureaucracy, along with the “zemstvo” reforms and “Tatar normal schools” created a new 
sense of social cohesion among Crimean Muslims and the new schools educated the first 
generation of Crimean Tatar intellectuals.  At the same time, while many Crimean Tatars 
joined the Mufti’s bureaucracy, the increase in Russian and Ukrainian peasants and land 
redistribution alarmed many Tatar leaders.46   
As the Ottoman Empire waned, the competition for control over the Black Sea 
culminated in the Crimean War (1853-56), the long siege of Sevastopol, and the eventual 
defeat that embarrassed Nicholas I and encouraged his successor’s modernization 
reforms.47  The Crimean War also brought extensive forced and voluntary immigration of 
Crimean Tatars to Tatar communities in Istanbul and other Ottoman-controlled regions of 
present day Bulgaria and Romania.48  In the wake of violence direct against Tatars during 
the Crimean War, young Tatar intellectuals began to question their place within the 
empire.  In this environment, the Crimean Tatar Islamic intellectual Ismail Gasprinskii 
began the Jadid movement, a Muslim reformist and modernization movement.  Jadids did 
not reject Russian rule, but resisted Russification and concluded that only a modernized 
and educated Tatar population could protect itself from coercion.  This discussion also 
outlined the idea of a distinct Crimean Tatar nation. Similar to Kazan and Central Asian 
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Jadids, they decided that the Mufti and official Islam were roadblocks to reforms within 
the Muslim community.49  Many Crimean Tatar Jadids led protests and formed their own 
branches of Muslim revolutionary committees during the Revolution of 1905.  However, 
because of the strategic importance of the Crimea, the Tsar’s Okhrana was much more 
active in repressing Crimean Jadids than the repressions in other regions.50   
However, World War I and the Russian revolution provided an opening for Jadids 
and Crimean Tatar nationalists.  During the revolutions of 1917, imperial “assemblage 
points” flexed their political muscles and had unique revolutionary narratives.  In the case 
of Crimean Tatars, Jadid and early nationalists transformed Islamic practice during the 
revolutionary period and used the cover of war and chaos to destroy the Islamic 
establishment that had been part of the Russian imperial government.  As Bryan Glynn-
Williams describes, this process was almost an inter-Crimean Tatar civil war of sorts, and 
many Crimean Tatar nationalists viewed the old conservative religious order as tools of 
Russian repression.   When Crimean Tatars formed their own autonomous governing 
body, the Kulturai (Congress) in mid-1917, reformers and nationalists under the 
leadership of Celebi Cihan defeated the “reactionary” Mullahs.  Cihan formed the 
Crimean Tatar National Party (Milli Firka) and “declared that the new foundations for 
Crimean Tatar society would not be decided by the Islamic clergy.”51  In December 1918, 
Crimean Tatars even formed a short-lived republic before pressure from Bolsheviks and 
the White Army ended the experiment after a month.  Afterwards, most surviving 
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Crimean Tatar nationalists and Jadids had to choose a side in the developing civil war, 
and allied with the Bolsheviks.52  
 As Lenin contemplated the Bolshevik stance on nationalities politics, he 
identified the secularist-nationalist surge among Crimean Tatars.  In his “Proclamation to 
all the Muslims of Russia and the Orient” in 1917, he insisted that he would reward 
Crimean Tatar support of the Bolshevik revolution with the freedom to continue their 
“national and cultural institutions.”  Of course, Bolsheviks were referring to the Kulturai, 
and the organization’s deliberate rejection of the old religious order.  When Lenin created 
the Crimean ASSR in October 1921, Jadids and other Crimean Tatar revolutionaries 
became the direct beneficiaries of Soviet “korenizatsia” policy, and they formed the 
political core of the Crimean ASSR during its “golden years” from 1923 to 1928.  This 
was a version of the “communal apartment” that Crimean Tatars, Russians, and smaller 
minorities shared, but the Crimean ASSR guaranteed Crimean Tatars political and party 
positions, a 36% share of Crimean ASSR Supreme Soviet seats, and cultural and 
linguistic autonomy.  Moreover, the Soviet state recognized Crimean Tatars as a nation 
separate from Volga and other Tatars.53  As Williams notes, Crimean Tatar nationalism 
had become quite popular among much of the Crimean Tatar population.  This was 
especially true in rural areas where nationalists had gained popularity by demanding 
Crimean Tatar control of farmland.  When the Bolsheviks began recruiting primarily 
rural Crimean Tatars into the Bolshevik party, the new Crimean Tatar party members 
brought this nationalist sentiment with them into the Crimean ASSR government and 
party.  For many Bolsheviks in the early 1920s, this secular nationalism was the version 
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of Crimean Tatar identity that was most conducive to world revolution and socialist 
politics.  In addition, the Soviet anti-religion campaigns eliminated the reformist Crimean 
Tatar Mullahs in the 1920s and 1930s, further secularizing Crimean Tatar society.  
Bolsheviks were purging Crimea of Islamic institutions and a faith that Crimean Tatars 
nationalists had already radically transformed.  This created the uncomfortable paradox 
for Crimean Tatars that the “autonomy” and “national identity” that they sought to 
recreate in Crimea was partially the product of Soviet policy.54   
Moreover, despite “autonomy,” Crimean Tatars suffered substantially in the 
Crimean ASSR, beginning with the trial and execution of the Crimean Central 
Committee Chairman, Veli Ibrahimov, for “bourgeois nationalism” in May 1927.  Similar 
to purges in other republics, “Veli Ibrahimovism” became the Crimean Tatar version of 
an “enemy of the state.”  Soviet authorities charged thousands of Crimean Tatar officials 
throughout the late 1920s and 1930s.  Most Crimean peasants, regardless of ethnicity, 
experienced the loss of property and some faced arbitrary “dekulakization.”  Famine 
ravaged the area from 1932-33.55  Despite the purges and frequent chaos, Crimean Tatars 
retained their political, economic and cultural position on the peninsula throughout 
collectivization and the “Terror.”  At the same time, as chapter 1 underlines, Stalin was 
already signaling a shift in nationalities policies for Crimean Tatars. 
After the begging of World War II, the religious aspect of the mass treason 
charges during World War II, ethnic cleansing, and the Soviet refusal to allow Crimean 
Tatars to return to their homeland made their experience more complicated than that of 
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Central Asian Muslims and even other deported groups such as the Chechens who 
returned home in the late-1950s.  As chapter 1 discusses, German occupation authorities 
promoted a renewal of Islam in Crimea in order to popularize collaboration with the Nazi 
regime.  Since both Crimean Tatar nationalists and Soviet purges had decimated the 
Crimean Tatar Islamic leadership in the preceding decades, Nazi administrators relied on 
Muslim leaders from Crimean Tatar diaspora in Turkey to lead the “Muslim 
Committees.”  However, the Nazi collaboration plan failed in part because many Crimean 
Tatars viewed the conservative mullahs as an unwanted return to prerevolutionary 
governance through religious elites.  Then, when the NKVD swept Crimea for Crimean 
Tatars that had collaborated with Nazis in April 1944, members of and participants in the 
Muslim Committees were a top arrest priority.  As a result, both Crimean Tatar activists 
and everyday Crimean Tatars understood, regardless of their personal religious beliefs, 
that Soviet authorities equated public displays of Crimean Tatar Islamic belief with 
treason and Nazi collaboration.56  
As the Crimean Tatar return movement began in the late 1950s, it was centered in 
the Uzbek SSR, where ethnic Uzbeks were still experiencing their own “secularized” and 
“nationalized” evolution of Islamic traditions.57  Social mobility in exile depended on the 
ability of Crimean Tatars to “speak Bolshevik.”  Even when Islam did attain a more 
official role during the Cold War, Crimean Tatars were uninterested in participating in 
Soviet outreach efforts to the greater Muslim world.58  The same is true of overtly Islamic 
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dissent effort in the Soviet period.  For example, when Volga Tatar and Bashkir 
nationalists began promoting a “pan-Turkic” movement in the 1970s that condemned the 
“suppression of religious practices,” Crimean Tatars activists declined to participate.59  
As such, the main basis for Crimean Tatar national identity from 1944 until 1991 was the 
memory of autonomy and secular nationalism of the Crimean ASSR combined with the 
shared experience of war, ethnic cleansing and exile.  
However, despite espousing secular nationalism and the taboo towards public 
displays of faith, many Crimean Tatar individuals and the national collective never 
abandoned their particular idea of Islamic identity.  When Crimean Tatars fought for a 
return to their homeland and cultural and political autonomy, the desire to preserve 
Islamic traditions and identity was implied as one of the reasons that national self-
determination was necessary.  They cloaked Islamic practices in terms of Crimean Tatar 
cultural traditions, songs, the Crimean Tatar language and the teaching of Arabic script.  
This was true for the four decades of protest from the 1950s to the 1980s, and the 
accounts of Crimean Tatar activists in the post-Soviet period support this interpretation.60    
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 Finally, the 2014 Russian annexation of the peninsula has further complicated the 
role of Islam for Crimean Tatars and their historical memory.  As this study underlines, 
anti-Tatar beliefs in Crimea transitioned from rhetoric of Crimean Tatars as “traitors” to 
the fear of the Tatar “other” in the 1970s, but still avoided direct insults towards Islam.  
However, the 2014 Russian annexation has introduced an anti-Islam dynamic to the 
current Russian repression of Crimean Tatar political enfranchisement and cultural 
expression.  Pro-annexation authorities in Crimea began portraying the limited, but 
visible, renewal of Crimean Tatar Islamic faith after 1991 as evidence of “extremist” 
Islamic radicalization directly connected to global Jihadists such as the Islamic State 
(ISIS).  Crimean police and “self-defense” units have raided mosques, confiscated 
religious materials, and recently incarcerated several Crimean Tatar religious leaders.61   
In the light of such charges, this study underlines the fact that, for forty years and under a 
much more repressive regime, Crimean Tatars maintained their political resistance as 
separate from their personal beliefs on religion.  Islamic practice did, as with all religious 
practice across the former Soviet Union, reemerge from the underground after 1991.  
However, there is no evidence of religious extremism among Crimean Tatars.  Any such 
action would be a radical departure from the post-deportation Crimean Tatar national 
identity and legacy of non-violent protest.  
 
Sources and Structure  
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hospitals,” The Guardian, March 28, 2017.  Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2017 




In December 2013, I expected to begin archival research in Moscow before 
extended research trips to work in Crimean archives and conduct oral interviews in 
Crimea.  This mix of archival documents with oral interviews was deliberate.  The 
documents of the “Soviet elite” are important because, as J. Arch Getty and Oleg 
Naumov argue, despite the lies, Soviet government sources “tell us at a minimum” what 
Soviet officials “wanted others to think.”62  At the same time, research on global 
imperialism and colonialism has caused historians to read archival documents more 
critically, and supplement the documents with oral interviews and other sources.  This 
methodology exposes how imperial centers have varying amounts of peripheral control, 
while the agency of subalterns and peripheral government officials also varies over time 
and geography.63  In short, the original idea of this study was a critical conversation 
between the Soviet elite and Crimean Tatars. 
However, by March 2014, I had cancelled my Crimean research as Russia 
occupied the peninsula and war erupted in Eastern Ukraine.  When Russian security 
forces shuttered the Gasprinsky Library in Simferopol and several prominent Crimean 
Tatar scholars fled their homes, it was clear that the decision was the right course.64  At 
the same time, in Moscow, I had the encouraging surprises of both excellent access to 
Soviet archives and the outstanding quality of documents.  The recent digitization of the 
search aides for the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) and the Russian 
State Archives of the Economy (RGAE) allowed a deep dive into dozens of archival 
                                                
62 J. Arch Getty and Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror: Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the 
Bolsheviks, 1932-1939 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 27. 
63 Eric Tagliacozzo and Andrew Wilford, eds., Clio/Anthropos: Exploring the Boundaries Between History 
and Anthropology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 2-4. 
64 Thankfully, Crimean authorities have since allowed the library to reopen: see “V Krymu likvidirovana 
krupneishaia krymskotatarskaia biblioteka,” KorrespondenT.net, September 19, 2014. Available online at 
http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/3421011-v-krymu-lykvydyrovana-krupneishaia-




collections concerning Crimea and Crimean Tatars from 1941 to 1991.  In addition, I 
conducted extensive research in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History 
(RGASPI), and in the samizdat and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty collections at the 
Open Society Archives in Budapest, Hungary and the Hoover Institution Archives in 
Stanford, California. 
As a result, several of this study’s chapters, along with one key argument, are not 
what I originally intended.  Fortunately, the derailment of the original research plan helps 
further separate this work from other projects on Soviet nationalities policies and 
Crimean Tatars.  Similar to previous projects, this study recognizes that Soviet organs, 
and hence archival documents, often concealed the scope and scale of repressions.  
However, the more important revelation is that some Soviet archival collections 
corroborate the arguments that Crimean Tatar activists have been making since the 
1950s.  From the NKVD in 1944 to Ukrainian Gosplan economists in 1990, the Soviet 
government understood how it ethnically cleansed Crimea, that Crimean Tatars never 
accepted the outcome, and that repressing Crimean Tatar rights and protest was a costly 
and often unsuccessful undertaking.  Crimean Tatars and the Soviet Union had a common 
understanding of the crimes and their consequences, and for four decades argued about 
righting these wrongs.  
This revelation is important for the limited and atomized study of Crimean Tatars 
and for the pursuit of Soviet historiography in general.  First, several recent works on 
Crimean Tatars rely on studies from the 1970s and the late-Soviet period, mixed with 
recent oral interviews.65   Each chapter in this study addresses this oral interview 
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evidence and often, again, supports earlier assertions.  For example, the archives support 
the assertions of Williams and Uehling that Crimean Tatars used memory to survive as a 
coherent “nation” in exile.66    However, among non-Soviet experts studying Crimean 
Tatars there is often a deliberate attempt to not “speak with the (Soviet) state” because 
the state was responsible for the ethnic cleansing, mass death and national degradation.  
Some historians of the Turkic World chide even examining Turkic people’s experience 
during the Soviet period, while others seem uninterested in the Russian-language 
scholarship of post-Soviet Crimean Tatar scholars.67  While never disputing the 
repressive nature of the Soviet state, this study argues that Crimean Tatar protest and 
return are products of interacting with the Soviet system.  Crimean Tatar activists and 
everyday citizens had specific arguments for the specific Soviet policies of deportation, 
ethnic cleansing, bureaucratic genocide, and ideology that went well beyond their basic, 
and universally understandable, desire to return home and maintain national identity.  
Moreover, these arguments with the Soviet state are crucial in understanding exactly how 
and why Crimean officials were so successful in using racial discrimination to undermine 
Crimean Tatar rights in Crimea and why that dynamic continues today. 
                                                                                                                                            
of the Crimean Tatar deportation.  While both works offer some insight on the 1950s and 1960s, they do 
not cover the crucial late-Brezhnev and Gorbachev periods.  The first edition of Edward Allworth’s The 
Tatars of the Crimea, an edited volume published in 1988, contains the most impressive documentation of 
the Crimean Tatar human rights movement, but mainly focuses on the leadership and cultural. The 
Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Tragic Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World 
War (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978); Edward Allworth eds., The Tatars of Crimea: Return 
to the Homeland, 2nd Edition (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998). 
66 Uehling documents stories of deportations, exile and attempts to return to the Crimea.  The focus on the 
memory of a homeland and how over generations Tatars never agreed upon these memories, explains why 
building national collectivity was complicated. See Uehling, Beyond Memory, 11-16.  The first iteration of 
William’s work, The Crimean Tatars is an excellent history of Crimean Tatar ethnogenesis, but considers 
the post-Stalin period as rather unimportant.  The 2015 reiteration of this work provides new and 
fascinating oral interviews, but does not draw on Soviet archival documents or address Russian language 
publications such as Gulnara Bekirova’s latest monograph. See Bryan Glyn Williams, The Crimean Tatars: 
The Diaspora Experience and Forging of a Nation (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 334-464; Gulnara T. Bekirova, 
Krymskie Tatary, 1941-1991: Opyt politisheskoi istorii (Simferopol’, 2008). 




Returning to Soviet historiography, Getty and Naumov are correct that 
understanding the Soviet elite is essential because high politics created most Soviet 
policies.  At the same time, they assert that it is “not vitally important” to use documents 
to establish “whether Bolsheviks regularly lied to themselves and to one another, or 
whether they believed anything of what they said.”68  This study asserts that it actually is 
useful and, to a certain degree, possible to establish whether or not a Soviet official 
believed what they said or wrote, especially once one leaves Stalin’s inner circle.  An 
exploration of numerous collections can actually entrap many Soviet leaders in their 
falsehoods, and some bureaucrats produced enough documents to gauge their 
understanding of, moods toward, and reactions to, certain crises, policies, and the most 
egregious lies they or their state told.  This exercise is essential to understanding how and 
why the Soviet state and its citizens acted the way they did, especially after Stalin’s 
death. The presentation of “smoking gun” documents the following chapters present are 
explanatory, not moralistic.  At the same time, some of these documents reveal that 
Soviet bureaucrats sometimes did their own moralizing, even about their own decisions 
or missions.  Crimean Tatars understood this tension.  They constantly battled with the 
Soviet state over Stalinist lies and catching Soviet officials in lies and hypocrisy helped 
fuel their prolonged resistance.  If Stalin’s “Terror” was “the negation of politics,” the 
Crimean Tatar story is a case study of the post-Stalin return to limited political debate, 
even at the height of the “stagnation.”69 
This study had two halves.  The first four chapters explain how and why Stalin 
ethnically cleansed Crimea and how the Soviet state implemented the policies.  Crimean 
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ethnic cleansing had five phases that included creating the mass treason lie, deportation 
and bureaucratic genocide, land redistribution and renaming, repopulating Crimea, and 
rewriting Crimean history.  The first chapter on Crimean Tatars in combat and 
collaboration provides a wartime narrative of Crimean Tatar service and identifies the 
mechanics and participants in fabricating false treason charges. This chapter utilizes 
NKVD documents as well as materials from Crimean partisans, labor organizations, the 
Crimean tourism industry, and other collections. The second chapter on the deportation 
and bureaucratic genocide of Crimean Tatars includes a close reading of NKVD 
documents contrasted with Crimean Tatar accounts from both archival and secondary 
sources.   The third chapter combines party and government documents with Gosplan 
archives and a host of other ministerial collections to explore how the Soviet state rebuilt 
Crimea with the intention to solidify ethnic cleansing.   Rewriting Crimean history is the 
focus of the fourth chapter.  This foray into how the Soviet union falsified the Crimean 
historical record examines numerous collections from trade unions, cultural and academic 
entities, Soviet censors, museums, and the work of Crimean historians, archeologists, 
museum curators, excursion guides, and others actors.  
The last four chapters reveal the reaction of Crimean Tatars.  In chapter five, 
Soviet police records and economic archives disclose how Crimean Tatar individuals 
began to resist ethnic cleansing.  Moreover, the chapter explains how, once mass death 
ended in exile, the reality of postwar Soviet life in the Uzbek SSR and other regions 
transformed the economic and educational composition of Crimean Tatar survivors.  The 
sixth chapter explores Crimean Tatar protest and the Soviet reaction of policy changes 




documents reveal that individuals and groups could influence policy debates in Moscow, 
and Soviet policy failures often led to more protest and new repressions. 
The seventh chapter interrogates the archives of Soviet samizdat, Radio Free 
Europe/ Radio Liberty and numerous Soviet collections to examine the cooperation of 
Crimean Tatars with Soviet dissidents and the international human rights movement.   
This joint effort climaxed in the late-1970s with another round of protest, policy, returns 
and harsh repressions, and underlines one area of drama during “stagnation.”   In the final 
chapter, the examination of over a dozen archival collections and other primary and 
secondary sources complete this study by discussing how the invigorated Crimean Tatar 
movement and a radical Soviet return plan contended with Crimean officials for control 






Exposing Stalin’s Lie: “Mass Treason” and Fighting for the 
Red Army during World War II 
 
 
Stalin told bold lies to justify mass terror and ethnic cleansing and give his 
enforcers ideological cover.  He was the project manager of a police system that, even 
after years of war, did not flinch from arresting decorated soldiers, partisans and war 
widows all because of their ethnicity.  When Stalin accused entire ethnic groups of “mass 
treason” during World War II, he was signaling to NKVD and MVD leaders who 
understood that the lies were cover for expelling entire ethnic groups from a given region.   
The impending victory against Hitler and the manipulation of treason and 
collaboration charges gave Stalin the cover to eliminate ethnic minorities.  In May 1944, 
Stalin accused Crimean Tatars and other Crimean minorities of “mass treason” during 
World War II and began a project of ethnic cleansing in Crimea.1   The victims included 
over 180,000 Crimean Tatars and over 40,000 Greeks, Armenians, Bulgars, and other 
nationalities that the Stalin deported to Central Asia and other Soviet regions.2   
                                                
1 See State Archive of the Russian Federation (hereafter GARF), f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l.l. 88-93. 
Gosudarstvennyi komitet oborony postanovlenia GOKO No. 5859ss ot 11 maia 1944 “O Krymskikh 
Tatarakh.”   
2 The second chapter will explain these figures in detail.  In general, by June 11, 1945 the official number 
of deported Crimean Tatars to the Uzbek SSR was 151,604 people.  By the end of June 1944 the NKVD 
had also deported 15,040 Greeks, 12,422 Bulgars, and 9,621 Armenians from Crimea.  Over 40,000 
Crimean Tatars would die within the first year, and around 10,000 more in the subsequent years.  GARF, f. 
9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 5-9. Tashkent NKVD, Polkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Mal’ytsev i Podpolkovnik 
Gosbezopasnosti Maslennikov - V. V. Chernyshov. (sekretno), June 25, 1944.  See GARF, f. 9479s, op. 1s, 
d.179, l. 227. Serov-Beria, June 28, 1944; GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 246, l.l. 44-45. “Dokladnaia Zapiska o 
khoziastvenno-trudovom ustroistve spetspereselentsev iz Kryma, rasselennykh v Uzbekskoi SSR, za 
vremia 1.7-44 g. po 1.7-1945 g.”  NKVD General-Maior Babadzhanov and Nachal’nik NKVD UzSSR 




Many Western scholars studying Crimean Tatars have avoided a deep 
examination of World War II for two reasons.  First, all of the relevant Soviet documents 
remained sealed for decades, and many critical documents remain classified today.  
Second, by arguing in detail over the exact number of collaborators, one engages in a 
discussion in which there seems to be some magic number or percentage of an ethnic 
group whose disloyalty to a state justifies ethnic cleansing.  This is why scholars such as 
Greta Uehling and J. Otto Pohl argue that Crimean Tatar collaboration with the Nazi 
occupation was no more extraordinary than that of other Soviet nationalities.3  Moreover, 
Soviet leadership itself on multiple occasions acknowledged that that mass collaboration 
was a “groundless charge.”4  While this is true, the lie and the Soviet creation of alternate 
versions of Crimean history mattered to Crimean Tatars and the protest movement that 
they began in 1958. 
In Crimea, Stalin’s falsehoods became essential to the memory of the Second 
World War because they justified Soviet terror on the peninsula just months after 
liberation and several weeks after the NKVD had arrested actual collaborators. Post-
deportation Crimean officials and participants in the transformation of Crimea from a 
multiethnic Soviet republic into an ethnic Russian homeland embraced the lie to preserve 
their economic and political monopoly in Crimea.  In some Russian nationalist circles, 
Stalin’s lie outlived the NKVD and the Soviet Union.  The lie also mattered because 
                                                
3 Pohl argues that the two “Deputy Peoples Commissars” of the NKVD, Ivan Serov and Bogdan Kobulov, 
claimed that the Nazis succeeded in their goal of recruiting 20,000 Crimean Tatar collaborators, but cited 
no actual evidence: see J. Otto Pohl, “The Charges of Treason Against Crimean Tatars,” an online 
publication by the International Committee for Crimea (Washington DC, 2010).  Available at 
http://www.iccrimea.org/scholarly/pohl20100518.  Accessed on June 6, 2017.  See also, Greta Lynn 
Uehling, Beyond Memory, 1-3. 
4 Document 2, “Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union,” September 5, 1967 in 




Crimean Tatars and the Soviet state knew that it was a lie.  Because most Crimean Tatars 
had not collaborated with the Nazis, in exile the Soviet state allowed individual Crimean 
Tatars to remain in the communist party and continue serving in the armed forces, 
government, and economic managerial positions.  By default, this gave Crimean Tatars 
the social and economic mobility in exile that they would later translate into organized 
dissent.   
This chapter combines individual biographies and other archival evidence with 
secondary sources to explore wartime sacrifices and present a counter-narrative to 
Stalin’s mass collaboration charges of Crimean Tatar “mass service” in the Soviet war 
effort.  As such, this paper first reviews Crimean Tatars in regular service in the Soviet 
armed forces, and then turns to occupied Crimea.  This effort is critical because some 
current historians such as O. V. Roman’ko still commit to the idea that collaboration both 
caused and justified the deportations.  To make this argument, scholars such as 
Roman’ko underestimate the number of Crimean Tatars that served in the Soviet Armed 
Forces and partisans and exaggerate collaboration numbers.  By doing so, they argue that 
more male Crimean Tatars collaborated than fought against the Nazis. Furthermore, 
Roman’ko dubiously asserts that the willingness to honestly discuss collaboration by 
Crimean Tatar activists and historians such as Gulnara Bekirova somehow absolves 
Soviet authorities of the crime.5   
Soviet archival material discredits Roman’ko’s point and supports Crimean Tatar 
accounts.  The most important revelation of this study is that Soviet archival documents 
                                                
5 Since the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, Roman’ko, who identifies as Russian, has become a 
professor at the V. I. Vernadskii Crimean Federal University (Krymskogo federal’nogo universiteta im. 
Versnadskago).  Bekirova has since left Crimea: see O. V. Roman’ko, Krym pod piatkoi Gitlera. 
Nemetskaia okkupatsionnaia politika v Krymu 1941-1944, (Moscow: Veche, 2011), 50, 392-330; Gulnara 




from the NKVD (secret police), MVD (Interior Ministry), KPSS (Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union), and Supreme Soviet actually corroborate Crimean Tatar claims that the 
majority of work-age Crimean Tatar males fought for the Soviet Union, and did not 
collaborate. For example, documents such as censuses, NKVD investigations, 
background checks, and surveillance on Crimea and the Uzbek SSR reveal that the police 
and military, from NKVD head Lavtreni Beria downwards, knew the charge was a lie.  
The NKVD was not alone.  Knowledge of Stalin’s falsehood helped determine how the 
Communist Party and other Soviet organs interacted with Crimean Tatar veterans after 
the deportation.6 Soviet government and party documents also display how, despite 
Stalin’s atrocity against Crimean Tatars, the war experience served as a shared 
experience for Crimean Tatars and other Soviet citizens. 
The final goal of this chapter is tracing the lineage of the falsehoods that the 
Soviet state used to justify ethnic cleansing against Crimean Tatars. In the years after the 
deportation, Soviet officials began a concerted effort to conceal Crimean Tatar 
participation in the partisan effort and the Soviet armed forces, while at the same time 
exaggerating Crimean Tatar collaboration with the Nazis.  Through the examination of 
books, tour guides, and other Soviet publications, this chapter exposes Stalin’s key 
accomplices who provided false evidence and details what methods they used to create a 
false historical record. 
 
Stalin’s Reason for Deporting Crimean Minorities 
                                                
6 Chapter 5 uncovers how Beria and top NKVD officials began releasing some Crimean Tatars from 
special settlement as early as 1944.  Also, the chapter provides evidence of the surprising, and widespread, 
incorporation of Crimean Tatar party members, veterans, and skilled workers into economic and political 




The reason Stalin gave for deporting Crimean Tatars and all Crimean minorities 
in 1944, mass treason, was a lie designed to conceal Stalin’s actual motivations.  In the 
case of Crimea, as early as 1927 Stalin was concerned about Crimean Tatar efforts to 
repatriate Crimean Tatar diaspora from Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania into the Soviet 
Union to take part in building Crimean ASSR institutions.  While Lenin had believed in 
outreach to Muslims outside the Soviet Union, Stalin disliked this approach, especially 
after Kemal Ataturk outlawed the Turkish Communist Party in 1925.  As such, he 
continually undermined Crimean Tatar efforts at repatriation.  Stalin believed that any 
former Turkish passport holder was a potential security threat because they could harbor 
pro-Turkish or pro-capitalist sentiment.  He also had similar concerns about Greek, 
Bulgarian, Iranian, and Armenian populations in Crimea.7  Even before the “Great 
Terror” began, Stalin accused the head of the Crimean ASSR government, the Crimean 
Tatar Bolshevik Veli Ibrahimov, and Crimean Tatar intelligentsia of creating a Crimean 
Tatar nationalist plan to gain greater demographic control of Crimea and betray the 
Soviet state to Turkish interests.  From the late 1920s to the height of the great terror in 
1936-38, the NKVD arrested and executed thousands of Crimean Tatars.8   
However, purging thousands of Crimean Tatars and other Crimean minorities 
from the government, party and cultural positions from Crimea did not alleviate Stalin’s 
distrust of Crimean ethnic minorities.  In fact, in preparation for the 1939 census, the 
Soviet Census Bureau downgraded Greeks and Bulgarians in Crimea from official 
“Soviet nationalities” to the lower status of “national minority.”  At the same time, the 
                                                
7 GARF, f. 1235, op. 141, d. 1102, l.l. 2-3.  Pis’mo TsIK Krymskoi ASSR- Sekretariat VTsIK.  February 
13, 1931. 
8 Williams underlines the extraordinary fact that, because Crimea was such a strategic region, the arrest and 
trial of Ibrahimov in May 1928 was one of the first and most important purges against “nationalists” that 




Census Bureau decided that Crimean Tatars no longer deserved an ethnic designation 
separate from Volga Tatars. On the eve of the Nazi invasion, Crimean Tatars became, per 
the Soviet state, “Tatars who reside in Crimea.”  While in 1939 these designations were 
just on paper, they established the groundwork for the postwar narrative that Crimean 
Tatars and other Crimean minorities were not indigenous to Crimea.9 
 
Crimean Tatars in the Soviet Armed Forces 
 
 
 Before the deportation of May 17-18, 1944, Crimean Tatars were one of the 
dozens of Soviet ethnic groups under occupation.  Similar to all Soviet citizens, for 
Crimean Tatars the war meant service in the Red Army, partisan resistance and, for a 
smaller number, collaboration.  Above all, the war brought suffering and death. Germany 
and Axis allies invaded and occupied most of Crimea between September and November 
30, 1941, with the exception of Sevastopol that held out until July 1942.10    
Thousands of Crimean Tatars began fighting as soon as the war began.  Drafted 
into the army in 1939, Izet Memetov served in Ukraine, where he was shot in the left leg.  
He continued fighting until receiving another injury in battle on the Dnepr River.  When 
the Soviet front collapsed, he returned to active duty and was wounded a third time near 
Kirovgrad and spent several months in the hospital.  Finally, in 1945 he was wounded a 
fourth time during the battle for Konigsburg (Kalinigrad) and remained hospitalized until 
early 1946.11  Party member M. Osmanov left his hometown of Simferopol on June 23, 
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1941 (the day after the war began), and joined the Soviet army, becoming an officer.  He 
received commendations for defending Stalingrad, and fought in the campaigns to 
liberate Kiev, Lublino, and Warsaw, and in the storming of Berlin.  Other Crimean Tatars 
such as I. U. Ablaev served at sea.  After working at the Sevastopol Shipbuilding Factory 
for 15 years, he began repairing damaged ships in the Black Sea Fleet during the battle 
for Sevastopol.  On March 15, 1942, his repair unit evacuated to the city of Tuaps.  
Shortly afterwards, the Luftwaffe bombed Ablaev’s unit while they were repairing the 
“Ostrovskii” transport ship. Hospitalized with head trauma, Soviet medics evacuated him 
to the Kazak ASSR.12   
Experiences such as these became a point of pride and thousands of these 
Crimean Tatar veterans would become a leading voice of the protest movement 
demanding the nation’s return to Crimea.  A 1967 protest letter from 20 Crimean Tatars 
underlines this fact. Six of the signees, Enver Abliaev, Asan Kadyev, Minure Kadyeva, 
Femi Ametov, Osman Kasabov, and Abduraman Molla, identified themselves as 
“decorated World War Two veterans.”  Five others including Seitumer Chalbash, Ismail 
Kenzhe, Settar Ipek-Ogly, Osman Ametov and Khodzhai Kendzhedmetov identified 
themselves as “World War Two veterans.”13  Often, veterans participating in letter-
writing campaigns also indicated where they fought. In an April 27, 1990 letter to 
Moscow, Crimean Tatar veteran Z. A. Chekhalaeva specified that he was a veteran of the 
Black Sea Fleet and had fought during the liberation of Odessa and Sevastopol.  In the 
same letter, N. A. Salidzhanov stressed his service in the liberation of Briansk and 
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Voronezh, while A. U. Bekirov highlighted that he had defended Stalingrad and later 
fought in Kursk and Briansk.14 
Most Soviet families lost members to World War II combat and Crimean Tatars 
underlined that they were no different in later letter-writing campaigns.  For example, 
while the Nazis forced A. A. Umerov into labor, his brother, Seit Bekir Umerov, served 
in the Red Army as a political commissar and died in the defense of Moscow.15  In a 
1966 letter to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, G. S. Suleimanova demanded to know 
how she was from a family of traitors when her sister died fighting in the siege of 
Sevastopol and her husband had received Soviet commendations in the same battle.16  
Thousands of more such accounts reside in collections of samizdat and human rights 
organizations, and the recent work of Crimean Tatar scholars such as Bekirova.17   
 NKVD and MVD reports confirm the preponderance of such stories among the 
Crimean Tatars they deported, providing both individual accounts and general trends.  
For example, the NKVD found that Zeidula Stil’skii defended Sevastopol until he was 
wounded on February 21, 1942.18  Other reports show that Meva Believa, Khaztizhat 
Khalilova and Malira Urachnieva were all widowed with children after their husbands 
died in combat, a fate shared by thousands of Crimean Tatar mothers and millions of 
other Soviet mothers.19  Many reports are incredibly detailed.  The NKDV report on 
Khatiszhe Alieva-Shibanova found that her two sons, Shanasi and Shevkem, served in the 
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16 Ibid., l. 109. 
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18 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 89.  Zakliuchenie 28 avgusta, 1945. 
19 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 138-139. “Spisok Krymskikh Tatar, prozhivaiushchikh na territorii 




Red Army and Shevkem was wounded in combat.  Her daughter, who was in Moscow 
when the war began, joined a defense unit, and received an “In Defense of Moscow” 
medal.20  Another report describes how Iach’ia Abdurefa Ibraimov had served in the Red 
Army since 1937, was awarded a “Red Star” for his actions early in the war, and received 
medals for the battles of Warsaw and Berlin.21 
As the accounts above display, from 1941 to 1944, the Soviet Union awarded 
Crimean Tatars with medals and other commendations. Some such as Uzeir 
Abduramanov became “Heroes of the Soviet Union.”22  Emir Chalbash had one of the 
most impressive Crimean Tatar wartime careers.  The NKVD reported that as a fighter 
pilot in the Soviet air force, he flew 345 sorties, fought in more than 50 dogfights, shot 
down 11 enemy planes, and assisted in shooting down six more aircraft.  He received 
numerous medals and became a flight instructor.  His brother, Kurt-Molla Chalbash also 
served with distinction in a Red Army tank unit.  Amet-Khan Sultan was another Soviet 
fighter pilot with over 30 kills.23 
The actual numbers of Crimean Tatars who served and died is a victim of chaos, 
but both Soviet and Crimean Tatar figures are much higher than proponents of the mass 
collaboration charge.  On the high-end, Crimean Tatar scholar and activist Aishe 
Seitmuratova claims that approximately 64,640 Crimean Tatars served in the war in some 
capacity. Of these, the conflict killed nearly 30,000 Crimean Tatars, including 
Seitmuratova’s father.24  In letter writing campaigns after de-Stalinization, activists often 
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stated that approximately 28,000 Crimean Tatars served in the Soviet armed forces while 
more than 4,000 fought as partisans.  Furthermore, more than 3,000 received 
condemnations and 17 became “Heroes of the Soviet Union.”25  
NKVD documents agree that the number of Crimean Tatar soldiers was large.  
During May 1944, the NKVD deported thousands of active duty Crimean Tatars from the 
front and Soviet regions.  This included Crimean Tatar soldiers who had taken leave 
immediately after the liberation of Crimea to help their families.  The NKVD in Tashkent 
oblast became frustrated by the situation because they received large groups of “Crimean 
Tatar officers and regular soldiers” and simply did not know how to handle the influx of 
soldiers “with military identification papers still in their hands… and still in full military 
uniform, just without weapons.”26  Sometimes Crimean Tatars deported straight from 
combat such as Red Army Captain Ussin Suleimanov and infantryman Abdulla-Gani 
Sattarova arrived “with their service pistols.”27  The NKVD separated many of the 
higher-level Crimean Tatar party officials, military officers, and partisan leaders from the 
bulk of Crimean Tatars and deported them to Molotov oblast.  Rather than receiving 
“traitors,” the head of the local NKVD, Major Natarov, reported that many of deportees 
were “party members with party tickets in their hands, partisans, and military medal 
winners.”28 
                                                
25 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447, l.l. 21-26. Krymski Tatary iz goroda Sukhumi.  January 17, 1968.   
26 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 43.  “Dokladnaia Zapiska- O prieme i rasselenii spetspereselentsev po 
Tashkentskoi Oblasti.”   Nachal’nik UKNVD Podpolkovnik Matveev i Upol. NKVD SSSR Polkovnik 
Tarkhonov- Kobulov. June 1944. 
27 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l 19. Kapitan Gosbezopastnosti Romashov- Upolnomochennomy NKVD 
SSSR po Uzbekskoi SSR Mal’tsevu. “Dokladnaia Zapiska o rezul’tatakh priema i rasseleniia 
spetspereselentsev (K.T.) po Andizhanskoi Obl.” June 1944. 
28 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 137. Kuznetsovu iz Zam. Nachal’nika UKNVD Molotovskoi Oblasti Po 




For the Soviet Armed forces, deporting thousands of active-duty Crimean Tatars 
was awkward and caused discontent.  Many military officers refused to disarm and deport 
their Crimean Tatar comrades.  Such refusals became so endemic that the NKVD General 
overseeing Crimean Tatars deportees, Chernyshov, bluntly told Beria in an October 31, 
1944, letter that many Crimean Tatar officers and soldiers were still fighting and also 
were requesting that the NKVD release their families from special settlement.  When the 
NKVD criticized commanders for disregarding deportation orders, officers retorted that 
there were “never clear instructions” on how to deport their fighters from combat zones.29    
This situation meant that thousands of Crimean Tatars served the remainder of the 
war, if not longer, and continued to arrive in special settlement throughout 1944, 1945, 
and in some cases until 1948.  One typical sample form NKVD records is from the fourth 
quarter of 1945, when most of the 2,200 new Crimean Tatar arrivals in the Uzbek SSR 
were Red Army soldiers.30  Officially, more than 7,000 demobilized Crimean Tatar 
soldiers arrived after the initial deportation, but the actual number was much higher.   
Most of the 16,000 new Crimean Tatars that the MVD added to the special settlement 
registry between July 1944 and July 1945 were veterans.  Moreover, in some cases 
special settlement authorities did not add demobilized Crimean Tatars demobilized to 
special settler lists as Crimean Tatars because the ethnic group no longer existed.31 
The MVD census of Crimean Tatar special settlers in March 1949 counted 477 
Red Army officers, 1,154 sergeants, 1,200 veteran invalids, and 5,287 regular soldiers in 
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the Uzbek SSR.  In addition, 7,065 were still “serving” in some capacity.  These numbers 
do not consider the around 10,000 of veterans and officers deported to other regions, the 
thousands who died in combat, thousands who died in special settlement, and hundreds of 
officers and soldiers who had already been released from special settlement.32  Rough 
estimates of Crimean Tatars killed in combat and by German atrocities often cite the 
figure of 12,000, but go as high as 30,000.33  Considering those numbers, the NKVD 
figures and other Soviet documents together, the suggestion that 28,000 or more Crimean 
Tatars served in the regular Soviet Armed Forces during the war is reasonable, but the 
actual number is likely higher.  
Finally, the above figure does not include around 4,000 partisans and 
underground communists or the party workers and agricultural specialists that did 
evacuate.  For example, the NKVD never deported dozens of Crimean Tatar 
administrators, specialists, and workers who evacuated to the Dagestan ASSR in 1941.34  
Nor does it count Crimean Tatars that Gosplan evacuated from Crimea to industrial areas 
of the Soviet Union.  This includes 4,000 Crimean Tatar males that Gosplan moved to the 
Moscow Region Coal administration in late 1941 (they continued mining until 1948).35  
Considering the service of regular soldiers, party workers, partisans, regular workers, and 
Crimean Tatars in other capacities, the “mass” service of Crimean Tatars in the war effort 
is at least around 40,000 people, perhaps more.  This was out of a prewar population of 
around 218,000 Crimean Tatars. 
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The Failed Nazi Occupation of Crimea 
 
Crimean Tatar activists never denied the fact that several thousand Crimean 
Tatars collaborated with Germans between 1941 and 1944, with the majority in “self-
defense units.”36  However, as Crimean Tatars and recent work by Uehling and Bekirova 
argue, Crimean Tatar treason was not any more extraordinary than that of other Soviet 
Nationalities. Russians should not share guilt for Vlasov’s Russian Army and the same 
goes for Ukrainians and Stepan Bandera’s followers.  Similarly, Volga Tatars, Georgians 
and Kazakhs had large German units, and none of these groups saw their autonomous 
Soviet republics dissolved or experienced ethnic cleansing.37 
Similar to Slavic peasants in the western Soviet Union who initially greeted 
German invaders as liberators from Soviet repression, the devastation of collectivization 
and Stalin’s terror caused some Crimeans to see Nazis in a similar light.38  Furthermore, 
as the NKVD left Crimea in late 1941, they executed all prisoners in Simfiropol, Yalta, 
and other cities.  Moscow’s scorched-earth policy did little to harm the German 
occupation and left both Crimean Tatars and Russians on the peninsula desperate.  
Kolkhoz farmers watched as Soviet officials took their farm’s livestock to Krasnodarskii 
krai, Stalingrad oblast and other regions, but left most of the farmers behind.39  The 
retreating Red Army then destroyed farm equipment, stored grain, and livestock. This 
was also detrimental to the Soviet partisan movement, and one of the reasons Soviet 
partisan units immediately took to robbing villages where some livestock had escaped the 
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agricultural purge.  However, of note in both Fisher and Roman’ko, there are few 
concrete examples of a sudden surge of Crimean Tatar affection for the invaders.  It is 
important to remember that by September 1941, most Crimean families already had one 
or more family members in the Red Army, differentiating the region from some of the 
more naïve welcomes Nazis received in the month after June 22, 1941, on the Eastern 
front.40  
While the detailed plans for the Crimean occupation are far beyond the scope of 
this study, some general facts need to be established.  First, Hitler (like Stalin) believed 
that Crimean Tatars could be a “fifth column” and he tried to organize armed Crimean 
Tatar collaboration around the formation of Crimean Tatar SS units, regular army units, 
and volunteer “self-defense” units.  In Crimea, Field Marshall von Manstein ran these 
military affairs.  The General Commissar for the Crimean Peninsula, Alfred Frauenfeld, 
handled administrative operations.  He attempted to govern Crimean Tatars through 
“Muslim Committees” that encouraged collaboration by bringing in exiled Crimean Tatar 
political and religious leaders from Turkey and Romania to renew “Islamic belief.”  
Similar committees governed Russians and Ukrainians and allowed them to elect their 
own Orthodox bishop.  While the push to elicit Tatar collaboration was intense in early 
1942, Germany still relied on mostly Russians and Ukrainians for the local 
collaborationist government, and even in helping to organize the Muslim Committees.41  
For instance, after the war the NKVD arrested Elena Fedorets for her organizational work 
with Muslim Committee members.42 
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However, terror was key to Nazi rule in Crimea.  While occupation authorities 
demanded collaboration, they simultaneously launched a wave of Gestapo terror to hunt 
down communists.  NKVD investigations reveal that the fate of thousands of Crimean 
party members in 1942 was similar to that of Ediia Memetova.  The Gestapo arrested her, 
interrogated her, and executed her.43  Some Crimean Tatars survived in the communist 
underground longer, coordinating propaganda and partisan activities.  Sever Useinov was 
a member of the party underground in Simferopol from December 1942 until March 
1943, when most members were arrested and executed.  Useinov avoided arrest until 
January 1944, when the Gestapo captured, tortured and executed him.44   
Most Party and Komsomol members remaining in Crimea formed dozens of 
partisan units that included Russians, Ukrainians, and Crimean Tatars.  Similar to 
underground party members, Crimean partisans often met a quick and brutal end at the 
hands of the Gestapo in 1942.  For example, Crimean Tatar Komsomol members Lutfie 
Ibraimova, Suleiman Tairov, and Abla Ibraimov were among dozens of Soviet partisans 
that the Gestapo hung in public to set an example for the residents of Bakhchisarai.45  
Some partisans did survive 1942.  Crimean Tatar and Komsomol member Alim 
Abdennanova led the “Dzhermai-Kaminskaia” partisans and provided the Red Army 
intelligence.  Still, the Gestapo eventually captured the group in March 1944, torturing 
and executing the members, including Abdennanova.46 
The hunt for communists quickly turned into the hunt for Jewish Crimeans in 
1942, thus beginning the Crimean Holocaust operation.  All told, German documents 
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record 91,678 murdered Jews, communists, Gypsies, and other “racially impure 
elements” between October 1944 and April 1942.47  In addition, Nazi authorities 
kidnapped thousands of Crimeans of all ethnicities, including Crimean Tatars, for slave 
labor in the Third Reich.  For example, A. A. Umerov was just 15 years old in 1942 when 
occupation authorities took him to Mathauzen in Austria.48 
However, in 1942 some Crimean Tatars and other Crimean residents collaborated 
with the Axis.  Nazi occupation plans stated an ideal number of between 15,000-20,000 
Crimean Tatar collaborators, and scholars from Fisher to Roman’ko cite these numbers.  
Roman’ko details the careers of Crimean Tatar collaboration leaders such as Abdulla 
Karabash, a communist party turncoat who headed the most successful Crimean Tatar 
collaborationist battalion (nicknamed “Schuma”), edited the Crimean Tatar occupation 
newspaper Kirim, and was complicit in the Holocaust and the murder of former 
comrades.  In addition, he found the names of 13 Crimean Tatar officers that led 
battalions.49   
However, the collaborationist quota and reality were very different.  The Nazis 
strove to elicit mass collaboration numbers during the first months of occupation, even 
allowing the “Muslim Committees” to use the Bakchisarai Palace as a functional and 
symbolic headquarters of collaboration.  However, by February 15, 1942, the 13 
collaborationist “battalion leaders” working with the Muslim committees had only 
recruited 1,632 Crimean Tatar volunteers.  The Mullahs from Turkey found few Crimean 
Tatars willing to collaborate in exchange for the freedom of religious practice, and the 
Germans abandoned the effort in early 1943.  In order to find more men, German 
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authorities sent Crimean Tatar collaborators to search Soviet POW camps for “Crimean 
Tatar volunteers.”  This effort was essential because most working age Crimean Tatar 
males were in the Soviet armed forces.  The effort produced between 8,000 and 9,000 
“recruits,” and in no way met the goal of over 15,000.50  What is more, thousands of the 
recruits were old men or children that the occupation army later dismissed as unfit for 
service.  Anecdotal evidence also suggests that some of those assigned to the “Tatar 
brigades” were other Muslims and even non-Muslim Soviet POWs.  In some cases, 
occupation authorities filled whole “Tatar” brigades with Soviet prisoners from Central 
Asia, the Lower Volga, and Caucasus.51   
Despite Roman’ko’s exploration of Crimean, German, and documents of allied 
powers, he never presents proof of much more than 5,000 collaborators who actually 
fought for the Nazi army.  When the Nazis evacuated Crimea in early 1944, they took 
around 2,500 collaborators with them, and this number included all nationalities.52  So, 
where are all of the proposed traitors that defenders of the collaboration charge allege?  
They do not exist in any documents, and the only way to claim that the number was 
higher is by citing the around 5,000 firearms that the NKVD confiscated from Crimean 
Tatars during the deportation.53  The use of this figure as proof of collaboration is absurd 
because most of these weapons came from the thousands of Crimean Tatar soldiers 
deported from the peninsula.    
Beria and the NKVD recognized the failure of occupation authorities to reach 
their goal of 15,000-20,000 Crimean Tatar collaborators, and this failure determined how 
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they handled Crimean Tatars in 1944 and throughout special settlement.  To understand 
the phenomenon, scholars must make a clear distinction between the three different 
NKVD operations concerning Crimea and Crimean Tatars.  The first NKVD operation 
from April 11 to May 14 swept Crimea and arrested individuals actually suspected of 
treason.  The NKVD arrested 1,137 Crimean Tatars as “anti-Soviet elements.”  
Moreover, these figures are likely exaggerated.54  As Marina Sorokina argues, the NKVD 
had multiple reasons to fabricate charges against innocent Soviet citizens.55  While some 
of these arrests were for specific cases of active treason in collaborationist units, many 
were farm managers and village elders.56  The second operation, the deportation, lasted 
from May 17 until delivering deportees into special settlement by the end of June 1944.  
The NKVD soldiers cited the mass-treason charge as the reason for the operation, but 
their commanders understood that the first operation had already arrested collaborators.  
The third operation, led by the Special Settlement Division of the NKVD, was a final 
sweep of Crimean Tatars in special settlement to double-check if the initial sweep had 
missed any collaborators. This last sweep netted only a few dozen treason charges and 
did not support the claim of “mass treason.”57   
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Interestingly, Supreme Soviet documents show that Roman’ko was not the first 
historian to defend the mass collaboration charge with the same sources and unimpressive 
figures.  The first serious attempt came from a historian whose name appears in Supreme 
Soviet records as Vasilov.  Throughout the first half of 1967, Vasilov compiled material 
to support the mass treason charge on behalf of those who did not want Crimean Tatars 
returning to Crimea.  Vasilov based much of his argument on the fact that, at his 
Nuremburg Trial, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein testified that at the height of the 
battle with Crimean partisans in 1942, he had six active Tatar battalions and four more 
comprised of the police volunteers that could be sent to fight if needed.  Moreover, he 
claimed to have 300 to 800 men per battalion.  With an average of 500 men per battalion, 
the figures indicate around 5,000 people in total.  It is no surprise then that when 
Roman’ko scoured Manstein’s paper trail for collaborators he uncovered roughly the 
same number Vasilov cited and Manstein indicated at Nuremburg.58 
Regardless of what one believes about the exact numbers, everyone at the time, 
including Manstein himself, admitted that the collaboration effort failed to enlist the 
target numbers of 15,000 to 20,000 Crimean Tatars.59  Manstein and his regime 
succeeded at quickly alienating every ethnic group on the peninsula through their actions.  
As 1942 turned into 1943, the recruitment failure caused Germans to implement mass 
violence as the primary means of governing Crimea.  Many of the “volunteers” joining 
brigades were coerced from the beginning, and such coercion blossomed in 1943.  With 
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numbers not increasing, the SS executed Crimean Tatars such as Kandar Abbliakim to 
“encourage” what men remained in his village to “volunteer.”  In March 1943 alone, the 
SS executed 60 people to set an example.60 
Coercion quickly morphed into mass atrocity.61  Manstein was one of Hitler’s 
monstrous ideological commanders, and fought a war against the Soviets that did not 
follow “the European rules of war.”  He believed that the “Judeo-Bolshevik system” was 
the true enemy of the “Lebensraum” project, and that he should exterminate all hostile or 
uncooperative elements during the occupation.62  Soviet liberators found Crimean Tatar 
collective farms such as Al’minskii, Zales’e and Bodany to have been “destroyed by the 
German occupiers.”63  In the case of the Crimean Tatar sovkhozes of Tomak and Chotty, 
the occupation authorities pillaged the farms’ hardware and leveled homes.64  In 
retaliation for partisan actions and other infractions, the Gestapo carried out mass 
executions of Crimean kolkhoz workers.  One such massacre occurred in the village of 
Mangush on November 13, 1943, when Nazis shot over 150 people and buried them in a 
mass grave.  Of the 96 bodies identified after the war, 29 were Crimean Tatars.65  In 
January 1944, the Germans burnt down the Tatar villages of Argin, Baksan, and Kazal, 
along with the Russian villages of Efendikoi, Kutur, and Neiman, and most of the 
survivors joined with partisans in the mountains for the remainder of the war.  Between 
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December 1943 and January 1944 alone, the occupation authorities burned down 128 
Crimean Tatar villages.66  
 Soviet economic data confirms the destruction of Crimean agriculture, and thus 
the lively hood of 70% of the Crimean Tatar population, during the war.  With supplies 
destroyed or confiscated by the evacuating Soviets and occupation authorities, more than 
half of the previously cultivated land became fallow.67  As the Nazi destruction of 
Crimean Tatar and Russian villages and deportations of working-age individuals to the 
Reich accelerated in 1943, Crimean agriculture languished and harvests in Crimea 
declined by more than 80%.68  Nazis and partisans alike poached livestock and decimated 
herds.69  For the Nazis, failure of the collaboration regime meant brutal retribution and 
the requisition of what human and material resources remained in Crimea. 
 
Crimean Tatar Partisans 
 
 
The NKVD recognized the failure of Nazi collaboration efforts in 1942. In 
response, the Soviet armed forces promoted Crimean Tatars to top partisan positions in 
1943 in a calculated effort to take advantage of Nazi dysfunction.  Ramozan Kurt-
Ucherov had served as the head of resort construction for the Presidium of the Crimean 
ASSR until the war. Active in the underground, he became the commissar of the 17th 
partisan unit of the 6th Crimean Brigade on June 16, 1943, and led the unit until being 
wounded on February 13, 1944.70  In similar fashion, Mustafa Selimov, the First 
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Secretary of the Yalta Party until the invasion, became a commissar of a unit in the 
United Southern Front of Crimean Partisans in June 1943, and served until liberation.71  
In the meantime, Seit-Ali Ametov became commissar for the 9th partisan division until 
liberation.72  With his family safely evacuated to the Dagestan ASSR, Refat Mustafaev 
led another partisan group outside the city of Alushta.73 
Crimean Tatar partisan leaders such as Abdulla Dagzhy (who acquired the 
nickname “Uncle Vova”) raided occupation supply and communications infrastructure.  
The female Crimean Tatar partisan Alima Abduennanova led the sabotage group “Sofia.” 
Other Crimean Tatar men and women such as Aishe Karaeva, Khatidzhe Chapchakchi, 
Server Syrly and Tairov Iusyf joined the uptick in partisan and underground efforts.74  
Sixteen-year-old Akhmet Osmanovich Koliak ran away from home to join a unit in 
1943.75 
The Soviet armed forces also arranged for the infiltration of Crimean Tatars from 
the Red Army into occupied Crimea to assist their comrades.  When the war began, 
Romazan Gafarovich joined the regular Red Army and survived his first two years on the 
front.  In 1943, partisan coordinators recalled him from the regular army and dropped him 
into Crimea.  He served as a regular partisan before commanding his own unit as the 
Soviet liberation began, receiving commendations for his service.76  Dzheppar 
Kolesnikov also had served in the Red Army for the first two years, in his case as a 
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political commissar.  He infiltrated Crimea in the summer of 1943, becoming the 
commissar of the Third Partisan Brigade of the United Eastern Front of Crimean 
Partisans, fighting until liberation.77   
The party awarded Crimean Tatar partisans for their service, and continued to do 
so just before and even after the deportation.  For example, a list of 180 Crimean 
partisans that the Crimean communist party produced after the deportation includes 14 
Crimean Tatars and several other Crimean minorities. Party lists show Ali Ibraimov 
received a medal on September 1, 1944, and Khamedul Akhmetov received a medal on 
May 8, 1944.78  Abdul Khairulla received a medal during the April 29-30, 1944, awards 
ceremonies, while the May 10, 1944, ceremony awarded Tul Urmatov and Memet 
Molochnikhov the Red Star Commendation for partisan service.79  Confirming this uptick 
in Crimean Tatar partisans after Mokrousov’s removal, historian N. F. Bugai found that 
Soviet partisan coordinators reported that 630 out of 3,783 (or 17%) of Crimean partisans 
were Crimean Tatars.80 
 In the decades after the war, surviving Crimean Tatar partisan fighters identified 
themselves with pride in protest letters to Moscow.  In a 1967 letter, Izzet Khairullaev 
signed as a “former partisan commissar,” while Ava Musliu Mova signed as a “decorated 
female partisan” and Mussemma Garfurova as a “female partisan.”81  In fact, after the 
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Soviet Union officially denounced Stalin’s lie in 1967, the Crimean Tatar paper in 
Uzbekistan, Lenin Bayragi, published a confirmation of Crimean Tatar partisan service.82   
 
Providing Evidence to Support Stalin’s False Allegations 
 
 
As Soviet writers began producing wartime narratives for public consumption 
after 1945, Soviet leaders made sure that accounts of the war in Crimea confirmed 
Stalin’s false allegations of Crimean Tatar treason.  To lead this effort, Crimean party 
leaders turned to individuals who had incentive to champion such allegations.  In 
particular, The Crimean 1st party Secretary, V. Bulatov, sought assistance from partisans 
who could identify and falsify the wartime accounts of specific Crimean Tatars, villages, 
and partisan engagements.  Their goal was to take isolated instances of Crimean Tatar 
treason and construct a compelling narrative of Crimean Tatar mass treason.83   
First, Bulatov sought out A. N. Mokrousov, a disgraced Russian partisan leader 
that Moscow had removed in 1942 after the partisan collapse. When the Crimean Partisan 
movement began, Moscow had appointed Mokrousov and A. V. Martynov to organize 
partisan actions (Mokrousov had been a successful partisan fighter during the revolution).  
By the end of 1942, the Gestapo had decimated both the general partisan movement and 
the underground.  In the summer of 1942, as the occupation forces were pressing their 
assault on partisans, Mokrousov and Martynov alleged to Marshal Budenny that the 
“overwhelming majority” of Crimean Tatars in mountainous regions were “following the 
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fascists.”  These accusations came after Mokrousov had lost control of several Crimean 
Tatar partisan units who continued to attack Axis forces outside of Alushsta.  Under 
Mokrousov’s command, partisan activities were often little more than the mass robbery 
of village livestock and foodstuffs, causing serious public relations problems.84  Many 
Crimean Tatar partisans did not condone Mokrousov’s tactics to solve supply issues and 
claim that he often ordered Crimean Tatar partisans to rob their own villages.85   
As the quarrel escalated, Mokrusov accused Crimean Tatar partisans of deserting 
to the Nazis and the bad blood devolved into an ugly situation by the late spring of 1942.  
When occupation forces destroyed several Crimean Tatar villages for providing men and 
supplies to partisans, several hundred Crimean Tatars civilians and a number of Crimean 
Tatar partisans took to the forest and sought to join Mokrousov’s partisans.  According to 
both Crimean Tatar accounts and the account of a Russian partisan, A. Ia. Olekha, 
Mokrousov refused to join with the groups and left the Crimean Tatars to be hunted and 
executed by the Gestapo.  These victims included prominent Crimean Tatar leaders such 
as Abdurefi Seyt-Iagi (the former president of the Crimean ASSR Supreme Soviet), Asan 
Seferov, and Nuri Asmanov.  Other allegations against Mokrusov and Martinov include 
reprisals against Russian and Tatar villagers who aided Crimean Tatar partisans not under 
his control.86  Crimean Tatars and the Crimean Obkom countered Mokrusov by providing 
evidence that Crimean Tatar villagers had aided partisan infiltration efforts throughout 
1942.  Even Manstein himself recalled fighting sixteen Crimean Tatar partisan brigades 
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of around one hundred men each at the height of the anti-partisan campaign in 1942.87  
Mokrusov’s failure to sustain partisan efforts angered Crimean Tatar partisans and even 
other Russian partisans, and displeased Moscow.88   
The partisan failure was the result of a sustained anti-partisan campaign by the 
Nazis and supply issues.  Collaborators did aid the Nazis, but this collaboration included 
all Crimean ethnicities and mirrored the situation in all regions the Nazis occupied.  
Furthermore, partisan failures were sometimes the sole fault of partisans themselves.  In 
one unfortunate incident, Timofei Kaplun, the Commissar of the Karasubazar partisan 
division, got so drunk with the Sudak partisan commander one evening that their 
merrymaking revealed their position to a nearby Romanian patrol.89  Moscow never 
bought his excuse, removing both Mokrousov and Martynov from their positions.90  As 
already discussed, part of the correction to the failure was placing more Crimean Tatars, 
both partisans already on the peninsula and those infiltrated in, into leadership positions.  
Crafting a wartime narrative in Crimea to fit Stalin’s allegation became 
Mokrousov’s ticket back into Moscow’s good graces. After the deportation, both the 
KPSS and Crimean party renounced the earlier dismissal of Mokrousov and declared 
that, in fact, his allegations of Crimean Tatar mass treason were right after all.  The party 
then appointed him the director of the excursion and tourism division for the Crimean 
branch of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (hereafter VTsSPS).  
Mokrousov’s primary job was to promote historical texts and accounts of the war that 
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defamed Crimean Tatars.91  In excursion texts approved by Mokrousov, excursion writers 
declared that Crimean Tatars had always been “enemies of the Russian people and the 
proletarian revolution,” repeated verbatim Stalin’s accusation of treason, and proclaimed 
that the war in Crimea had been against both “fascists and Tatar traitors.”92  Crimean 
publishing houses in Simferopol soon repeated these lines, as with the 1949 “Crimean 
Almanac” that described all Crimean Tatars as “lazy,” “parasitic,” and “traitorous.”93   
Being a tour operator tasked with the assignment of creating the evidence of 
Crimean Tatar mass treason meant changing thousands of wartime facts.   Moreover, 
even in the Stalinist Soviet Union, falsifying history caused problems.  As is evident in a 
correspondence between Mokrousov and his bosses, Moscow was nervous because 
Crimean materials were claiming “all Crimean Tatars were traitors since the very 
beginning of the war.”94  The reason for Moscow’s apprehension was simple.  As 
discussed earlier, in 1943 and 1944 the Soviet armed forced had infiltrated Crimean 
Tatars into Crimea as partisans.  Why would Soviet generals have done this if Crimean 
Tatars were all collaborating?  Moreover, as displayed in the Soviet documents discussed 
earlier in this paper, evidence that Crimean Tatars were not mass collaborators is 
overwhelming.  
Subsequently, the most important part of Mokrousov’s job became getting 
Russian and Ukrainian Crimean partisans to write personal narratives of the war that 
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supported Stalin’s allegation Crimean Tatars.  In 1949, Mokrousov tapped Russian 
partisan commander Il’ia Vergasov to pen his experiences for use in the Crimean tourism 
industry and historical publications.  Thus began the career of the Soviet Union’s most 
virulently anti-Crimean Tatar writer who presented the false allegations of mass treason 
to the Soviet public for decades to come.    In a 1971 publication, he would go so far as to 
brag about personally leveling Crimean Tatar villages in revenge for their alleged 
collaboration.  However, Vergasov manufactured his anti-Tatar zeal after a lengthy 
editing process with Mokrousov that changed his memories to fit Stalin’s charges.  The 
VTsSPS archives saved the paper trail of this process and underline that Vergasov’s first 
attempt to record the history of Crimean resistance was very different from his later 
publications.   
Vergasov’s first 55-page account of Crimean partisan warfare, written in 1949, is 
the most extraordinary document on partisan warfare in Crimea.  The document does not 
provide any evidence of overwhelming Crimean Tatar collaboration.  It does the 
opposite, echoing the complicated reasons for partisan failure, the participation of 
Crimean Tatars in the Crimean underground and partisans, the collaboration of small 
numbers of both Slavic and Muslim Crimeans, and even confirms Manstein’s failure at 
filling Tatar brigades.95  He lists partisan units he commanded from Crimean Tatar 
mountain villages such as Kacha-Biiuk and Uzen.  He said that even during the worst of 
the German onslaught in 1942 Crimean Tatar and Russian villagers still helped them.  In 
fact, he kept his headquarters in the Tatar village of Laki.  There were villagers that the 
Germans had collected into “volunteer” units, but that many of the villagers were on their 
                                                





side.  He even claimed that some members of the local “Muslim Committee” were 
assisting their operation.  Other Tatar villages such as Chair, Makur and Stil provided 
food and treated wounded partisans.  Moreover, Vergasov described how his partisan 
units had nominal control over the Crimean Tatar villages of Beshui, Sabil, and Uzenbash 
and credited the villagers with “not allowing the Germans to operate” on their territory.96 
While Vergasov discussed collaboration, he gave no blanket condemnation of 
Crimean Tatars.  Out of the four individual traitors that he executed, three were Russians 
(one his own partisan), and one Crimean Tatar.  On collaborationist adversaries, he 
remembered fighting recruits from the Russian Liberation Army (ROA).  He described 
the cooperation of some Tatars not as mass, but rather coming from some “elements,” 
mainly “reactionaries and nationalists” from the “old order of mountain villages” that had 
housed resistance to Soviet power in 1918.    While attributing some issues to treason, he 
indicated that the general partisan failure was organizational, especially with their supply 
dumps.  The Axis troops used this oversight to their advantage, leaving the partisans 
undersupplied and isolated in mountainous regions.  This assessment corresponds with 
the evidence that Mokrousov simply lost control of many partisan brigades as the enemy 
pressed their assault from December 1941 through much of 1942.97 
The most stunning revelation, especially given Vergasov’s later accounts, is that 
he confirmed the failure of the occupation forces to illicit mass collaboration of Crimean 
Tatars through the Muslim Committees and brigades of Tatar “self-defense units.”  He 
admitted that when some villages were surrounded by German forces they might “help” 
Germans.  However, he scoffed at the German effort of organizing Tatar brigades:  






“Volunteer units were formed, under the holy Muslim Committee that was based in the 
Bakchisarai palace. All of this, of course, was a myth and later the Germans dissolved the 
committee.”  Taken as a whole, Vergasov’s summary of Crimean partisan warfare aligns 
with NKVD documents and Crimean Tatar accounts.  But why did his account 
fundamentally change in the coming decades?   
The answer is simple.  Mokrousov took the transcript of Vergasov’s account and, 
with a pen, removed the positive information on Crimean Tatar service and the parts 
addressing the failed Nazi efforts to create robust Crimean Tatar collaboration, and added 
fabricated accounts of collaboration.98  This is just one document, but the man who would 
become the most prominent partisan writer providing evidence of Crimean Tatar treason, 
wrote it.  Moreover, the Crimean partisan commander who not only created the myth of 
Crimean Tatar mass collaboration, but also had the job of popularizing the myth, 
censored it.  As Mokrousov and his staff edited partisan accounts to exaggerate Crimean 
Tatar collaboration, they established a body of work that by the early 1950s, in the words 
of Crimean Tatar activists, “systematically poisoned the consciences of Soviet citizens 
that travel to Crimea for treatment and relaxation with the shameful accounts in excursion 
guides, tourist materials, and racist and nationalistic books.”99   
The falsified accounts of Vergasov and Mokrousov’s other writers became very 
specific.  For example, in lectures and his 1959 book, In the Mountains of Tavridia: 
Notes of a Partisan (V Gorakh Tavrii: Zapiski Partizana), Vergasov singled out the 
decorated partisan Bekir Osmanov and claimed that instead of being a loyal Soviet, 
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Vergasov executed Osmanov as a traitor.100   False allegations as specific as the one 
against Bekir Osmanov are easy to expose with archival evidence and border on comical.  
Osmanov was a partisan leader and the KPSS recognized his service in 1943 and in 1944 
during a formal ceremony along with other Crimean partisan leaders.  Osmanov received 
these commendations after Vergasov had “executed” him “for treason.”101  Osmanov was 
still alive and a party member in the 1960s and became so incensed that he traveled to 
Crimea to confront Vergasov in-person and wrote letters to the Supreme Soviet.102   
These efforts failed, and Vergasov’s 1971 book, Krymskie tetradi (Crimean Notebooks), 
continued the charade.103   
Together, Mokrousov and Vergasov established the tone and method for 
exculpating Crimean Tatars from the Crimean partisan effort, and they attacked both 
Crimean Tatar individuals and the ethnic group as a whole.  Denying that Crimean Tatars 
participated in the Red Army, partisans and received medals was essential.   When the 
Crimean publisher “Krymizdat” published a collection of stories of “Hero of the Soviet 
Union” winners who were born in Crimea, only one Crimean Tatar (two-time Hero of the 
Soviet Union Akhmet Sultan) was among the 46 included.  Crimean Tatar activists 
savaged this publication, correctly noting that Abduraim Reshitov, Abdul Treifuk, Bekir 
Mustafaevich, Seitnafe Seitveliev, Uzeir Abduramanov and 11 other Crimean Tatars 
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received the medal.104  Their exclusion from such publications was intentional and 
persistent until the late 1980s.   
As Uehling notes in her interviews with Crimean Tatars, Russians, and 
Ukrainians, after 1944 the Soviet press excelled at fusing the charges of mass treason 
with the “negative stereotypes” of Crimean Tatars as Muslims from the “East” who the 
Soviet government could not be trusted.105  Mokrousov’s early work with VTsSPS was 
just the beginning of the process, and chapter 4 will underline how the VTsSPS and 
academics created a much larger anti-Tatar narrative for public consumption once they 
had established the basic treason charges.    
 
A Legacy of Falsehoods 
 
Stalin ordered Crimean officials and Slavic partisans to create a narrative of 
Crimean Tatar mass treason in order to justify his geopolitical project in Crimea.  Since 
the early days of the Crimean ASSR, Stalin had disliked Crimean Tatar autonomy and the 
war gave him an opportunity to change the political and demographic landscape of one of 
the Soviet Union’s most strategic regions.  However, the fact that Soviet officials had to 
create false evidence reveals that they were nervous about such blatant lies.  As this 
chapter has demonstrated, Soviet documents from the NKVD, MVD, military, and other 
Soviet organs counter Stalin’s allegations and support the Crimean Tatar argument by 
providing individual examples of Crimean Tatar wartime experiences and rough 
estimates of service totals.  Moreover, the Soviet archives reveal that Moscow understood 
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the failures of the Nazi occupation regime in Crimea to create a robust collaborationist 
army.  The Soviet armed forces reacted by bolstering Crimean Tatar partisans in Crimea 
in 1943.  To reiterate, this evidence comes from the state that charged and punished the 
entire nation with mass treason.  However, with direct order from Moscow, Mokrousov, 
Vergasov and Crimean officials supported Stalin’s ethnic cleansing by framing the myth 
of Crimean Tatar mass collaboration in the narrative of Crimean liberation and fascist 
defeat.   As this study will discuss in chapter 4, by the early 1950s the Crimean historians 
adopted these treason stories as part of their larger anti-Tatar historical narrative. 
However, because the myth of Crimean Tatar mass treason was absurd, the charge 
became difficult to sustain after his death.  As the rest of this study also highlights, after 
the initial atrocity Crimean Tatars in special settlement could still navigate the Soviet 
state to achieve a form of social mobility.  They remained or became Komsomol 
members and KPSS members, as well as demanded pensions and even voted in the 1946 
Soviet elections.  At the forefront of this group were Crimean Tatar veterans such as 
Bekir Osmanov who would begin petitioning for rehabilitation only a month after 
deportation.   
These veterans became the vanguard of the Crimean Tatar resistance and protest 
movement for full rehabilitation and return to Crimea. They cited their indisputable 
service during the war to demand the attention of the Soviet state, and many dedicated 
their lives to attacking Stalin’s false allegation of mass treason.  As the following 
chapters argue, it was largely through their efforts that the Crimean Tatar return 
movement became the longest, largest, and most organized protest movement in the 




Soviet comrades.  As Amir Weiner argues, the war produced “an assertive Soviet 
individual who held tight to his (and it was mostly his and not hers) newly earned-in-
blood right to define his identity.”  As the next chapters elucidate, Crimean Tatars took 
this assertiveness further than most and expanded their assertive wartime identity to the 
nation as a whole.106 
Simultaneous to this resistance, belief in the treason charges became the defining 
dogma of the postwar Crimean communist party and government.  As the following 
chapters highlight, new Crimean officials and residents argued that the expulsion of 
“treasonous” Crimean Tatars from the peninsula was essential to the larger project of 
creating a “new Russian Crimea” and sustaining the postwar status-quo after the 1956 
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 The Bureaucratic Genocide of Crimean Tatars 
 
 
 From May 1944 to the summer of 1946, the Soviet state committed bureaucratic 
genocide against Crimean Tatars, killing between 40,000 to 60,000 people, or around one 
fourth of the prewar Crimean Tatar population.  Haphazard special settlement plans, 
intra-ministry fights, late trains, stolen food, conflicting orders, cruel individuals and a 
plethora of other bureaucratic issues caused mass death through exposure, disease and 
starvation.  The Soviet bureaucracy, from mundane agricultural ministries to factory 
directors, killed Crimean Tatars and share guilt with Stalin and his captains.  This fact is 
significant for explaining how the mass death occurred and why some Crimean Tatars 
died, while others survived.   
Out of all the aspects of Crimean ethnic cleansing that Crimean Tatars resisted 
from 1944 to 1991, nothing was harder to overcome than the demographic and 
geographic implications of this displacement and mass death.  At the same time, this sea 
change in Crimean Tatar history was a collective trauma, and survivors created a 
decades-long protest movement that both condemned and sought to reverse all the aspects 
of Crimean ethnic cleansing.   
The goal of this chapter is to explain how mass death unfolded once Stalin put his 
deportation plan into motion. This chapter’s first section explains the terminology 
surrounding Crimean ethnic cleansing, and places the Crimean Tatar story into the larger 




while the third section explores how Soviet bureaucracy implemented the plan, creating 
inhumane conditions.  Finally, the fourth section documents the peak of mass death in 
special settlement.   
 
Crimean Tatars, Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide 
 
For most of the Cold War, the Western discussion of genocide was self-centered, 
including only those crimes, as Samantha Power states, in which the U.S. could 
“influence the killers.”1  However, since the end of the Cold War historians have 
reconsidered the motivation, planning, and outcomes of numerous twentieth-century 
atrocities, and placed them into the academic debates surrounding genocide.  These 
debates often focus on the “intent” of the guilty party.  Some of the debated Soviet crimes 
that closely resemble the mass death of Crimean Tatars include the deaths of Kulaks and 
special settlers during Stalin’s collectivization, other ethnic deportations during World 
War II, the Ukrainian “Kholodomor,” and the Kazakh and other Soviet famines.2  A non-
Soviet example would be the 1945 Czechoslovakian-led “population transfers.”3  
Although debates over the above events continue, the language of crimes against 
                                                
1 In A Problem From Hell, Powers does not include the Soviet ethnic cleansing of ethnic minorities in her 
discussion that includes crimes affecting Armenians, European Jews, Cambodians, Rawandans, Kurds, 
Bosnians, and others.  This is unfortunate because Soviet Crimes, as she points out, strongly influenced the 
father of the term, Ralph Lemkin: see Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of 
Genocide (New York: Pereninial/Harper Collins, 2002), xv-xvii, 21.  Sure enough, Norman Naimark points 
out that had Lemkin’s insistence on including crimes committed by states against their own citizens, this 
would have implicated both the Soviet Union and United States. Norman Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides, 17. 
2 For example, while there are strong opposing opinions that the Ukrainian famine was either intentional or 
accidental/unavoidable, the truth probably lies closer to Michael Ellman’s assertion that some deaths were 
intentional, while others were accidental.  In contrast, Nicolo Pianciola convincingly argues that the 
Kazakh famine was largely unintentional: see Michael Ellman, “The Role of Leadership Perceptions and 
Intent in the Soviet Famine of 1931-1934,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 57, No. 6, September 2005, 823-841 
and Pianciola, Nicolo, “Famine in the Steppe,” Cahiers du monde russe, 45, 1-2, 2004. On the experience 
of Kulak special settlers, see Lynn Viola, The Unknown Gulag: The Lost World of Stalin’s Special 
Settlements (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
3  On Czechoslovakian “population transfers,” see Chad Bryant, Prague in Black: Nazi Rule and Czech 




humanity, which developed in response to twentieth century atrocities, frames these 
discussions. 
When this study began, I first described Stalin’s solution for Crimean Tatars as 
“ethnic cleansing.”  I hesitated at using “genocide” as an unqualified noun because Soviet 
historian Norman Naimark qualifies Stalin’s Crimean Tatar policy as “ethnic cleansing” 
and “cultural genocide.”   Naimark asserts that Stalin’s plan did not require the 
extermination of Crimean Tatars as individuals, just as a nation and social/political entity.   
Stalin sent such “enemy nations” into exile “with the idea that they would disappear 
through a combination of attrition, permanent removal from their homelands, and 
assimilation into their new surroundings.”4     
However, as my research continued, the decision not to use the term “genocide” 
became uncomfortable for several reasons.  First off, Naimark’s work focuses on motive 
and commonalities between crimes, only glancing over the means, methods, and 
outcomes of specific crimes.5   Also, just because Stalin’s plan did not require total 
extermination, the process and result of killing a large percentage of one ethnic group and 
removing them from their homeland is a similar outcome to many other atrocities that 
historians now consider genocide.   Most importantly, Crimean Tatars began using the 
term “genocide” and the Tatar term “Sergun” as early as the late 1950s to characterize the 
crime.6  Certainly “ethnic cleansing” describes the physical removal of Tatars from 
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Crimea and the other elements of Stalin’s project that this study details, but it does not 
indicate how or why Crimean Tatars died en masse.  
Eventually, a paper trail of Soviet documents made it apparent that Stalin, 
Molotov, and Beria realized their plan was sentencing tens of thousands of people to 
death because they knew how the Soviet state would implement the plan.7  They knew 
that trains would run early or late, food and supplies would not be delivered, housing 
would not be ready, and that individuals along the way would exacerbate the problems 
because Stalin had declared the deportees to be a nation of traitors.  They knew medical 
assistance in the Uzbek SSR would be sparse.  In particular, food and supplies organs 
such as the Central Commission for Worker’s Supply (hereafter “Narkomtorg”), the 
Central Commission for Meat and Milk (hereafter “Narkom MMP”) and the Central 
Commission for Provisions (hereafter “Narkomzag”) ensured mass death by refusing the 
NKVD’s requests to feed special settlers and ensuring that the rations special settlers 
received were as pitiful as possible.  Even when food did arrive or housing was available, 
abusive factory and farm directors condemned people to death.  In short, every influential 
Soviet official involved with Crimean Tatars expected that the “resettlement” plan would 
not work until a substantial number of deportees were dead.  By 1944, Stalin and the 
Soviet state understood that deporting “enemy nations” created mass death and knew how 
                                                                                                                                            
Naimark does not mention that Crimean Tatar historians, and even some Soviet dissidents such as Grigorii 
Aleksandrov, began referring to Stalin’s crime against them as genocide as early as the late 1950s. See, 
Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides, 96-97.  On the use of Nuremburg trial transcripts and how these documents 
came to Tashkent in the 1950s and were used by Crimean Tatars and Soviet dissidents, see GARF, f. 
10148, op. 1, d. 26, l.l. 1-7.  “Stat’ia Ali Khamzina, interv’iu posvishennye pamiata G. M. Aleksandrov.  
June 5, 2003.  By the mid-1960s, Crimean Tatar activists used GENOCIDE, in all-caps and bolded, in both 
petitions to the Soviet government and in samizdat.  For example, see GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 447. l. 69. 
Info # 71, June 17 to July 1, 1968. 
7 Molotov in particular had “increased responsibilities” from 1941-1945: see Oleg Khlevniuk (trans. Nora 





to ignore and conceal the mass death, while at the same time finding scapegoats to blame.   
The crime was inefficient and sloppy, but such was Soviet bureaucracy. 
At the same time, Stalin planned on some Crimean Tatars surviving.  One 
paradox of the crime is that, while the NKVD was the main offending state organ, 
Stalin’s decrees, no matter how unrealistic, ordered the NKVD to keep special settlers 
alive in exile.  No matter how cynical one is about the NKVD, the leadership of the 
Special Settlers Division did try to secure food needed for Crimean Tatar survival.  This 
was their job.  While many of the following NKVD and MVD documents are biased 
towards Stalin’s police and blame the mass death on other ministries, all accounts of the 
mass death confirm that some special settler authorities prevented death from becoming 
worse.  Therein lay the uniqueness of Stalinist bureaucratic genocide.  There was always 
a “plan” for some survivors so it is impossible to conclude that Stalin intended to kill all 
members of any given group.  However, Stalin and his bureaucracy knew that his policies 
created mass death and only worked after a substantial percentage of any deported group 
was dead.  
In sum, the mass death of Crimean Tatars from May 1944 to 1946 was 
bureaucratic genocide, a genocide that the entire Soviet bureaucracy, in a collective 
effort, created and implemented.  This crime was the first and most important component 
of the larger ethnic cleansing campaign in Crimea that had the primary goal of removing 
Crimean Tatars as individuals and a nation from the peninsula.  The rest of this chapter 
explores how the event unfolded, from Stalin down to individual Crimean Tatars and 
Uzbek factory and farm directors. 
 






 Stalin’s intent to ethnically cleanse Crimea is indisputable.  GOKO* order 5859ss 
on May 11, 1944, proclaimed that during World War II “many Crimean Tatars” had 
deserted, betrayed Soviet partisans, or volunteered for the Third Reich Tatar brigades.  As 
a result, Stalin ordered the NKVD to deport all Crimean Tatars to the Uzbek SSR as 
“special settlers.”  The six-page order assigned the roles of various Soviet organs in the 
deportation process, leaving no doubt that Stalin sought the total ethnic cleansing of 
Crimean Tatars from their homeland.8   
 Order 5859ss did not specify the actual date of deportation as May 17-18, but 
required Beria to have completed the Crimean phase of the “project” by June 1, 1944. 
Beria and Ivan Serov approved many of the crucial decisions of the Crimean deportation 
and worked with Kaganovich on transportation logistics.  Together, they decided the 
number of convoys, their sizes, timetables, the train stations of arrival and departure, and 
arranged the motor transport to and from the stations.  Moreover, as this chapter 
highlights, Stalin gave much of the final say on questions about the project to Molotov, 
and he and Beria would disagree on critical points.9 
Once on the train convoys, the immediate future of Crimean Tatars was in the 
hands of the MVD, NKVD, the local authorities in the regions of special settlements, and 
the various Soviet organs tasked with providing supplies.  From Moscow, Molotov, Beria 
and Vasily Chernyshev (head of the NKVD’s special settler commission) oversaw the 
plan. In the Uzbek SSR, Amaiak Kobulov (Uzbek NKVD Commissar), Abdudzhabar 
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Abdurakhmanov (the head of the Uzbek Sovnarkom), and Usman Iusupov (the Uzbek 
Central Committee Secretary) organized the intake of deportees.10  While en route, Stalin 
ordered Narkomtorg to provide hot water and one hot meal a day, and Narkomzdrav (the 
health ministry) to provide a doctor, two nurses, and medical supplies for each convoy.11  
Food supplies organs were supposed to provide deportees with 500 grams of bread, 70 
grams of meat or fish, 60 grams of grain, and 10 grams of fat a day.12   
In Uzbek oblasts receiving Crimean Tatars, the head of the local NKVD and local 
party and Soviet bosses were supposed to form commissions of three (troikas) to oversee 
the process and create similar troikas on the district level.  These bodies first had to 
arrange vehicle transport for Tatars to farms and factories.  Once at the new 
“settlements,” the troikas had to provide housing or land plots, building materials and 
construction workers.  For security, Beria dispatched extra NKVD officers already 
experienced in deporting ethnic “fifth columns” to Central Asia in 1943.13  The NKVD 
required every 350 families to be guarded by one NKVD commandant with an assistant 
and in locations with more than 350 families, an addition of 250 families required an 
extra commandant would be added.   Each commandant commanded three to seven 
regular NKVD soldiers.14   
 
                                                
10 Chernyshev was a policing expert and GULAG boss during the war: see Anne Applebaum, GULAG: A 
History (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), 260. 
11 GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l.l. 88-93. Gosudarstvennyi komitet oborony postanovlenia GOKO No. 
5859ss ot 11 maia 1944 “O Krymskikh Tatarakh.”   
12 To pay for the project, Stalin provided the NKVD with 30 million rubles from the Sovnarkom reserve 
fund. GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l. 94. Vedomost’ vydeleniia produktov Narkomtorgu SSSR dlia 
pitaniia spetspereselentsev v puti sledovaniia- prilozhenye No. 1 k Postanovleniiu GOKO No. 5859ss ot 11 
maia 1944.   
13 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1s, 179, l. 2.  Zam. NKVD SSSR Komissar Gosbezopasn. 2 Ranga Chernyshov- 
NKVD Uzb. SSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti  3 ranga Kobulov. May 12, 1944. 
14 GARF f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l.l. 33-34. NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov 







The actual removal of Crimean Tatars from Crimea was brutal and quick.  On 
May 9, 1944, 19 year-old NKVD soldier A. Vesnin and his squadron arrived in Crimea at 
the Dzhanskoi train station and then drove to Kerch.  Their commanding officers gave 
them no official reason for their deployment, but a rumor spread that Beria was sending 
them to fight “brigades of Nazi Tatar-volunteers.”  In Kerch, the NKVD regulars 
patrolled the surrounding hills, only to find no traitors.  Then, on May 15, Vesnin’s 
squadron drove to the Lenin regional center and awaited orders.  Finally, in the early 
morning hours of May 18, commanders rushed the squadron out of bed, ordered the 
soldiers to grab their weapons, and loaded them onto lorries.  The convoy flew across the 
steppe, arriving at the Crimean Tatar village of Oisul around 3:30am.  As Vesnin recalls, 
only upon arrival did the officers announce that the operation was in fact the deportation 
of Crimean Tatars.  They loaded their weapons and officers divided the men into groups 
of three with each group headed by a sergeant or a Kerch NKVD operative.15  At 4:00 am 
the groups burst into Crimean Tatar homes and announced a scripted declaration: “In the 
name of Soviet authority!  For treason against your motherland you are being relocated to 
a different region of the Soviet Union!”  The NKVD gave families two hours to collect 
200 kg of belongings, not the 500 kg that Stalin’s order stipulated.  The transportation of 
the entire village to the closest train station, Sem’ Kolodezei, was made in one trip with 
new Ford and Studebaker trucks.  According to Vesnin, most NKVD soldiers carried out 
the operation mechanically, but there were also “revolting” acts of cruelty.  One old 
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woman in Oisul was so overcome with “shock and grief” that she fled into a field and, 
instead of retrieving her, a soldier “cut her down with a burst of machinegun fire.”  
Another soldier “dragged an invalid to the Ford by his hair.”16  
 Crimean Tatars confirm the basics of Vesnin’s account.  Tenzila Ibraimova 
recalled that the NKVD woke them at 3:00 am in the village of Adzhiatman.  With her 
husband in the Soviet army, she alone gathered her children in five minutes.17  Sanzika 
Ibragimova recalled that the NKVD burst through their door at 3:00 am and gave them 
five minutes to get dressed, not allowing them to collect food.  From their village of 
Adzhiatmak in the Fraidorfskogo district, the NKVD transported Sanzika and her three 
children to the train station in Evpatoria.  Tenzila’s and Sanzika’s situation of being alone 
with their children was common because, as Chapter One underlined, most Tatar families 
had husbands who were fighting or had been killed in action.18  Other accounts point to 
times as early as 2:00am.19 
Nearly 160,000 Crimean Tatars were en route to seven different Uzbek SSR 
oblasts by May 20.  Tashkent oblast was expecting 61,000 Crimean Tatars, followed by 
Samarkand oblast (37,500), Ferghana oblast (25,700), Namagan oblast (20,000), Andijan 
oblast (21,500), Kashka-Darin oblast (10,200), and Bukhara oblast (4,100).20  In these 
seven oblasts, Uzbek authorities planned to resettle 94,500 deportees to kolkhozes, 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
17 Nekrich, The Punished Peoples, 110-111. 
18 HU OSA, Sobranie Dokumentov Samizdata (hereafter SDS) AC No. 1877, pg. 18. “Obrashchenie 
krymskotatarskogo naroda k XXIII s”ezdu KPSS.” 1968. 
19 Nekrich, The Punished Peoples, 110-111. 
20 GARF f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l.l. 24-27. May 20, 1944.  Sekretar’ TsK KP(b) Uzkekistana U. Iusupov and 




36,300 to sovkhozes, and 23,200 to industrial sites.21  They based this distribution on 
labor needs, the availability of housing, and the order to disperse the population thinly 
across the republic for the duel purposes of security and destroying the Crimean Tatar 
nation by isolating Tatars from each other.22  
In addition, the NKVD deported around 32,000 Crimean Tatars to Russian 
oblasts.  Documents reveal that this was an effort to both separate much of the Crimean 
Tatar political and party elite from the majority of Crimean Tatars and to place party 
members, skilled workers, and veterans into useful positions.  These Crimean Tatars were 
concentrated in Molotov oblast (10,002), Mariin ASSR (8,597), Gorki oblast (5,514), 
Sverdlov oblast (3,591) and Ivanov oblast (2,800).23  Smaller numbers also ended up in 
Iaroslavl’ oblast and several other regions.24  
The NKVD fully understood the conditions that awaited Crimean Tatars in their 
journey to exile.  Before the trek began, commanders circulated a questionnaire for all 
NKVD soldiers to ask when they unloaded Crimean Tatars.  While the first questions 
were basic information, question eight bluntly asked how many people died per family 
during the journey.  Since the NKVD knew what age groups would die first, questions 
nine and ten asked for the totals of deceased children and elderly and requested the cause 
of death.  The eleventh question then inquired about how many family members required 
hospitalization after the journey and what ailment each individual had.  Finally, 
                                                
21 GARF f. 9479, op. 1s, 179, l. 29. May 1944.  NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. 
Kobulov- Beria.  
22 GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 5-9. 25.IV.1944 Tashkent NKVD, Polkovnik Gosbezopasnosti 
Mal’ytsev and Podpolkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Maslennikov- V. V. Vhernyshov. (sekretno) 
23 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 67. Spravka- O sostave I kolichestve vyselennykh iz Kryma 
spetspereselentsev.”  By Zam. Nach. Otdela Spets. NKVD SSSR Polkovnik Mal’tsev. July 1, 1944. 
24 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 63.  Zam. Nach. UNKVD Iaroblasti Podpolkovnik Nemirovskii i Nach. 




indicating the general chaos of moving a whole nation in a week’s time, the fifteenth 
question asked how many people were “left along the way.”25  
 As expected, conditions quickly deteriorated on the convoys and upon arrival.  
Several aspects of the unloading and resettlement plan accelerated the crisis.  First off, it 
is important to realize just how haphazard the process was on the Uzbek side. Beria 
deported Crimean Tatars on May 17-18, and only two days later, on May 20, Uzbek 
officials were required to provide Beria with a list of oblasts, districts, and train stations 
“ready” to receive special settlers.  Next, while the NKVD and supply organs were 
supposed to take steps to avoid starvation and illness on convoys, most convoys never 
received rations.  In addition, Stalin had ordered the Uzbek NKVD to establish kitchens 
along the Tashkent railroad and stipulated that deportees receive 400 grams of bread a 
day.  Again, most of these food and provisions never arrived, about which the NKVD on 
the ground in the Uzbek SSR complained repeatedly.  Even in districts that did receive 
bread, supplies were sporadic and whole districts would go without rations for days at a 
time.26  The NKVD and some Uzbek officials noted how the lack of food was “especially 
hard on children, who were getting nothing but a little bread.”27 
The deportation was also too quick.  Crimean Tatars arrived in Central Asia as 
much as a week ahead of schedule. While Tashkent oblast was expecting arrivals the first 
week of June, Kobulov simply told oblast NKVD officials on May 19 that “due to the 
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razgruzke eshelonov so spetspereselentsami.”  May 12, 1944. 
26 GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 23ob.  “Dokladnaia Zapiska- O rabote po rasseleniiu krymskikh tatar v 
Kashka-Dar’inskoi oblasti, UzSSR.”  Nach. NKVD K/Dar’inskoi Obl. Podpolkovnik Gosbez. Samarodov 
and Nach. Po NKVD UzbSSR Podpolkovnik Gosbez. Nikolaev- Kobulov.  July 13, 1944.  
27 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 27. “Dokladnaia Zapiska- otprieme I rasselenii krymskikh tatar po 
Namanganskoi obl.”  From Nach.  UNKVD po Nam. Obl. Maior Gosbez. Gotsev,  Upolnomochenniy 
NKVD SSSR Podpolkovnik Miliakov, Upol. UNKVD Podpolkovnik Trofimov, Upol. NKVD SSSR 




expediting of the Crimean Tatar resettlement project,” the first convoys would begin 
arriving at Tashkent railway stations as early as May 25.  This was only ten days after 
Uzbek officials learned of the operation.28 
Finally, the numerous instructions outlining the plan were confusing.  On the one 
hand, Beria ordered the Uzbek NKVD to quickly transport Crimean Tatars to their final 
destinations, ordering 650 trucks to be ready.29  On the other hand, in an attempt to avert 
outbreaks of typhoid fever and other illnesses, the Uzbek Sovnarkom ordered that every 
Crimean Tatar had to be “sanitized” before they could be transported to farms and 
factories.30  Uzbek police fenced off isolation areas adjacent to train platforms to 
quarantine children and “cleanse” Crimean Tatars.31  The Uzbek Sovnarkom also forbade 
Uzbek residents from assisting or having contact with the deportees.32  As Paul Stonski 
argues, when deportees did have contact with Uzbeks, the interactions were often hostile.  
As national traitors, there was often hostility and sometimes violence towards Crimean 
Tatars that only made their predicament worse.33  Rumors about special settlers spread 
through rural communities and helped fuel aggression.  For instance, in Kashka-
Dar’inskoi oblast a rumor spread that the NKVD was going to deport all Russians and 
                                                
28 GARF f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l. 36.  NKVD UzSSR Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov to 
Samarkand Pred. Oblispolkoma Artykov and Sekretar Obkoma Makhmulov.  May 19, 1944.   
29 GARF f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l. 26. Sekretar’ TsK KP(b) Uzkekistana U. Iusupov and NKVD UzSSR 
Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov to Beria.  May 20, 1944.   
30 GARF f. 9479s, op. 1s, 179, l. 54-56.  Postanovlenie Sovnarkom Uzbekskoi SSR No. 596-80s.  Signed 
by Zam. Pred. SNK UzSSR P. Kabanov and Sekretar’ TsK KP/b/Uz U. Iusupov.  May 24, 1944.   
31 To assist this effort, Tashkent and Samarkand medical institutions sent nearly 500 students to quarantine 
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3 Ranga A. Kobulov to Beria. May 1944.   
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596-80s.  Signed by Zam. Pred. SNK UzSSR P. Kabanov and Sekretar’ TsK KP/b/Uz U. Iusupov.   




Uzbeks from the region once the Tatars arrived.34  This disdain of Uzbeks towards 
special settlers was never universal and would wane in later years, but, in the wake of the 
war, a visceral hatred towards “traitors” was real.  
As a result, even if all the required parties met Crimean Tatar convoys when they 
arrived, there was automatically a conflict between NKVD and Uzbek officials over the 
speed at which they should place Crimean Tatars on Uzbek farms and factories.  Uzbek 
authorities sought to delay the process, while the NKVD demanded that Crimean Tatars 
reach their final destination as soon as possible.  
These inconsistencies created a deadly situation.  The “quarantine” areas were 
often no more than exposed encampments where Crimean Tatars starved and succumbed 
to illness because Uzbek authorities refused them shelter and food.    In internal Uzbek 
NKVD correspondences, local NKVD commanders complained that much of the 
“industrial establishment” tasked with receiving special settlers had not “seriously 
prepared” for the project, and enterprise directors refused to let deportees enter their 
territory. Specific examples of these abuses abound in NKVD correspondences.  The 
director of the PDI Enterprise, Nikolaev, refused to house 75 families (300 people) and 
said that he had no space for them.  At Stalin factory 708, the director declined to house 
2,000 deportees, only accepting around 270 people.35  The directors of the 
Krasnoarmeiskogo strip mine in the Akhan-Goransk district of Tashkent oblast 
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Zemskov on December 9, 1991.   
35 GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 39-40.  “Dokladnaia Zapiska- O prieme i rasselenii spetspereselentsev 
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abandoned the 400 settlers assigned to them.36  At least 1,200 Crimean Tatars arrived at 
the Kalinin Oil Enterprise in Andijan oblast on June 1, but the directors told the NKVD 
that special settlers would have to wait on trains and platforms for “10 to 15 days.”37  
Even some organizations that requested special settler labor did not pick up deportees and 
had often lied about available shelter.  For example, at the Voenstroi factory in Tashkent 
oblast, management placed 400 Crimean Tatars in an abandoned club and took no step to 
find them housing.38  In other cases, local NKVD officers disobeyed Moscow and 
Tashkent.  For instance, the commander of the Iani-Iul’ city NKVD, Major Sleptsov, did 
not arrange care for deportees and lied about preparations.39   
Compounding the crisis, many convoys arrived in regions that received more 
deportees than expected, or in regions not expecting settlers.  One such group of 
deportees was convoy number 613/637, which was supposed to go to Piatok station in the 
Izbaskent district of Andijan oblast.  At the last minute, the Andijan oblast party and 
NKVD changed the destination, directing the convoy of 2,578 people to the Assake 
station in the Lenin district.  With no housing ready, authorities left the deportees to the 
elements.  Some sought shelter in local teahouses.  Weeks later 199 families were still 
homeless.40  In similar fashion, the Bossuiskoi hydroelectric station in Tashkent oblast 
unexpectedly received over 3,000 people with only a few hours notice.  Directors housed 
as many people as they could in earthen dugouts, cramming around 120 people into each 
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3 Ranga A. Kobulov- NKVD Chernyshev.  June 1, 1944. 
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40 GARF f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 15-19. June 1944.  Upolnomochennyi NKVD SSSR po AND OBL 
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dugout.41   Many factories and farms that received unexpected settlers had no shelter 
whatsoever available.  When the Kaitash strip mine in Samarkand oblast received 2,200 
settlers, even many of the regular workers were living in temporary tents.  Only around 
1,000 settlers could fit into the tents and the rest had absolutely no shelter.42  
To be clear, the abuse was not isolated, but endemic.  According to the NKVD, 
“the majority” of party and government officials in Nagaman oblast refused to participate 
in the troika committees receiving special settlers.43  The local organizations that were 
supposed to provide hot meals while the deportees were awaiting transport often never 
arrived.  The chaos placed many NKVD officers in the conundrum described by NKVD 
Lieutenant Doroshenko in the Ak Kurgan district.  Out of the three troika officials 
ordered to greet the convoy arriving at the 56 Raz”ezd station, he and his soldiers were 
the only ones to arrive, leaving them without proper transport and medical care.   In 
addition, the directors of local cotton sovkhozes refused to provide hot meals.44  With the 
local party and government not cooperating, Doroshenko appealed to Tashkent for help 
in saving the convoy.  In another example, the Namagan oblast NKVD complained that 
the Iangi Kurgan district party secretary, Galagonov, completely ignored his duties to 
special settlers.  Galagonov bluntly responded to the NKVD’s complaint: “the party 
secretary has more important government matters to attend to, and that (special settlers) 
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are the duty of the district NKVD… the party secretary has no obligation to work on this 
matter.”45   
In short, NKVD officers were often the sole coordinators of the resettlement.  
They were overwhelmed and undersupplied at best, but sometimes also abusive.  Little 
bread arrived and there is no evidence that any Crimean Tatars ever received the 
promised meat, fish, or fat.  A few days after the deportation began, Uzbek NKVD 
Commissar Kobulov claimed to Beria that 124,500 living quarters were ready.  The 
reality as depicted above shows that the NKVD count was inaccurate because many of 
the dugouts and other shelters were not fit for human inhabitance, especially in the 
coming winter.46  Some Tashkent NKVD reports to Moscow in 1944 attempted to hide 
the reality by proclaiming that many Crimean Tatars in the republic were “pleased” that 
the NKVD had not abandoned them “in open fields” to die.47  This was true is some 
cases, but such claims suggest that everyone expected exposure, disease and starvation.   
 Given the chaos, the death toll on the convoys and during the “transit” from 
stations to the final destinations of farms and factories is difficult to surmise, especially 
for those groups left alone to the elements.  In all, over 70 convoys of Crimean Tatars 
embarked between May 17 and 18. Each transported between 1,500 and 6,000 people.48  
By June 8, the last large deportation convoys bound for the Uzbek SSR had arrived in 
Central Asia.  Tashkent reported that they had received 57 train convoys with 151,529 
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people: 27,558 men, 55,684 women, and 68,287 children.  Per NKVD records sent from 
Tashkent to Moscow, 191 Crimean Tatars had died en route.  The deadliest convoy was 
convoy number 633 that arrived in Kugai, Namagan oblast, having lost 9 out of 3,094 
passengers.49   
In actuality, the number of deaths en route to the Uzbek SSR and immediately 
after disembarking was much greater.  Reports by oblast authorities reveal that Uzbek 
NKVD officials in Tashkent blatantly concealed death and illness totals.  While special 
settlers death was expected, it also meant NKVD officers were not doing their “job.”  As 
Naimark argues, this gave NKVD leaders the incentive to conceal “extraneous deaths” in 
special settlements and the GULAG.50  For instance, Kobulov’s assistant, A. Matveev, 
produced the final report for Beria that counted only 19 deceased and three hospitalized 
persons for the 6 convoys (13,804 people) that offloaded in Namgan oblast.51  However, 
an earlier report to Tashkent from the Namagan NKVD stated that 31 people had died 
and 88 had become seriously ill on the convoys, and another 29 people had become ill 
after arriving.  Reflecting on the general condition of deportees, the Namagan NKVD 
observed that most Crimean Tatars showed signs of “light illness” due to “changes in 
climate conditions,” meaning heat exhaustion, dehydration and exposure.52  
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NKVD reports from Kashka-Darin oblast parallel these discrepancies.  Tashkent 
reported just 13 hospitalizations to Moscow, when in fact the oblast NKVD reported that 
71 deportees required immediate hospitalization and more than 350 “were suspected to be 
ill.”   Low-level NKVD officers were not medical experts, but they knew that the 
developing outbreaks of typhus, malaria and other diseases would only spread, as would 
starvation and exposure.  They even informed Tashkent that victims “were just now 
beginning to display symptoms.”  Sure enough, in the weeks after arrival they 
hospitalized an additional 35 people in the Shakhriziabskii district and “many more” in 
other districts across the oblast.53   
First-hand Crimean Tatar accounts confirm the atrocious conditions and rising 
death toll.  In fact, evidence strongly suggests that oblast NKVD leaders had already 
greatly deflated the death tolls and that Tashkent only further shrunk the totals in reports 
to Beria.  Rustem Mustafaevich recalled how he and his four siblings (already orphans) 
arrived in Uzbekistan and the NKVD simply left them with other Crimean Tatars on a 
barren train platform at Stantsii Novoaleksevka.  With no food or shelter, his brother 
Bekir died and eventually the NKVD placed the surviving siblings in an orphanage.  
Rustem recalled the similar plight of his friends “Munire, Sabira, Taire, Alie and Emine” 
and other Crimean Tatar orphans as their number swelled.54  Another survivor, Shamil 
Aliadin, confirmed the fact that even through convoys made it to Central Asia and Siberia 
in good time, it took many Crimean Tatars up to a month to get to their final destinations.  
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Many deportees spent weeks in “stifling” cattle cars on railway sidings in the Kazakh 
SSR or on train platforms.  Death on the convoys was so pervasive, according to Aliadin, 
that the “NKVD would seize corpses and throw them out of the freight car windows” 
along the way.55  According to Yusuf Suleymanov, he personally buried 18 dead 
compatriots, and estimated that nearly half of the 208 people form his village died on the 
convoy and on the Urta-Aul train platform in Tashkent oblast.56    This is a sharp contrast 
to the 10 total deaths that the Uzbek NKVD reported at the Urta-Aul platform, especially 
when considering that Suleymanov’s account references just a small segment of the 5,589 
settlers stranded on the same platform during the deportation.57  Other Crimean Tatars 
reported incidents such as that on a convoy somewhere between Zaparozhia and 
Kharkov.  When a three year-old Tatar boy from the Crimean village of Aiseres fell off a 
train wagon, the guards did not retrieve him.58  The above accounts perhaps reveal why 
the NKVD did not report totals for the question about how many people “vanished” while 
en route when they unloaded Crimean Tatars.   
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There is no doubt that the Uzbek NKVD lied to Moscow about the scope and 
scale of death and illness as the situation deteriorated.  However, NKVD counts of 
special settlers do hint at the scale of death on convoys bound for the Uzbek SSR.  The 
NKVD claimed it deported approximately 180,000 Crimean Tatars to the Uzbek SSR by 
May 20.59  However, after unloading those convoys in late May and early June 1944, the 
Uzbek NKVD reported that they had only received 151,604 Crimean Tatars.60  Most of 
this gap is likely from convoys diverted to Russian oblasts.  Still, the fact that Uzbek 
NKVD officers unloading the convoys lowered the total of Crimean Tatars in the Uzbek 
SSR from 154,617 to 151,604 between May 25 and June 11 suggests a death toll of at 
least several thousand during over this period.61  Again, this was the same period that 
Crimean Tatars reported dreadful conditions on train platforms. 
Documentation of death and disease is even murkier for the over 30,000 special 
settlers sent to RSFSR oblasts.  On the one hand, many of these deportees were party 
members, Soviet bureaucrats, veterans, and skilled workers, and the NKVD quickly 
placed them into factories to utilize their skills, especially in Gorki and Molotov oblasts.  
On the other hand, several NKVD documents do suggest disease outbreaks.  For 
example, a report from Molotov oblast described unsanitary conditions as deportees 
unloaded from convoys onto boats.  At least 54 Crimean Tatars became ill with typhus 
and the NKVD predicted the “outbreak would grow” without “immediate sanitary 
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measures.”62  A report form Gorki oblast admitted that over a dozen Crimean Tatars had 
contacted typhus, but afterwards the NKVD took sanitary measures and vaccinated 
special settlers.63  This access to vaccines and medical care appears to be the main 
difference between the RSFSR oblasts and the Uzbek SSR.  
  A final complicating factor to the deportation policy and the accuracy of Soviet 
numbers was the fate of Crimean Tatar soldiers.   Secret orders dictated that commanding 
officers were supposed to immediately strip soldiers of their weapons and identification, 
give them a special settler card, and place Crimean Tatar soldiers in NKVD custody.  
Sure enough, the NKVD did deport several thousand active-duty Crimean Tatars on May 
17-18.  One typical individual deportation story is that of Alimzhan Satdarov.   When the 
deportation began, he was located in Simferopol, serving in the 180th Reserve Rifle 
Division. On May 18, the NKVD removed him from his unit and deported him to 
Ferghana oblast.64  Some of the individual deportation stories of Soviet soldiers are 
astounding.  For instance, Abdal Gafarov had served in the Red Army since 1930, fought 
at Stalingrad, received commendations, and had become the Assistant to the Commander 
of the 197th OATB Technical Unit of the Eighth Airborne Army.  On the morning of May 
17, 1944, Gafarov and his comrades assisted the NKVD in preparing trucks for the 
deportation in Crimea’s Sudak district.  Then, despite protests from his commander, the 
NKVD removed Gafarov from his unit on May 18 and deported him to Molotov oblast 
on the deportation convoy he had helped prepare.65  
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However, as Chapter One underlined, the initial deportation did not include at 
least 10,000 Crimean Tatar soldiers in the Soviet armed forces. 66   As the war raged, 
officers often ignored orders to deport Crimean Tatar soldiers because they did not want 
to loose experienced personnel.  In addition, Moscow allowed senior Crimean Tatar 
officers not engaged in political agitation to keep fighting. Many of these soldiers arrived 
in Central Asia only after demobilization form 1945 to 1946, and some eluded special 
settlement for several years afterwards.67   
The stories of how and when these Crimean Tatar soldiers arrived in Central Asia 
are quite diverse.  Despite being wounded four times, Izet Memetov was only 
demobilized in 1946, and promptly traveled to his wife Bibik who had fled to Ukraine’s 
Poltava oblast during the war.  He lived with his family until 1947, when he decided to 
find his mother in the special settlements.  The Uzbek MVD then detained Memetov 
when they found him traveling to the village of Pskent in Tashkent oblast to find his 
mother.  In another example, tank soldier M. Osmanov attempted to return to his 
hometown of Sevastopol when the Red Army demobilized him in 1946, but the NKVD 
refused him entrance into Crimea and deported him to the Uzbek SSR.68  In other cases, 
the NKVD did not immediately deport hospitalized Crimea Tatars soldiers.  One such 
veteran was I. U. Ablaev, who was recovering from war wounds at a hospital in the 
Kazak ASSR during the deportation.  Even after the hospital discharged him, a Kazakh 
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VTEK commission declared him an “invalid of the second category” and remobilized 
him to work in a Kazak mine.  In the meantime, the NKVD had deported his family from 
Sevastopol to Bekabad in the Uzbek SSR.  After the mine demobilized him in 1946, he 
left the Kazak SSR and joined his family in special settlement.69  In sum, Stalin deported 
thousands of Crimean Tatar families even as their relatives served in the Soviet armed 
forces, and the deportation did not interrupt the service of several thousand of these 
Crimean Tatar soldiers.   Unlike their families, there is little evidence of Crimean Tatar 
veterans dying during their personalized deportations.   
Whatever the actual number of initial Crimean Tatar victims, the deportation was 
just the beginning of a months-long deterioration of conditions that led to hunger and 
disease, killing tens of thousands.  This crime was a combination of cruelty, confusion, 
and Soviet inefficiency that began on the deportation convoys.  
  
The Defects of Special Settlement Planning 
 
 
 Recent experience with Chechen, Ingush, other “special settlers” and the logistics 
of the resettlement plan left no doubt that the policy would lead to mass death.70  True, 
the deportation orders gave food and supply organs the responsibility of providing special 
settlers with a daily quota of 8 kilograms of flower, 8 kilograms of vegetables, and 2 
kilograms of grain and potatoes.  On paper, these organs would deliver these food 
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supplies to Uzbek organs that would then distribute the rations.71  However, similar to 
their grim understanding of the convoys, the NKVD knew that nightmarish conditions 
would follow the deportation.  
The starvation and disease that began on the convoys only expanded its hold on 
the population once the trains reached the stations. As noted by Crimean Tatars and 
underlined in the previous section, the fact that convoys “arrived” quickly to train 
platforms in no way indicated that their journey was over.  Even when deportees arrived 
at a final destination, food and other supplies were often absent and promised housing 
remained poor or non-existent.  With the exception of some bread rations, Chernyshov 
admitted that in the Uzbek SSR the promised meat, vegetables, potatoes, and shoes never 
made it to the special settlers.72  Even when a rare grain shipment did reach the Uzbek 
SSR, the NKVD faulted oblast and local authorities for distribution problems.  In some 
cases, farm and factory administrators distributed less grain than stipulated in the orders, 
or gave it to regular kolkhoz workers.73  As one NKVD officer explained, Uzbek officials 
often “stole” or used the food meant for special settlers “not following the order’s 
intention.”  Some kolkhozes such as Narpai became notorious for stealing grain from the 
special settler fund.74 
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While abusive Uzbek officials were a real problem, the NKVD blaming regional 
authorities masked the main systemic failure of Stalin’s plan: the food compensation 
system that depended on the cooperation of Crimean and Uzbek officials, the NKVD, 
Narkom MMP, Narkomtorg, Gosplan, and other Soviet organs.  On paper, when the 
NKVD, Narkom MMP, and Narkomtorg confiscated livestock and food from Crimean 
Tatars they were supposed to provide deportees with a voucher.  Special settlers could 
then exchange the voucher for food, work animals, clothes or raw materials.75  
In practice, the use of the voucher system for feeding special settlers was an 
abject failure for several reasons.  First off, the war had already strained Soviet food 
production and the rationing in rural areas was already in chaos.  Many Uzbeks bartered 
for food, and Crimean Tatars had nothing to barter and were automatically on the bottom 
of food rationing priorities.76  Second, the NKVD was a secret police organization, and 
often did not have direct access to food and other supplies. Narkom MMP, Narkomzem, 
Narkomzag, and farm directors controlled livestock and food rationing.  Third, the above 
agricultural organs, the NKVD, the Crimean Sovnarkom, and the Crimean Obkom all had 
to provide Moscow with confiscation numbers.  All the parties failed to do so and 
immediately delayed food distribution to special settlers.  Accusations and 
counteraccusations between the food organs and the NKVD blamed each other for the 
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delays.77  Eventually, as May turned to June, the NKVD in Crimea reported confiscating 
15,740 cattle, 44,276 sheep and goats, and 4,450 horses in May 1944.78  A separate tally 
by Crimean Obkom officials in September counted well-over 10,000 confiscated “horned 
animals,” suggesting that the NKVD had an accurate figure.79 
    The plan then became so absurd that one must wonder if Moscow meant it to 
fail.  At the end of the day, the most important count of confiscated livestock came from 
the Crimean Sovnarkom leader, Aleksandr Kabanov, who actually controlled livestock in 
Crimea at the time.  Kabanov had just assumed near total control of the dual ethnic 
cleansing/rebuilding project in Crimea.  He delayed passing along his own confiscation 
tallies and only did so after the NKVD complained.80  When he did report, far from the 
tens of thousands of animals the NKVD counted, he claimed that during the deportation 
officials had confiscated only 2,589 large livestock and 2,283 goats and sheep from 
Crimean Tatars. Presiding over a devastated Crimea and tasked by Stalin with 
revitalizing Crimean agriculture, Kabanov had incentive to conceal much of the 
confiscated livestock.81  Kabanov admitted that many of the confiscated animals were 
“subject to theft.”82  Documents from the Sovmin SSSR on postwar Crimea state that this 
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theft was deliberate.  In fact, divisions of agricultural organs in Crimea, at the time 
nominally under Kabanov’s control, seized animals from all Crimean farms, including 
those with remaining Russians and Ukrainians, so that the new government had total 
control over food supplies.83  
Afterwards, Crimean officials mostly refused to issue vouchers to special settlers 
or remaining Crimean residents.  Neither the deportees nor remaining Slavic farmers 
were in a position to complain. The NKVD was aware that Kabanov’s numbers did 
match their own count, but inquiries into the whereabouts of animals were fruitless.84  
Molotov attempted to “clarify” the situation in early July, ordering that all confiscated 
livestock should go to new Crimean settlers that had already begun arriving from 
different Russian oblasts.  Molotov’s order accepted that no one would get any 
compensation, and that Stalin endorsed Kabanov’s methods.  The project in Crimea, not 
the welfare of deportees, took precedence. During this bureaucratic debate, Crimean 
Tatars waiting for the food starved.85  
Few Crimean Tatars ever received vouchers for confiscated food and livestock.  
The NKVD’s admitted that the “return” of grain, livestock and other materials 
confiscated in Crimea occurred “irregularly and with large delays,” if at all.86  Even when 
Soviet organs did appraise confiscated items, the system failed.  For example, 
Narkomzem appraised 5,943 beehives confiscated from Crimean Tatars and gave them to 
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the Ukraine SSR.  In return, Narkomzem ordered the Ukrainian state to pay the Uzbek 
government the appraised value so the Uzbek state could buy Crimean Tatars new 
beehives.  What became of the money is unclear, but Crimean Tatars never received new 
honeybees.87 
As conditions worsened, the Soviet ministries that controlled food had no interest 
in preventing the spread of starvation. Receiving little cooperation from anyone, the 
NKVD made a request to Narkomzag for 14,608 tons of grain to feed Crimean special 
settlers, with 9,977 tons designated for the Uzbek SSR.  Narkomzag balked at this 
tonnage, and offered only 4,000 tons total, with 2,733 tons for the Uzbek SSR.  Then, the 
supply organ proposed offering potatoes and vegetables in place of grain.88  Narkomzag 
had already failed to provide any of the required vegetables and potatoes stipulated as 
rations during the deportation, mostly because the supplies did not exist.  As such, this 
proposal was the equivalent of giving Crimean Tatars nothing.89     
To reiterate, the most damning aspect of the genocidal policy was the plan itself.   
To base the sustenance of Crimean Tatars on the amounts of confiscated livestock and 
grain amounted to murder.  There was never going to be enough livestock or grain 
confiscated from deportees in Crimea to feed the special settlers in the first place.  
Moscow knew that a pathetically small amount of livestock remained in Crimea by May 
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1944.90  This was true even if all parties involved had honestly calculated totals and 
reimbursed deportees, and Chenyshov explained this directly to Molotov in a secret letter 
on September 5, 1944.91  When Molotov did issue a definitive order on what organization 
would provide what food, he went against the NKVD’s request and used the lower 
Narkomzag numbers, promising non-existent potatoes and vegetables.92  In this light, the 
plan was a deadly farce in which every organ involved knew that they could not supply 
the food needed for special settlers, so they constantly deflected blame and incriminated 
each other.   
 In addition to the inadequate food rationing and reimbursement plans, unrelated 
circumstances further reduced available food. Uzbek crop failures in 1944 greatly 
depleted Central Asian food supplies.  Simultaneously, as the Soviet army liberated 
swaths of Ukraine, Stalin ordered the Uzbek SSR to ship livestock to Ukraine.  Summing 
up the food situation for Uzbek special settlers in late 1944, Kirrilov admitted that 
fulfilling the rations for special settlers and returning grain and livestock was 
impossible.93  It is also important to underline that this starvation was not part of the 
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Soviet-wide famine of 1946-1947.  That crisis began only in the summer of 1946 after the 
majority of Crimean Tatar deaths had occurred.94 
 Hope for adequate shelter for the coming winter was also dismal.  Similar to the 
food situation, there were detailed plans for home building.  Stalin had ordered 
Glavsnables (the lumber supply organ) to provide lumber and other materials for 
homebuilding, while Glavneftsnab (the fuel supply organ) had to deliver 600 tons of 
petrol.  Stalin also instructed the Sel’khoz bank SSSR to provide 5,000 rubles of credit 
per family for home construction, or a lump sum of 57 million rubles.95   
In reality, many Uzbek farms and factories still refused to house special settlers or 
provide each family with a plot of land.  The NKVD reported that 15,871 out of 36,568 
Crimean Tatar families (or 43.5%) in the Uzbek SSR did not receive plots in 1944. 
Moreover, documents suggest that 15,871 families reviving plots was inaccurate.  Soviet 
farms and industry were often not willing to cede land to “traitors.”  In one representative 
case, when the Zerovshan beet selkhoz in Samarkand oblast designated 30 hectares for 
special settlers, the head of the Uzbek beet growing enterprise, Fedrenko, traveled to the 
farm and forbade the farm from handing over the land to special settlers.  Instead of 
going to “guilty parties,” the plots should go to Uzbek workers.  While the NKVD later 
reprimanded Fedrenko, they opted to transfer the settlers to a different farm rather than 
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force the beet-growing organization to comply.  During the dispute, the families remained 
exposed to the elements.96 
Out of the 57 million rubles in credit that the Selkhoz bank provided for Crimean 
special settlers, Uzbek authorities never even claimed over 17 million rubles, and the 
credit just expired at the end of 1945.  Broken down by oblast, Tashkent oblast actually 
overspent by 2 million rubles, so the persistence of dire condition indicates either money 
poorly spent, stolen and/or the initial sum was never enough to provide housing.  All 
other oblasts claimed less than was allotted to them. For example, Bukhara oblast had a 
4.4 million-ruble credit line for special settlers, but only claimed 380,000 rubles.  
Explaining the disarray of the loan plan, the Uzbek NKVD alleged that Selkhoz SSSR 
bank in Moscow failed to provide clear “instructions” to its Uzbek branches on the “order 
and conditions of loans to special settlers.”   The general cash flow problem during the 
war in rural Central Asia only exacerbated the problem.97   
Even if special settlers had received land and credit according to plan, the 
building materials did not arrive in 1944.  On June 7, 1945, the Sovnarkom SSSR 
repeated its request for building materials, although in smaller amounts, and again 
nothing arrived in the Uzbek SSR.98  This lack of materials was also detrimental to many 
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of the Crimean Tatars who had received “housing” because many buildings were just for 
summer or agricultural use and needed doors, windows, roofs and stoves for the winter.99  
Similar to food, most special settlers never saw the money or building materials that were 
supposed to help them survive the winter of 1944-45.   
 Another abuse was that several farms, factories, construction projects, and even 
NKVD officers used thousands of Crimean Tatars as slave labor across the Uzbek SSR 
and other regions of special settlement.  According to Chernyshev, throughout the 
summer of 1944 local Soviet organs ordered special settlers to work at factories, 
construction sites and in city departments without the permission of Moscow, and the 
local NKVD organs often colluded with this unapproved use of special settlers.  
Chernyshev’s report eviscerated this slave labor as a deadly abuse.  The practice caused 
“working special settler families, who had received homes, land plots, and gardens to 
loose everything provided to them when they were mobilized (into slave labor) and soon 
found themselves in extremely bad conditions.”  Only at the end of July 1944 did the 
NKVD attempt to end this practice with secret order.100    
 
The Peak of Starvation, Disease, and Exposure, 1944-1946 
 
 
 The culmination of the above abuses accelerated the mass death of Crimean 
Tatars as wretched conditions spread disease and starvation.  Most of the Soviet 
bureaucracy, from entire Soviet organs to individual farm and factory administrators, still 
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refused to care for special settlers.  While the NKVD easily concealed death and disease 
during the deportation, epidemics soon threatened the entire Uzbek state.   
In a secret letter to Beria on July 10, Chernyshov warned that the Uzbek NKVD 
was reporting a full-blown epidemic with sharp increases in malaria and stomach 
illnesses among Crimean Tatars in several oblasts.  In Tashkent oblast at the Baiaut 
Khovastskogo farm, 132 Crimean Tatars had a stomach virus and 36 had already died, 
while in Samarkand oblast’s Pakhtakorsk district half of the 1,309 Tatars had malaria.  Of 
13,907 Crimean Tatars in Namansk oblast, 40% were ill with malaria or stomach viruses.  
At the notorious Narpai sovkhoz alone, 94 Crimean Tatars died in June from malaria and 
stomach viruses, including 33 children.101  The Soviet Narkomzdrav initially ignored 
requests from the Uzbek Narkomzdrav for medical supplies.102  In fact, the only evidence 
of medical assistance from Moscow during the peak of the epidemics was a claim that 
Moscow sent 200,000 dysentery pills and other medicines.103   
 The Uzbek NKVD pleaded with Beria to send medicine and extra doctors on 
August 8 because “amongst Crimean Tatar special settlers there has been an 
extraordinary increase in cases of malaria and stomach/intestinal illness.”  In Andijan 
oblast, authorities reported that 1,015 people had malaria and 813 had stomach ailments, 
while in Kashka-Darin oblast 4,324 out of 9,984 Crimean Tatars had malaria.  Bukhara 
oblast was reporting 629 malaria cases, and 126 people had already perished from 
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disease.104  By August 15, the Uzbek NKVD counted 18,621 seriously ill special settlers 
(or 12% of the special settler population in Uzbekistan) and in certain districts over half 
of the Crimean Tatars were seriously ill.  Narpai was again an example, with 667 people 
currently ill and an updated death toll of 229.105 
Crimean Tatar accounts of the first 12 months of special settlement underline how 
starvation and disease killed individuals and decimated families. Menube 
Sheikhislamova’s husband died fighting in the Red Army, and she was alone caring for 
their eight children.  As the crisis worsened, Menube and seven of her children died.  One 
lone daughter, Nera, did survive, but hunger left her disabled.  According to Menube’s 
aunt, Sanzika Ibragimova, the fate of her niece’s immediate family was common.  Out of 
the thirty families the NKVD deported from her village, only five remained at the end of 
1945.106  Uzbek physician Sulamif Prakhye, who worked at the Irgut district hospital in 
Samarkand oblast from 1942 to 1948, remembered feeling helpless during the crisis: 
“What could I do with only a meager supply of pills?”  His patients were almost all 
women and children, and were either “skin and bones” or “swollen from malnutrition.”  
The hospital crammed two to three people to a cot as they arrived at the door.  Mothers 
often shared their cot with children, and Prakhye believes that hospital rations saved 
some children.  With so many parents dying, the hospital became overwhelmed with 
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orphaned children between the ages of 6 to 13 who were suffering from “PDE-protein-
deficiency edema.”107  
Calculating how many Crimean Tatars perished during the mass death of 1944-
1945 is difficult.  While NKVD documents covering the epidemics and famine for the 
fall of 1944 are open, most of the detailed NKVD documents from the winter of 1944-
1945 remain sealed.  The period from May to September 1944 was deadly enough, and at 
least 10,105 Crimean Tatars (or 7% of Crimean Tatars) died over those months.108   
Furthermore, all Crimean Tatar accounts of the period assert that mass death through a 
combination of disease, starvation, and exposure peaked during the winter months.109   
While the NKVD accounts on the oblast-level remain sealed, larger population 
statistics and special settlement labor statistics support the Crimean Tatar assertion and 
provide an ominous picture.  The Uzbek NKVD reported that on July 7, 1944, there were 
150,904 special settlers (36,940 families.) with 78,754 on kolkhozes, 29,474 on 
sovkhozes, and 42,676 in industry.  A year later, by July 7, 1945, there were only 
128,627 special settlers left with 48,297 on kolkhozes, 29,196 on sovkhozes, and 51,161 
in industry.  In short, between July 1, 1944, and July 1, 1945, the NKVD removed 22,355 
or 15(14.8)% of the Crimean special settlers in the Uzbek SSR from the registry. 
However, the July 7, 1945, count included 16,934 new special settlers.  This included 
1,390 births and new arrivals over that time-period (demobilized from the Army or 
                                                
107 HIA, Aishe Seitmuratova ,“Mustafa Dzhemilev and the Crimean Tatars: Story of a Man and His 
People- Facts, Documents, How To Help” The Center for Democracy: New York, 1986, Box 99, Folder, 3, 
pg. 5, Center for Civil Society International Collection. 
108 Bekirova, Krymskie Tatary, 31. 
109 Bekirova’s oral interviews and other research confirm that the bitter cold and exposure of the winter 




transferred from other republics).110   Considering this fact and the NKVD deflating 
numbers, the death toll for 1944-45 approached 40,000 people.  There are caveats to this 
disturbing number because the NKVD removed several hundred Crimean Tatars arrested 
for various offenses from the list, as well as escapees or those moved to another republic.  
Still, these totals at the most would only account for a few thousand people.   
Conditions did improve marginally throughout the spring and summer of 1945, 
but Tashkent continued reporting far rosier conditions to Moscow than inter-Uzbek 
communications reveal.  Moreover, when the NKVD in Tashkent did admit to problems, 
they continued to scapegoat oblast-level and other regional authorities. In the Tashsel’ 
district of Tashkent oblast, the director of the Instrumental’nyi (instrument) factory, 
Anteshev, and the director of Factory no. 309, Radzhapov, both allegedly withheld 
special settler pay for two to three months.  Once again, Tashkent savaged the 
administration of Narpai for also withholding pay. At factories in several districts of 
Kashka.-Dar oblast and Namangan oblast, workers did not receive pay for several 
months.111  The NKVD in Samarkand oblast complained that at three sovkhozes the 
administrators refused to pay the special settlers for the entire second quarter of 1945.  At 
several beet sugar factories in the same oblast, factory directors fired any special settlers 
who got ill.  With the families’ lone breadwinner, most often female, jobless and ill, the 
situation led to an “increase in the cases of starvation and death.”112 
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 Furthermore, many farm and factory directors, perhaps believing in the mass 
treason charges, continued to not provide housing on purpose.  Housing problems 
remained widespread in Andijan oblast.  In Tashkent oblast at the Farkhadstroe 
construction organization, 742 families (2,417 people) lived in dirt dugouts.  A similar 
situation existed in the Piangarstroia Khatyrchinsk district of Samarkand oblast.  At the 
Zira-Bulakskoom and Krasnogvardeiskom sugar factories in Samarkand oblast 143 
families lived in “totally unacceptable dwellings.”113  At the Kyzyl-Kakhraman kolkhoz 
the director, Tadshiev, refused to give Crimean Tatar families work.  Tadshiev also 
displayed abject cruelty when, for no apparent reason, he left Arifa Tairova and five 
family members for dead in an open field 10 km from the farm.  Sick with malaria and 
suffering from exhaustion, the NKVD claimed that it intervened by providing the family 
a home elsewhere and arresting Tadshiev.114  With winter again fast approaching, the 
NKVD counted 25,372 people living in housing “unfit for people.”115 
 Knowing that a repeat of the past winter’s mass death was likely, on September 
15, 1945, Chernyshov ordered that special settlement authorities inspect housing for 
special settlers to determine if they were properly winterized.116  Furthermore, he ordered 
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special renovation brigades to winterize the sub-standard housing.117  However, NKVD, 
Soviet government, and Crimean Tatar accounts reveal that attempts to better prepare for 
the winter of 1945-46 did not prevent widespread sickness and starvation for a second 
year in a row.  For example, in Tashkent oblast, 46 out of 60 special settler kolkhozes in 
the Mirazchul’sk district were not ready for winter in the fall.118  Out of 111 families in 
the Farkhadstroi enterprise in Tashkent oblast, 12% still lived in terrible conditions over 
the winter and were starving.  The situation at Farkhadstroi was so dire that Chernyshov 
issued a specific decree on March 2, 1946 that supposedly “solved” the problem.119  As 
with the 1944-45 crisis, abusive factory and farm directors imperiled the survival of 
Crimean Tatars and starvation and disease ensued.  So many families were starving in the 
Uzbekvino (Uzbek Wine) factory no. 3 and various wine sovkhozes in the Kashka-Darin 
oblast that on January 15, 1946, the Uzbek SNK ordered the Uzbek orgburo to fix the 
problem before the end of January.120  The Narpai kolkhoz remained atrocious.  The 
management never distributed the food and supplies that the Uzbek food organs had 
delivered to the farm after a special order in December 1945.121 At the Motororemontom 
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(motor renovation) factory in Samarkand oblast, the factory managers still used orphans 
for slave labor.122 
 The lack of building supplies, land, money and other supplies also continued. At 
several factories in the Kashka.-Darin and Namangan oblasts workers did not receive pay 
for several months. Uzbek officials approved 10,403 families for building loans, but 
Selkhoz bank branches often still did not have the money to lend, suggesting a continued 
monetary bottleneck in Tashkent.123  For a second winter in a row, Uzbek and NKVD 
officials failed to ensure that all special settlers had proper shoes, clothes, sanitary 
conditions and medical service.124  In May of 1945, the Soviet Sovnarkom had requested 
the same materials, although in smaller amounts, and the responsible Soviet organs again 
failed to deliver the supplies.125  The situation with children was especially pathetic.  That 
winter 13,499 out of the surviving 25,076 school-aged special settlers could not go to 
school because of a lack of clothes and shoes, placing a continued burden on working 
mothers.126  By October, these conditions were killing Crimean Tatars at an alarming 
rate.  During the fourth quarter of 1945, the NKVD reported that 3,302 or 2.7% of the 
Crimean special settlers died.  Similar to a year before, the majority of deaths were 
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among the young and elderly, but starvation, cold, malaria, and other ailments affected a 
majority of special settlers.127 
 Sometimes Crimean Tatars dealt with the deteriorating conditions themselves by 
moving locations in search of food and shelter, and soon Uzbek authorities began to 
sanction such moves.  In the winter of 1945-1946, many special settlers fled to the Tajik 
SSR.  By January 1, 1946, the NKVD recorded 3,134 Crimean Tatars that arrived in the 
fourth quarter of 1945. These families arrived in a poor state, and most were sick and 
starving and all were “physically exhausted.”  The NKVD never charged these Crimean 
Tatars with escape because the farms they fled in the Uzbek SSR were literally starving 
them to death. Tajik authorities reported that many special settlers died on their journey 
and that mass death was imminent.  The Tajik Sovnarkom and central committee 
requested a one-time aid package of 5000 kg of fat, 50 tons of bread, 10 tons of kerosene, 
and 3.5 tons of soap. While there is no evidence that the fat reached settlers, Tajik 
authorities do claim that they did receive bread by January, but this was weeks or months 
after many families had arrived.128  While Tajik officials did not quote exact death totals 
from this period, some of these victims are perhaps included in the 235 individuals 
removed from the Tajik SSR special settler list in the fourth quarter of 1945.129  Some 
Crimean Tatars also fled to the Kyrgyz SSR and the Kazakh SSR, but how many 
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Tadzhikskoi SSR Polkovnik Mikalelian and Nachal’nik Otdela Spetsposelenii NKVD Tadzhiksoi SSR 




Crimean Tatars ended up in these republics from 1945 to 1946, when they arrived, and 
under what circumstances, is not clear.130   
The exact number of Crimean Tatars deported and the number of those who died 
from May 1944 until mid-1946 is impossible to confidently state.  However, since the 
1960s Crimean Tatar activists have argued that 46.2% of the total Crimean Tatar 
population perished because of deportation.  Activists arrived at that percentage using the 
following numbers: 
While 10-11% of the Crimean Tatar population was lost in military 
actions of World War Two, the deportation of the whole nation in May 
1944 resulted in the deaths of 46.2%131 of the Crimean Tatars in 18 
months… of 99,400 children, 45,922 died; of 13,300 16-18 year olds 
6,144 died; of 93,200 women, 43,085 died; of 32,600 men, 15,061 died.132 
 
All toll, the above count claims nearly 110,000 Crimean Tatars died.  However, this 
claim rests on the assertion that the Soviet state purposely undercounted the total 
Crimean Tatar population beginning in the 1920s, an accusation that is difficult to prove 
or disprove. 
 Soviet figures on the number of people deported from the Crimean ASSR and the 
number who died in exile vary between different reports and Soviet organs.  As Naimark 
notes, the specific numbers quoted by the NKVD are suspicious because the “impossible 
accuracy may reflect deeper problems with the veracity of the numbers.”133   This chapter 
has shown that Naimark is correct and the NKVD often concealed deaths and illnesses.  
Another reason for discrepancies is that NKVD and MVD counts of special settlers 
                                                
130 By the late 1940s, many Crimean Tatars did reach these republics in search of work and education, and 
this trend continued after special settlement ended.  Nekrich, The Punished Peoples, 115 
131 Crimean Tatars repeat exact percentage of 46.2% in most nationalist literature and has the figure has 
become an important part of deportation memory. 
132 HIA, Ayshe Seytmuratova, “Mustafa Dzhemilv and the Crimean Tatars,” The Center for Democracy, 
1986, page 5, Center For Civil Society International Collection, box 99, folder 3.  




sometimes lumped Crimean special settlers of different nationalities together, while at 
other times counting each ethnicity separately.  Often the Uzbek NKVD and Uzbek 
authorities used the terms “Crimean Tatar” and “special settler” interchangeably, since 
the vast majority of new special settlers in the republic were Crimean Tatars.   
Despite discrepancies, all counts suggest that at least 40,000 Crimean Tatars died 
in special settlement.  By far the most extensive report ever written by a Soviet official on 
the deportation was the 1991 research project by party worker V. N. Zemskov.  Using 
access to Soviet archives, Zemtsov put the total number of Crimean residents deported in 
1944 at 228,392, including 183,155 Crimean Tatars.  Zemtsov also believed that NKVD 
simply never counted many demobilized Crimean Tatar soldiers. In trying to assess the 
death toll, the report claims that in 1949 only 186,535 Crimean special settlers remained, 
meaning the total “contingent” shrunk by 41,857 people from 1944 to 1949.134  
Considering the additions of at least 20,000 more special settlers over that period, 
Zemtsov’s numbers suggest that between 50,000 and 60,000 Crimean special settlers 
died, and the majority of those were likely Crimean Tatars.   
Other Soviet reports and statistics support Zemtsov’s findings.  For example, a 
joint Gosplan SSSR and Ukrainian Academy of Sciences research project from 1989 to 
1990 found that the total Crimean Tatar population shrunk from 218,200 in 1939 to 
165,000 in 1953, or a decrease of roughly 53,000 people.  If one takes into account the 
over 10,000 deaths during the war, late arrivals and the “high birth rate” of Crimean 
Tatars from 1947 to 1953, the death total is roughly between 40,000 and 50,000 
                                                
134 The Soviet Government Commission on Nationalities ordered Zemtsov to write the report as it began 
Crimean Tatar return. GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 21, l.l. 79-80. “Nekotorye dannyi o deportatsii i 
reabilitatsii Krymskikh Tatar.”  By Zamistitel’ Nachal’nika otdela goskomnatsa RSFSR, B. V. Truskov.  




people.135  Moreover, NKVD and MVD statistics further confirm the concentration of 
death in the Uzbek SSR.  By March 1949, the MVD reported that only 115,101 Crimean 
Tatars remained in the Uzbek SSR, a decrease 36,503 people from June 1944.  When 
adjusted for thousands of late arrivals and births the number goes well over 40,000.136 
 Mass death only ended in 1946 as the NKVD and the MVD special settler 
divisions contained the chaos and fully instituted the “spetskomendatur” regime in the 
Uzbek republic and other regions.137   While a critical lack of experienced NKVD and 
MVD administrators had greatly undermined any organization of special settlement 
throughout 1944 and 1945, when the war ended the NKVD created “seminars” to train 
special settler commanders and their assistants.  Because of the rapidly shrinking 
Crimean Tatar population, the MVD only created 76 of the 97 proposed Uzbek 
“spetskomendatur.”138  Thus, the special settlement “plan” did not really take effect until 




The term bureaucratic genocide best describes the intent, process and outcome of 
Stalin’s policy towards Crimean Tatars from May 1944 to mid-1946. Stalin gave no 
specific order to kill Crimean Tatars because he did not have to.  Stalin showed his intent 
                                                
135 RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 9982, l.l. 73-73.  Ekseptnoe Zakliuchenie po predlozheniiam po 
ratsional’nomu rasseleniiu Krymskikh Tatar I razvitiiu sotsial’noi sfery Krymskoi oblasti- SOPS AN Ukr. 
SSR.”  Zh. A. Zaionchkovskaia. 1990. 
136 For the number of Crimean Tatars in 1944 see GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l.l. 5-9.  Tashkent NKVD, 
Polkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Mal’ytsev and Podpolkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Maslennikov to V. V. 
Vhernyshov (sekretno).  June 25, 1944.  On the 1949 MVD census see GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 483, l.l. 
140ob-141.  Statisticheskie svedeniia o rezul’tatakh perepisi vyselentsev- spets. Na territorii Uz. SSR.  St. 
Oper. Upolnomochnym OSP MVD Uz. SSR Baibarodim.  March 28, 1949. 
137 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 179, l. 27. Sekretar’ TsK KP(b) Uzkekistana U. Iusupov and NKVD UzSSR 
Komissar Gosbezopasnosti 3 Ranga A. Kobulov to Beria. May 20, 1944. 
138 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 180, l. 9. Tashkent NKVD, Polkovnik Gosbezopasnosti Mal’ytsev and 




to kill and ethnically cleanse Crimean Tatars the moment he declared the whole nation to 
be traitors. He knew the Soviet bureaucracy would kill thousands and he expected that 
the different parts of the bureaucracy would blame each other for the deaths. This is 
exactly what happened.  Beria, Molotov and Soviet organs determined the logistics, local 
officials signed the death warrants, and the NKVD special settler division participated in 
the whole process by trying to follow absurd orders.  This crime has similarities to others 
outside the Soviet Union.  However, it was Stalin’s state that perfected bureaucratic 
genocide, a crime that used inefficiency, irresponsibility, confusion, and loyalty to the 
system to destroy the national, political and social “enemies” of the Soviet Union.  
 Placing any one group on the lowest level of the Soviet social and political strata 
was a genocidal policy because these groups suffered mass death under Stalinist 
bureaucracy.  If historians can claim that some mass death due the first collectivization 
and special settlement campaigns was unintentional, over a decade later no such excuse is 
acceptable.  The documents discussed in this chapter have underlined that the entire 
Soviet bureaucracy expected mass death and participated in the crime.   
However, as I will explain in the following chapters, the mass death of Crimean 
Tatars was not a singular goal.  Stalin wanted to kill the Crimean Tatar nation, and many 
Crimean Tatars had to die to do so.  But he also expected some individuals to survive.  
He believed that the survivors would be isolated, assimilated into farms and factories, and 
inconsequential as far as continuing the Crimean Tatar nation was concerned.  In the long 











 Moscow combined postwar recovery and ethnic cleansing into one process in 
Crimea.  Because Crimea was a strategic location and matter of Soviet pride, even before 
the war ended the USSR began redistributing Crimean Tatar land and resettling Crimea 
with primarily Russian peasants in order to reestablish the Soviet economic and political 
system on the peninsula. The preeminent demonstration of the strategic and symbolic 
importance of Crimea was the Yalta Conference.1  Moreover, there is perhaps no better 
indictment of the genocidal nature of twentieth-century great power politics than the fact 
that the conference, held by the soon-to-be victorious allies, occurred in a region that the 
host nation was in the process of ethnically cleansing.  To the outside world and Allies at 
time of the Yalta conference, this dark side of recovery was of little concern.2  After all, 
they were defeating Hitler.   
                                                
1 Held at the Livadia Palace in Yalta from February 3-11, 1944, Serhii Plokny describes the meeting 
between Stalin, Winston Churchill, and Franklin D, Roosevelt as “the most secretive peace conference of 
the modern era.”  The leaders “moved armies” and decided the fate of nations in a “contest of geopolitical 
aspirations.”  With clashing “egos and values systems,” they set the parameters for the Cold War.  Also, 
Constantine Pleshakov and Vladislav Zubok argue that the meeting was an Allied acknowledgement of the 
“enormous Soviet sacrifices and successes” in defeating Hitler: see Serhii Plokny, Yalta: The Price of 
Peace (New York: Viking, 2010), 1; and Constantine Pleshakov and Vladislav Zubok.  Inside the 
Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 32. 
2 Fisher, Nekrich and Crimean Tatar activists stated that these policies were important, but they did not 
have the archival access to examine the processes in detail.  See Fisher, The Crimean Tatars, 171-174 and 
Nekrich, Punished Peoples, 34-35.  Furthermore, works published after the Soviet collapse have, 
understandably, focused on many of the immediate problems.  For example, Edward Allworth underlines 
that the Crimean Tatar homeland underwent “significant alteration” in their absence, but does not describe 





However, these policies mattered for those peoples that Stalin deported and were 
part of what made Crimean ethnic cleansing so extreme.  Stalin’s lie and the deportation 
and bureaucratic genocide of Crimean Tatars were just the first steps in Crimean ethnic 
cleansing.  These economic and demographic policies were the next two phases of the 
project.  By 1950, the land redistribution and renaming produced the near total 
Russification of urban and rural Crimea.  The early economic stability of this new Crimea 
was precarious because the first voluntary resettlement campaign failed when Slavic 
farmers abandoned Crimean once they experienced the awful conditions.  As a result, 
Stalin began a campaign of forced migration that eventually succeeded in creating a 
Slavic (primarily Russian) population to fill the void of war and deportation.  Although 
resettlement occurred in other regions, the scale and duration of Crimean resettlement 
was unique and, unlike in Chechnya or Kalmykia, did not end after Stalin’s death.3 
As Crimean Tatar activists have stressed for decades, physically returning to 
Crimea did little to reverse the demographic changes, loss of possessions, and the “total 
renaming of population centers and the gifting Crimean Tatar national territory” after the 
deportation.4   In the same letters in which activists decried Stalin and the NKVD, they 
also condemned the postwar Crimean administration and Soviet organs that implemented 
and enforced Crimean ethnic cleansing by restructuring Crimea as a social, political and 
economic entity.  In the words of Crimean Tatars activists in 1990, this postwar Crimean 
                                                
3 For example, the resettlement of Crimea was on a much larger, long-term scale than in Chechnya, even 
though the Soviet Union deported at least 100,000 more Chechens than Crimean Tatars.  Moreover, most 
other resettlement campaigns ended when indigenous people returned after the release of special settlers in 
1956.  In Crimea, Crimean Tatars could not return and the resettlement continued until the late 1970s.  For 
a comparison of resettlement in Crimea and Chechnya, see GARF f. 327, op. 2, d. 662, l.l. 2-9 Otchet 
pereselencheskikh otdelov pri Groznenskom i Krymskom oblispolkomakh o rabote za 1950g. March 25, 
1951. 
4 GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 9. Telegraph to Sez”d RSFSR Delegatu Vaslovu, Vorotnikovu, 
Kozhokinu, Predsedatel’stvuiushchemu Kazakovu & Gazetu Sovetskaia Rossiia ot Sobraniia Krymskikh 




administration ensured that the results of Crimean ethnic cleansing had no “expiration 
date.”5  When Crimean Tatars returned, they found towns and districts with unfamiliar 
names and housing mostly new residents.6  When the privatization of land, homes, and 
economic enterprises began in the 1990s, returning Crimean Tatars had little to privatize 
and almost no political or economic influence.7  Therefore, this transformative aspect of 
Soviet ethnic cleansing is key to comprehending the immense challenges the Crimean 
Tatar movement faced in the areas of housing, economics, property and demography.   
Finally, examining economic and resettlement records further confirms the 
absurdity of Stalin’s false treason charges.  Far from suspicions of all Crimean Tatars, 
Crimean Tatar leaders were key in creating and implementing the Crimean recovery 
plans from 1943 until a week before the deportation.  In the month between liberation and 
the deportation, thousands of Crimean Tatar party members and leaders from the 
Crimean ASSR returned to Crimea.  In fact, the deportation destroyed the original 
Crimean recovery plans and created nearly insurmountable hardships in rebuilding the 
Crimean population and economy.  As this chapter underlines, only by forcing ethnic 
Slavs to move to Crimea was Stalin able to stabilize the Crimean economy.  
The rebuilding/reorganization and resettlement projects occurred simultaneously 
and depended on each other for their ultimate success.  This chapter discusses them 
separately as the most reasonable approach to understanding this large body of evidence.  
Since the rebuilding effort began earlier, the first section details this redistribution of land 
                                                
5 GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 15.  “Ne povtorit’ istoricheskoi oshchibki”- Zaiavlenie Makhalinskikh 
Sobranii NDKT. 02.06.90. 
6 Williams interviewed elderly Crimean Tatars in the 1990s who found confiscated possessions that the 
new Slavic residents kept such as tables and wall-hangings.  Williams The Crimean Tatars, 115. 
7 As Andrew Wilson argues, this allowed Crimean authorities to ignore Crimean Tatar political demands 
and pleas throughout the 1990s: see Andrew Wilson, “Politics in and around Crimea: A Difficult 




and resources.   The second section reveals the failures, force, and ultimate success of 
repopulating Crimea, and a final section explains the outcome and Crimean transfer to the 
Ukraine SSR.   These policies changed Crimea in ways that would influence political 
events in the domestic and international spheres for decades to come. 
 
Redistributing and Renaming 
 
 
 The war, occupation, and deportations shattered the Crimean ASSR.  The 
situation was dire by the summer of 1944, and agricultural production would only 
deteriorate further.8  Over half of Crimean farmland land remained fallow, and much of 
the cultivated fields died by autumn.  Most fruit trees had already died.  Water, the 
lifeblood of the arid region’s farms, resorts, and cities, was scarce because the war had 
destroyed irrigation systems and most wells.9   Ruined factories dotted Crimean cities, 
and the few in working condition mostly lacked the raw materials and workers to operate.  
This was especially true for factories that depended on agriculture such as bread factories, 
preserve canneries, grain mills and the wine and tobacco industries.10   
To recover from this devastation, Soviet officials had to reorganize Crimea.  Since 
the Crimean ASSR had actively promoted Crimean Tatar political, economic and cultural 
enfranchisement, Moscow recast the region as an oblast of the RSFSR, thus 
disassociating the region from its former role as the Crimean Tatar homeland.  The 
downgrade in status liquidated or radically changed the Soviet institutions that Moscow 
had used to promote Crimean Tatars and smaller deported groups in the former republic.  
                                                
8 RGAE, f. 4372, op. 46, d. 70, l. 59.  Dinamik posevnykh ploshchadei po Krymu. 1946. 
9 RGAE, f. 4372, op. 44, d. 970, l.l. 145, 37.  Upravlenie Delami Sovmin SSSR M. Pomaznev- Goslpan 
Tov. Demidovu.  November 12, 1949. 





This transformation included most Crimean collective farms, some factories, the majority 
of Crimea’s 435 Soviets and party branches, Komsomol branches, native-language 
schools, trade unions, and other organizations.11  Simultaneously, the state confiscated all 
material items and harvested goods that Crimean minorities had processed.  The other 
targets of this transformation were Crimean Tatar villages, place names, and other aspects 
of Crimean Tatar heritage that predated the Crimean ASSR.  Crimean authorities simply 
leveled some historical sites such as graveyards, but mostly they redistributed Crimean 
Tatar land with remaining structures intact.  In short, the new Crimean oblast 
administration first had to redistribute or eliminate much of the economic and political 
remnants of the Crimean ASSR. 
In the beginning, Crimean ethnic cleansing did not determine all aspects of the 
Crimean recovery.  Sevastopol functioned as its own entity, and Moscow was going to 
rebuild devastated Crimean industry regardless of the deportations.  However, documents 
from Gosplan, the Supreme Soviet, the NKVD, the Ministry of Land, and other Soviet 
organs are explicit in describing how ethnic cleansing and rebuilding became the same 
process.  As this section will underline, even Sevastopol naval installations and military 
factories that had had little to do with Crimean Tatar life before the war participated in 
land and resource redistribution. 
 The joint ethnic cleansing/recovery of Crimea after May 1944 had three primary 
actors, each with a different degree of participation.  The first actor was the main 
economic recovery agency in Crimea, and the one that had the most important role in 
legitimate postwar recovery, the Gosplan Committee for the Recovery in Crimea led by 
                                                
11 On the distribution of Crimean ASSR Soviets see GARF, f. A-385, op. 44, d. 120, l. 27.  Spisok raionov 





P. Ivanov.  This Gosplan branch would be key in facilitating early land redistribution.  
The second actor was the Crimean Communist Party under the leadership of Pavel 
Tiuliaev.  However, the party usually served as a rubber stamp to the third and most 
important actor, the Crimean Sovnarkom under the leadership of Aleksandr Kabanov.  
Originally, Stalin sent Kabanov to Crimea to oversee the confiscation of deported 
peoples’ land, but by November 1944 Kabanov had become the leader of the Crimean 
Sovnarkom and subsequently the most authoritative figure in Crimea.  In terms of 
replacing Crimean Tatar power in Crimea, the Sovnarkom post was key because, since 
the conception of the Crimean ASSR, the leader of the Sovnarkom had always been 
Crimean Tatar, while the party leader had usually been Russian. 
 In May 1944, Kabanov was still working for the Ministry of Agriculture 
(Narkomzem) and was just one of dozens of ministry workers organizing the confiscation 
process.  During this initial phase, Kabanov dealt solely with seizing Crimean Tatar land, 
houses, and work animals, as well making a general assessment of the remaining 
population.  Working alongside Kabanov, the Ministry of Milk and Meat (Narkom MMP) 
corralled milk cows and fowl, the Ministry of Food Production (Narkomzag) collected all 
“agricultural products,” and the Ministry of Finance (Narkomfin) handled all financial 
issues and confiscated cash.12  Kabanov and his colleagues had just begun confiscating 
Crimean Tatar possessions when Stalin increased their workload by deporting Greek, 
Armenian, Bulgarian and smaller minorities from Crimea in June.  
                                                
12 Stalin formed a committee headed led by the Soviet Sovnarkom and consisting of five other members, 
each representing a separate Soviet ministry.   
GARF, f. 10026, op. 4, d. 1025, l.l 90-91. Raschet vydeleniia produktov dlia spetspereselentsev- 




Ivanov and his Gosplan team arrived in Crimea weeks before the deportation, and 
began implementing the pre-liberation plan that Crimean ASSR officials had drafted in 
exile.  His first goal was to immediately restore the Sevastopol naval base and all other 
military installations, ports, railroads, motorways, communications, and industries vital to 
recovery.13  He also began rebuilding and repairing housing and government buildings in 
urban areas.  Because nearly every Soviet organ had an establishment in Crimea, he often 
served as an inspector and coordinator who interfaced between Gosplan, Crimean 
authorities, and dozens of ministries and economic enterprises.14   
 While Ivanov had no specific orders to combine ethnic cleansing and recovery, 
the reality of post-deportation Crimea made the synthesizing of the processes 
unavoidable.  The deportation fully or partially depopulated over 800 of the 1,200 
Crimean collective farms, and this was after these farms had sustained war loses.  Even in 
some urban areas such as Sevastopol where Crimean Tatars had been a small minority, 
the deportation hindered Ivanov’s work. To reiterate, most Crimean light industry, food 
factories, and resorts depended on products such as grapes, fruits, grains, tobacco, 
vegetables and meat that deported peoples had produced.15  Moreover, because the 
deportation was a haphazard, Ivanov, Gosplan and Crimean officials only received notice 
of the plan on May 17, 1944, one day before the deportations began.  Compounding the 
confusion, Moscow gave Gosplan and Crimean officials vague instructions about 
                                                
13 RGAE f. 4372, op. 45, d. 133, l. 32.  Otchet o rabote Uplonomochennogo Gosplana SSSR po Krymu, 
Ivanov.  April 1945. 
14 In fact, in the GOKO deportations and confiscation orders, there was no outline of what to do with the 
Crimean political and economic system afterwards.  
15 For example, Crimean officials complained how the deportation had further devastated the wine 
enterprise “Krymvintrest” and the network of Massandra vineyard sovkkhozes.  The same was true of the 
tobacco and citrus farms, as well as regular crops and vegetables such as peppers. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 




providing a new plan.16  From Ivanov’s point of view, the only way for Crimean 
agriculture to recovery to prewar levels was through reorganizing and redistributing the 
kolkhozes, sovkhozes, MTSs, and the attached factories.    
However, during the summer of 1944 Ivanov still had no concrete guidance from 
Moscow.  Rural Crimea was in chaos, and Ivanov and Tiuliaev began the reorganization 
of Crimean agriculture without treating Russian farms differently than those of deported 
peoples.  As the lead economic engineer, Ivanov reasoned that it did not matter who had 
lived on a farm before or why it was empty.  Therefore, throughout the summer of 1944, 
Gosplan and the Crimean party dissolved and redistributed over 440 collective farms of 
deported peoples and nearly 200 Slavic kolkhozes.  Kabanov alerted Moscow of this 
issue, and it became clear that Gosplan and Crimean authorities needed a direct order 
from the center before they were going to treat the farms of Slavs and non-Slavs 
differently.17   
Kabanov explained to Ivanov and Tiuliaev that Stalin had decided to create a 
“new Russian Crimea.”  They had to preserve and repopulate all Slavic farms, while 
dissolving and redistributing all non-Slavic farms.  Afterwards, Ivanov fused land 
redistribution with the general recovery process.  First, he disassembled the former 
republic’s autonomy by facilitating the RSFSR takeover of the Crimean ASSR’s 
economic infrastructure.  This measure gave the RSFSR more direct control over the 
industrial recovery and speed up redistributing confiscated land.18  Next, Ivanov explored 
                                                
16 GARF, f. 5446, op. 46, d. 1058, l. 125. Sovnarkom Rasporiazhenie No. 10789-r ot 17 maia 1944.  Zam. 
Pred. SNK SSSR A. Mikoian. 
17 Many Russian farms were almost vacant due to the war and evacuation. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 759, 
l.l. 103, 194-201, 107. November 27-29 Plenum of the Crimean Obkom (1944).  
18 For example, in May 1945 Moscow began placing factories of the Crimean Narkompishcheprom under 




how Crimean industry and enterprises could benefit from the post-deportation land rush.  
With the guidance of Ivanov, many Crimean economic entities claimed the land of 
deported peoples.   
After this initial misunderstanding, Stalin decided that building a new Crimea 
required one concrete leader.  Given the circumstances, Kabanov became the head of the 
new Crimean government.  He understood the level of devastation and controlled most of 
the remaining Crimean resources (outside of Sevastopol).  While Ivanov and Tiulaev 
would continue their roles, after November 1944 Kabanov effectively became their boss. 
Only by examining Kabanov’s efforts does the full extent of the combined 
recovery/ethnic cleansing become clear. 
The redistribution effort that Kabanov managed was confusing in some cases, 
while straightforward in others, and is best understood by categorizing specific examples 
into two different groups of redistributed land.  The Soviet government redistributed the 
first group of farms in massive orders that Kabanov arranged with Gosplan, other organs 
and economic enterprises.  In general, these orders affected the Crimean wine and 
tobacco industry that Crimean Tatars had dominated.  Kolkhozes and sovkhozes that 
Kabanov redistributed individually in or in small groups comprised the second group.  
 After Stalin’s deportation orders, perhaps no other acts did more to transform 
Crimea than order 877 on the “Immediate measures to restore the establishments and 
sovkhozes of the Crimean People’s Committee of Food Production” and similar mass 
redistribution plans.  Ironically, the first group of mass redistribution plans originated as 
                                                                                                                                            
organization, the Narkommiasomolproma RSFSR then placed individual factories and operations into the 
Russian republic organizations that reflected their product.  For example, the Simferopol poultry production 
plant became part of the “Rosglavmiaso trest.”  GARF f. A-259, op, 6, d. 536, l. 1.Sovnarkom RSFSR 
Rasporiazhenie No. 1231-r.  Signed by Zam. Predsedatelia Sovnarkom RSFSR A. Gritsenko. May 30, 




part of legitimate recovery efforts led by the Crimean Tatar head of the Crimean 
Sovnarkom, Seifulaev, and the Crimean ASSR government in exile.  They began 
working on the economic restoration plans well before the deportations in 1943.  
Comparing the three working versions of the project to the final version is a vivid paper 
trail documenting how Moscow removed the wartime Crimean ASSR officials and fused 
ethnic cleansing with recovery plans from May to July 1944.19 
 In its final version that Stalin signed on July 15, 1944, order 877 dissolved twenty 
Crimean Tatar kolkhozes and reorganized six larger Crimean Tatar sovkhozes in seven 
Crimean districts.  Many of the farms were part of the Massandar winery and the final 
plan reorganized the entire Crimean wine enterprise and placed it under the control of the 
food ministry (Narkompisheprom) of the RSFSR.   Other farms were part of the tobacco 
and produce industries. The order also mandated the transfer of remaining homes and 
buildings in dozens of Crimean Tatar villages such as Degermenkoi and Kizilkoi to the 
new farms that would soon house new settlers.20 
 Gosplan and the Crimean Sovnarkom next created a mass redistribution plan 
affecting former Crimean Tatar and a few German kolkhozes in Ak-Mechet, Fraidorf, 
and Larindorf districts.  The project dissolved the old kolkhozes and used the 82,635 
hectares of farmland to create three large sheep sovkhozes.21  Gosplan and Crimean 
officials then expanded the project, claiming more former Tatar farms.  In the final 
                                                
19 Seifulaev was working with Gosplan on the project up to a week before the deportations.  The pre-
deportation plan that includes Crimean Tatar farms and Seifulaev can be found in GARF, f. 5446, op. 46, d. 
1058, l.l. 105-121.  Proekt SNK SSSR Postanovlenie “O meropriiatiiakh po vosstanovleniiu predpriiatii 
Narkompishscheproma v osvobozhdennykh raionakh Kryma.”  The post-deportation plan is in the same 
delo. GARF, f. 5446, op. 46, d. 1058, l.l. 181-196.  SNK SSSR Postanovlenie No. 877 ot 15 iiulia 1944 “O 
neotlozhnykh meropriiatiiakh po vosstanovleniiu predpriiatii Narkompishscheproma v osvobozhdennykh 
raionakh Kryma.” 
20 Ibid. 





version approved on June 16, 1944, the project included all or some parts of over 40 
former kolkhozes and encompassed 147,400 hectares, all of which the order dissolved 
and redistributed into five large sovkhozes.  The order also created a Crimean wool 
enterprise that gained control of the structures and tools on the former farms.22  A further 
amendment to the order gave one large Crimean Tatar sheep kolkhoz, Kenegez, to the 
land ministry (Narkomzem SSSR) for an unexplained reason.23 
The redistribution of individual farms that comprised the second group was often 
confusing, but some general characteristics defined the process.  Orders concerning the 
piecemeal restructuring of Crimean kolkhozes and sovkhozes usually began with 
organizations requesting or physically occupying Crimean Tatar land.  Afterwards, 
Kabanov would make official requests to various organs in Moscow, and Moscow 
officials usually approved Kabanov’s recommendations.  Still, there were often 
disagreements because the redistribution of evenone farm could involve several different 
Soviet organs and enterprises competing for new land.  As such, understanding this 
process requires examining some specific cases.    
 The story of the Stalin’s Third Five-Year Plan kolkhoz outside of the village of 
Beshui in the Simferopol district displays how involved the redistribution process of 
Crimean Tatar land could become.  In the fall of 1944 with the farm workers gone and 
many buildings “destroyed by Germans,” the Simferopol cafeteria authority collected 
what fall harvest could be salvaged from the farm (albeit with no official permission to 
do so).  In addition, they spent 55,000 rubles on new equipment, buildings, and livestock.  
                                                
22 RGAE, f. 4372, op. 44, d. 1127, l.l. 27-28.  Spisok Karakulevodecheskikh Sovkhozov 
Narkomvneshtorga, vosstanavlivaemykh I vnov organizuemykh v Krymu. 
23 RGAE, f. 4372, op. 44, d. 1127, l.l.  25-29.  Sovnarkom SSSR “Postanovlenie “O vosstanovlenii i 




At the same time, other nearby Slavic kolkhozes began grazing livestock on the farm and 
additional local organizations made claims to parts of the 2,920-hectare farm.  The 
Southern-Coast Military Traders in Yalta and the Yalta Tuberculosis Sanatorium then 
approached the Simferopol Soviet for official permission to use parts of the farm.  On 
December 16, 1944, the Simferopol Soviet granted them permission, but this did little 
good since the cafeteria authority already had de facto control of the land. In the 
meantime, another one of the nearby kolkhozes, Krasnyi Oktiabria, bypassed the 
Simferopol’ Soviet and requested 60 hectares of farmland from the Crimean Sovnarkom, 
while the Kuibysheva Crimean Nature Preserve and Zoo followed suit and requested 400 
hectares of forestland.24    
 With just this one Crimean Tatar kolkhoz, by early 1945 five different 
organizations had either occupied the land or legally claimed it.  In an attempt to resolve 
the dispute, the involved parties presented their cases to Kabanov and the Crimean 
Sovnarkom.  The Crimean Sovnarkom accepted the initiative of the cafeteria 
organization, and granted them 2,460 hectares for a period of five years and granted 
Krasnyi Oktiabria its desired 60 acres.  In doing so, the Crimean Sovnarkom overruled 
the decision of the Simferopol district government and denied the Yalta military traders 
and tuberculosis sanatorium any claims, suggesting that they claim the land of “other 
empty kolkhozes.”25  The Crimean Sovnarkom then forwarded their order to the Soviet 
Sovnarkom for approval, and on April 30, 1945, Kosygin gave the cafeteria organization 
and the kolkhoz the requested amounts.  Oddly, the Crimean Nature Preserve must have 
                                                
24  GARF, f. 5446, op. 47, d. 3219, l.l. 1-2. Letter to Sovnarkom SSSR ot zam. Narodnogo Komissara 
Zemdeleniia SSSR Penzin, 2/IY, 1945. 
25 GARF, f. f. 5446, op. 47, d. 3219, l. 5. Postanovlenie Sovnarkom Krymskogo ASSR No. 278, March 14, 
1945.  Signed by Pred. Sovnarkom Krymskaia. ASSR V. Sederov and Uprav, Delam Sovnarkoma 




had friends in high places because Kosygin added their requested 400 hectares to the final 
order.26  
 As the above story suggests, the fate of former Crimean Tatar farms in the second 
group had individual twists and turns based on a variety of factors, but Kabanov usually 
had the final say on land claims.  For example, after the deportation of Crimean Tatars 
from the kolkhoz of Papanina near Bakchisarai,  “settlers of Russian nationality” from the 
nearby Krasnyi Krym kolkhoz occupied their homes.  In this case, the Russian farm 
workers had lost their own homes from German bombing.27  As a result, Kabanov and the 
Crimean Sovnarkom drafted order 560 on October 16, 1945, recommending that Krasnyi 
Krym annex Papanina to solve the housing situation and save the fruit trees and berry 
bushes that Crimean Tatars had tended.  Penzin at the Narkomzem in Moscow approved 
and both the Sovnarkom’s of the RSFSR and SSSR blessed Kabanov’s request.28   
Kabanov’s Crimean Sovnarkom order 883 on December 11, 1945, reorganized the 
Krymsovkhoz Tresta Glavkonserva, a communal farm organization that produced canned 
preserves.29  Kabanov divided the organization’s Crimean Tatar sovkhozes of Tomak, 
Chotty, and Eshkene into five separate farms and gave them the Russian names of 
Primor’e, Stepnoi, Vesna, Pobeda, and Frunze.  Mikoyan and the Sovnarkom in Moscow 
approved the restructuring on February 9, 1946.30   
                                                
26 GARF, f. 5446, op. 47, d. 3219, l. 13. Rasporiazhenie Sovnarkom SSSR No. 7123-r ot 30 aprelia 1945, 
singed by A. Kosygin.  
27 GARF, f. 5446, op. 47, d. 3230, l. 18. Vypisko iz raportiki No. 88, utverzhdennoi Tov. Andreevym and 
signed Tov. Degiar’ Sovnarkom RSFSR from November 19, 1945. (f. 5446, op. 47, d. 3230, l. 18) 
28 GARF, f. 5446, op. 47, d. 3230, l. 15. Resheni Ispolkom Krymskogo Oblsoveta Deputatov 
Trudiashchesiia No. 560, October 16 1945.  
29 GARF, f. 5446, op. 48, d. 1233, l. 15. Reshenie Ispolkoma Kryma no. 883, December 11, 1945.  Signed 
by A Kabanov.  
30 GARF, f. 5446, op. 48, d. 1233, l. 24. Sovnarkom Rasporiazhenie SSSR no. 1605-r.  Febuary 9, 1946.  




On a peninsula with scarce water resources, authorities coveted Crimean Tatar 
land with bodies of water.  The large reservoirs on the Tatar kolkhozes of Sergo and Eni-
Dun’ia led Kabanov to issue Crimean Sovnarkom order 644 that created water-foul 
farms.  In addition, the order established the Arbatskii sovkhoz on the 5,977 hectare 
Crimean Tatar sovkhoz of Arma-Eli.31 
 Land claims from the military and the NKVD usually encountered little 
controversy.  For instance, the Black Sea Fleet Factory 54 in Sevastopol desired 161 
hectares from the Crimean Tatar kolkhoz Bolshevik, and Kabanov and Moscow granted 
the requested with no challenges from other organizations.32   Having received that land, 
the Black Sea Fleet then requested an additional 1,808 hectares of land from the Eni-
Kuvet and Bolshevik Crimean Tatar kolkhozes in Crimea’s Zuiskskii district.  Kabanov 
personally supported the transfer and argued that that the land was not great for new 
settlers, but perfect for livestock because “the Germans had leveled the houses and the 
Tatars had been deported.”33  Kosygin approved of the fleet’s new pastureland on April 
18, 1945.  In addition, the same order also awarded the Crimean NKVD Spetstorg 1,781 
hectares of the former Tatar Third International kolkhoz in the Simferopol district.34 
 But the post-deportation land rush was not endless.  Not every organization got 
what it wanted, and Moscow did not endorse every request that Kabanov and the 
Crimean Sovnarkom made.  The Sergo Ordzhonikidze Aviation Institute in Moscow 
contacted Kabanov and requested 295 hectares of land from the Ulu-Uzen sovkhoz, but 
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22, 1944.  
32 GARF, f. 5446, op. 47, d. 3219, l. 13. Rasporiazhenie Sovnarkom SSSR No. 7123-r ot 30 aprelia 1945, 
singed by A. Kosygin. 
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the RSFSR Sovnarkom rejected the proposal because they wanted the sovkhoz’s fruits 
and vegetables to “stay in Crimea.”35  In other cases, Moscow upheld arbitration court 
decisions involving Tatar property and disputes that went against Kabanov’s wishes.36 
Moreover, disputes between new Crimean settlers and different Soviet organs 
over confiscating Crimean Tatar land continued well into the late 1940s as tens of 
thousands of new settlers arrived.  For example, farmers from the Fourth Party Congress 
kolkhoz wrote directly to Stalin and complained that the Simferopol Military Trade 
enterprise had misused the land of the former Crimean Tatar kolkhoz Zhdanov.37  The 
dispute lasted nearly two years as the farmers and enterprise accused each other of killing 
the farm’s fruit trees.  Despite the fact that the enterprise invested thousands of rubles 
into reconstructing the farm’s buildings, Moscow was desperate to retain the new farmers 
in Crimea and awarded them the land in June 1947.38  Despite such disputes, by late 1948 
Kabanov and Soviet authorities had accomplished most of the redistribution. 
 The redistribution of Crimean Tatar farms and other land did much to erase 
Crimean Tatars’ geographic footprint, but most of these orders only effected Soviet 
institutions and did not rename most of the villages and geography that predated the 
Soviet system.  The new Crimean communist party realized this problem early and began 
changing place names not included in land redistribution.  First, on July 16, 1944, the 
                                                
35 GARF f. f. A-259, op. 6, d. 769, l. 30.  Zam. Pred. Sovnarkom RSFSR A. Gritsenko to Sovnarkom 
SSSR. May 26, 1945. (no. 207-8) 
36 One important note is that while Crimea’s most important peacetime industry was the massive tourist 
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position to take on more territory in the immediate postwar period.  Instead, the party ministries and 
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Rasporiazhenia No. 555-r ot 16 marta 1945 goda.  By Zam. Predsedatelia Sovarkom RSFSR A. 
Sarotorszhskii. March 16, 1945. 
37 GARF, f. 5446, op. 49, d. 4208, l. 25.  Pis’mo “Po porucheniiu kolkhoznikov kolkhoza 4-ii S”ezd 
Soveta”- Stalinu.  January 18, 1947. 




Crimean Oblispolkom concluded that, “because of the changes of the situation in Crimea, 
we believe it is necessary to change the names of certain towns, district centers, MTSs 
and communal farms with any relationship to Tatar origins.”  The Oblispolkom then 
presented a list of name changes to Moscow for approval.39   
Their plan was ambitious and Moscow chose to complete the project in several 
phases, beginning on the macro-scale with districts.  On December 19, 1944, the 
Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR renamed the 11 non-Slavic districts of Crimea and their 
administrative centers.  For example, the Crimean Tatar Ak-Mechetskii district became 
Chernomorskii district, and the administrative center changed from Ak-Mechet to 
Chernomorsk.  The Karasubazarskii district became Belogorsk district, and so on.  Nine 
of the renamed districts were Crimean Tatar, while two were the German districts of 
Larindorf and Fraidorf that became Pervomaisk and Novoselsk, respectively.40  
 While these changes did go into effect and land redistribution largely took care of 
communal farm and MTS names, thousands of other villages maintained non-Slavic 
names. This concerned Kosygin and others in Moscow, and a RSFSR Presidium decree 
on August 21, 1945, proposed renaming all non-Slavic towns and locales in Crimea.41  In 
response, the Crimean Sovnarkom created a special commission for erasing non-Slavic 
names headed by Crimean Oblispolkom memeber and land management expert, I. 
Vevooborotov.42  Pouring over Crimean maps, they used patriotic terms, national heroes, 
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16 VIII, 1944. 
40 GARF, f. A-385, op. 47, d. 120, l. 101. Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhonogo Soveta RSFSR No. 621/8 ”o 
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41 GARF, f. A-385, op. 47, d. 120, l. 147. Spravka by Bukharov. October 20, 1967.  
42 GARF, f. A-385, op. 47, d. 120, l. 148.   Zam. Zaveduiushchego Otdelom Klub Krasnykh Sledopytov G. 




and geopgraphic features to create new names, all of which were Russian.43  However, 
the implimentation of the thousands of name changes was slow and confusing, and the 
project stalled as the Soviet authorities in Crimea struggled to provide food and 
provisions to civilians. 
 Finally, in the spring of 1948, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet created a new 
commission to complete the Crimea renaming project that included members from the 
Crimean and RSFSR governments, as well as the topographic department of the Soviet 
armed forces.44  The result of their labor was RSFSR Supreme Soviet Order 745/3 on 
May 18, 1948.  The sweeping, eleven-page document immediately renamed 1,062 
Crimean towns and villages, the vast majority of which were Crimean Tatar.  It effected 
every district, not just the Tatar and German districts renamed in 1945.  
When combined with already renamed districts and Soviet institutions, the result 
was the near-total Russification of Crimean geography.  What was in 1941 the village of 
Ak-Kaia in the Karasubazarskii district became the village of Beloe Skala in the 
Belogorskii district by the summer of 1948. The village of Sheikh-Monai in the 
Ichkinskii district became Lebednika in the Sovetskii district, while the village of Kul'-
Dzhankin in the Ak-Mechetskii district became Okhotniki in the Chernomorskii district.  
It was so radical that it even renamed Russian and Ukrainian villages because they too 
were associated with the defunct Crimean ASSR.  For instance, the Ukrainian village of 
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Merkulova became Lebednianka, while the Mikhailovka Slaviansk farm soviet became 
the Borodino soviet.45   
With the land redistribution and remaming policiy, Stalin erased the Crimean 
Tatar homeland as a geographic and economic entitiy in what was a stunning reversal of 
Soviet indigenization policies.  However, initially much of the reorganization of Crimea 
was only on paper because there was no one to work the new farms and live in renamed 
villages.  As such, a coplimentary policy aimed to populate this project. 
 
Repopulating Crimea:  A Coalition of the Reluctant and Willing 
 
 
 Combined with the wartime population loses, the deportation was catastrophic for 
Crimean demographics and imperiled the reconstruction of Crimea.  Crimean officials 
and Stalin’s inner circle admitted this fact.  As Kosygin told Molotov in a September 
1944 letter, the two violent events removed two-thirds of the prewar Crimean 
population.46  According to Soviet counts, the war shrunk the Crimean population from 
1,126,000 people in 1939 to only 633,000 people immediately after the April 1944 
liberation.  The deportation then removed another approximately 230,000 people, 
meaning by June 1944 only around 400,000 people remained in Crimea.  The worst 
situation was on Crimea’s mountainous Southern coast where most Crimean Tatars had 
lived.47   
                                                
45 GARF, f. A 385, op. 47, d. 120, l.1. 111-122(obs).  Ukaz Prezidiuma Ver. Sov. RSFSR No. 745/3 ”O 
pereimenovanii naselennykh punktov Krymskoi oblasti.”  Signed by Pred. Pres. Ver Sov. RSFSR I. Vlasov 
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46 GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 6460, l.l. 7-8.  Spravka, A. Kosygin- Molotovu. September 9, 1944. 
47 GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 3368, l.l. 19-20.  Pis’mo s proetom postanovleniia GOKO No. 6372s.  




The wastefulness of the deportation is difficult to overstate.  From republic-level 
plans down to the plans of individual farms, it interrupted a recovery that had already 
been underway for a month.  Remaining Crimean leaders admitted that the deportation 
reversed much of the progress made in the month between liberation and the beginning of 
deportations. Even Gosplan’s basic infrastructure repairs were nearly impossible with the 
new labor deficit.  In one typical letter that illuminates the reality of the recovery effort, 
the officials of the Siuren-Koush Railroad complained that they had the rails to repair 
railroads, but no workers to lay the rails.48   
The worst situation was in Crimean agriculture.  The land office of the Soviet 
Sovnarkom admitted that the exit of Crimean Tatars killed most of the Crimean farms 
that still were partially functioning after the war.  The new party secretary for the Seitler 
district, Puzakov, told the party that 12 of his farms were not functioning because of the 
“special settlement.”49  Tobacco industry officials described how Crimean Tatar tobacco 
farmers were tending their fields when the deportation ripped them from their crops.50  A 
speaker at the Crimean party plenum remarked how they had created their work plan 
“before the deportation of Tatars,” had begun implementing that plan in April 1944, and 
now were having to make extensive “corrections.”51  Officials in the Sudak district 
complained that there was not one grape-growing expert remaining, that the fruit trees 
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1944 goda. Sekretar Seitlerskogo RK Puzakov. 
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SSSR V. A. Sharapov- Mikoianu I Narkomu Zagotovok K. P. Subbotinu.  May 31, 1944. 
51 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 758, l.l. 25-25ob.  Protokol No. 1 Zasedaniia Plennuma Obkoma VKP(b) ot 14 




had died, and the tobacco was wilting.52  Even the Crimean Party Secretary, Tiuliaev, 
along with the director of the Massandar wine enterprise, did not hesitate in underlining 
the deportations’ role in the situation.  In a report on the Massandar winery enterprise to 
Moscow, they described how “since the deportation of Tatar kolkhozes” all the grape 
vines were now in awful shape and had been “overrun with weeds” in absence of “Tatar 
grape growers.”53  A NKVD inspection of Crimean farms in August 1944 revealed a non-
existent harvest.54   
Crimean authorities needed these farms to reestablish the Soviet system in 
Crimea.  Again, the lack of agricultural production meant that even operational Crimean 
factories were useless without raw materials, and the real production of bread and food 
products was only a fraction of prewar levels.55  In desperation, Tiuliaev and Gosplan 
ordered thousands of factory workers and soldiers in Crimean cities to help save crops 
that the deportees had planted in the spring.  The effort was fruitless and many Crimean 
factory directors balked at providing workers, and instead sent “homemakers, pensioners, 
and invalids.”56  Furthermore, stretching the urban Crimean workforce thin only slowed 
the reconstruction of Crimean infrastructure.  
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1944 goda. 
55 GARF, f. 5446, op. 48, d. 1233, l.l. 8-7. Letter to Sovnarkom SSSR on March 16, 1945 from Zam. 
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Soon, Crimean officials wrote blunt letters to Moscow demanding a fix to the 
labor deficit.57  As a result, the land office of the Sovnarkom in Moscow and Gosplan 
pushed the matter of repopulating the peninsula, specifically citing the fact that the 
deportations had made realizing pre-war agricultural production “extremely difficult.”  
By July 14, 1944, Crimean party leaders and Gosplan had compelled the Soviet 
Sovnarkom to act.58   But who was going to go?  As war raged there were few workers to 
spare between May 1944 and 1946.   
However, Moscow considered Crimea a special situation and found the people. 
The wave of new settlement had two main groups.  The first group was part of an official 
resettlement plan that, often forcefully, moved Slavic settlers from the mainland to the 
peninsula.  The secondary group consisted of spontaneous and uncoordinated 
resettlement that the Soviet government and armed forces encouraged.    
The first group of settlers began arriving after Stalin and the GOKO ordered the 
resettlement of 51,000 Russian and Ukrainian farmers (17,000 total kolkhoz families) to 
Crimea on August 12, 1944.  The order specified that Kabanov had to provide the settlers 
the private plots and homes of “former Tatar, Bulgar and other deported farmers” with 
the purpose of restarting Crimean agriculture.59  They also received home loans and a tax 
break.60  The bulk of these families were from farms in the Voronezh, Krasnodar, Rostov, 
Tambov, and Stavropol’ regions, with smaller numbers from other regions and the 
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Ukrainian SSR. Among these farmers were 819 “specialists” including 165 kolkhoz 
directors, 125 soviet chairs, tractor drivers, mechanics and other skilled professionals.  
The plan called on Crimean officials to travel to the designated oblasts and, working with 
local officials, choose the new settlers and complete the resettlement between September 
1 and 15, 1944.  While delayed a few weeks because of poor road conditions and wartime 
chaos, resettlement officials soon exceeded their target.  By mid-October 1944, 85 
convoys had brought nearly 65,000 settlers (17,082 families) to Crimea.61 
This first plan to resettle Crimea with Slavic farmers failed for several reasons.  
First off, although Soviet officials referred to these settlers as “volunteers,” the 
relocations were often forced and the Slavic settlers faced some of the same problems as 
special settlers.  The plan was haphazard and Crimean party and government officials 
only had three-days notice that they would be receiving thousands of settlers, and hence 
were unprepared.62  Because of the speed of the relocation, the NKVD and Crimean 
officials crammed the settlers into train cars before they could collect their last paychecks 
or back-pay from their former kolkhozes.63   In contrast to special settlers, they traveled 
in passenger cars and not cattle wagons.   They also had a shorter trip (usually 3 days) 
and actually received food rations en route.64   Regardless, most “volunteer” settlers did 
not want to go, and this would soon become obvious. 
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A second reason for the failure (and another similarity to special settlement) were 
the awful conditions awaiting the “voluntary” settlers. The GOKO order had promised 
food, grain, livestock, fruit trees, loans for homebuilding and other supplies.65  However, 
as was evident in Chapter Two, there was little food or animals left in Crimea to support 
the new settlers.  The key difference between the special settlers and the Crimean settlers 
was that, since they want the project to succeed, Soviet authorities provided sufficient 
sustenance to the settlers to avoid mass starvation.  Moreover, unlike Crimean Tatars, 
Soviet authorities often allowed settlers to take food, livestock, and other supplies with 
them.66   While this extra food prevented mass death, food still became scarce during the 
first month in Crimea and a lack of livestock feed threatened herds.67 
A third problem was that, despite the importance of Crimean resettlement, 
repairing Crimea’s military bases was the top priority in the early Cold War and the 
demands of military officials often trumped the needs of resettlement.68  As a result, 
housing was insufficient because promised lumber, construction materials and funding 
were unavailable.69  Exacerbating the housing situation was the fact that the land 
redistribution and resettlement processes were often uncoordinated, sometimes 
                                                                                                                                            
Upolnomochennyi Voronezhskogo Obkoma Partii Tiurin I Nachalnik eshelona No. 634 Bartenev.  
September 14, 1944. 
65 GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 3368, l.l. 13-18.  GOKO postanovlenie No. 6372s ot 12 avgusta 1944 goda.  
“O pereselenie kolkhoznikov v raiony Kryma.” 
66 For example, one convoy of 50 families from Voronezh oblast included 232 cows, as well as smaller 
numbers of calves, goats, pigs, and several tons of vegetables and grain.  Another convoy of 7,281 settlers 
from Tambov oblast arrived in Karasubazar district with 560 cattle, 630 sheep and goats, 20 pigs and 790 
birds.  However, in some cases the relocation authorities lost “lost” settlers’ animals or refused to let them 
take everything.    GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 3368, l. 33.  Telegram Sekretar’ Tambovskogo Okoma 
Volkov, Pred. Oblispolkoma Volokarinov i Upolnomochennyi GOKO Silin- Molotovu.  September 24, 
1944.  
67 RGAE, f. 4372, op. 45, d. 133, l 40.  “Otchet o rabote Ivanov.”  September 20, 1945. 
68 GARF, f. 5446, op. 49a, d. 3407, l.24.  Sovmin SSSR Rosporiazhenie No. 4053rs ot 14 aprelia 1947. 
69 GARF, f. 8131, op. 29, d. 289, l.l. 8-10.  Pis’mo Pred. Krymskogo Oblispolkoma S. Postobalov i 
Sekretar’ Krymskogo obkoma P. Titov- Malenkovu. “O Khode pereseleniia v kokhoze Krymskou oblasti.”  




conflicting, and always unclear on how many livable structures remained in any given 
village.  When 200 settler families arrived in the Crimean Tatar villages of Biiuk-
Uzenbash and Kuchuk Uzenbash, the settlers learned that the Germans had actually 
burned down all 643 Tatar homes during the occupation.  Next, the settlers learned that 
Kabanov had already transferred the land to a factory so they could not even build new 
homes.70   By September 1944, at least 2,640 farming families were homeless, and 
Crimean officials struggled to shelter them. By the winter of 1945-1946 thousands of 
families lived in temporary housing or with multiple families.71  In contrast to special 
settlers, Crimean authorities prevented death from exposure, but could not ensure decent 
living conditions and the settlers, again, complained.72   
The fourth problem was that the settlers had little clue about how to farm in the 
foreign climate and topography.   Few of the farmers were familiar with tobacco 
cultivation and grape growing.73  Unlike their old kolkhozes in the “black earth” 
heartlands of Western Russia and Ukraine, Crimean Tatar farms were widely dispersed in 
rugged and mountainous territory.  For example, Ukrainian party officials were 
concerned that the settlers arriving at the Kzyl-Kermen kolkhoz would be isolated 
because the farm actually consisted of 75 small plots scattered across several 
mountainsides.  At the Lenin kolkhoz in the Otarchisk agricultural soviet, the 90 hectares 
of pastureland were located in 33 separate plots, while the Leninism farm in the Tataro-
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Osman agricultural Soviet had 34 separate pastures.  As one Ukrainian official argued, 
“these farmers were used to growing grain, potatoes and vegetables… and scattering 
them on isolated mountainside plots created unfamiliar and difficult conditions.”74   This 
isolation also made the logistics of distributing household necessities daunting and this 
remained an annoying fact-of-life for the settlers until the early 1950s.75 
The fifth problem was that there were no experts or farm directors to teach new 
settlers how to successfully farm in Crimea.   The deportation of Crimean Tatars expelled 
most Crimean hydrology, winery, and tobacco experts and workers, and the cumulative 
knowledge that they had honed in the arid environment disappeared.76  After the 
irrigation issue became obvious in the second half of 1944, the Sovnarkom ordered the 
Ministry of Land to send 50 skilled workers to Crimea to help create irrigation systems 
for the settlers.77  Other orders also sent agricultural specialists to Crimea.  Still, these 
specialists still had no knowledge of Crimean specifics.  Moreover, the agricultural 
schools in Crimea were wrecked, and many of the former instructors dead or deported.78  
Even in Slavic kolkhozes with farmers who survived the occupation, the NKVD had 
removed most of the directors for operating kolkhozes under occupation, leaving 
survivors and the new settlers with poorly organized farms run by a depleted staff.79  
While the repopulation effort was massive, the repopulation plan in ideal conditions 
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Ukr. SSR V. Starchenko- GOKO (Molotovu).  September 4, 1944. 
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would take a decade to replace war losses, meaning Crimean farms continued with a 
depleted labor force for years.80   
The sixth problem was the fact that the Crimean party and government remained 
depleted.  For example, in October 1944 only 30 percent of the prewar party members 
remained.81  Many town and district party organizations barely existed.  While there was 
a campaign to attract Komsomol members to Crimea, as the war still raged there simply 
was a lack of experienced men and women to replace the old cadres.82 
 The seventh and final problem was that many of the home regions that the settlers 
were leaving from were also devastated.83  Not surprisingly, local Russian and Ukrainian 
authorities did not want to part with healthy farmers and their livestock.  Russian and 
Ukrainian officials often resisted the orders and complained about the conditions and the 
fact that many settlers did not want to go to Crimea.  At first, Kosygin responded by 
telling the officials and settlers to stop complaining and follow orders.84   
With Kosygin’s blessing, Crimean party workers and the NKVD began 
aggressive efforts to poach kolkhoz farmers, but this created even fiercer resistance.  In 
Kursk, Voronezh, and Ivanov oblasts, local party workers and farm directors refused to 
assist Crimean authorities, and claimed that they had received no orders.  In several other 
Russian and Ukrainian regions, local authorities forbid the selected farmers from leaving.  
A number of party and government workers also used force and intimidation to dissuade 
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82 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 44, d. 763, l. 130.  “Doklad o rabote Krymskogo Obkoma.”  October 1944. 
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Crimean authorities.  For example, in the Riazan district of Iaroslavl’ oblast the district 
party secretary had the police expel Crimean party workers and refuse their reentry into 
the district.    Elsewhere, local party workers destroyed the promotional Crimean posters 
and forbade the distribution of Crimean party newspapers.85 
 Another tactic that local leaders employed to avoid losing productive farm 
families to Crimea was sending “invalids, elderly, and city dwellers” in place of farmers.  
The first secretary of the Cherkess district in Stavropol region said he would not send 
healthy farmers.  And many others party leaders repeated this threat and followed through 
by sending “hairstylists, artists, nurses, and accounts,” as well as the “chronically ill and 
people with sexually transmitted diseases.”86   
The second group of new settlers were not part of the official plan and consisted 
of the families of Soviet soldiers, some demobilized soldiers from the Red Army and 
Black Sea Fleet, and homeless kolkhoz families from the Western oblasts of Russia.  
Although the exact numbers and motivations of these settlers are hazy because their 
movements were often off the radar of Soviet bureaucracy, anecdotal evidence reveals 
that their numbers were significant.  Catherine Merridale suggests that Soviet soldiers in 
Crimea saw themselves as “conquers” who “inhabited empty houses that were thick with 
ghosts.”87  For example, in Crimea’s Kuibyshevskoi district at least 188 families of Black 
Sea veterans had settled in former Tatar homes by September 1944 even though Ivanov 
had designated the homes for official settlers.  In a similar fashion, the families of sailors 
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also occupied deportee homes in Verkhniaia, Fotisala, Ianisala and other villages before 
the new settlers arrived.88   In early September 1945, the head of the Orgbiuro of the 
Crimean Obkom Soviet M. P. Goroshkin wrote an urgent letter to the Central Committee 
of the Forestry Union in Moscow requesting “to please explain the rules for handling new 
settlers arriving to live in the homes of Crimean Tatars that had been deported from the 
kolkhozes.”  He explained that the bulk of new settlers have come on their own accord 
from the Rostov, Stavropol, Tambov Kuban, and Voronezh oblasts and that the kolkhoz 
and forestry managers have welcomed them.  In addition, there were also new settlers 
who Red Army soldiers returning from the front and others who had been conscripted by 
the Nazis into German slave labor.  With Crimean farms still in disarray, many of these 
people began working for the Soviet forestry service, producing lumber for rebuilding.  
As such, Goroshkin asked if he could offer these unofficial settlers Crimean registration 
and membership in the Forestry Union.89  The answer from Moscow was that all Slavic 
persons with passports could settle in Crimea.  Furthermore, the VTsSPS ordered all 
Crimean workers’ unions to accept new Slavic members.90  The result was that, as long 
as you were of a “safe” ethnicity such as Russian or Ukrainian, you could stay. 
 Not only could they stay, but by October 26 the Sovmin in Moscow ordered that 
resettlement benefits for official settlers be expanded to 1,000 families of these unofficial 
settlers.91  In 1950, the Sovmin continued this policy and specified that Crimean farms 
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had to accept the at least 1,000 new families of Soviet armed forces servicemen a year 
outside of the official plans and required this policy to continue indefinitely.92  These 
orders not only provide a hint at how many families were moving on their own, but also 
showed that Moscow supported their actions.  Regardless, even if most remained in 
Crimea, their numbers before 1950, while significant, could not rescue the faltering 
official resettlement. 
 Even by Stalinist standards of waste and inefficiency, the Crimean resettlement 
project had become a spectacular failure by the summer of 1945.  Russian and Ukrainian 
settlers, for the most part, simply did not want to deal with the plethora of problems 
described above.  They were technically volunteers and not special settlers, so they voted 
with their feet and left by the tens of thousands once they realized the harsh conditions of 
life on the peninsula.  This was settlers’ best form of protest to their predicament.  Ivanov 
was the first to document the exodus.  When he inspected 12 resettled kolkhozes in April 
1945, he was furious to find that 932 families had already fled those locations and 
returned to their old farms.93  On further investigation he found that 4,259 of the 17,040 
families that had moved to Crimea as part of the original resettlement had already left 
Crimea.94  The final attrition rate for the first waves of special settlers is staggering.  
From May 1944 to the end of 1946, at least 18,040 families (65,888 people) resettled in 
Crimea.  By the end of 1950, at least 10,962 of those families had left Crimea.95  Besides 
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wasted labor and time, Gosplan complained that the failure had already wasted at least 
40.5 million rubles by July 1946.96   
 As the extent of the failure became clear, Crimean authorities attempted drastic 
measures.  In particular, Crimean officials complained that settlers had learned how to 
profit from the resettlement benefits without actually staying in Crimea.  Many farmers 
collected the building loans for home construction and then left Crimea and returned to 
their former farms.   While Crimean authorities had the NKVD to coerce settlers into 
moving, they had no mechanism to make them stay.  Crimean authorities loathed this 
fact, and demanded that the head Soviet prosecutor in Moscow allow them to charge 
settlers who left Crimean kolkhozes after taking home loans with a felony for theft 
(ugolovnoe delo).97  However, the settlers were not special settlers, and the head SSSR 
prosecutor’s office responded by saying that there was nothing technically illegal about 
taking the loans and leaving Crimea.98 
 The failure of resettlement did not stop the effort because the project was too 
important to Moscow.  At the same time, the conditions improved little from 1944 to 
1950 so the failures repeated themselves annually.  For example, the 1950 resettlement 
plan brought a further 3,019 families (13,523 people) to Crimea.  Over half of the 
families fled immediately, and by the beginning of 1951 only 676 of the new families 
remained.   
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Finally, from 1948 to 1950, Gosplan and Crimean officials convinced Stalin’s 
inner circle that the resettlement by attrition was not working.99  First, an often-ignored 
August 26, 1948, Supreme Soviet decree that legalized home private home ownership 
(and hence private home sales) for Soviet citizens who built their own homes on state 
land gave new settlers more incentive to stay in Crimea.100  Homeownership did have an 
appeal to Homo Sovieticus.101  Next, in late 1949, Malenkov ordered a massive 
construction and propaganda campaign to rescue Crimean resettlement.  Before the new 
construction project began, teams of Crimean party workers and regular Crimean workers 
traveled to the locales of potential settlers and distributed editions of the Crimean party 
paper, Krasnyi Krym (Red Crimea), brochures on the Crimean travel and history, and 
plastered farm and party building with promotional Crimean posters.102 
 The key change with the new campaign was that homebuilding efforts were much 
more robust.  Whereas before, materials never arrived, after 1950 the opposite was true.  
The Sovmin special settlement division distributed tractors, cars, petrol, machine tools, 
and generators, roofing materials and other hardware, and confirmed that Crimean 
settlers actually received the goods.103  This included monthly inspections of every 
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district with new settlers.104  Moreover, Crimean authorities sent Crimean kolkhoz 
workers by the hundreds to personally log forests in the Arkhangelsk region and 
chaperone the lumber on special trains bound for Crimea.  On Crimean farms and in 
cities receiving settlers, the government coordinated with construction organizations and 
organized several construction brigades to make sure the wood did not go to waste once it 
arrived.  The Crimean party claimed that it quickly built several hundred new homes in 
the spring of 1950 as the building materials arrived.  In addition, various industries and 
Crimean enterprises such as the Forestry Workers Union built dorms for workers, and 
whole families began occupying new dorms.105 
 Furthermore, considering settlers’ complaints about the layout of Crimean Tatar 
farms, villages and houses, in the early 1950s Crimean construction directors began 
stressing to new settlers that they would be living in “Russian” and not “Tatar Houses.”  
According to one Crimean official, he agreed with settlers that Crimean Tatar houses 
were “not suitable for inhabitation by Russian people.”  They often lacked heating stoves 
and had narrow corridors, thin doors, awkward stairs and sometimes windows only on the 
second floor or very low windows on the first floor.  Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the 
isolation of houses on the sides of mountains was not ideal for well-planned kolkhozes.   
As such, Crimean officials ordered the disassembly and rebuilding of Crimean Tatar 
homes in the Sudak, Alushta, Yalta and other districts to create housing clusters 
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resembling mainland Russian villages and “Slavic living conditions.”106  In the long-
term, this effort gave rebuilding and farm reorganization a crucial role in Crimean ethnic 
cleansing and transforming Crimea. 
 An effort to restore Crimean resorts coincided with the homebuilding drive.  The 
resorts’ successful recovery provided demand for Crimean agriculture and gave the new 
settlers purpose.  While the full extent of Crimean resort recovery is outside the scope of 
this study, similar to Crimean repopulation efforts, the early recovery plans stalled 
because of the lack of building materials, personnel, the theft of construction materials 
and the reconstruction of military bases taking precedence.107 As late as 1949, the 
condition of many Crimean tourist areas was embarrassing to Crimean authorities.  
Soviet workers came to Crimea to relax, not to wade through “flowing excrement” 
running down a hillside.108   In response, the Sovmin SSSR in Moscow created the 
Commission of Crimean Resorts to undertake repairs and begin a general beatification 
program.109  Stalin then issued numerous decrees throughout the early 1950s that 
prioritized the industry both as the foundation of the Crimean peacetime economy, and as 
an international symbol of Communist paradise.110 
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Crimean farm directors greeted new settlers with celebrations and the party 
claimed that settlers cheerfully exclaimed that they were happy to “follow the orders of 
comrade Stalin to transform the nature of Crimea, and grow on its fertile ground aromatic 
tobacco, citrus fruits, grapes, and grains.”  The Crimean party did exaggerate much of the 
pageantry and preparations, but the much lower attrition rates of settlers after 1951 
indicate that Crimean authorities had improved living and working conditions.111  More 
proof of the improved conditions was that for the rest of the 1950s the number of 
unofficial settlers and military families boomed.  By 1953, Crimean officials realized that 
providing benefits to only 1,000 unofficial families a year was inadequate, and the 
Crimean party guaranteed another 5,000 families benefits if they moved themselves to 
Crimea.  By mid-1953, Crimean authorities had registered 2,840 new families (10,388 
people) outside of official resettlement plans.  According to Crimean officials, news of 
improved conditions in Crimea spread with the help of military spouses.112 
 
A Transformed Crimea and Transfer to the Ukraine SSR 
 
 
 Finally, although this topic deserves a more detailed examination independent of 
this study, the 1954 transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR was also important in the 
successful transformation of Crimea.  The transfer was not a random decision by 
Khrushchev, but the result of Stalin’s actions that began in 1947 and snowballed.  The 
RSFSR failures to coordinate housing construction and reestablish water sources after the 
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war led Stalin to believe that RSFSR organs could handle neither the repopulation nor 
future canal building logistics.  As such, this power transfer began with Stalin’s decision 
that the Ukrainian “Ukrovodstroi” construction organization, and not similar RSFSR 
construction organizations, would control the Crimean canal construction meant to 
provide Crimea’s steppe regions with water from the Dnepr.113  
The most noticeable consequence of the Ukrainian takeover from 1950 to 1954 
and the final transfer were upticks in irrigation and home construction that helped 
convince Russian settlers to stop abandoning Crimea en mass.114  As early as 1951, 
Ukrovodstroi began running Crimean building projects related to the repopulation 
project.115   From 1950 to 1953, Ukrovodstroi improvements in irrigation and repairing 
wells allowed the organized repopulation of Crimea to continue and at least 186,500 new 
settlers arrived.116   
Stalin’s death and the transfer did slow down and complicate the logistics of 
repopulation for a few years. His death put many of his policies into question, especially 
the return of deported peoples to their homelands.  The final transfer meant that the 
RSFSR committee on settlement that had arranged resettlement from 1944 to 1954 no 
                                                
113 For an example of how Stalin gradually placed Ukrainian construction enterprises in charge of Crimean 
infrastructure see GARF f. 5446, op. 86 d. 4294, l. 208 (Sovmin SSSR Postanovlenie ot 29 Maia 1952 g. 
No. 2506 “Ob organizatsii politotdelov pri stroitel’no-montazhnykh upravleniiakh Ukrodvodstroia.” 
114 On the complete transfer of construction enterprises see GARF f. 112 (Min. Zhilishchni-Grazhdanskii 
Stroitel’stva RSFSR), op. 1, d. 408, l.l. 2-3. Prikaz po Ministervstvu Zhilishchno-Grazhdanskogo 
Stroitel’stva RSFSR no. 82.  1 April 1954. 
115 On how Ukrovodstroi took the initiative in further expanding their work in Crimea see GARF f. 5446, 
op. 60, d. 14877, .l.l. 1-2. Min. Klopkovodstva SSSR Iu. Iusupov- Malenkovu. 16 May 1952. 
116 Both Crimean Tatars and later Soviet commissions quoted these figures from a published report titled 
Narodnoe khoziastvo Krymskoi oblasti (Odessa, 1967). See also, GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l.l. 15-16. 
Pis’mo “Ocherednoi shag v napravlenii likvidatsii krymsko-tatarskogo naroda kak natsii.”  October 4, 
1967.  As with all Soviet numbers, the real totals likely differ from these well-rounded numbers.  Adding to 
the confusion, Sovmin plans only listed the number of families, not individuals, and it is not clear if these 
numbers counted unofficial settlers.  Regardless, every source agrees that tens of thousand of settlers 
arrived annually between 1944 and 1954.  See GARF f. 5446, op. 86, d. 2908, l.l. 24-26.  Sovmin SSSR 





longer participated in the project, and the Ukraine SSR needed time to organize new 
population transfers.117  However, the lull in new settlement benefited the repopulation 
program by allowing Crimean home construction to catch up with demand.118  Once the 
mass repopulation effort restarted (albeit with larger percentage of Ukrainian settlers), the 
housing situation had improved dramatically.  Per official resettlement plans another 
300,500 people settled in Crimea between 1958 and 1966, with very low attrition rates.119   
As the rest of this study will underline, and as Crimean Tatars understood all-too-
well, the redistribution, renaming and repopulation policies were crucial to the success of 
Stalin’s overall plan of ethnic cleansing and transforming Crimea.  “Of course we don’t 
represent a majority of the Crimean population,” admitted Crimean Tatar leader and 
activist Mustafa Dzhemilev to writer Anna Reid in 1993.  By that time, Crimean Tatars 
had achieved their primary goal of returning to Crimea, but the results of Stalin’s 
redistribution, renaming, and repopulation campaigns undermined Crimean Tatar rights 
in their “native land.”  This is why Crimean Tatar activists have documented and 
criticized the policies described in this chapter since the 1950s.120  Because Crimean 
Tatars no longer had a room in the Soviet “communal apartment,” Stalin remodeled the 
room for a new national tenant.  This “remodeling” dismantled Soviet institutions 
designed for Crimean Tatars, as well was pre-Soviet Crimean Tatar homes, villages and 
cultural sites. Taken together, these policies provided the economic, geographic and 
                                                
117 Gosplan had a plan to settle 2,400 families in 1954, but only around one hundred families ended up 
moving.  GARF, f. 5446, op. 87, d. 1500, l. 6.  Pis’mo Gosplan (G. Kosiachenko i A. Kozlov)- Malenkovu.  
July 1953. 
118 GARF, f. 9520, op. 1, d. 322, “Ekskursii po gorodu Simferopoliu.” TEU VTsSPS.  June 1, 1956. 
119 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l.l. 15-16. Pis’mo “Ocherednoi shag v napravlenii likvidatsii krymsko-
tatarskogo naroda kak natsii.”  October 4, 1967. 
120 Anna Reid.  Borderland: A Journey through the History of Ukraine (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 




demographic foundations of the new “Russian” Crimea.  The fact that the Russifying 
region became part of Ukraine is another glaring contradiction in Soviet policy towards 
Crimea and Crimean Tatars. As chapter five and chapter eight explain, while not having 
many immediate consequences outside of economics and resources, the transfer created a 












From 1944 to 1954, Stalin and the Soviet state cleansed the Crimean room of the 
Soviet “communal apartment” and turned a former Russian colony into a Russian 
homeland.1  As chapter two elucidates, Stalin began this systematic expulsion of 
Crimea’s non-Slavic peoples with the 1944 deportation of Crimean Tatars and other 
minorities.  While Stalin’s Crimean ethnic cleansing was a process of destruction, it also 
included creative elements.  After the deportations, Soviet officials decided to replace 
diverse Crimean historical and cultural heritage with a new Crimean narrative, a rewritten 
history for a region they had just ethnically cleansed.   
While the Soviet Union deported indigenous populations in over a dozen 
republics and oblasts during World War II, the Crimean project was unique.  The Soviet 
ethnic cleansing of Crimea was a multifaceted project that included deportation, land 
redistribution/renaming, resettlement, falsifying Crimean partisan accounts of the war, 
and the rewriting of Crimean history.  Even if some of the policies were comparative to 
Soviet actions in other regions, in Crimea Soviet authorities took each of the above 
policies to the extreme.  This is particularly true with the new Crimean narrative.   
Crimea was different in its importance to the Soviet Union as a military base, a 
symbol of Soviet might, and in peacetime as an “all-union” resort. As a result, when 
                                                
1 On the metaphor of the Soviet communal apartment see Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal 




Moscow began the mass resettlement of the peninsula with Slavic settlers, it decided that 
the new settlers, workers, and tourists needed a proper historical narrative to attach to the 
new Crimea.  This ideological factor became one of the main elements that separated the 
ethnic cleansing of Crimea from similar policies in regions such as the former Chechno-
Ingush and Kalmyk ASSRs. 
The new Crimean narrative argued, unequivocally, that Crimea had always been 
“Slavic” (usually equated with Russian) land since the ancient Scythians and that all 
other peoples, from Greeks to Armenians to Crimean Tatars, had been occupiers.  At the 
heart of this narrative was the rebirth of Russian nationalism that Stalin had encouraged 
during the war. As David Brandenberger asserts, Soviet historians employed the 
“indiscriminate blurring of Tsarist and Soviet history” for wartime mobilization and 
received state support for their efforts.2  In postwar Crimea, this rebirth transformed into 
an odd mixture of Russian nationalism and Slavophile ideas that were unified by the 
purpose of cleansing all other ethnicities from Crimean history.  As such, the new 
Crimean narrative rejected the ethnic affirmative action  (korenizatsiia) of Soviet 
nationality policy that throughout the 1920s and 1930s had ensured a place for Crimean 
Tatars and other minorities in the Crimean ASSR.3  In the context of the Second World 
                                                
2 David Brandenburger explains that Stalin began to use “iconography from the Russian national past” as 
early as 1937 as the threat of war increased.  The actual war “led to an escalation of such Russocentric 
agitational rhetoric.”  There was a constant tension between the “seemingly heretical move” of 
“neonationalists” to employee Russian nationalism in the war effort and the “internationalists” devoted to 
framing the war in strict Marxist-Leninist terms.  Russian nationalism proved to be a more pragmatic and 
successful mobilization tool and, after a 1944 conference and much arguing, the “Russocentric” 
interpretation of the war effort became widely accepted: see David Brandenburger, “…It is Imperative to 
Advance Russian Nationalism as the First Priority: Debates within the Stalinist Ideological Establishment, 
1941-1945,” in Ronald Suny and Terry Martin eds., A State of Nations: Empire Building and Nation-
Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 275, 286-288. 
3 Of course, Fisher is correct that the relationship with the Soviet state, particularly with Crimean Tatar 
elites and peasants (and obviously Muslim leaders), was often antagonistic.  Terry Martin posits that the 
“Tatar variant” of korenizatsiia included conflicts over “language politics” and “white collar jobs.”  Fisher, 




War, the narrative argued that the expulsion of the Nazis and the subsequent ethnic 
cleansing were the final acts of liberation after centuries of occupation.  Since Slavs were 
the only indigenous people of the peninsula, the massive resettlement of Russian peasants 
and Russification of the peninsula took on its own form of indigenization.     
  This chapter reveals how removing unwanted remnants of Crimea’s past and 
writing and popularizing the new Crimean narrative became a combined effort of party 
organizations, censors, academics, museum curators, excursion guides, and others.  
Together, they recast Crimean history to fit the demographic results of ethnic cleansing 
and made them seem permanent, just, and logical.    Although this narrative was 
somewhat fluid with several details changing over time, the above core beliefs underlying 
the new Crimean narrative became the ideological basis for Soviet Crimea after World 
War II.   
  This narrative did not exactly replace Marxism-Leninism because Crimean 
scholars argued that Russian colonization and imperialism on the peninsula were actually 
progressive events.  The narrative’s creators cherry-picked quotes from Marxist-Leninist 
works in order to develop a unique iteration of liberationist politics where the colonizer 
(Russia) had to be liberated from the colonized (indigenous Crimean minorities). 
However, the new Crimean narrative would prove to have an appeal that often 
overpowered Marxism-Leninism and certainly outlasted it, remaining a defining aspect of 
present-day Crimean politics.  
 To be clear, this chapter does not argue that Crimea was not or should not be part 
of either a Russian state or Ukrainian state.  Moreover, the new Crimean narrative was 




narrative was an after-the-fact justification that Soviet authorities designed to target new 
settlers and party members in postwar Crimea.  It signaled a profound and permanent 
change in how Moscow had handled the peninsula for centuries (outside of Sevastopol).  
One only needs to compare the present-day positions and demographics of indigenous 
peoples in the current Tatar, Kalmyk, and other autonomous republics in the Russian 
Federation with Crimean Tatars in order to understand this change.4   
   
Censorship: Removing Crimean Tatars as a Noun, Subject, and Adjective 
 
 
 In January 1945, the Sovnarkom of the USSR appointed Anatolii Nikitovich 
Zotiev to the head Crimean ASSR Glavlit (the local branch of the main Soviet censorship 
organ).  From 1945 to 1947, Zotiev expunged Crimean Tatars and the Crimean 
peninsula’s multi-ethnic past from literature, media, and all party publications in Crimea. 
Unlike efforts to write the new Crimean narrative examined latter in this study, Moscow 
tightly directed Zotiev’s effort.  He had to write extensive quarterly reports to the 
Sovnarkom Committee of War Secrets and Glavlit in Moscow, as well as contact 
                                                
4 During the Soviet collapse, Volga Tatars, Kalmyks and other non-Russian peoples with autonomous 
republics or newly sovereign states were in a position to negotiate the new local government structure and 
ownership of resources in their regions.  As Matthew Evangelista summarized, “the Soviet authorities 
created the formal institutions of self-rule” that eventually “provided the basis for the assertions of 
autonomy during the post-Soviet transition”: see Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars: Will Russia go 
the Way of the Soviet Union? (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2002), 3.  In one example, the 
Tatar republic negotiated with Yegor Gaidar to retain republic control of half of Tatarstan’s petroleum 
resources (eventually creating the Tatneft corporation) and ensure the place of both Tatars and Russians in 
the republic’s political fabric.  On Gaidar and Tatars, see GARF f. 10121, op. 1, d. 21,l.l. 113-121. 
Stenograph of Kazan Meeting, December 1991.  At the same time, as Ronald Suny argues, while some 
nationalities were able to consolidate power and culture during the Soviet collapse, the “destabilizing 
pressures of Russification, both demographic and linguistic” had been severe in several Soviet republics: 
see Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 158. No region is better evidence to that than Crimea.   




Moscow about a plethora of words and ideas that might violate the new party line on 
Crimea.5 
 As with the postwar population in Crimea in general, the war and deportations 
had left Crimean Glavlit woefully understaffed, with only a handful of “inexperienced” 
censors.  Zotiev complained that the “sharp lack in all cadres” in Crimea threatened his 
work and the reestablishment of the Soviet system in Crimea.6  Moscow responded by 
sending new, experienced censors to Zotiev, and he went from only a handful of workers 
in March 1945 to 38 workers that July.  Reflecting the larger repopulation of Crimea, the 
majority of newcomers were Russian with a few Ukrainians.7   
 Zotiev and his staff had a painstaking task.  Crimean Glavlit, at the insistence of 
Glavlit SSSR, issued order no. 73 that banned all books that did not reflect the 
“ethnographic changes.”8  One problem for Zotiev was that neither Crimean nor Moscow 
officials had a list of all books that contained mentions of Crimean Tatars or other 
deported groups, so this required a scan of almost every book on the peninsula. In 
practice, their work became removing or editing anything concerning “Tatar life, 
existence, and their participation in the cultural life and agriculture of the peninsula, as 
well as Soviet indigenization policy.”9  During the first quarter of 1945, the campaign 
targeted mainly bookstores and party organs.  They outright banned many books about 
pre-war Crimean history because that story was impossible to write without Tatars.  
                                                
5 GARF f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l.l. 23-26. Glavnoe Upravlenia po Okhrane gosudarstvennykh tain-Zotiev. 
1944. 
6 Ibid. 
7 GARF f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l.l. 51-58. Otchet o rabote Glavlita Krymskoi ASSR. January1- June 1, 
1945. 
8 GARF f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l. 26.  




During the first months of 1945, Glavlit reviewed over 45,300 books and banned 44 of 
them.10 
 For the rest of 1945 and then into 1946 and 1947, Zotiev used his increasing 
number of censors to expand his operation reviewing literature.  For example, during the 
first half of September 1945 Glavlit removed 10,060 copies of books written by Crimean 
Tatars and nearly 80,000 books translated into Crimean Tatar.  In Crimea’s 301 working 
libraries over a two-year period, from 1945 to 1946, Glavlit inspected 794,130 books, 
2,126 of which were banned.11  Furthermore, the campaign expanded into educational 
institutions, radio, and the party press. After initial inspections of a library, bookstore or 
establishment, Glavlit workers carried out follow-up inspections every two to three weeks 
and continued to remove hundreds of new books.  A particular headache were books 
published elsewhere in the Soviet Union where Crimean “changes” had not yet been 
explained.  Any book with taboo material had all but two copies destroyed. To conduct 
these time-consuming searches, Glavlit summoned local party organs and police to assist 
Zotiev’s staff.12 
 In addition, Zotiev tasked himself and his best censors with carefully editing 
offending literature that they did not ban outright.13  In some cases, current Russian 
                                                
10 GARF f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l. 26.  
11 GARF, f. 9425, op. 1, d. 467, l.l. 101-110. Otchet Krymskogo Oblita za 1946. 11 January 1947. 
12 Two copies of each destroyed book were then kept in “closed fonds” at libraries in Simferopol, 
Evpatoria, Sevastopol, Yalta, Feodosia and Kerch. GARF, f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l.l. 82-90. Otchet o rabote 
Krymoblita.  1 June-1 October 1945. 
13 A secondary goal in Zotiev’s work was censoring literature available in Crimea of instances of poor 
Russian handling of the peninsula or of any problems in Crimea that would discourage new settlers.  One 
example was Zotiev’s editing of Russian writer Alexander Griboedov’s works in which he freely criticized 
Russian cultivation techniques.  One Griboedov quote Zotiev censored was his complaint that Crimea 
proved that “no people so easily conquered land and at the same time so poorly used it as Russians.” The 
censorship of Griboedov’s opinions (along with those of Pushkin, Chekhov and other Russian cultural 
figures) was important because they were symbols of the ethnic Russian claim to the peninsula.  GARF, f. 




writers in Crimea seemed to not have received the memo that they could not mention 
Crimean Tatars.  For example, Zotiev personally censored the work that author Sergeev 
Tsenskogo wrote in 1945 and removed phrases such as “Tatar land, Tatar barns, Tatar 
villages, Tatar cows, etc.”  Every time the author used Tatar as an adjective to qualify a 
noun, censors dropped it just leaving the noun standing alone.14  After a while, Zotiev 
became weary of having to edit out every phrase in Tsenskogo that could “in any way be 
construed as positive towards Tatars.”15  Furthermore, Tsenskogo was actually very 
critical of the initial Russian colonization of Crimea.  For example, in Volume 1 of his 
1945 Izbrannye Proizvedenie (Selected Works), Zotiev found that Tsenskogo believed 
that Russians had given Tatars little in return for the “green mountains, blue sea, and blue 
sky” that the Russian aristocracy had turned into their playground.  Zotiev removed the 
whole passage from the book.16    
 Unfortunately for the deported peoples, Zotiev excelled at removing Crimean 
Tatars and other minorities from Crimean history.  However, Zotiev was not in the 
business of writing the new Crimean narrative.  In fact, over the course of his censorship 
campaign he recognized the dire need for Soviet power to establish a new historical 
narrative to replace the one he was erasing.  In September 1945, he came upon an article 
in Sovetskii Krym (Soviet Crimea) by an A. Tseniugalova titled “Osobennosti krymskogo 
klimatika (The Particulars of Crimea’s Climate).”  This article highlighted the need to 
replace the historical void in Crimea so vividly that he thought Moscow should 
immediately address the problem. On September 14, 1945, in a letter to the head of the 
Soviet Glavlit in Moscow, Bol’shakov, Zotiev explained: 
                                                
14 GARF, f. 9425, op. 1, d. 467, l.l. 70-73. Tekstovaia svodka 16. 4 September 1945.  
15 GARF, f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l. 85.  




I am sending you an article and I would like your opinion on whether or 
not such articles are publishable. As you are aware, in Crimea there are 
now new residents- kolkhoz immigrants, Soviet and party workers, and 
others.  They show a real interest in wanting to become acquainted with 
their new home. But all of the old local literature has already been 
destroyed or for different reasons has been drastically changed. Various 
organizations in Crimea are requesting new regional literature.  Comrade 
Bol’shakov, could you please give me an answer to this question!17 
 
In other words, the Soviet Union has just ethnically cleansed Crimea, erased much of the 
previous history of the region, and the new settlers and workers needed a proper narrative 
to attach to their new home.  
This was a problem for Zotiev because it displayed the demographic and 
ideological void that Soviet ethnic cleansing in Crimea created, and the party’s failure to 
immediately fill it.  As Zotiev noted in a another instance of pressing Moscow to produce 
a new narrative, he said that the only sure thing in Crimean history besides that Tatars 
were traitors was the past, present and future of Sevastopol as a crucial naval base.18  
Otherwise, how the party should portray the rest of Crimean history was not clear. 
  
Writing the New Crimean Narrative 
 
 
 While firmly overseeing the removing of Crimean minorities, redistributing land, 
resettlement, and censorship, Moscow provided only a minimum of guidance in how to 
rewrite Crimean history.  At first, from May to November 1944, there was no order from 
Moscow indicating what ethnicity would be the region’s new indigenous population.  
Finally, during the Crimean party Obkom plenum from 27 to 29 November 1944, 
Moscow clearly indicated that the “new Crimea” was Russian.  At the direction of the 
                                                
17 GARF, f. 9425, op. 1, d. 333, l. 73. Sekretno, A. Zotiev - Nachal’nik otdela posleduiushchei tsenzury 
glavlita tov. Bol’shakov. 14 September 1945.   




Central Committee in Moscow, Stalin’s handpicked representative in Crimea, Crimean 
Sovnarkom leader Aleksandr F. Kabanov, declared that “new settlers replacing Tatars, 
Bulgars, Greeks and Armenians” were building “a new Crimea with a Russian makeup.”  
However, aside from this loaded declaration, Kabanov and the Crimean party and 
government were far too busy accommodating tens of thousands of new settlers and 
rebuilding the devastated region to elaborate on how the “new Crimea” should be 
presented in history books and party publications.19  
When this ideological vacuum finally began to strain the work of Zotiev and other 
party apparatchiks in 1945, Crimean academics and newcomers filled this void with a 
new and specifically Crimean version of Russian nationalism and Slavophilism.  The 
Soviet government and party gave Crimean academics (relatively) broad creative 
freedom and the funds to pay for the academic project.  This new Crimean narrative 
quickly became popular on the peninsula, and even those local and Moscow officials who 
criticized the narrative for its contradictions and divergence from Marxism-Leninism had 
to grudgingly accepted the imperial nostalgia as the new, postwar reality. 
 The archeologist Pavel Shults and the historian Pavel Nadinskii were the two 
scholars who led the academic thrust of the rewriting of Crimean history.  Under the 
authority of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (Akademii Nauk SSSR, hereafter AN SSSR), 
they began writing the new Crimean narrative in 1945.  Since Crimean Tatars were the 
largest indigenous people in Crimea, the first task was establishing new indigenous 
populations to replace Crimean Tatars.  In 1945, the only starting points that Shults and 
                                                
19 This proclamation came after the Crimean Party and Gosplan began dissolving abandoned Russian 
kolkhozes along with the kolkhozes of deported peoples.  Moscow sharply rebuked this action, gave 
Kabanov near total control of postwar Crimea, and made it clear that all kolkhozes would be repopulated 





Nadinskii had were the Crimean plenum remarks and the fact that Russian and Ukrainian 
settlers were now replacing those Crimean residents lost because of the war and 
deportations.  To make the argument that Slavs (and specifically Russians) were the 
peninsula’s true indigenous population, they had to reinterpret the Crimean archeological 
and historical record.  
The ancient Scythians presented a potential Slavic starting point. This idea was 
not new, but borrowed from controversial linguist Nikolai Marr.  Both Shults and 
Nadinskii adopted Marr's claim that Scythian and Tavridian languages were related to 
early Slavic languages.  Although most linguists maligned Marr's work and he fell out of 
communist favor by the late 1940's, at the time Shults, Nadinskii, and Crimean party 
officials believed this theory was perfect for proving the Russian and Slavic origins of 
human inhabitance in Crimea.20   Folding their new narrative into the wartime epic of 
patriotic struggle and liberation from Nazi occupation, they postured that all non-Slavs in 
Crimea were always occupiers of Slavic and Russian land.  Following this logic, the 
expulsion of Nazis and minorities from Crimea was simply the last act in two millennia 
of Slavs battling occupiers of their land, the first of which were Greek colonists.  Their 
future work was to provide evidence for this hypothesis. 
 Shults was the most prominent and accomplished academic to participate in 
writing the new Crimean narrative.  Paradoxically, this man who gave credentials to the 
new theory was born into a well-educated German family in St. Petersburg in 1903.  
                                                
20 The controversies surrounding Marr's theories are beyond the scope of this study and are covered in 
numerous volumes; On the theory and Crimea, see Aibabin, A. I. Etnicheskaia istoriia rannevizaniiskogo 
Kryma. (DAR/Natsional’naia Akademia Nauk Ukrainy Institut Vostokovedeniia Krymskoe Otdelenie, 
Simferopol’, 1999).  Available online at https://byzantina.wordpress.com/2011/09/26/aybabin/. Accessed 
on December 12, 2014; On Marr in general, see Velmezova, Ekaterina. Les lois du sens. La sémantique 
marriste. (Genève, 2007); see also Alpatov, V. M.  Istoria odnogo mifa: Marr i marrizm. (Moscow: 




However, by the end of his career his admirers considered him a “bright representative of 
the Russian intelligentsia.”  An incredibly efficient scholar, he studied at Petrogradskii 
Universitet during World War I, where he specialized in Scythian and Samarian 
sculpture, worked at the Hermitage, and conducted excavations in Crimea after the Civil 
War ended.  By 1925, he was a senior scholar in the antiquity division of the Academy of 
History and Material Culture, and from 1933 to 1934, he conducted more excavations of 
Greek sites in Crimea.  He spent the early days of World War II in Crimea guiding 
partisan units before being seriously wounded.  Afterwards he taught at MGU until early 
1945 when Moscow ordered him to launch a Scythian-Tavridian archeological expedition 
to help establish the new Crimean narrative.21 
 When Shults came back to Crimea at the beginning of 1945 with the support of 
AN SSSR, he was known by his students and other academics for his earlier publications, 
his engaging lectures, his heroics during the war, and for taking rifles into the field, 
including impromptu hunting expeditions after work. There is no greater proof of 
Shults’s authority and the importance of his project than the fact that, while the war was 
still going on, Moscow provided him the men, material, and funds for a two-year 
expedition to unearth the Slavic past of Crimea.22 
Shults, in early 1945, went to work excavating a site known as “Scythian 
Neapoli” and other locations with dozens of workers divided into three teams.23  On the 
                                                
21 O. A. Makhneva, U Ponta Evksinskogo: pamiati Pavla Nikolaevicha Shul’tsa. (Krymskii filial Instituta 
arkheologii NAN Ukrainy: Simferopol’, 2004), 241-243. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Makhneva, U Ponta Evksinskogo, 241-243; Ironically, while Shults used Scythian artifacts to undermine 
Crimean Tatar claims to Crimea, a Crimean Tatar politician, amature archeologist, and direct descendant of 
Khanate royalty, Aleksandr Ivanovich Sultan-Krym-Gireia, made the original discovery in 1827 in the 
Tatar village of Kermenchik near Simferopol.  Russian imperial archeologists eventually tied “Scythian 
Neapoli” to the Scythian king Skilura. http://krimea.info/lyudi-kryma/shulc-p-n-tavro-skifskaya-




one hand, post-Soviet archeologists consider the actual excavations of Shults, especially 
the Scythian mausoleum found at “Scythian Neapoli,” quite extraordinary.24  On the other 
hand, even his admirers such as student and protégé O. A. Makhneva admit that the 1945-
1947 Crimean exhibition was, first and formost, a political project to establish a new 
indigenous population for the peninsula.  However, Makhneva claims that Shults's 
political task was replacing not Tatars from Crimean history, but rather Goths.  In 
actuality, while maligning Goths was important, Shults assigned fellow archeologist E. 
V. Veimarn to that project.25   
During the immediate postwar period it was Shults who presented his work as 
uncovering what lay beneath the “so-called Turkish” ruins in six articles and numerous 
lectures.26   He argued that, “in the characteristics of (Scythian) cities, homes, dishes, 
wood carvings, and ornaments there were noticeable points of similarity with ancient 
Slavic culture, and with Russian and Ukrainian national art.”27  For Crimean authorities, 
historians, and Moscow party officials (at least for the time being), the suggestion of 
similarities between Scythian and early Slavic artifacts was enough to confidently state 
that Slavs, and no one else, were the true indigenous people of Crimea. 
 Besides providing this archeological foundation, Shults played an important 
administrative role in creating the new Crimean narrative.  By late 1947, the Presidium of 
                                                
24 For example, see Aleksei Smirnov, Skify (Moskva: Lomonosov, 2014), 1-13. 
25 V. Ui. Iurochkin, “Gotskii i slavianskii voprosy v poslevoennom krymu” in Rshtsaios: sbornik statei k 
60-letiiu prof. S. B. Sorochana/ Narteks. Byzantina Ukrainensis. Tom 2 (Khar’kov: Maidan, 2013), 396. 
26 P. N. Shults, “Raskopki Neapolia Skifskogo” v Udal’tsov, A. D. i Passek, T. S. redaktori. Kratkie 
cobshcheniia o dokladakh i polevykh issledovaniiakh instituta material’noi kul’tury. Vypusk XXI. (Moskva-
Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1947), 16-21.  Available at http://arheologija.ru/shults-
raskopki-neapolya-skifskogo/. Accessed 12 December 2014; see also GARF f. A-513 (Gosudarstvennyi 
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the AN SSSR tapped Shults to help establish a Crimean branch of the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences (hereafter AN Crimea) in Simferopol.  Because much of the new Crimean 
narrative was unclear on several important points in Crimean historiography, the mission 
of Shults and the AN Crimea was to solidify the narrative.  His official position was the 
director of the division of Crimean history and archeology, where he made appointments, 
allocated resources for research, and served as a primary editor at “Krymizdat,” a 
publishing house for Crimean scholars.28  Consequently, as a scholar and administrator, 
Shults had an enormous influence on Crimean history because Crimean scholars adopted 
his theories and respected his advice and academic appointments.29   
 Unlike Shults, Pavel Nadinskii-Posiagin (1894-1961) had absolutely no formal 
education.  He was a Russian Bolshevik who joined the party in 1917, fought in the civil 
war, and contracted a debilitating illness.  After the civil war, Nadinskii joined the Cheka 
and, in 1933, the party assigned him to Crimea.  However, his health worsened in Crimea 
and he had to have both legs and his left arm amputated.  Despite his lack of formal 
education and poor health, he possessed writing and rhetorical skills and the party 
deputized him as postwar Crimea’s official historian. With the ethnic cleansing of fifth 
columns and the ethnic German Shults heading the AN Crimea, the Russian chekist was a 
perfect fit to historicize the new Crimean narrative.  Nadinskii, as the historian V. Iu. 
Iurochkin argues, served as Shults’s “commissar on the ideological front,” claiming the 
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“historical rights” of Slavs, and particularly of Russians, to Crimea.  If Shults provided 
academic legitimacy to the new Crimean narrative, Nadisnkii provided it Bolshevik 
legitimacy.30  
In 1952, Soviet Academic G. A. Novitskii summed up the basic thesis of 
Nadinskii work as “since ancient times the Crimean Peninsula has been Slavic land.”31   
Krymizdat first published his thesis in 1946, and it appeared in several more articles in 
1947 and 1948.32  With the main task of assigning an ethnic claim to Crimea established, 
Nadinskii began writing a book to cement his argument, which Shults and Krymizdat 
published in 1951. 
 In Ocherki po istorii Kryma (Essays of Crimean History), Nadinskii took Shults’s 
theory on Scythians, and wrote a chronological narrative of how they “were one of the 
sources of Russian culture” and that the small Tavridian kingdom on the peninsula that 
had relations with the Kievian Rus were descendants of these Scythians.33  He argued that 
the Greeks were invaders and all of the other peoples, even those who “took large parts of 
Crimean territory and ruled for considerable amounts of time,” were always foreign 
occupiers, of which Tatars and Turks were the worst.  Often equating Slavic with 
Russian, Nadinskii argued, the full history of Crimea made one thing certain, “only 
Russians have an indisputable claim to Crimea.”34 
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 In a state founded on the Marxist liberation of working class and indigenous 
people from the bonds of capitalism and imperialism, the most signifigant stance 
Nadinskii took was that the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783 was not an 
imperialistic expansion.  He argued Crimea was never a Russian colony with a majority 
Tatar population because it had always been Slavic land.   As a result, historians should 
employ the term “vossoedinenie,” or “reuniting” when describing the 1783 Russian 
annexation of Crimea to Russian instead of using “prisoedinenie” or “uniting.”  For 
Nadinskii, the Russian annexation was a progressive step that liberatied Slavic land and 
deserved praise from Marxists.  Furthermore, his book and articles idolized the general 
who helped Catherine the Great capture Crimea, Aleksandr Suvorov.  For Nadinskii, 
Suvorov was a liberator of Slavic peoples.35   
 Despite the quick pace Nadinskii and Shults achieved in writing the new 
narrative, by 1947 the Crimean Obkom of the KPSS was too impatient to wait for 
Nadinskii’s full book for evidence that Russians were the indigenous people of Crimea.  
Subsequently, the Crimean party appealed to the Gosudarstvennaya Publichnaya 
Istoricheskaya Bibloiteka (The State Library of Public History) in Moscow to publish a 
comprehensive annotated bibliography to support the claim.  Completed in 1948, the 
creators of the 248-page bibliography gave it a self-explanatory name: Istoriya Russkogo 
Kryma (The History of Russian Crimea). 
 The extraordinary outcome of the annotated bibliography was that all works on 
Russian and Slavic peoples in Crimean history now stood alongside the works of Marx, 
Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.  Certainly, the party had used pre-revolutionary historians and 
ethnographers in establishing the chauvinistic nature of empires, but the citations and 
                                                




annotations of this bibliography were different.  For the most part, the citations were only 
included if they supported the Russian nationalist narrative and, most importantly, the 
progressive nature of the Crimean annexation in 1783 and Russia’s influence on the 
Black Sea region.  
 In all there were 10 different sections including Marxism, Scythians and Tavrids, 
Russians in Medieval Crimea, Imperial Russian Crimea, Soviet Crimea, Crimea as an all-
union resort, historical sites, the Russian ownership of property in Crimea, and Crimea in 
art and literature.  The only thin section was the Scythian and Tavridian period, which 
was “currently being uncovered by archeological excavations,” but proved that “the 
ancestors of Russians were the indigenous people of Crimea.”  The two sections on 
Russians in Crimea had the specific goal of documenting “Russian crusades in Crimea 
after its capture by different peoples.”  The final product was a base of evidence not 
supporting the road to communism, but Russian and Slavic claims to Crimea stretching 
back 2,000 years that the bibliography designed to justify the deportation of minorities 
and the subsequent Slavic indigenization policies.36   
 In early 1952, with the narrative now published in multiple versions and 
supported by the bibliography, Crimean officials awaited Moscow’s approval of their 
theory.37  Since the order to create a “new Russian Crimea” came from Stalin’s man in 
Crimea, Kabanov, it is not surprising that the party and the head of AN SSSR, Aleksandr 
Nesmeianov, approved of the declaration of Russians and Slavs as the indigenous people 
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of Crimea.  More importantly, Malenkov, Suslov and other party officials ordered that the 
Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia) and the Soviet standard 
history textbook (Istorii SSSR) both be edited to remove any “idealization” of the Tatar 
and Turkic periods in Crimean history, and any mention of the Russian annexation and 
colonization of Crimea as in anyway being “colonial.”  Following Nadinskii, the books 
now portrayed the annexation, colonization, and Russification of the peninsula as 
progressive events.  With these changes, the Soviet Union implemented the basics of the 
new Crimean narrative on a Soviet-wide level.38 
 
Popularizing the New Crimean Narrative 
 
 
Even as the narrative began to solidify, the accomplishments of Shults and 
Nadinskii did not ensure the success of the new Crimean narrative among the masses.  
Instead, the popular writing and consumption of the new Crimean narrative depended on 
the workers of cultural and tourist institutions.  This aspect of establishing the new 
Crimean narrative was often a rough process, sometimes lacking guidance central from 
Moscow. 
 No cultural worker had a more unenviable position in postwar Crimea than the 
director of the Bakchysarai Palace Museum, M. G. Kustova.  She was directing a 
museum housed in the Crimean Khan’s 16th century capital building.  Moreover, during 
the Crimean ASSR’s existence the museum had showcased Crimean Tatar cultural and 
political accomplishments.  From 1944 to 1948, saddled with the paradoxical project of 
creating anti-Tatar exhibits in a Tatar palace, she became frustrated and eventually vented 
directly to Kliment Voroshilov.   
                                                




There were several obvious reasons for her frustration.  First off, in late May 
1944, other than the “fact” that Crimean Tatars were traitors, she received no direct 
advice as to how to create a new historical reality before scholars had advanced the new 
Crimean narrative.  For example, was there a cut-off date for when she could discuss 
Crimean Tatars in the Russian Empire?  A similar conundrum was how to contrast the 
terrible Tatars with the elegant palace they built?  The only direction she had were 
Zotiev’s guidelines for liquidating all of the “old, prewar exhibits” that had “bragged of 
the power of Crimean Khans.”  Tatar art and cultural relics were no longer evidence of 
the peninsula’s indigenous people, and Kustova’s staff disposed of these remnants of 
Tatar “kulak existence.”39 
 The lack of direction created a headache for Kustova.  By late 1944, she already 
had to engage in agitprop on a massive scale for vacationing soldiers, generals, students, 
and the tens of thousands of new Slavic kolkhoz settlers and party workers flooding onto 
the peninsula.  Kustova simply had no time to make sure her exhibits and lectures met the 
expectations of Moscow and Crimean party officials.  Regardless, her staff was soon 
providing crash courses in Crimean history.40  And the people came, with over 82,000 
visitors between 1944 and 1948.  Kustova attempted to streamline her task by creating a 
new exhibit “to display just how horrific the crimes committed by the Crimean Horde 
were, how they turned Russian and Ukrainian land to ash, and how the Russian people 
fought a heroic fight against the Tatar attacks.”41   
 However, no party officials in Crimea and few in Moscow were willing to 
critique, comment on, or approve her work even though she was already hosting visitors 
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and providing lectures on a daily basis.  Even mentioning Crimean Tatars was too toxic 
for most, and dozens of requests by Kustova for feedback went unanswered.  For 
example, she sent a rough outline of the exhibit plan and excursion text to the RSFSR’s 
Central Committee’s Art Council of Ministers in 1945, but the committee only approved 
it a year later.  This meant for a year she operated on the hope that she and her staff had 
not crossed any lines.42 
 Once the museum had completed all the exhibit materials for the project on 7 
November 1947, they compiled a portfolio for final approval. Yet again, she received no 
feedback even as the amount of visitors to the museum was increasing.   Kustova’s 
professional dedication to the museum profession further endangered her position, 
leaving her torn between preserving the museum as a historical artifact, and her Soviet 
devotion to following the party line.  In fact, when compared to other books, lectures, 
excursion texts, and tourist guides written in Crimea after the war, the text for the 
Bakhchisarai Palace excursion, while full of Tatar treachery, Russian nationalism, and 
Slavic lore, still presented an extensive portrayal of the diplomacy, culture and 
architecture of the Crimean Khanate.43   
Finally, by October 1948, Kustova had had enough.  Crimean and Soviet officials 
were happy to send workers, soldiers, and settlers to the museum for educational 
purposes, but they did not want to take any responsibility for its operation or content.  In 
a blunt, handwritten letter to Voroshilov on 14 October 1948 she insisted that she could 
not proceed with her orders to educate about Crimea if she could not get one Soviet 
official, at any level, to comment on whether or not her exhibits, palace tour, and lectures 
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were following the party line.  Further, she proclaimed that it was “physically 
impossible” to hide the fact that the palace was the home of the Crimean Khans so long 
as it was a museum.44 
 The letter was a risky and a fascinating example of how people navigated postwar 
Stalinism.  While Kustova had received no feedback for a year, she was likely aware of 
Kabanov building a “new Russian Crimea” and structured her letter to Voroshilov 
accordingly.  She said that to the museum workers, the fact that the Palace was the home 
of the Khans was the least important fact.  Rather, the palace was a “monument to 
Russian culture, especially after the architectural editions made to the palace after Crimea 
became part of Russia.”  Fortunately, for Kustova, the palace was “undeniably” linked 
with Russian culture because its fountain was the subject of a Pushkin poem.45  But, she 
asked, “since the palace is a palace where the Khans lived, how should I address this 
reality?”  She had written dozens of party, government, and academic officials and no 
one was willing to even comment on anything “associated with the treason of Tatars.”  
She insisted that the museum staff deserved an answer because they were dedicated 
communists working to “create a genuine patriotic feeling- the feeling of the greatness of 
Russia culture.”  She concluded the letter by asking Voroshilov to end the “conspiracy of 
silence” and, in blunt fashion, asked, “whether or not it (the museum) is even needed?”46 
 Kustova’s hand-written plea worked.  In fact, this was the type of problem that 
Shults had to solve in his new position at AN Crimea.  Voroshilov immediately contacted 
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Shults to investigate the museum and ordered the Arts Committee of the Soviet of 
Ministers of the RSFSR to send A. E. Udal’tseva (AN SSSR) and N. D. Baklanova 
(Soviet Academy of Architecture or Akademii Arkhitekturi SSSR) to assist Shults.47  Their 
recommendations had the museum present, as best it could, the new Crimean narrative.  
The Russian architectural additions, Pushkin’s poem and other Russian writings about 
Crimea occupied most of the museum’s excursion, while mentions of the Crimean 
Khanate were kept to a bare minimum and were only negative.   
Most fascinating was how, on the recommendations, Kustova ordered paintings of 
famous Russians to visually occupy the palace.  In the diplomatic hall where the khans 
had entertained foreign ambassadors, she hung a painting of the Russian military leader 
of the Azov campaigns against the Crimean Tatars (1695-96), Boris Sheremetev.  She 
dedicated another room to General Suvorov, the Russian “liberator” of Crimea who 
Nadinskii idolized.  As the leader who “reunited” Crimea with Russia, several rooms 
celebrated Catherine the Great, her victory in Crimea, and her visit to the palace in 1785.  
Finally, Kustova dedicated a large hall to the “reunification” of the 1783 annexation and 
Petomkin’s governance of the Tavridian Government thereafter.  The only room that 
maintained a theme somewhat connected to the Tatars was the harem, where a painting 
titled “The Captives of Constantinople” hung, highlighting the sexual practices and 
slavery of the Turkic-dominated Black Sea.48   
 Several other regional (kraevedcheskii) museums throughout Crimea also had to 
remove Crimean Tatar material, but obviously lacked Kustova’s paradoxical situation. 
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These regional museums also had more local control.  A close associate of Shults, V. P. 
Babenchikov, created many of the new historical and archeological exhibits at the most 
important of these museums, the Central Regional Museum of Crimea (Tsentral’nyi 
Kraevedcheskii Muzeia Kryma) in Simferopol.   Babenchikov was an experienced 
archeologist who, along with the museum’s lead historian, Kobets, assisted Shults in his 
archeological excavations.  Babenchikov and Kobets also coordinated with Nadinskii and 
Shults in writing their own articles promoting the new Crimean narrative.  They 
simultaneously created new museum exhibits with titles such as “Russian Slavs in 
Crimea,” “Russian heroes,” “Soviet Crimea,” and “Tatar slavery.”   As the archeological 
digs, article writing, and exhibits progressed, the museum held a small conference with 
Shults and began providing “consultations” to the local branches of the museum in 
Feodosiia, Evpatoriia, Yalta and other locations.  Meanwhile, Babenchikov and other 
staff began hosting excursions and lectures to acquaint Crimean teachers with the new 
history.  Similar to Kustova’s palace museum, the visitors came, with the museum 
hosting 46,014 people in 1944 and 54,075 people in 1945 (including 26,982 soldiers, 
17,966 students, and 9,127 other citizens).49 
 As the new Crimean narrative solidified, Babenchikov and the museum 
prospered.  They presented more than 300 lectures in 1946 and participated in the Soviet-
wide “know your region (znai svoi krai)” campaign.50  By 1949 Shults had given 
Babenchikov a concurrent research position at the AN Crimea and he continued his work 
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at the museum and completed a dissertation on Scythians that provided further support to 
the new Crimean narrative.51 
Under the direction of Simferopol’, the local branches of the regional museum 
had the same agenda.  At the Kherson museum, Director Martinov, a fresh graduate of 
MGU, focused on the occupations of Crimea, beginning with the Greeks and ending with 
the Tatars.  Because Nadinskii’s articles “were the only materials” for Crimean workers 
to describe modern Crimean history, every museum in Crimea took a “strong” position 
on the use of “vossoedenenie” and dedicated a room to the reunification of the peninsula 
to the mainland.52  In sum, despite the initial problems of Kustova, all Crimean museums 
had the clear goal of educating the new Crimean settlers and tourists alike of the new 
Crimean narrative.53 
 If some museum employees felt a professional obligation to keep up a façade of 
historical accuracy, workers and administrators in the Crimean branch of the All-Union 
Central Council of Trade Unions (Vsesoiuznyi tsentral’nyi sovet professional’nykh 
soiuzov, hereafter VTsSPS) had no such qualms.  And it was their work in running 
dozens of Crimean resorts and tourist bases that gave Crimea’s largest and most 
important cultural industry the lead role presenting the new Crimean narrative to locals 
and visitors.  As soon as Shults and Nadinskii penned their first articles in 1945, tourism 
workers set about presenting the new theory for popular consumption, creating accessible 
summaries with personal touches. 
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 As the Methodological Director of the Alushta Tourist Base, I. Kirrilov was 
responsible for writing the excursion guides and texts for tours originating from his base 
and convincing tourists that Crimea had always been Russian.  Kirrilov began his tour of 
Alushta by declaring that the Crimea has had a special place in the history of the Russian 
people since the ancient Scythians.  Citing Nadinskii, the 400 years of Tatar rule was an 
occupation similar to the recent Nazi occupation, and Catherine’s conquering of Crimea 
was not imperial expansion, but the Russia/Slavic liberation from the Asiatic hordes, 
again comparable to the liberating qualities of the Red Army.54  He continued by 
referring to the Russian Empire under Peter I as “our government” as he described the 
Russian attempt to return “Russian ancestral lands (russkikh iskonnykh zemel)” to Russia.  
Similar to Kustova, Kirrilov continued the trend of pushing Russian architecture and 
literary figures to the center of Crimean history, with Pushkin’s poem about Bakhchisarai 
appearing on page seven of the tourist guide.55  
 As for Crimean Tatars, they never had a legitimate role on the peninsula and were 
“always enemies of the Russian people and the proletarian revolution.”56  Dismissing the 
Crimean Tatars’ political and ideological role in the Crimean ASSR, he claimed all 
Crimean Tatars had been against the Revolution and welcomed the German occupation of 
Crimean in 1917.  They had also collaborated with the Mensheviks and imperialist 
interventionists during the civil war.  To highlight the “pattern” of Crimean Tatar treason, 
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he repeated verbatim the 25 June 1946 RFSFR directive that accused all Crimean Tatars 
of treason and dissolved the Crimean ASSR (making it an RSFSR oblast).57 
 As for after the Tatars’ deportation, Kirrilov admitted that the “makeup of the 
Alushta district population had drastically changed,” with Russian “volunteer” settlers 
arriving from Voronezh oblast.  This transformation had only been positive because, just 
as with the first Russian “liberation” of 1783, an influx of Russians arrived to modernize 
agriculture and the economy.58  In short, he had no issue describing the ethnic cleansing 
and demographic engineering because he saw nothing wrong with it.  Tatars were always 
enemy occupiers and the new influx of Russian settlement was natural because the 
peninsula has always been Russian land.  The only place Marxism actually factored into 
his narrative was a quote he took from a letter Engels wrote to Marx on 23 May 1851. In 
the letter, Engles said that the Russian Empire was playing a “progressive role” in 
developing the Black and Caspian Seas.  Kirrilov’s use of the words “Soviet” and 
“socialist” were nearly absent.”59 
 While Kirrilov was just one man, he was an influential prolific writer of excursion 
texts and had a long and respected career.  In fact, hundreds of excursion writers repeated 
this version of the new Crimean narrative in thousands of other excursion texts written in 
Crimea for the rest of Soviet history.  The main excursion writer at the Yalta tour base, 
Chernets, focused even more on Russian writers and architectural additions.  Still, he also 
made clear that all Tatar rule was a “dark age,” Crimea was “Russian land that had been 
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stolen,” Tatars were eternal enemies of Slavs, and that the only Crimean indigenous 
peoples were descendants of Slavic Scythians and Tavrids.60 
 At the Yalta “House of Tourism (Dom Turista),” the introductory meeting for 
visitors by tourism specialist Figin began with a declaration that Crimea was vital to the 
history of “great Russian military leaders, poets and writers.”   While the heroism of the 
Soviet people was evident in Crimean history, the “Russian people” had the most 
important role in Crimean history.61  Unlike Kirrilov, Figin at least made an attempt place 
his feelings within a Marxist framework.  For example, he said that “based on the strict 
scientific theories of Marxism-Leninism, Soviet historians have studied Crimean’s past 
and architectural remnants and determined that the peninsula has always been Russian 
land, eternally soaked with Russian blood,” and that the Scythians were the forefathers of 
Eastern Slavdom.   Shults had confirmed these “facts” with his 1945-47 expeditions of 
because he “uncovered the remains of a Scythian city near present day Simferopol’.”  In 
addition, tourists learnt that all Russian attempts to take Crimea were simply attempts to 
liberate part of the Russian Motherland, and that the 1783 annexation of Crimea was a 
“gathering of Slavic lands.”62  
 As Crimean museums and the VTsSPS honed their presentations of the new 
Crimean narrative, they began coordinating exhibits together, further unifying their 
cultural agitation.  The Central Regional Museum of Crimea invited Chernets to 
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Simferopol’ to lecture in 1946, and the museum and the VTsSPS opened an exhibit on 
Crimean sanatoriums in 1949.63  
Thanks to Crimea’s cultural workers, the arguments of Shults and Nadinskii 
overwhelmed the memory of the deported peoples.  Guided by the new Crimean 
narrative, new Slavic settlers were meant to believe that they were simply reclaiming 
their ethnic birthright established by their Slavic forefathers after centuries of struggle 
against Greek, Genoese, Tatar and other occupations, with World War II being the final 
liberation of Crimea.   
   
Critiquing the New Crimean Narrative 
 
  
 The elevation of Slavic and Russian identity over Soviet identity, the absurdity of 
many Russian nationalist claims, and, above all, the sometimes-blatant disregard for 
Soviet Marxism-Leninism made a backlash from the center inevitable.  However, this 
backlash failed to meaningfully dislodged or alter the new Crimean narrative.  As this 
section displays, the attack on the new Crimean narrative actually revealed that key 
Soviet academics and the AN SSSR fully supported the basic account.  Aside from 
removing a few contradictions, these academics provided only a hollow critique, thereby 
condoning the total Russification of Crimea. 
 As soon as Nadinskii and others began writing, there was pushback because, 
without direct orders, staffers in Glavlit, Gosplan, the VTsSPS and other organizations 
had no reason to equate the Crimean deportations with Russification.  In fact, the leader 
of cleansing Crimea’s history, Zotiev, rejected the new Crimean narrative as a Russian 
project.  While it was his job to remove mentions of Crimean Tatars and even remove 
                                                




critiques of Russian imperial policy, he drew the line with the Soviet period.  For 
example, in October 1945 Zotiev censured an Evpatoriia newspaper for referring to 
“Russian people” fighting for the peninsula because the “Soviet armed forces were made 
up of all Soviet nationalities.”64  
 He specifically had a problem with “incorrect” explanations of the Russian 
annexation of Crimea in 1783, and he disliked Nadinskii’s nationalist assertions.65  In a 
25 October 1946 letter to an assistant of the War and Government Secrets Division of the 
Soviet of Ministers in Moscow, M. D. Ovsiannikov, he criticized Nadinskii’s article The 
Crimean Pages of Suvorov’s Biography (Krymskie Stranitsy v biografii Suvorova).  He 
argued that Nadinskii had not used “facts” to claim that Russia’s imperial expansion, 
annexation of Crimea, and Suvorov’s career were “progressive.”66  However, 
Ovsiannikov ignored Zotiev’s complaint.  Ovsiannikov did not even comment directly on 
Nadinskii’s argument, but merely responded that journals could publish the article.67  In 
this indirect way, Zovtiev’s bosses allowed the new Crimean narrative to continue. 
 The most flamboyant writer of the new Crimean narrative, Kirrilov, was also not 
immune to criticism.  In fact, the edited transcripts of his excursion texts reveal that the 
head of the Crimean branch of the Tourist-Excursion Division of the VTsSPS, A. V. 
Mokrousov, attempted to contain Kirrilov’s affinity towards ethnic Russians.  The 
handwritten edits removed the use of “Russian” as an adjective when describing new 
Crimean settlers and added “Soviet.”  When Mokrousov forwarded the text to Moscow 
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for final approval, the head of the Tourism-Excursion Division of the VTsSPS SSSR, G. 
Kosilov, and his head excursion writer, E Supina, still found plenty of over-the-top 
material.  Kirrilov’s use of “our government” to describe the Russian empire confounded 
them, and they even said that he spent so much time lambasting Crimean Tatars that it 
made them seem too important.  Furthermore, similar to Zotiev, they believed the use of 
“reuniting” to describe Crimea’s annexation was improper.68    
 Most troubling for the Moscow VTsSPS was that many excursion writers either 
left out Marxism-Leninism or only included it haphazardly at the end of texts.69  In 
summing up the problem with the Crimean excursion texts written between 1945 and 
1950, Supina told Mokrousov that Crimean excursion writers did not present a “modern 
internationalist” point of view and that this needed to change.70  But the critiques by the 
VTsSPS headquarters in Moscow did little to influence the writing and dissemination of 
the new Crimean narrative, especially since texts sent for approval had sometimes 
already been in use for a year or more. 
 Finally, in the summer of 1952, Moscow decided to formally critique Crimean 
creativity.  Several Moscow academics at the AN SSSR and the Institute of Regionalism 
and Museum Work (hereafter IKMR) had specific problems with the new Crimean 
narrative.  Some, including A. N. Novitskii, A. N. Smirnov, N. A. Smirnov, Ia. I. Linkov, 
V. K. Gardanov, A. B. Zaks, and P. N. Tarkov had open contempt towards the authors’ 
work and attempted to inject Marxism into the narrative and eliminate contradictions.  
                                                
68 GARF f. 9520, op. 1, d. 153, l. 1. “Zakliuchenie” razrabotka Kirrilova “Alushta.” Nachal’nik Turistsko-
Ekskirsionnogo Upravlenie VTsSPS SSSR G. Kosilov i Zavidushi Metodsektorom E. Supina. 12 January 
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The fact that some AN SSSR scholars led the crackdown was cynical, since just a year 
before they had presented the new Crimean narrative as a success and published 
Nadinskii’s book.  Still, it would be wrong to assume that this meant before 1952 all 
Moscow historians agreed with all the aspects of the new Crimean narrative.   
 The first indication of friction came in the summer of 1951 when a delegation 
from IKMR traveled to Crimea.  After touring the Bakchisarai Palace Museum and 
several other museums, the delegates immediately wrote a letter to AN SSSR and 
reported that the exhibits were haphazard and “weak on Marxism.”  At first, the AN 
SSSR replied that it could “spare no experts” to investigate the matter.71  However, in the 
summer of 1952 this lack of oversight ceased with a combined effort by the AN SSSR 
and the IKMR that culminated with an academic conference on 25 May 1952 at the AN 
Crimea.  Before and after the conference, the academics inspected Crimean museums, 
educational institutions, and tourist excursions. After the conference and inspections, 
academics debated recommendations at a follow up meeting in Moscow on 13 June 1952.  
 It became clear at the conference that the critiques of 1952 were not because 
Moscow academics condemned the Crimean ethnic cleansing, Slavic resettlement, or 
claims that Crimea was Russian land.   Moreover, they believed that the primary goal of 
the conference was to solidify and even celebrate the new Crimean narrative’s key 
assertions.72  The problem with the new Crimean narrative was that “locals” such as 
Nadinskii wrote a history that only fit “the local (Crimean) framework,” and this local 
version quickly became popular in Crimea.  For example, during his visit to Crimea, Ia. 
A. Linkov described how an employee at the Kherson Historical Museum proclaimed 
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that he now had a “Crimean point of view” concerning Russian history.  Instead of the 
traditional “Russian point of view” that focused on Kiev and Moscow as the hearths of 
the Russian nation, Crimean Slavs, thanks to the new Crimean narrative, now considered 
the role of Crimea to be equal in importance, if not more, because Scythian civilization 
predated Kiev and Moscow.73  For Moscow academics, a Russo-centric narrative for 
Crimea was fine, but it could not undermine Moscow’s role in Russian national history. 
At the Simferopol’ conference, historians B. A. Rybakov, B. N. Grekov, and 
others highlighted the “mistakes” of Shults and Nadinskii and outlined the needed 
amendments. Not surprisingly, first on Moscow’s chopping block were the theories of 
Marr connecting Scythian civilization to Slavs.  The KPSS had already denounced Marr 
in the late 1940s as anti-Marxist, but afterwards Shults and Nadinksii still promoted his 
Scythian hypothesis.  Besides suggesting that Slavdom in Crimea predated that of Kiev 
and Moscow, academics disliked the argument that Greek colonizers in Crimea were 
occupiers that subjugated Slavs.  This “broke the (Marxist) historical process” that began 
with classic Greece, and held that Greek colonies in Crimea were progressive city-states 
comprised of working class refugees fleeing repression.74  Finally, some historians found 
the Scythian theory objectionable because the “primitive” Scythians could not possibly 
have given birth to the great Slavic and Russian cultures.75 
 As a respected academic, Shults “should have known better,” and at the 
Simferopol’ conference he rejected the Scythian theory and denounced Marr, instead 
shifting Slavic origins in Crimea to the ancient Tavridian kingdom.76  Nadinskii perhaps 
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never had the respect of Moscow academics and they lambasted him.  Outlines of 
Crimean History was “not a real scholarly work,” argued A. B. Zaks.77  He had written a 
sloppy populist history that had little to do with Marxism/Leninism and, even if it “did 
not create the mistakes,” it “repeated and popularized them.”78  
 Besides the Scythian issue, Nadinskii’s detractors believed that using the term 
“vossoedinenii” and portraying the 1783 annexation as progressive were incompatible.  
The problem, as historian A. N. Smirnov argued, was the “reuniting” claim detracted 
from the progressive nature of Russian “crusades” into Crimea during the middle ages.  
In his view, since the middle ages Russia and Crimea were always united in Slavdom 
despite the Turkic “occupation.”  Furthermore, “vossedenenie” mostly refers to the 
uniting of people, and not geographic regions.  Nadinskii’s sloppy application of the term 
could also lead readers to believe that Russians and Crimean Tatars were united in the 
Russian empire ethnically.79  
 In their Simferopol’ presentations, Grekov and Rybakov argued that 
“connections” between “indigenous Crimeans” with ancient Eastern European Slavs, 
Kiev, and “the gradual Slavic penetration and settlement in Crimea” alone supported the 
Russian claim to Crimea.  They said that Nadinskii was correct in suggesting that 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea was “progressive,” but historians had to base this 
narrative on “Marxism” and the claim that Russians bought progress before and after 
1783.  They needed to avoid fantasies about the Scythian origins of Slavic civilization 
and instead needed to provide “fact-based” evidence.  This included contrasting the 
capitalist advancements, aristocratic palaces, and culture of the Russian empire with the 
                                                
77 GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l. 36-37. 
78 GARF f. 10010, op. 1, d. 495, l. 34. 




Khanate. This shift away from the Scythian origins of Russian Crimea was meant to de-
localize that new Crimean narrative and ensure that Moscovite Russians, and not 
“primitive” Scythians, were the founders of “Russian Crimea.”80 
 While the intervening academics believed it was their duty to provide 
“excursionists, tourists and new settlers with a more comprehensive Marxist history of 
Crimea,” they doubted that even these minor changes would disseminate into popular 
history.  In fact, their reports on the popularity of the new Crimean narrative in museums, 
excursions, and outlets on the peninsula confirmed its success.81  At the Bakhchisarai 
Palace Museum, Smirnov reported that Kustova “personally escorted us around the 
museum and requested help in improving the exhibits.”  While he sympathized with her 
efforts, he disliked the crude way in which she had decorated the museum with Russo-
centric paintings, and the exhibit on the “reuniting” of Crimean to Russia remained.82  
Smirnov was dismayed that, “every ten minutes in Bakchisasarai a car pulls up to the 
palace and unloads tourists and it’s the same at the Kherson museum and others.” In his 
visit to the Kherson museum, Linkov was “horrified” to see how the museum exhibited 
the Greeks as occupiers.83  Moreover, the director of the Kherson museum, in Smirnov’s 
opinion, was too inexperienced to enforce Moscow’s guidelines among her workers.84   
 Meetings and further inspections after the conference only increased their 
pessimism.  Before the trip to Crimea, N. A. Smirnov wrote an essay titled “Vkliuchenie 
Kryma v sostav Russkogo gosudarstva (The Inclusion of Crimea in the Russian State)” 
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with the specific goal of arguing against the use of the term “vossoedinenie.”   However, 
after arguing his point in dozens of “lectures and private meetings” that summer, he 
found that Crimeans reacted to his argument with skepticism, if not outright hostility.  He 
said that both Crimean party officials and cultural workers argued that they “have gotten 
used to saying ‘vossoedinenie,’ have already disseminated this idea amongst the new 
population that just came to Crimea, and therefore do not want to change this term and 
there is no reason why they should.”  When Smirnov pushed the matter, a Crimean 
museum employee replied, “so what, Slavdom existed in Crimea in ancient times, this is 
ancient Russian land.”  Zaks also convened a meeting with the staff of the Simferopol’ 
museum and found the museum employees “incredibly stubborn” and attached to the 
term and their interpretation of the new Crimean narrative.  A meeting with Kustova’s 
staff yielded similar results.  Zaks concluded that most cultural workers in Crimea had 
“conservative” worldviews and that the scholars at AN Crimea were no better.  He 
believed that only “serious” Marxist historians from Moscow could fix the problem.  
Grekov also presented a paper at the Simferopol conference arguing for the use of the 
term “vkliuchenie” instead of “vossoedinenie,” but similarly believed his Crimean 
interlocutors ignored his suggestion.85 
 At the June follow up meeting in Moscow, Linkov summarized the problem: 
“Crimean historians have written a history that does not consider the larger history of the 
motherland and should not be allowed in Soviet science.”  Unfortunately, the new 
Crimean narrative had already become ingrained in “the bulk of our historical researchers 
of Crimean history.” Linkov further lamented that they (Moscow academics) could create 
committees and make recommendations, but they did not “have the strength” to enforce 
                                                




orders because of their limited influence on the peninsula and the convictions of the 
Crimeans.  Especially alarming was that the “popular historical literature” published in 
Crimea since the war had only multiplied these problems because the “mass of workers 
who come to Crimean resorts” read the mistakes of Shults and Nadinskii.86 
 A. N. Smirnov agreed that Crimean research monographs, tour guides, excursions 
and articles in local party newspapers displayed an absence of “preparation” in Marxist 
methodology and “hyper-exaggerated” the academic mistakes.  Smirnov believed that the 
Crimean AN should form a special commission just for the purpose of policing the 
popular history, guidebooks, and excursion/tourist literature.87  However, he believed any 
such effort was doomed: “I get the impression that local workers will not use the term 
‘uniting,’ and whether or not they will in the future only time will tell.”88  
 Their predictions were right.  Not only did Crimean officials ignore their pleas, so 
did the leaders of AN SSSR and AN Crimea.  From the perspective of AN Crimea, the 
critiques were minor asides. The purpose of the conference was confirming the new 
Crimean narrative and ending the Soviet “idealization of the Tatar and Turkic period.”89  
In a letter to Malenkov after the conference, the presidium of AN SSSR supported AN 
Crimean’s perspective and described the outcome of the conference.  The letter repeated 
the tenants of the new Crimean narrative, evening using “reuniting” despite the fact that 
Moscow academics had argued against the term.90   With the exception of removing the 
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Scythian thesis, the historians critical of the narrative could get neither their bosses nor 
Crimeans to make other minor changes.   The plan for the Crimean AN for 1953 
continued on the same track as before, “uncovering Crimean Slavic heritage.”91  As such, 
by 1953 the Soviet state had scrubbed the historical record (as far as the Soviet state and 
citizens were concerned) of Crimean Tatars’ legitimate place in Crimea and created a 
new, anti-Tatar epic. 
 
A Profound Legacy 
 
 
From 1944 to 1953 historians and cultural workers employed an odd mix of 
Russian nationalism and Slavophilism to justify Stalin’s policy in Crimea.  They wrote a 
popular, triumphant history that connected with the mindset of the war-weary Slavic 
settlers that repopulated the peninsula.  Moscow academics tried to inject more reason 
and Marxism into the narrative, but they mostly failed.   This is partly because, as this 
paper has displayed, even the Moscow academics critical of the narrative supported the 
overall argument that Crimea had always been Russian.  Their bosses also saw no need to 
alter a narrative that supported Stalin’s Crimea policy and it stood as the new status quo 
for Crimean history. 
In the long term, the new Crimean narrative mattered for everyone with a stake in 
Crimea’s future.  The Soviet Union created an awkward situation by combining the new 
Crimean narrative with the deportations, land redistribution, Slavic resettlement, and the 
1954 transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR that chapter three describes.  The key 
paradox to the above cascade of events was that the 1954 transfer of Crimea to the 
                                                





Ukrainian SSR did not alter the new Crimean narrative.  Both Stalin and Khrushchev 
believed that “the economic and geographic connection of the peninsula to Ukraine” was 
reason enough to put the direction of Crimean development in the hands of Ukrainian 
SSR institutions.  At the same time, authorities in Moscow, Kiev, and Simferopol’ all 
explicitly stated that the Crimea being economically and politically a region of Ukraine 
and being culturally and ethnically Russian were not mutually exclusive.92  In late April 
1954, both Pravda and Izvestia published speeches by party leaders that directly quoted 
Nadinskii on how Crimea was “Russian ancestral land,” and how for centuries non-Slavs 
had been trying to “steal Slavic land.”  In short, Ukraine became the keeper and 
developer the peninsula.    The transfer also coincided with the celebration of the “300 
years of ‘vossoedenenie’ of Ukraine with Russia.”  Moscow officials applied the term to 
the understanding of the relationship between the Russian and Ukrainian people that the 
Russian Empire had “reunited” three centuries earlier.  In this context, the Crimean 
transfer was not a “gift,” but a brotherly gesture that made sense economically, and was 
only possible because both the Russian and Ukrainian nations were united.  As such, 
before 1991 the annexation changed little on the ground and rarely challenged the new 
Crimean narrative because, as Slavs, Ukrainians were not occupiers.93  
Then the Soviet Union collapsed.  Overnight, Crimea became a strategic region 
where one state controlled land with a majority population that believed itself to be 
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connected to another state, all while the ethnically cleansed indigenous population began 
returning and remained disenfranchised.  This created political ire between Russia, 
Ukraine and Crimean Tatars after the 1991 Soviet collapse and shaped the events of 
2014.   
As the following chapters reveal, Crimean Tatars acknowledged the success of the 
new Crimean narrative and fought its falsehoods by directly confronting them well before 
1991.  They savaged the work of Nadinskii and Shults, challenged the purveyors of the 
new Crimean narrative in the government, the party and security services, and exposed 
the chauvinistic nature of tour guides, excursion texts, accounts of World War II, and 
museum exhibits.  This effort even included directly confronting authors and tour guides 
in person.94  Along with challenging specific authors and texts, Crimean Tatar activists 
acknowledged the significance of the May 25, 1952, Simferopol conference and 
condemned its outcome for solidifying the politics of “Crimea without Crimean Tatars.”95  
Unfortunately, in 2016 the political and economic disenfranchisement of Crimean Tatars 
and animosity towards their place in Crimean history remains. The new Crimean 
narrative helped create this reality by providing a durable nationalist myth that easily 
outlasted the Soviet collapse. 
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Crimean Tatar Rehabilitation, Resistance and Exile 
 
 
Death, national degradation, and imprisonment are the main legacies of special 
settlement for Crimean Tatars.  Moreover, there is no disputing that the Soviet state 
forced the Uzbek SSR and other regions to house special settlers.  Crimean Tatars first 
reacted to the terrible conditions by writing individual petitions for rehabilitation and 
escaping.  Early petitions were often very personalized, with individuals and perhaps 
their family members writing letters.  Escapees fled anyway they could, but the arid 
terrain of the Uzbek SSR often hindered their success.   As this chapter underlines, while 
a handful of petitions and escapees succeeded, the majority of Crimean Tatars remained 
in special settlement until 1956. 
However, the relationships between the exiles and host regions were not entirely 
destructive.  What Paul Stronski remarked about the postwar population of Tashkent 
applies, in a more limited capacity, to Crimean Tatars.  That is, people “reacted to, 
adapted, and ultimately helped shape” events “during times of intense turmoil in Soviet 
history.”1  Crimean Tatars in exile participated in broad developments such as 
industrialization and economic, educational, and party advancement during and after the 
special settlement.  This “adaptation” did not mean acceptance of Stalin’s ethnic 
cleansing and exile.  Rather, it fostered Crimean Tatar survival as individuals and as a 
nation.  Both the experience of early resistance and the limited assimilation of Crimean 
                                                




Tatars into political and economic systems in exile were crucial to the beginning of a 
robust protest movement in the 1960s. 
 To explore this final dynamic of the immediate postwar period, this chapter 
begins by outlining Crimean Tatar reaction to special settlement.  The second half of this 
chapter then examines social, political and economic trends as special settlement chaos 
ended in 1946, and Crimean Tatars and their host regions attempted to find some 
normalcy and opportunity in their otherwise antagonistic union. 
 
Early Resistance and Rehabilitation in Special Settlement 
 
 
 From 1944 to 1953, Crimean Tatars resisted special settlement through the legal 
channel of petitioning the NKVD/MVD for rehabilitation and the main illegal protest of 
escape.2  Petitioning and escape usually had the combined goals of finding food, finding 
family members, seeking release from special settlement, and, sometimes, returning to 
Crimea. 
In the first weeks after the deportation, Crimean Tatars did not hide their 
discontent.  Within days of arriving in the Uzbek SSR numerous Crimean Tatars, without 
permission, journeyed to Tashkent and bombarded authorities with petitions questioning 
the legality of their deportation and seeking the whereabouts of family members.  In 
some cases such as the Bukhara oblast kolkhoz of Narpai, a group of Crimean Tatars 
chose two representatives to travel to Tashkent on their behalf.3   Other Crimean Tatars 
demanded to know when they would receive the promised “goods or money in exchange 
for their livestock and grain confiscated in Crimea.”  In Namagan oblast, the NKVD 
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reported that the 15,000 Crimean Tatars “all complained about the lack of food” in June 
1944.4  Crimean Tatars exiled to other Soviet regions also complained to local 
authorities, especially since most were now separated from relatives in the Uzbek SSR.5    
The NKVD in Tashkent and elsewhere ordered low-level NKVD officials to record the 
complaints.6  However, immediately after the deportation the NKVD forwarded the 
complaints to Crimean authorities (the special settlers’ last place of legal residence) and 
these early requests were mostly dead-ends.7   
Outside of the important exceptions of veterans and party members discussed 
later in this section, the only evidence of Crimean Tatars influencing Soviet policy during 
special settlement was an isolated case in Moscow and Tula oblasts.  Over 4,000 Crimean 
Tatars had been working in the Moscow coal consortium since the early days of the war 
and had continued mining after the deportation (though now as special settlers). With 
their families living in awful conditions after deportation, the coalmines saw a quick rise 
in escapes.  The miners soon began sending mass requests to Moscow asking that they be 
reunited with their families that had been deported.8   
 The head of the Moscow Coal Consortium, Zasyanko, did not want to lose the 
miners.  He proposed that the families be allowed to join the miners in Moscow and Tula 
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oblasts, and his bosses at the Ministry of Fuel Enterprise Construction agreed.9  Beria 
approved the proposal and championed the idea to Stalin.  Arguing that the policy change 
would undermine Stalin’s falsified mass treason charges against Crimean Tatars, 
Molotov objected.  Beria won the dispute, and in a letter to Molotov explained that the 
plan was the best economic outcome because the Crimean Tatar workers were productive 
at the mines.10  On August 17, 1947, Stalin ordered that families of miners be allowed to 
register as special settlers at the mines.11  By 1948 several hundred miner’s families had 
arrived, and the mine consortium eventually allowed a large number of Crimean Tatars to 
travel to the Uzbek SSR and other regions to find their families.12  
 However, the above case was isolated and the majority of early Crimean Tatar 
petitions only informed the NKVD of what they already knew.  Crimean special settlers 
were unhappy, disoriented, and not receiving rations and these conditions were leading to 
a humanitarian catastrophe.   
The only Crimean Tatar special settlers that successfully petitioned the Soviet 
state for increased rights and release were a small number of Crimean Tatar party 
members, veterans (or active duty soldiers), and women with non-Tatar spouses.  These 
developments began with a debate over the basic rights of special settlers.  As early as 
July 1944, Chernyshov argued that new special settlers should retain all their rights as 
Soviet citizens, with the exception of the right to leave special settlement.  His opinion 
                                                
9 GARF, f. 5446, op. 49a, d. 3343, l. 3.  Pis’mo Min. Stoitel’stva toplivnykh Predpriatii SSSR- Beria.  April 
30, 1947. 
10 GARF, f. 5446, op. 49a, d. 3343, l. 8.  Sekretnoe Pis’mo, Beria- Molotovu.  July 18, 1947. 
11 GARF, f. 5446, op. 49a, d. 3343, l. 9.  Sovmin SSSR Postanovlenie No. 2890-931s.  August 17, 1947. 




came to light as Crimean Tatar soldiers and officers, and in some cases their 
commanders, began petitioning for their rights to receive “social welfare and pensions.”13   
Uzbek SSR authorities objected to such rights, and understanding the awkward 
Uzbek position is important.   Special settlers were supposed to be traitors and the Uzbek 
party was busy lecturing mid-level Uzbek bureaucrats about the danger of Crimean Tatar 
treason.  Moreover, the NKVD had already stripped many special settlers of their internal 
passports.  Now, Moscow was demanding that local Uzbek officials, who had just learned 
about Crimean Tatar treachery, had to return to their jobs and provide these “enemies” 
with rations, loans, jobs, homes and pensions for military service.   
Why did Chernyshov and the NKVD “champion” the rights of special settlers in 
this case?  Chernyshov was not a great humanitarian, but he was a pragmatic 
administrator who wanted to secure benefits because he was looking for anyway to keep 
special settlers alive.  Nor was the NKVD was not alone in this opinion.  In one of the 
more astonishing letters of 1944, Soviet General Andrei Khrulev, at the time the Chief of 
the Rear of the Red Army and Soviet Armed forces (and former Deputy Defense 
Commissar), demanded that his officers and their families forced into special settlement 
receive pension payments.  In fact, Khrulev organized payments so that the financial 
branch of the People’s Commissariat of Defense (Narkom Oborony) provided the funds 
directly to oblast-level special settlement authorities, bypassing the gridlock of the banks, 
financial ministries and republic governments.14   
                                                
13 GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 7535, l. 2.  Pis’mo Zam NKVD SSSR Chernyshov- Sovnarkom SSSR 
Kosyginu.  August 10, 1944. 
14 GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 7535, l. 3.  Pis’mo Narkom Oborony SSSR Nachal’nik Tyla Krasnoi Armii 




The letters and pressure from the NKVD and military did influence the 
Sovnarkom.  In a secret letter to Molotov on August 17, 1944, Kosygin said that the 
Sovnarkom had begun a debate on providing pensions for special settlers because of 
“numerous requests about the payments of payments and benefits” from “places of 
special settlement.”15  Kosygin agreed with Chernyshov that special settlers were 
“entitled to the same social benefits and equal conditions as other citizens.”  Eventually, 
the NKVD, Red Army, Sovnarkom and Uzbek officials reached an informal compromise 
that pensions had to be paid to officers, veterans, veteran families, invalids, and mothers 
with multiple children.16  To clarify that they understood Chernyshov and the 
Sovnarkom’s order correctly, the Uzbek Sovnarkom directly asked Moscow if this meant 
“paying pensions to the families of special settlers still serving (in the armed forces),” 
and they received an affirmative answer.17  It is impossible to calculate how many 
Crimean Tatars actually received pensions and benefits before 1946, and likely few ever 
saw such benefits.  Still, many former officers and party members were certainly better 
off material-wise than regular Crimean Tatar special settlers.18 
These petitions did not stop with requesting benefits, and as mass death began 
hundreds of Crimean Tatar veterans and party members began petitioning the Soviet state 
for their release.19  Numerous letters arrived at the Soviet Central Committee in Moscow 
                                                
15 GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 7535, l. 15.  Sekretnoe Pis’mo A. Kosygin- Molotovu.  August 17, 1944. 
16 GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 7535, l. 17.  Soversheno Sekretno Pis’mo A. Kosygin- V. M. Molotovu.  
August 18, 1944. 
17 GARF, f. 5446, op. 46a, d. 7535, l. 5.  Pis’mo Zam. Pred. Sovnarkoma Uzbeksoi SSR Ia. Aliev- 
Sovnarkom SSSR Uprav. Delami Mitrichevu.  July 20, 1944. 
18 This was likely because most arrived at later dates and were more likely to find work.  During 1944 and 
1945 its is doubtful that many Crimean Tatar veterans even knew about this right since there is no evidence 
the Uzbek SSR published the order. 




and at Malenkov’s office.20  The influx of requests from Crimean special settlers was 
large enough that by October 1944 Beria had to decide how to handle the issue.  
Chernyshov and his deputies told Beria that they believed Crimean Tatar party members, 
veterans, and Crimean Tatar women married to non-Tatar servicemen should have the 
right to dispute their special settler status.21   
Beria knew there could be no blanket rehabilitation of Crimean Tatar veterans and 
party members, so he decided to meet with Chernyshov on October 31, 1944, and create a 
process for handling the requests.  At the meeting they considered several cases that 
Chernyshov had already decided.  Sundus Useinov was one of the first rehabilitated 
Crimean Tatars and her case was an important precedent that Beria took into account.   
She was the wife of slain Crimean Tatar partisan Server Useinov, and she had argued that 
the release of her and her daughter Lelia would honor her husband’s sacrifice.  Even 
before the meeting with Beria, Chernyshov agreed and approved their release on 
September 12, 1944.22 After reviewing such cases and their options, Beria and 
Chernyshov agreed that they would grant release from special settlement to veterans and 
party members on an individual basis, and only after a NKVD investigation of every 
case.23  In some instances such as the Useinov case, the NKVD could also rehabilitate 
family members of the petitioner.  Beria clarified that release from special settlement did 
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21 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 160, l. 27.  Pis’mo  Chernyshov i Kuznetsov- Beria.  August 1, 1944. 
22 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 101.  Zakliuchenie 12 sentiabria, 1944. 
23 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l. 6. Spravka “po postanovleniiu Biuro Krymskogo Obkoma VKP/b/ ot 13 
sentiabria t. g. o faktakh vozvroshcheniia v krym spetsposelentsev.”  By I. O. Nach. Otdela Spetsposelenii 




not mean that an individual automatically had the right to return home (to Crimea).  
Special permission to return to Crimea was possible, but only in some cases.24   
  After the meeting with Beria, similar petitions and rehabilitations accelerated. 
Based on his wartime record, “Hero of the Soviet Union” Uzeir Abduramanov argued 
that the NKVD should immediately release him, his father, three sisters, two brothers, 
and wife from special settlement, and allow them to return to Crimea.  On September 12, 
1945, Chernyshov released Abduramanov and his family members with permission to 
return to Crimea.25  A few weeks later on September 25, 1945, Mustafa Selimov, the 
former First Secretary of the Yalta Party District Committee and former partisan, won his 
freedom.26  Many of the letters to Moscow are fascinating accounts of individual Crimean 
Tatars transitioning from a Soviet soldier to an “enemy of the state” overnight. For 
example, Alimzhan Satdarov’s letter described how the NKVD had deported him from 
Crimea while he was on active duty in the 180th Rifle Reserve Division, and how he had 
been wounded and received commendations earlier in the war.  The MVD investigated 
his wartime record and approved his release on September 20, 1947.27    
Some Soviet military leaders continued to defend Crimean Tatar soldiers.  For 
example, Red Army Airborne officer Abdal Bakobashevich was one of several Crimean 
Tatar service members whose commanding officers sent letters supporting their release.  
Chernyshov not only released Bakobashevich on May 20, 1945, but also allowed him to 
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25 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 7.  Zakliuchenie 12 sentiabria, 1945. 
26 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 80.  Zakliuchenie 19 sentiabria, 1945. 
27 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 401, l.l. 96-100. Spravka: Ha osvobozhdennykh iz spetsposeleniia tatar s 
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return to his position at the headquarters of the Eighth Airborne Army.28  Red Army 
officer Vait Khabulaeva was one of thousands of Crimean Tatars whose officers did not 
deport them in May 1944.  He continued fighting until the war ended and, after being 
demobilized, he found his wife in special settlement and successfully petitioned for her 
release in January 1947.29  Other Crimean Tatars that the NKVD and MVD released from 
1944 to 1948 include (but are not limited to) partisan leaders such as Ramazon Kurt-
Umerov and Seit-Ali Ametov, former assistant to the Crimean prosecutor Nadzhie 
Nasyrova, and the former 2nd Secretary of the Staro-Krymsk district Party, Usein 
Adzhiev.30  
 While Crimean Tatar men in military and/or party positions wrote most petitions, 
there were exceptions.  Zare Khalidova, a Crimean Tatar woman, was serving as a 
captain in a Red Army medical unit in 1944 when the NKVD deported her mother, 
Tenzile Khalidova, to Kostromskoi oblast.  Similar to many of her male Crimean Tatar 
comrades, Khalidova’s service shielded her from deportation, and she continued serving 
until 1946.  After demobilization, Khalidova requested her mother’s release and, after a 
brief investigation, Chernyshov signed her mother’s release order on September 30, 
1946.31  Aisha Memetova was another female Crimean Tatar petitioner.  Her mother had 
been a Crimean party member and the Germans had executed her for underground 
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bez prava v”ezda v Krymskuiu oblast’ by Konstantinov.  September 1948. 
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activities.  Based on her mother’s service, Chernyshov approved Memetova’s release 
from special settlement in Sverdlov oblast on January 31, 1945.32 
 Beria and Chernyshov also released some Crimean Tatar women with non-
Crimean Tatar spouses.  Although the NKVD outlined no racial theory as to why they 
allowed such rehabilitations, documents suggest an underlying assumption that Crimean 
Tatar women married to non-Tatars (and their children) were seemingly purified by their 
Slavic husbands.  After her deportation to the Uzbek SSR, Crimean Tatar Munire 
Davydenko’s husband, a Russian officer, petitioned for her release and Chernyshov freed 
her on November 9, 1945.  When V. F. Val’ko, an ethnic Ukrainian and a Red Army 
Major, found out that his Crimean Tatar wife, Fatima Ramazanova, had been deported to 
the Kazakh SSR, he and his son (also in the army) began petitioning the NKVD for 
Fatima’s release.  Chernyshov approved her unconditional release on September 17, 
1946.  E. I. Dymchenko, Alime Asan-Sary, Aishe Selimova, M. F. Martynova and over a 
dozen more Crimean Tatar women also gained their freedom thanks to petitions from 
Slavic husbands.33 
While usually Slavic husbands wrote mixed-marriage petitions, there were 
exceptions.  For example, T. S. Valednik-Murzig had been married to a Jewish man who 
died in 1939.  Based on the fact that her husband had not been Crimean Tatar, she 
petitioned for her and her daughter’s release.  Chernyshov even gave them permission to 
return to Evpatoriia when he ordered their release on January 15, 1947.   Other cases 
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prove that relations between Crimean Tatar special settlers and local Uzbeks and other 
ethnicities in special settlement were not always antagonistic.  After arriving in the 
Pakhtarskogo district of Samarkand oblast (Uzbek SSR), Razis Memetova met ethnic 
Uzbek Dostuva-Iadgarom and they married in May 1945.  Memetova’s husband then 
petitioned for her release on the grounds that he was an ethnic Uzbek.  The process did 
take several years, but on January 9, 1948, the MVD released Memetova.  Uris 
Mustafaeva-Tsuprunova also met her husband, Grigorii Tsuprunov, in special settlement.  
Grigorii was ethnic Russian and a Red Army officer when the couple married on June 16, 
1946, in Chirchik, Uzbek SSR.  When the army transferred Grigorii to Stalinabad he 
petitioned for Uris’s release from special settlement and the MVD approved the request 
and allowed her to travel to Stalinabad.34 
 NKVD/MVD records on the totals of rehabilitated Crimean special settlers are 
detailed.  Between 1945 and September 20, 1948, Chernyshov approved the release of 
173 Crimean Tatars.  This included 71 releases in 1945, 34 in 1946, 42 in 1947 and 26 in 
1948.  Of the 173 rehabilitated Crimean Tatars, only 33 (25 adults and 8 children) were 
allowed to return to Crimea.35  And a handful of Crimean Tatars did return.  For example, 
Evstafii Osmanovich, a rehabilitated Baltic fleet veteran, registered in Gurzuf in 1947.36  
Most of the returning Crimean Tatars registered in Yalta, where the MVD reported 
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registering 19 rehabilitated Crimean Tatars between 1945 and 1948.37  A further 200 
cases of Crimean special settlers were still under review in September 1948.38 
Since these rehabilitations were only possible for a miniscule number of Crimean 
Tatars, the majority of Crimean Tatars had no hope of leaving special settlement.  When 
desperation to find family members or seek better conditions boiled over, special settlers 
turned to the more open method of resisting the deportation: escape.  As David Shearer 
underlines, “escape was not as difficult as one might expect” because, unlike the 
GULAG, special settlements “had no barbed wire” and people could just leave.39  Special 
settlements also lacked permanent guards and were closer geographically to urban centers 
such as Tashkent.40  By the end of August 1944, at least 334 Crimean special settlers had 
escaped, with the largest number (189 people) escaping from Tashkent oblast.  The 
NKVD claims that they were able to capture 22 of the August escapees over the next 
months, but only because many had left to find family members, making escapees’ 
destination easy to surmise.41  By October 16, 1944, Chernyshov informed Beria that the 
NKVD had arrested a further 1,577 Crimean special settlers for escape.42  This number 
would climb dramatically in the months to come as mass death gripped the special 
settlement population. 
The chaos of early special settlement made preventing escapes difficult.  The 
proliferation of escapes in early August 1944 led Beria to pressure NKVD officials in 
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39 Shearer, Policing Stalin’s Socialism, 429-430.   
40 While daunting, Anne Applebaum proves that some GULAG prisoners still managed to escape.  
Applebaum, GULAG, 390-401.  
41 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 174, l.l. 48-49. Dokladnaia Zapiska iz Tashkenta. November 13, 1944. 




Tashkent to enhance security and prosecute all escapees.43  In addition, the NKVD 
established a network of informants inside the Crimean Tatar community to report on the 
general attitudes of Crimean Tatars and locate escapees.44  Regardless, the increased 
surveillance did not stem escape.  For example, a year later in the third quarter of 1945 a 
total 1,551 special settlers escaped.45  
Outside of the Uzbek SSR, Crimean Tatar escape also exploded.  The case of 
escapee Sale Ashirov in Gorky oblast was typical for the period.  Ashirov’s mother said 
that he went to work on October 7, 1944, and never came home.46  Out of around 10,000 
Crimea Tatars in the oblast, the NKVD reported that 2,385 escaped between June and 
September 1944.  However, because most escapees were searching for family in the 
Uzbek SSR, NKVD operatives had captured all but three escapees by October 1.47 
 In addition to seeking family and escaping horrid conditions, some Crimean 
Tatars escaped with the goal of returning to Crimea. Similar to escaped prisoners and 
special settlers of all ethnicities, Crimean Tatars often hid with friends and forged 
passports.  A small number of escapees chose to confront Crimean authorities and 
demand compensation for confiscated possessions.  In one extraordinary case, a Crimean 
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Tatar named Abdul Beitullaev escaped from special settlement and returned to Crimea in 
early 1946.  He somehow petitioned a Simferopol court to have his home and land 
returned, won the case, and then sold his home.  The Crimean MVD eventually arrested 
him, but the case was so shocking that Crimean police jailed several local police and 
officials for their part in allowing Abdul to individually undo Stalin’s wishes.48  While 
the above case was extreme, by 1945 so many escaped Crimean Tatars were evading 
authorities that the head of the Crimean MVD, A. Kalinin, scolded the Crimean “passport 
tables” and revised instructions for preventing escaped special settlers from returning.49   
 The best quantitative picture of early Crimean Tatar escape and return to Crimea 
comes from MVD records.  During the peak of mass death in 1945, Crimean authorities 
detained 529 escaped Crimean Tatars and received 607 BOLOS (be on the look out) for 
escaped Crimean Tatars.  By 1948, Crimean authorities had “detained and sent back to 
special settlement” 771 Crimean Tatars, arrested an additional 228 escaped Crimean 
Tatars for prosecution (although most were re-deported along with detainees), and 
received a total of 1,738 BOLOS for escaped Crimean Tatars.50    
The fact that a small number of Crimean Tatars were returning to Crimea did not 
go unnoticed in Moscow. In September 1948 Stalin traveled to his Yalta dacha.  
According to Crimean officials and other sources, at some point during his visit he 
became aware that some rehabilitated and escaped Crimean Tatars had returned to 
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Crimea.  Stalin became infuriated and on September 13 called the Yalta Party Secretary, 
Bulatov, to his Dacha and berated him for allowing any Crimean Tatars to return to 
Crimea.51  The veracity of accounts surrounding Stalin’s rant is questionable because the 
crackdown on Crimean Tatars occurred during a Soviet-wide assault on all released or 
escaped special settlers.52  Regardless, the incident was a clear signal to Soviet authorities 
that absolutely no Crimean Tatars, under any circumstances, should reside in Crimea and 
that Chernyshov and Beria should cease rehabilitating any Crimean Tatars. 
To end rehabilitations, the MVD and MGB began forwarding release petitions to 
the Crimean oblast prosecutor’s office instead of reviewing individual petitions in-house 
as Chernyshov had done.53  The Crimean authorities, unlike the NKVD and MVD from 
1944 to 1948, simply ignored the requests.  For example, of the over 20 requests sent by 
Crimean special settlers in the 1st quarter of 1952, there is no evidence that Crimean 
authorities granted any releases.54  
 To end the return of escaped and rehabilitated special settlers to Crimea, the MVD 
in Moscow and Crimea first issued three related orders that demanded Crimean passport 
tables treat everyone with suspicion.  The policy change then culminated on November 
26, 1948, with a Supreme Soviet SSSR order that forbid any special settler of any 
ethnicity from returning to their homelands and prescribed even harsher penalties for 
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escape and aiding escapees.55  Simultaneously, from October 5 to15, 1948, the Crimean 
MVD swept Crimean towns, factories and farms and began a new, albeit small, wave of 
deportations of any “suspicious” persons.56  The Crimean MVD even deported some 
Crimean Tatars such as Svtafii Osmanovich who had received MVD permission to return 
to Crimea.  In general, the October security sweep generated widespread panic because 
any Crimean resident who were former German labor conscripts or lived under 
occupation became concerned about deportation.57  
 In addition, Moscow gave Crimean and Uzbek authorities the permission to 
prosecute all escapees and those who had forged names or passport details with article 58 
of the Soviet penal code (which covered anti-Soviet activities and treason).   One of the 
main problems for Crimean authorities from 1944 to 1948 was that they could rarely 
prosecute escapees for escape because that required collecting documents from special 
settlement authorities in remote locations.  In fact, Crimean prosecutors only tried 22 
Crimean Tatars for escape before 1948.  Usually, Crimean authorities just re-deported the 
hundreds of escapees they detained.58  Allowing Crimean authorities to charge escapees 
with article 58 meant that documenting their escape was irrelevant because their very 
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presence in Crimea was an “anti-Soviet” crime.  The case of Emira Kasan confirms 
simplified prosecutions.  After escaping and evading Uzbek authorities, she returned to 
Crimea, living with Russian friends in Alushta.  The MGB began investigating her 
whereabouts in early 1952 and soon arrested her and turned her over to Crimean Oblast 
prosecutors for violating article 58.59  
Article 58 also allowed Crimean and Uzbek prosecutors to detain suspects 
indefinitely until they decided how to prosecute the escapee.  Consequently, prosecutors 
often arrested Crimean Tatars for one crime, and then prosecuted them for a different 
crime.  For example, in 1952, the Crimean MVD arrested escapee Davydova-Memetov 
for article 58 (specifically spying), but at trial article 58 was not a factor and a Crimean 
court sentenced her to 10 years for escaping from special settlement.60  The case of 
escapee D. A. Apazidi displays that Uzbek authorities also began using article 58 to 
detain escapees.  The Ferghana oblast MGB began investigating Apazidi in January 1952 
and arrested him on December 18, 1952 with article 58.61  Ferghana prosecutors then sent 
him to Crimea where Crimean prosecutors sentenced him to ten years for escape.62   
As considerable jail time (usually a decade or more) became the consequence of 
escape after the 1948 decrees, instances of Crimean Tatar escape shrunk to just a few 
dozen every year.63  During the 4th quarter of 1952 and most of 1953 the Ferghana oblast 
MVD did not charge a single special settler under article 58.  This is despite the fact that 
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in Ferghana oblast, as in all oblasts with special settlers, special prosecutors made 
quarterly inspections of special settlers looking for such cases.64  Similar sharp declines 
in cases from other oblasts during the same period suggest that special settlement 
authorities were, on the eve of Stalin’s death, confident that they had reached a workable 
status quo in controlling unhappy special settlers.65  Escape attempts had mostly stopped, 
and most Crimean Tatars calling for their rehabilitation or criticizing the state had either 
been rehabilitated or jailed.   
Despite being a small number of individuals, this period of rehabilitation and 
escape was significant for two reasons.  First, as will become apparent in the following 
section, rehabilitated Crimean Tatar party members such as Mustafa Selimov became 
authority figures to other Crimean Tatars, and helped secure economic stability for 
special settlers by taking administrative positions in farms, factories, and party Soviets.  
After the end of special settlement, Selimov and other such individuals became leaders of 
the protest movement and their early experience with petitioning the Soviet state would 
be crucial to the effort.  Second, Stalin’s 1948 reaction to Crimean Tatars returning to 
Crimea solidified anti-Tatar sentiment amongst the post-deportation Crimean 
administrators, particularly Crimean police and party members.  The orders of 1948 and 
prosecutions of Crimean Tatars for “anti-Soviet activities” set a precedent in 
discouraging Crimean Tatar return.  Crimean authorities would use this precedent to 
justify anti-Crimean Tatar policies for decades after the end of special settlement and the 
1967 declaration giving individual Crimean Tatars the “right” to return to Crimea. 
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“Normal” Life in Special Settlement 
 
Outside of the few hundred rehabilitated Crimean Tatars and the escapees, the 
vast majority of Crimean Tatars who survived mass death spent the rest of special 
settlement making their bleak situation bearable and seeking opportunity when it arose.  
Harsh circumstances and pragmatic concerns began a socioeconomic shift among 
Crimean Tatars with a trajectory towards urbanization and industrialization.  As talented 
Crimean Tatars rose through the Uzbek socioeconomic system, an increasing number of 
them received educations in Tashkent and other cities and joined the Komsomol and 
party.  Many would later join older veterans to become the networkers of the Crimean 
Tatar protest movement, serving as nodes of organized protest and communicating with 
rural Crimean Tatars, Soviet dissidents and Soviet authorities alike.  To examine the 
origins of this transformation, this section explores the demographic legacies of mass 
death, what problems lingered after 1946, and what policies and trends arose from those 
circumstances as the Soviet state attempted to “normalize” special settlement. 
In Crimea before the deportation, nearly 70 percent of Crimean Tatars had lived 
and worked in agricultural regions, but the opposite was true by 1989.  Nearly 70 percent 
of Crimean Tatars had become urbanized and only 30 percent remained in rural areas of 
primarily the Uzbek SSR.66  This change began because mass death shifted the surviving 
Crimean Tatars and new arrivals to increasingly industrial and urban settings.  While the 
initial conditions at many industrial sites were atrocious for Crimean Tatars in 1944 and 
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1945, the NKVD was able to more quickly improve conditions in such areas because they 
were geographically and logistically closer to the urban centers of Soviet power.   
NKVD documents on the population dynamics of Crimean Tatar special settlers 
reveal the beginning of this change.  Initially, the NKVD based the resettlement of 
Crimean Tatars in the Uzbek SSR on the group being primarily agricultural, as well as 
the security concerns and “national degradation” goal described in chapter one.  The 
official plan was to settle 94,500 deportees in kolkhozes, 36,300 in sovkhozes and 23,200 
at industrial sites.67  By November of 1945, the reality of mass death had significantly 
changed this dynamic, with NKVD numbers recording 44,303 Crimean Tatars on 
kolkhozes, 27,697 on sovkhozes, and 50,101 in industry.68  These numbers not only 
reflect the mass death on kolkhozes, but the transfer of survivors into industry and how 
the NKVD placed over 16,000 Crimean Tatars who arrived after May 1944 on industrial 
sites instead of farms. 
The number of Crimean Tatar special settlers outside of the Uzbek SSR was 
smaller, with around 32,000 people by July 1944, but the trend towards urbanity and 
industry was similar.  As described in chapter two, these populations were concentrated 
in Molotov oblast (10,002), Mariinskoi ASSR (8,597), Gorkovskii oblast (5,514), 
Sverlodskoi oblast (3,591) and Ivanovskoi oblast (2,800) and smaller groups in Iaroslavl’ 
oblast and other regions.69  Again, while smaller and widely dispersed, these populations 
were consequential because many Crimean Tatars in Gorky and Molotov oblasts were 
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party members, politicians, high-ranking veterans, and well-educated, and the NKVD 
placed most in industry.  Moreover, most of these special settlers would gradually move 
to Uzbek cities and industrial sites between the late 1940s and 1960s, and help bolster the 
burgeoning Crimean Tatar urban population and the growing protest movement.  
While bureaucratic genocide began the population shift, by 1946 Moscow’s 
solutions to the remaining problems in special settlement further drove this change.  
Beyond ending mass death, a crucial remaining problem for “normalizing” special 
settlement conditions was the ideological paradox that began after the deportation: how to 
uphold Stalin’s lie of Crimean Tatar treachery, while at the same time assimilating 
Crimean Tatars into the socioeconomic and political structures in exile.  As described in 
chapter one, from 1944 to 1946 these contradictory goals and the “mixed messages” from 
Moscow to Uzbek officials about Crimean Tatars had contributed to mass death.70 
Afterwards, the Uzbek party and government continued portraying special settlers as a 
dangerous influx of enemy elements that needed to be repressed, and did so for the rest of 
special settlement.  For example, a 1950 Uzbek Party Central Committee meeting 
referred to special settlers as traitors, and stated that many special settlers were “actively 
working against us (the SSSR)” or had a “harmful influence” on Uzbek workers.71  
Moreover, the resettlement of Crimean Tatars in the Uzbek republic continued to cause 
resentment, and the NKVD noted how many Uzbeks wondered why these “traitors” were 
not deported to more unpopulated regions or even executed.72       
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The truth is no one ever found a concrete solution to this paradox, and this was a 
common problem with Stalinist “punishments.”  As Lynne Viola argues, Gulag and 
special settlement planning created “utopian quagmire and dystopian nightmare” because 
the system was permanently undermined by the “disjunctures between planning and 
reality,” and this discord was an “essential feature of Stalinism.”73  Nonetheless, the 
dystopia did “function” in some respects.  After World War II, the primary goal of 
special settler authorities was to retain some of the human capital even while the general 
Stalinist policies were creating immense destruction and waste.   In the Uzbek SSR, 
Moscow relied on the NKVD/MVD convincing some regional authorities that the 
deportation was an overall positive because Crimean Tatar workers were a boost to the 
economy.74  To realize the “economic benefit,” in 1946 Moscow and the MVD special 
settlement division launched a concerted effort to incorporate Crimean Tatars into the 
Uzbek economy.  
The obstacles special settler authorities and special settlers faced were immense.  
As mass death ended in 1946, Uzbek resentment and distrust towards Crimean Tatars 
translated into chronic unemployment because many factory and farm directors still 
refused to employ special settlers.  An investigation into the situation found that only 
38% of working-age Crimean Tatars were unemployed nearly two years after the 
deportation.  Nor was the workforce ideal.  Over 10,000 Crimean Tatar men in the Soviet 
Armed Forces had died during the war and thousands of others continued service in the 
army and work force outside of special settlement.  According to the MVD, by the 
beginning of 1946 “the majority of Crimean Tatar families in special settlement were 
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headed by women,” often caring for multiple children.  In short, malnourished mothers, 
children, and the elderly were the bulk of the Crimean Tatar workforce in 1946.75  
 Moreover, as was true since the first months of deportation, “employment” was a 
strong word.  Official and unofficial work for special settlers was still often equivalent to 
slave labor.  For those on payrolls, the pay and rations received were, by Moscow’s own 
admission, “very small” if received at all.76  Another endemic problem, and one that 
Soviet Finance Minister Arsenii Zverev acknowledged, was that “when compared to 
regular workers at the same kolkhozes, the special settlers usually receive far less 
working days.”  Even if a kolkhoz did pay Crimean Tatars for time worked, their wage 
was often a pittance because they were allowed to work only a few days a week.77 
Compounding the financial problems for Crimean Tatars, the promised 
compensation for possessions confiscated in Crimea never arrived.  After the failure of 
the reimbursement plan in 1944 and early 1945, the Soviet Sovnarkom gave the Narkom 
Zemledeliia and the Uzbek Sovnarkom over seven million rubles from the Sovnarkom 
reserve fund to fully reimburse all special settlers by the end of 1945.  The Uzbek 
Sovnarkom again failed to do so, never even touching over half of the money.78   
On the housing front, the Sel’khoz Bank of the USSR claimed that by 1946 
Crimean Tatars had received over 52 million rubles in building loans.  However, this 
number is dubious because local authorities stole much of the money.  For Crimean 
Tatars who did claim the loans, the vast majority used the money to survive in the short-
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term.  The Ministry of Finance estimated that 88 percent of the 52 million rubles went to 
purchasing bread, grain, shoes, clothes, livestock and other necessities.  Combined with 
the lack of pay, the loans became a huge burden for Crimean Tatars and the Selkhoz bank 
alike.  When the Selkhoz bank requested 3 million rubles in interest payments in 1945 
from Crimean Tatars, it received none of the money.  This led Moscow to demand that 
Uzbek farm and factory directors pay the special settlers not just for the settlers’ benefit, 
but also to help pay back the more than 8 million rubles in interest that special settlers 
owed in 1946.79  As Finance Minister Zverev argued, no one wanted special settlers 
accruing debt because this financial drain could keep the special settlement situation from 
stabilizing.80 
  Numbers on housing for Crimean Tatars confirm the failure of the loans to 
stimulate home building.  By 1946, only 208 new houses had been built for the 46,358 
Crimean Tatar families in the republic.  Much of the money that authorities actually used 
for Crimean Tatar housing was to renovate 9,780 homes.  The land situation remained 
dismal, with only 2,318 families receiving plots in 1946.  When Crimean Tatars bought 
building materials, the items usually sat idle because most Uzbek authorities still refused 
to distribute land for homebuilding.   The result was that the majority of Crimean Tatar 
families (36,370 according to the NKVD) remained in “overcrowded” dorms or 
structures “not worthy of human habitation.”81   
To solve these problems and prioritize the economic benefits of special settler 
survivors, Moscow issued and finally enforced a new round of orders on Crimean special 
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settlers, usually focused on the Uzbek SSR.  To achieve the full placement of all Crimean 
Tatars in the Uzbek SSR into jobs and homes, Beria reiterated the responsibility of Uzbek 
officials with a decree on July 28, 1946, that demanded Uzbek authorities prove that 
Crimean Tatars had homes and employment, and also gave Crimean Tatars an extra four 
years to pay off loans for home construction.82  Simultaneously, Moscow pressed Uzbek 
Sovnarkom head Abdurakhmanov to actually distribute the money earmarked for 
compensating Crimean Tatars for confiscated possessions. The Ministry of Finance 
placed the unclaimed funds directly into the Uzbek budget for 1946.  Moreover, the 
Sovnarkom passed a specific order granting an additional 500,000 rubles to Crimean 
Tatars for the reimbursement of confiscated fruit trees and beehives.  In addition, the 
NKVD also increased the prosecution of NKVD officers and enterprise directors who 
abused Crimean Tatars or denied the benefits discussed in the above orders.83  As with 
pensions, there is no way to tell how much money Crimean Tatars actually received, but 
conditions did improve dramatically after 1946. 
Another part of the effort in 1946 was the controversial step to allow all deportees 
to participate in the 1946 Supreme Soviet elections.  When the NKVD ordered Uzbek 
officials and special settlers to prepare for voting, both sides were confused.  Uzbek 
officials wondered why “traitors” were now allowed to vote.  Crimean Tatars, according 
to Uzbek and NKVD officials, also could not comprehend why their votes would matter.  
After all, the NKVD had stripped many Crimean Tatars of their passports during the 
deportation, so many “voters” were not even sure of their citizenship status.  For their 
part, Uzbek officials claimed that Crimean Tatar skepticism towards the vote was not 
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from the rage over death and deportation, but the work of “anti-Soviet” agitators and 
fascist collaborators.  To combat the skepticism, a secret order from the Uzbek Central 
Committee ordered all local parties to interface with both the special settlers and special 
settler authorities and create informational meetings.  For many Crimean Tatars, the 
meetings and the subsequent elections were their first post-deportation experience with 
local party leaders.84  However, as Crimean Tatar Bekir Aca allegedly argued in one such 
meeting, why should they vote “if there are no Crimean Tatars to elect?” 85  Soviet 
elections were cosmetic to begin with, but at the very least the effort was a further signal 
to Uzbek authorities that Crimean Tatars were now a permanent part of the Soviet system 
in the Uzbek SSR.  
Simultaneous to the above factors, the NKVD handling of Crimean Tatar party 
members and skilled workers played key roles in shaping special settlement.  While 
famine and disease were raging and Tashkent and Moscow negotiated the future of 
Crimean Tatars in the Uzbek republic, special settler authorities began a concerted effort 
to place former Crimean ASSR government and party workers, agricultural experts, and 
skilled workers into jobs that utilized their expertise.  But why would any Soviet directors 
or party deputies welcome Crimean Tatar elite if so many others refused to give regular 
Crimean Tatars employment?    
One reason was that many of Crimean Tatars remained party members. 
Pragmatically, since Stalin’s mass treason charges were false, the NKVD saw no reason 
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to expel all Crimean Tatar party members.  On the ground, the NKVD sought their 
authority among the deportees to help “normalize” life in special settlement.86  In June of 
1944, the NKVD placed all deported party members into the district party organization in 
their place of exile, and the local party reviewed their cases on an individual basis.  
Doubtless, the fact that many Crimean Tatars remained in the party was awkward.  To 
lessen this contradiction, Moscow intentionally deported many Crimean Tatar party 
members, bureaucrats and specialists to Gorky and Molotov oblasts, separate from the 
bulk of the Crimean Tatar population.  Once in these oblasts, NKVD and local officials 
placed many of the higher-ranking party members and those with economic-oriented 
educations in mid-level positions.87   
Furthermore, the NKVD often kept party cohorts from specific Crimean districts 
and towns together in special settlement in an apparent effort to maximize their economic 
benefit for the host regions.  For example, the former chief land manager for Crimea’s 
Sudak district, Dzhamal Dediaev, became an inventory specialist at the Gorky oblast 
Bumkombinat (paper factory) in the summer of 1944.   Abdul-Aziz Chorman, a former 
inspector for the Sudak party committee, became a supply agent for the factory, while 
former Sudak agitation and propaganda director, Emir Khalilev, became the director of 
cultural activities.  Ganis Mustafaev, Abdureman Aliev, Elizhe Arabadzhieva and other 
Sudak Crimean Tatar agricultural experts and educators also received positions at the 
factory and its attached settlements.   The factory could not find an equivalent job for 
every Sudak Crimean Tatar party member and some, such as Shabadin Khalilev (a former 
assistant to the Crimean ASSR judicial committee) and Kerim Shal’verov (a Sudak 
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middle school director) became loaders (gruzchiki).88  Similar to Gorky oblast, in 
Molotov oblast authorities gave hundreds of Crimean Tatar doctors, engineers, teachers, 
agricultural specialists, tractor drivers, beekeepers and other skilled workers jobs in their 
fields.89  These concentrations of Crimean Tatar elite do conflict with Stalin’s goal of 
killing the Crimean Tatar nation through attrition, but, again, such paradoxes were 
common and the NKVD sought economic pragmatism with educated special settlers. 
The placement of Crimean Tatars into the Uzbek political and economic system 
was more complicated, but proceeded nonetheless.  On the one hand, the rhetoric of the 
Uzbek party towards Crimean Tatars was more vitriolic than in other regions and, as 
discussed earlier, the shear number of special settlers in the republic caused panic and 
resentment.  On the other hand, even before the war many of the Uzbek regions where 
Crimean Tatars now resided had understaffed and unorganized farms, factories, and party 
and Komsomol organizations.  The war had only exacerbated the problem.  For instance, 
the Uzbek party Central Committee described the Uzbek Komsomol organization as so 
disorganized in the mid to late 1940s that the Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee was 
“basically not functioning.”  In the meantime, 30-35% of party positions in several 
oblasts during the postwar period were vacant.90   
To combat these problems, Moscow launched a renewed industrialization and 
educational campaign designed to transform the Uzbek republic into a global example of 
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Soviet agricultural and industrial progress.91  Throughout this period, Tashkent constantly 
implored regional party authorities to fill the vacancies in cadres with qualified 
individuals, but these professionals simply did not exist.92  The industrialization aspect of 
the plan focused on Tashkent and Ferghana oblasts, but immediately stalled.93  
Furthermore, attempts to relocate thousands of Uzbeks to new farms and factories in 
Tashkent oblast failed.94  This glut of party leaders, managers and regular workers 
motivated some Uzbek officials to fill work and party cadres with “kulaks, pan-Islamists, 
special settlers,” and other groups in exile.95      
Vital to this process were the Crimean Tatars leaders that the NKVD had deported 
to the Uzbek SSR.  Similar to the situation in Gorky and Molotov oblasts, the NKVD 
placed remaining elite Crimean Tatars in positions utilizing their skills. The only 
restrictions that the NKVD placed on Crimean Tatar jobs in Uzbek special settlement 
were bans from the ministries of railroads, transportation and communication.96  It is 
critical to understand that there was a direct relationship connecting the rehabilitations 
and continued party membership granted to a small number of Crimean Tatars and the 
entrance of Crimean Tatars into the Uzbek economy.  A prime example is Mustafa 
Selimov, who was the former First Secretary of the Yalta district party and a partisan 
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92 RGASPI, f. 574, op. 1, d. 23, l.l. 25, 23, 65, 68..  Stenograficheskaia zapis’ besedy Upol. TsK VKP(b) po 
Uzbeksoi SSR S. D. Ignat’eva s chlenami Biuro TsK KP(b) Uzbek SSR.  August 10, 1950. 
93 RGAE, f. 4372, op. 45, d. 148, l. 17.  Chlen Gosplana SSSR A. Lazrishchev- Upolnom. Gosplana SSSR, 
Uzbekskoi SSR Finikovu.  January 31, 1945. 
94 RGASPI, f. 574, op. 1, d. 24, l.l. 9-11.  Pis’mo Upol. TsK VKP/b/ po Uzbekskoi SSR S. Ignat’ev- 
Malenkovu.  June 6, 1950. 
95 Moscow was well aware of this fact, and certainly had some trepidation, but more so with Uzbek 
nationalists and pan-Islamists than with special settlers and kulaks. RGASPI, f. 574, op. 1, d. 24, l. 85.  
Pis’mo  Tashkent (VKP/b/ Uzbek SSR)- Stalinu, Malenkovy, Ignat’evu.  March 25, 1950. 
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veteran.  As described earlier in this chapter, he was one of the first Crimean Tatars that 
Chernyshov released in 1944.  Remaining a party member and being an expert in 
hydrology, he moved to Tashkent and became the deputy director of the Tashkent 
Institute of Hydrology.97  Dzheppar Bekabadn was not rehabilitated, but he retained his 
party membership and was a pedagogical specialist, former editor of the Crimean Tatar 
party newspaper Kyzyl Krym (Red Crimea), and a former partisan.  In the Tashkent oblast 
industrial city of Bekabad, party and economic enterprises were so desperate for qualified 
individuals that they even ignored the ban on Crimean Tatars working in transportation 
and appointed Akimov as the deputy boss of the Farkhadskoi railroad political division.  
For Crimean Tatar party members such as Selimov and Akimov, their skills and careers 
outweighed their ethnicity and Stalin’s mass treason charges.98  By September 1944, the 
NKVD reported that 11 Crimean Tatars who were former secretaries and assistants of 
Crimean district parties and soviets now worked in party organizations in Ferghana and 
Tashkent Oblasts, and at the Farkhadstroi building organization.  Another five Crimean 
Tatar workers from the Crimean ASSR’s prosecutor’s office also received desk jobs.99  
Former Crimean Tatar NKVD and MVD officers were not allowed to work in the NKVD 
or MVD proper, but many received low-level assignments in the their local MVD special 
settlement commissariats.100    
The NKVD also began funneling skilled Crimean Tatars into factories and 
kolkhozes that were receptive to Crimean Tatars.   By November 1945, of the 984 
Crimean Tatars in the Uzbek SSR with higher education, 864 had been placed in their 
                                                
97 GARF, f. 9479, op. 1, d. 204, l. 80.  Zakliuchenie 19 sentiabria, 1945. 
98 Chronicle of Current Events 31 (May 17, 1974), 114. 
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specialized areas.  For instance, by September 1944 the NKVD had placed 119 teachers 
and 71 agricultural specialists in their respective positions.101  The same was true for 
skilled workers, and out of 2,150 Crimean Tatar skilled workers such as tractor drivers 
and blacksmiths, 1,765 were soon working in their fields.102   By November 1945 the 
Samarkand Engine Repair Factory employed Crimean Tatars such as blacksmith Khalil 
Bektimirov and production line worker Ibraim Kadyrov.  Once Crimean Tatar party 
members and skilled workers had secure positions at certain Uzbek enterprises, the 
acquisition of non-skilled Crimean Tatars accelerated.  Sites such the Nizhne-Bosuiskoi 
hydroelectric station and the Krashniy Dvigatel factory in Samarkand accumulated large 
Crimean Tatar workforces, as did numerous enterprises in the growing industrial towns 
of Begovat and Chirchik in Tashkent oblast.103  The same trend applied to Tashkent 
proper.  In September 1945 the Tashkent Train Renovation Factory solved its labor 
shortage by requesting and reciving 700 special settlers from rural regions.104 
The influx of special settlers into these regions did not solve larger Uzbek 
problems or change the fact that special settlements (and the Gulag) were, in reality, 
economic drains.105  It did mean that, eventually, some regional authorities saw a 
potential benefit in placing Crimean Tatars in work and party cadres.   And it was this 
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potential benefit that allowed Beria to argue that the deportation was an economic plus 
for effected regions in 1946.   
As the inclusion of Crimean Tatar party members and workers in the Uzbek 
Republic became more acceptable, the situation presented a small, but important new 
cohort of Crimean Tatars the opportunity to advance in party politics.  A 1948 MVD 
census on special settlers provides evidence of this shift.   The Uzbek region with the 
largest concentration of Crimean Tatars, Tashkent oblast, listed 198 Crimean Tatars as 
communist party members.  The census did not indicate when these Crimean Tatars 
became party members, so it is likely that the majority had retained their membership 
from before the war.  However, the census confirms a new influx of Crimean Tatars into 
postwar Soviet society, recording 32 new candidates for party membership and 402 
young Crimean Tatars who had joined the Komsomol.106   Census numbers from 
Samarkand oblast recorded 164 Crimean Tatar party members, 14 candidates for the 
party and 215 Komsomol members, while in Ferghana oblast the smaller Crimean Tatar 
population still had 49 party members, 4 candidates and 73 Komsomols.107  The census 
confirms that not only did Uzbek officials abide by the orders that Crimean Tatar party 
members would maintain their membership in special settlement, but by the late 1940s 
they were allowing Crimean Tatars, young and old, into party life.   
This development was particularly important for young Crimean Tatars.  As Paul 
Hagenloh argues, the Soviet police state at times granted minors and the children of 
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special settlers more flexibility in receiving educations and geographic mobility because 
Soviet police considered them to be the “least-threatening group of special settlers.”108  
Crimean Tatar experience confirms this observation, as the advancement of young 
Crimean Tatars into the Komsomol translated into a parallel increase of Crimean Tatar 
special settlers becoming full-time students.  This development was especially significant 
since the vast majority of Crimean Tatars in the Uzbek SSR (67,607) had received only 
primary educations and another 22,796 Crimean Tatars were illiterate.109  In this context, 
educational advancement was a key opportunity in exile.  
By 1948, young Crimean Tatars such as El’vedin Seitov and Refat Abibullaev 
remained on the special settler lists, but were allowed to leave their oblasts to go to 
schools in cities such as Angren, Chirchik, Kokand, Tashkent, and even to Alma-Ata in 
the Kazakh SSR.110  Others remained in their oblasts for education.  The 1948 MVD 
census of special settlers recorded 585 full-time Crimean Tatar students in secondary 
education in Tashkent Oblast and 179 such students in Ferghana Oblast.111   
Partially due to this search for education, but also the continued search for 
relatives or better conditions, the legal migration of Crimean Tatar special settlers 
between republics and oblasts increased in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  This 
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migration originated with the mass of Crimean Tatars that fled to the Tajik SSR in 1945 
described in Chapter Two.  However, in the late 1940s, more Crimean Tatars received 
MVD permission to move to the Tajik republic and by the beginning of 1952 the MVD 
reported that 4,256 Crimean Tatars resided in the Tajik SSR, and by mid-1952 new 
arrivals brought the number of Crimean Tatars in the Tajik SSR to 4,389.  Those from 
failing farms who did not move to the Tajik SSR moved to more friendly farms in 
Ferghana and Tashkent oblasts.  By January 1952, Tashkent oblast had 31,632 Crimean 
Tatars, with 914 new arrivals in the last quarter of 1951.  Combined with statistics on 
other oblasts for 1951, the last quarter of that year alone saw at least 3,000 Crimean 
Tatars moving from oblast to oblast.112   In the meantime, Crimean Tatars from Gorky 
and Molotov oblasts began moving to Uzbek cities by the thousands in 1948.113   
This intra-special settlement migration was important for Crimean Tatars as 
individuals and as a nation.  Again, as part of destroying the Crimean Tatar nation, Stalin 
had intended to keep Crimean Tatar populations under one hundred people at any given 
farm or factory and keep them confined mostly to rural areas.  However, by the early 
1950s Crimean Tatars were increasingly concentrated on farms with reasonable 
conditions and in cities and towns with factories and educational institutions.  Most 
importantly, Crimean Tatars congregated in the same areas as family members and other 
families from the same Crimean village.  As Mubeyyin Altan argues, these 
concentrations of Crimean Tatar relatives and neighbors helped maintain the importance 
of Crimean Tatar family units and neighborly relations as the basis of the Crimean Tatar 
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nation.114  After the end of special settlement, these existing networks helped foster the 
quick formation of organized protest. 
On the eve of Stalin’s death, a MVD census on special settlers was the last official 
count of Crimean Tatars until the late 1980s.  On the special settler lists, there were 
165,259 Crimean Tatars remaining in the USSR, but the actual census only counted 
160,734 Crimean Tatars with 46,461 men, 64,053 women, and 50,220 children.115  The 
vast majority (around 127,000) were in the Uzbek SSR.  Reflecting the concentration of 
Crimean Tatars increasingly in urban areas, the city of Ferghana had nearly 4,000 
Crimean Tatars, while the industrial city of Chrichik in Tashkent oblast had over 5,000 
Crimean Tatars.  Some of the most important kolkhozes for the Crimean Tatar protest 
movement were the three “Dal’verzin” farms in Tashkent oblast’s Begovat district that 
had well over 3,000 Crimean Tatars by this time.  Such numbers reinforce the fact that 
the NKVD plans of housing no more than 100 Crimean Tatars in any one location, and 
keeping them separated from most native Uzbeks, quickly collapsed when faced with the 
conditions of the postwar Uzbek SSR.116 
 
The Scene Before Stalin’s Death 
 
The above investigation of the developments during special settlement is in no 
way meant to downplay the hardships. Crimean Tatar advancement in the party and 
educational sphere was meant to assimilate them into exile, and not help produce 
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resistance.  In particular, education in special settlement for Crimean Tatars meant 
Russification, and the intentional absence of Tatar language and culture.117  Also, 
individuals who did take advantage of party and educational opportunities were not 
automatically free of special settlement constraints or repression.  For example, Il’ia 
Luiksemburg recalled how Selik, his Crimean Tatar classmate at the Tashkent 
Agricultural Technical Institute, complained that Tashkent authorities refused to issue 
him a new passport even after he became a student.  More ominously, when Selik started 
an argument with a professor, the institute expelled him.118  Women with multiple 
children (now the largest Crimean Tatar demographic) had to rely on the Uzbek state.119   
And even then there was a huge gray area for tens of thousands of workers who were also 
owed pensions and had been stripped of their passports.   
Nevertheless, as the next chapter will display, the quick development of the 
Crimean Tatar movement to return to Crimea and related mass resistance would not have 
developed the way it did without the above factors.  By 1953 thousands of Crimean Tatar 
party members, Komsomol members, veterans, students and skilled workers had become 
part of the Soviet system in the Uzbek SSR and other regions.  Most Crimean Tatars, 
with the permission of special settlement authorities, had congregated in Uzbek cities, 
industrial regions, and farms where they found a measure of stability.  These outcomes of 
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special settlement gave Crimean Tatars the leadership, network, and numbers to demand 







De-Stalinization and Crimean Tatar Resistance 
 
 
 Stalin’s death on March 5,1953, gave Crimean Tatars and all special settlers the 
hope that total rehabilitation would soon follow.  After Moscow rejected the mass return 
of Crimean Tatars to Crimea in 1956, Crimean Tatars created the longest and most 
intense protest movement in Soviet history.1  In the words of a contemporary observer, 
Crimean Tatar resistance was unique for both its “high degree of overt organization and 
manifest mass participation.”2  For many Crimean Tatars, their desire to return to Crimea 
became a “religious-like” devotion and a pillar of national identity.3  This protest 
movement resisted all aspects of Stalin’s ethnic cleansing discussed in the first four 
chapters of this study.  The mass participation, coordination of street protests, lobbying in 
Moscow, and letter writing campaigns forced the Soviet state to react.  What followed 
was a case study of how Brezhnev’s Soviet state attempted to balance concerns about its 
international image and constraints on mass repression with the real need to undermine a 
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Jewish “Refusnik” movement.  While this movement had origins in the late-1950s and would eclipse the 
Crimean Tatar movement in international attention by the mid-1970s, it only became an organized effort in 
1971:  see Boris Mozorov, Documents of Soviet Jewish Emigration (New York: Routledge, 2013), 14-66 
and Noah Lewin-Epstein, Paual Ritterband, and Yaacov Ro’I, eds., Russian Jews on Three Continents:  
Migration and Resettlement (New York: Routledge, 2013), 43-58, 65.  Moreover, the Armenian protest in 
Yerevan’s Lenin Square to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Armenian genocide and demand 
recognition of the crime had larger numbers for any single event, but was, according to Lehmann, a one-
time effort proceeding the anniversary and there was not a similar event in the Armenian SSR until 1988.  
Lehmann, “Apricot Socialism,” 9. 
2 Peter J. Potichnyj, “The Struggle of Crimean Tatars,” Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue Canadienne des 
Slavistes Vol. 17, No. 2/3 (Summer and Fall, 1975), 318. 




large protest movement that was active in multiple Soviet republics and threatened to 
destabilize one of the Soviet Union’s most strategic regions.  
The result was a reform in 1967 that focused on granting individual Crimean 
Tatars the right to live anywhere in the Soviet Union instead of a state-led mass return to 
Crimea.  No matter how cynical and self-serving the “reform” was, thousands of Crimean 
Tatars called Moscow’s bluff and returned to Crimea.  Some of these returnees became 
legal residents, while Crimean authorities deported thousands of other returnees in an 
uneven, but effective, effort to deter a larger return.  Overall, this period of Crimean Tatar 
resistance underlines that popular protest in the post-Stalin Soviet Union yielded results 
and exposed Soviet weaknesses in ideology and state functions.  The Soviet state had real 
insecurities about how Soviet citizens and the world viewed policies towards even a 
small ethnic group on the periphery of the world’s largest state. 
 This chapter begins with an examination of Crimean Tatars during the initial 
“thaw” and their exclusion from full rehabilitation.  The second section tracks the 
formation of the Crimean Tatar protest movement and its various avenues to petition and 
pressure both local authorities and the center.  The third section uncovers the anatomy 
and thinking behind the September 5, 1967 decree that granted minor concessions to 
Crimean Tatars.  The final section examines the aftermath and reality of the reform, and 





Beria began the mass rehabilitation of Crimean Tatars and other special settlers 




full-time students, women over 55, men over 60, members and candidates of the KPSS, 
veterans, and some families of those killed during World War II.  Despite Beria’s arrest 
in June 1953 and the nullification of some orders, during 1954 and 1955 the release of 
special settlers accelerated.4   If on the eve of Stalin’s death the MVD had counted 
160,734 total Crimean Tatars in special settlement, by the end of 1955 only 118,351 
Crimean Tatars remained on special settlement lists.  In short, the first wave of mass 
rehabilitation freed approximately 40,000 Crimean Tatars.5 
Finally, on April 28, 1956, the Supreme Soviet issued order 135/42 and ended 
special settlement status for all Crimean Tatars, along with smaller ethnic groups 
deported from the North Caucasus and Georgia.  However, an addendum attached to the 
order forbade Crimean Tatars from returning to Crimea and separated Crimean Tatars 
from other rehabilitated ethnic groups such as Chechens and Ossetians who were able to 
return to their homelands.6  In sum, it was a partial rehabilitation of Crimean Tatar 
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individuals and not a rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatar nation in Crimea.7   And this 
nation was growing despite exile, with a population of around 190,000 by 1959.8  Also, 
while the living conditions of most Crimean Tatars had improved in the Uzbek SSR after 
1956, the general problems of housing and access to food and consumers goods remained 
and former special settlers were anxious to return home.9 
This partial rehabilitation was deliberate.  In the months after Stalin’s death, 
Crimean oblast prosecutorial records show a sharp increase in rehabilitation requests 
from Crimean deportees and a general anxiety among officials that deported people were 
going to return home.10  Again, while the Soviet Union ethnically cleansed several 
regions during the war, the ideological, economic and demographic transformation of 
Crimea was unique.  The entire Soviet system, not just Stalin, had transformed Crimea 
and neither Khrushchev nor Crimean leaders had a desire to undo the results of the ethnic 
cleansing. 
 Several related factors informed this belief that the new status quo in Crimea was 
optimal.  First, Stalin’s death did nothing to change that “Crimea was, is, and will remain 
the Soviet strongpoint on the Black Sea.”11  Second, as the Cold War and Soviet support 
of global anti-colonialism accelerated, Crimea became a tool of Soviet diplomacy and 
soft power.   The Yalta Conference was just the beginning of Moscow using Crimea to 
promote an idealized version of post-war Soviet socialism. Anastas Mikoyan was perhaps 
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the most reform-minded politburo member, but he was also involved in fashioning 
Crimea as a destination for anti-colonial leaders.  He developed a coordinal political 
relationship with Crimean leader Aleksandr Kabanov, and often relaxed with Kabanov 
and his family in Crimea.12 From the late 1940s onwards, Mikoyan hosted hundreds of 
international visitors, especially anti-colonial leaders from Africa, Latin America and 
Asia at Crimean resorts and historical sites.  While the ethnic diversity and enjoyment of 
leisure at camps and resorts made sense, the tours included some odd choices.  For 
example, a 1961 photograph with Ghana President Kwame Nkrumah displays how 
Mikoyan paraded foreign delegations around Crimean Tatar architectural and historic 
sites such as the Bakchisarai Palace, which museum workers such as Kustova had 
transformed into celebrations of Russian imperial ambition.  In the photo, Mikoyan 
stands with Nkrumah in front of the mosque with the Arabic script adorning the entrance 
still visible (the irony of Crimea as an example of Soviet internationalism is difficult to 
understate and was not lost on Crimean Tatars).13   
In its interactions with the West, the Soviet Union used such events as the 
Brussels’ World’s Fair to show documentary films on Crimea and Sevastopol to portray 
an image of military might combined with a workers’ paradise.14  Pictures in the Soviet 
Pavilion portrayed how Pioneers spent their summers at Artek and other Crimean camps, 
and Soviet hosts distributed samples of “Gold Award-winning” Massandra wine.15  
                                                
12 GARF, f. f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1644, l.l. 1-3.  Dnevnik poezdki A. M. Mikoyana v otdykhe v Krym.  1961. 
13 GARF, f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1644, l.l. 8-9.  Pictures of Mikoyan and Nkrumah at Bakchisarai. September 
1961. 
14 GARF, f. 9470, op. 1, d. 6, l. 67.  Spravka “O podgotovke i otgruzke kinosiuzhetov dlia pristendovogo 
pokaza v sovetksim pavil’one na vsemirnoe vystavke 1958g v Briussele.”  April 8, 1958. 
15 On Crimean photography, see GARF, f. 9470, op. 1, d. 12, l. 239ob.  Predlozheniia po rasshireniiu 
ekspozitsii pavil’ona SSSR.  April 1958.  On wine, see GARF, f. 9470, op. 1, d. 13. l. 81.  Spisok 25 




Similar to hard power considerations, Stalin’s death did nothing to change this important 
role of the peninsula as a diplomatic asset.  
Third, after 1944 the rejuvenation of Crimean tourism also became a symbol of 
normalized life after decades of turmoil for Soviet citizens.  The number of Soviet 
citizens traveling to Crimea with state tourist vouchers doubled from around 500,000 to 
over a million annually between 1965 and 1974.16  As Mikoyan stated, on the southern 
shore of Crimea “everyday you can meet fishermen from Sakhalin, Siberian lumberjacks, 
metal workers of the Urals, and specialists and academics from Moscow, Leningrad, 
Kiev and all ends of the Soviet Union.”17  The enjoyment of Crimean rest and relaxation, 
beaches, chess tournaments, hikes up Chatir Dag and other tourist activities was 
appreciated by most Soviet citizens.  As displays and publications in Crimean libraries 
declared, Soviet citizens had the “right to relaxation” and exercising this right in Crimea 
helped define postwar Soviet life.18   
The marriage between ethnic cleansing and the Crimean tourist industry expanded 
after Stalin’s death as both became relatively successful and sustainable.  Such anti-Tatar 
excursion guides such as Ivan Kirillov received “Masters of Soviet Tourism” 
commendations.  All Crimean historical and tourist texts remained proudly anti-Tatar.19  
Stalin had purposely reconstructed the “all-union resort” with participants in Crimean 
ethnic cleansing and these Crimean leaders guarded their positions.  Their belief that 
                                                
16 RGAE, f. 9480, op. 9, d. 2481, l. 88.  Zam. Pred. Oblispolkoma Kryma V. Semenchuk-Goskomitet 
Soveta Mnistrov SSSR po nauke i tekhnike.  1974. 
17 GARF, f. f. 5446, op. 120, d. 1644, l. 5.  Dnevnik poezdki A. M. Mikoyana v otdykhe v Krym.  1961. 
18 Oddly enough, while a proposal was made, Crimean authorities never replaced the Crimean Tatar name 
of Chatir Dag, a mesa-like mountain.  For a sample of activities and photographs see GARF, f. 9493, op. 3, 
d. 2035, l.l. 1-20. Rabota VTsSPS v Krymu.  January 1953. 
19 GARF, f. 9520, op. 1, d. 464, l. 83.  Postanovlenie No. 2 Ukrainskogo respublikanskogo soveta po 




there was no place for Crimean Tatars in the new Crimea was sincere and, again, 
remained after Stalin’s death.20  
 
Frustration and the Birth of Crimean Tatar Protest  
 
Crimean Tatars were shocked that they would have to remain in exile even though 
most deported ethnic groups were returning to their homelands.  By denying Crimean 
Tatars this right, Soviet policy prompted the quick formation of Crimea Tatar “initiative 
groups” to petition for returning to Crimea.  As discussed in previous chapters, the Soviet 
state had allowed many Crimean Tatars to retain their party membership and rehabilitated 
some individuals with exemplary military and party records.  A combination of this older 
generation along with Crimean Tatar students born in exile became the primary initiators 
of the protest movement.    
The regional government’s attitude towards Crimean Tatars changed little after 
1956.  Tashkent still refused to acknowledge the Crimean Tatar nation as separate from 
other Tatars.  The central government condoned this policy, and the 1959 Soviet census 
as a result recorded only 46,800 Crimean Tatars because Uzbek officials counted most 
Crimean Tatars as Volga Tatars.21  
Uzbek officials continued to assimilate Crimean Tatars into the republic.  From 
1956 to 1967, more than 766 Crimean Tatars served in their local party and governments 
                                                
20 The transfer of Crimea from the Russian SSR to the Ukrainian SSR in March 1954 made Moscow even 
more reluctant to consider Crimean Tatar reform in 1956.  As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, the need to 
increase water and electricity needed for the Crimean recovery and repopulation motivated both Stalin and 
Khrushchev to empower Ukrainian enterprises and ministries in the region and that resulted in the transfer.  
Khrushchev hoped that the transfer would be the final status change for Crimea.  As the 1980s proved, 
Crimean Tatar return would mean a new debate over Crimea’s status. 
21 GARF, f. f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l.l. 694-695. Spravka “o chisle Krymskikh Tatar (po materialam 




and the Uzbek state awarded more than 500 economic achievement medals to Crimean 
Tatars.  Educational and party advancement gave Crimean Tatars important positions.  
For example, E. A. Ashipova became the head engineer at the Iangaiulskii Candy 
Factory, I. A. Kaimazov headed the Ferghana Building Enterprise, and A. A. Appazov 
served as the deputy to the Ferghana city KPSS Chairman.  In perhaps an odd position for 
a Crimean Tatar, Ia. P. Abliakimov served as a political ideology instructor for the 
Ferghana oblast party.  At the same time, Soviet trust in the youngest Crimean Tatar 
generation born in exile translated into opportunities in the Komsomol, artistic and 
cultural activities, and education.22   
This political and social advancement was real, but it did not remove Crimean 
Tatar frustration.  In fact, the two trajectories of activism and social mobility were not 
mutually exclusive.  Many Crimean Tatars on an upward political or social trajectory 
faced discrimination and used their positions in the Soviet state as a platform for dissent.  
The experience of Zul’fira Asanova reveals how mobility and activism were interrelated.  
Born in 1948, she was a member of the first generation of Crimean Tatars born in exile.23  
Asanova was a gifted dancer and her talents enamored Uzbek artistic representatives.  In 
1957, she represented the Uzbek SSR in the World Youth Festival in Moscow, one of the 
defining global events of the “Thaw.”24  Ironically, her accomplishments earned her a trip 
to the Crimean pioneer camp “Artek.”  The camp designated her “Laureate of the First 
Degree” and afterwards she studied at a choreography school in Tashkent.  Her story 
                                                
22 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l.l. 27-29.  Spravka “k voprosu ob obrazovanii natsional’noi avtonomii 
krymu i vozvroshcheniia tatar v krym. Zhdanov.  April 6, 1967.  See also GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 
21.  Spravka k nekotorym voprosam istorii rasseleniia tatar.  A. N.  Zharkovskii.  February 6, 1967. 
23 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. . Perechen- “Voprosov, postavlennykh hekotorymi grazhdanami 
Tatarskoi natsional’nosti v pis’makh I zaiavleniiakh, postupivshikh v 1966 godu v adres Ver. Sov. SSSR.” 
1966.  (hereafter “Perechen’”). 




reveals the opportunities and continued repressions for Crimean Tatars after 1956.  A 
young Crimean Tatar went from special settlement to representing the Soviet Union to 
the world within the span of two years.  At the same time, Uzbek authorities concealed 
the fact that she was Crimean Tatar.  When her coaches proposed that she travel abroad 
with her dance troupe, the Uzbek KGB intervened.  Incensed, Asanova and her mother 
contacted Crimean Tatar activists and wrote a letter of protest to Moscow accusing 
Uzbek authorities of ethnic discrimination.  Her story became part of the budding protest 
movement.25 
 The early Crimean Tatar activists Asanova contacted often had military and party 
experience.  As discussed in chapter 5 and as Weiner argues, the war created “an 
assertive Soviet individual” who defended their rights by citing frontline service and 
exploits.26  Moreover, Crimean Tatars were a unique instance where, in a concentrated 
and popular manner, veterans translated that assertiveness into dissent after 1956. With 
his background of partisan service, early rehabilitation, and career advancement in exile, 
Mustafa Selimov was a protest pioneer.  A natural leader, he helped found an “initiative 
group” in the Kubyshevskii district of Tashkent in 1956.  A “dead” man organized a 
similar group in Fergana oblast.  While Ilya Vergasov claimed Crimean partisans had 
executed Bekir Osmanov in 1942, in reality Osmanov was alive, a decorated veteran with 
party membership, and working as an agricultural specialist in Fergana oblast.  The 
protest group he founded in Fergana would become one of the most active over the next 
decades.  Some “initiative groups” organized themselves in specific factories or farms 
with large Crimean Tatar concentrations.  For instance, party members Muarem Martinov 
                                                
25 Perechen’, l. 60. 




and Dzheppar Akimov helped organized groups in the city of Bekabad and surrounding 
branches of the Dal’verzin sovkhoz.27   
 These “initiation groups” mastered the art of collecting stories and opinions from 
across the USSR and penning mass petitions and collective letters to the Supreme Soviet, 
Soviet of Ministers, KPSS Central Committee, and dozens of other Soviet organs.28  
After authoring the texts, the activists traveled throughout their regions collecting 
Crimean Tatar signatures.   One letter to the KPSS Central Committee had 14,000 
Crimean Tatar signatures attached.   Tens of thousands of individual letters also flooded 
government offices in Moscow throughout 1957 and early 1958.29  The Politburo debated 
how to handle the situation for several months and Khrushchev requested that party and 
government bureaucrats keep him abreast of Crimean Tatar developments.  Still, after 
some debate in March 1957, Khrushchev and the Party Central Committee did nothing.30    
Crimean Tatars expanded their activities in response to Moscow’s inaction.  
Throughout 1958, Crimean Tatars inundated Moscow with manifestos and individual 
letters.  One letter presented to Moscow by 81 Crimean Tatars in Abhakhzia (Georgian 
SSR) is a prime example of how Crimean Tatar activist literature included multiple-page 
indictments of Soviet policy that cited sources and underlined the hypocrisy of Soviet 
policy towards Crimean Tatars in both the domestic and Cold War context. 
 Addressed to Khrushchev, the letter began by framing their argument in the 
context of the “Thaw” and the 20th Party Congress.  Crimean Tatars were upset that the 
                                                
27 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 117.  Spisok naibolee aktivnikh storonikov idei vozvrashcheniia Tatar 
v Krym i preddostavleniami natsional’noi avtonomii- po dannym TsK KP Uzbek SSR.  January, 1967. 
28 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 117.  Spisok naibolee aktivnikh storonikov idei vozvrashcheniia Tatar 
v Krym i preddostavleniami natsional’noi avtonomii- po dannym TsK KP Uzbek SSR.  January, 1967. 
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“correction of Stalinist mistakes” had not erased Stalin’s accusation of mass treason 
because most Crimean Tatars had not collaborated and tens of thousands had fought for 
the Soviet Union.  The letter then pivoted to how in 1922 Lenin had guaranteed the right 
of Crimean Tatars to party and government positions, cultural autonomy, and language 
rights within the Crimean ASSR.  Activists argued that anything short of Moscow 
reinstating these rights would be an insult to Lenin’s legacy, an affront to Soviet 
nationalities policy, and prove de-Stalinization to be hollow.31 
Activists next argued that Khrushchev’s inaction made the Soviet Union’s role in 
Crimean history similar to that of imperial Russia and threatened Soviet Marxism.  They 
cited a Time magazine interview, a Pravda article, and a speech in Kyiv, in each of which 
Khrushchev had praised Lenin and the nationalities principles on which Lenin had 
founded the Crimean ASSR.32  The letter accused Khrushchev of hypocrisy for criticizing 
U.S. racism, while discriminating against an ethnic minority in his own country.  
Crimean Tatar activists placed their cause on the side of Lenin’s revolutionary ideals 
because they believed that their situation was a liability for a state supporting Cold War 
anti-colonialism.33   
 Finally, Crimean Tatars criticized Soviet officials by name for the past or current 
roles in ethnic cleansing and Crimean policy.  In particular, the letter condemned 
Kabanov, Mokrusov, Nadinskii, Shults, and Zotiev.   Activists also cited Crimean 
excursion guides that “paint Crimean Tatars with the blackest paint possible” in regards 
                                                
31 GARF, f. 5446, op. 92, d. 887, l.l. 1-5. Krymskie tatary v Abkhazskoi ASSR- Khrushchevu.  May 10, 
1958. 
32 Crimean Tatars took Khrushchev’s quotes from questions he and the Presidium answered in Time, 
“Foreign News: Don’t Call Me Boss,” August 19, 1957. http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article 
/0,9171,809723,00.html.  Accessed on March 17, 2016. 





to both centuries of Crimean history and World War Two.  They decried Crimean 
officials who referred to Crimean Tatars “in the past tense” and publishing houses that 
published negative material.34  
  In short, just one year after the end of special settlement Crimean Tatars were 
already aware of the methods and extent to which Crimean officials had transformed 
Crimea. All three tropes highlighted in the letter- the demand for return, the hypocrisy of 
Soviet policy, and the disgust with the new Crimea- became prominent in Crimean Tatar 
arguments for the rest of Soviet history. 
The ability of Crimean Tatars activist to organize and communicate these 
grievances with the Soviet state and other Crimean Tatars was key to beginning a the 
prolonged protest movement.  These early pronouncements of Crimean Tatar frustration 
revealed that tens of thousands of Crimean Tatars were willing to sign their names on 
protest petitions.35  Moreover, Crimean Tatar activists began traveling to Moscow to 
confront the government and party. In an attempt to deescalate the situation, Mikoyan 
met with Crimean Tatars on March 19, 1958.  While Mikoyan made no promises, 
Crimean Tatars viewed the meeting as the beginning of a reform process and an 
affirmation that Moscow could not ignore their efforts.  The massive letters and petitions 
continued, sometimes with thousands of attached signatures.36  Letter readers at the 
Soviet of Ministers in Moscow collected the letters and petitions into two large binders 
and noted in inter-agency correspondence the “high level” of mass participation and 
                                                
34 Ibid. 
35 The earliest petitions include signatures in both Russian and in the older Crimean Tatar Arabic alphabet.  
There Arabic script disappeared on petitions in the 1960s as Russification intensified.  GARF, f. 5446, op. 
92, d. 887, l.l. 100-101. Pis’mo Khrushchevu.  August 18, 1958. 
36 This letter, with 111 pages of over 3,000 signatures, was large enough to get its own “delo” in the Soviet 




“coordination between Crimean Tatars.”  They also complained that the volume of 
Crimean Tatar mail was overwhelming the office spaces at the Supreme Soviet, Soviet of 




 For Crimean Tatars, one of the most frustrating aspects of the Crimean 
transformation and their inability to return to Crimea was their knowledge of population 
and job growth on the peninsula, and they understood that the only reason they could not 
participate was because of their ethnicity.  Crimean authorities claimed that there was no 
room for Crimean Tatars even as they began a new building boom that created thousands 
of jobs in tourism and supporting industries.  Instead of Crimean Tatars returning, 
migration from Russia and Ukraine increased.38  Advertisements in Soviet state media 
bragged about the successful resettlement of thousands of families in Crimea and 
implored more Soviet citizens to join them.  While Crimean government, party and police 
were committed to anti-Tatar policies, activists noticed that when faced with increased 
quotas, some farm and enterprise managers ignored the ethnicity of new workers.  Many 
Crimean Tatars that visited Crimea during military service understood this fact.  
Moreover, from May 15 to 25, 1965, a delegation of Crimean Tatar activists visited 
                                                
37 GARF, f. 5446, op. 92, d. 887, l. 173. Sov. Min. Spravka.  March 1958. 
38 On the tourist boom, see GARF f. 9520, op. 1, d. 801, l.l. 26-32.  Stenogramma II plenuma Ukrainskogo 
respublikanskogo soveta po turizmu.  November 25, 1965.   On claims that there was “no room” for 
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Crimea and found numerous kolkhozes, enterprises and even educational institutions that 
seemed indifferent to ethnicity issues.39    
 With this knowledge, several hundred Crimean Tatars attempted to return to 
Crimea.  For example, Seitbilial Seitumerov and his family moved to Sevastopol’ after 
the April 1966 earthquake in the Uzbek SSR, and began classes at the Sevastopol 
Instrument Manufacturing Institute.40  However, police refused his family registration in 
the city.  The Emirsaliev family also left the Uzbek SSR for Crimea in June 1966, and 
started living in a home with the Neskov family.  They said police harassed them, but 
they were able to enroll their children at the local school.41  This group of Crimean Tatars 
was small, but they put Crimean authorities on notice about their intentions to return, and 
some early returnees such as Seitumerov became members of the Moscow lobby and 
used their Crimean experience to assist future returnees.42  
From 1962 to 1966, resistance expanded and Crimean Tatars created an 
increasingly sophisticated protest movement anchored by lobbyists in Moscow, 
thousands of activists in the Uzbek USS and Tajik SSR, and a growing group of returnees 
in Crimea.  Thousands of individual letter writers such as Rimzi Ablialitov demanded a 
response from the party and government.43  Alim Murtazaev, a party member and 
scientific specialist at the Tashkent Science and Research of Agriculture Institute, drafted 
                                                
39 For example, a November 2, 1965 edition of Slava Trudu in Bakhchisarai announced that “2,122 new 
families had settled in the district over the last three years.”   Other articles promised “benefits” such as 
home loans.  See Perechen’ Voprosov, l. 77.  
40 The earthquake caused death, destruction, and a new housing crisis in Tashkent city and oblast, the 
Uzbek region with the highest concentration of Crimean Tatars.  Stronski, Tashkent, 233, 252-253. 
41 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 404, l. 82.  Obrashchenie Krymskikh tatar D. Emirsalev i drugie iz goroda 
Simferopol’.  February 22, 1967. 
42 Seitumerov later attended university in Odessa and participated in the lobby in the early 1970s.  GARF, 
f. 7523, op. 101, d. 404, l. 79.  Kollektivnaia telegramma krymskikh tatar po delu studenta Seitumero.  
January 28, 1971. 




a return proposal and visited his Supreme Soviet deputy, Mustafa Chachi, in 1966.  
Crimean Tatars in Tashkent such as doctor Dil’tad Il’iasov and engineer Izzet Khairov 
used their positions in the urban center to coordinate the transfer of these letters and 
samizdat documents from the Uzbek SSR and Tajik SSR to the Moscow lobby.   By 
1967, Crimean Tatars began the bi-monthly publication of Information (Informatsia, 
hereafter Info), a samizdat newsletter that chronicled the protest campaign’s actions in 
Central Asia, Moscow, Crimea, and elsewhere.  Crimean Tatars never hid the creation of 
the newsletter and often told Moscow who worked on a certain editions and in what hotel 
room they were staying in Moscow.44   
In addition to Info and letters about current repression, Crimean Tatars expanded 
their attacks on Soviet disinformation about World War Two and the new Crimean 
narrative.  Long letters formatted as research papers repeated indictments of “Nadinksii-
type academics,” Crimean tourist industry managers such as Mokrusov, and the Crimean 
branch of the Academy of Sciences.  Despite Crimean Tatar “rehabilitation,” Vergasov in 
particular continued to slander their nation.  In a 1966 edition of Zvezda he argued that 
Stalin “should have deported Crimean Tatars during collectivization.”45  When Vergasov 
published another article, “Zhivi Sevastopol’,” in Pravda, a Crimean Tatar schoolteacher 
in Samarkand, I. Dzhepparova, wrote a scathing denunciation of Vergasov.46  Activists 
then took the letter to the Pravda editor, A. Ia. Blatin, and the propaganda office of the 
KPSS to complain.47  To counter the anti-Tatar accounts of the war, Crimean Tatar 
activists lobbied the Pravda and Komskomolskaia Pravda editors to publish accounts of 
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45 Perechen’ Voprosov, l.l. 73-76, 92. 
46 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l. 73.  Info No. 42.  March 16-31, 1967.  




decorated Crimean Tatar partisans such as Alim Adbennanov and Abdul Dagdzhi.48  
Other letter writers protested the 1967 publication of the fourth edition of Nadinskii’s 
book, as well as several new anti-Tatar partisan histories.49  One partisan fighter spoke 
for thousands of Crimean Tatar veterans when he pleaded for Moscow “to make right 
with the dead and honor those who died” fighting for Soviet citizens.50   
By 1967, the Crimean Tatar letter-writing campaign was “unprecedented,” with 
the volume of mail overwhelming the Supreme Soviet, Soviet of Ministries, and KPSS 
Central Committee letter-receiving offices.51  The Supreme Soviet alone received at least 
9,125 individual letters from Crimean Tatars in 1966, and the number increased in 1967.  
Activists touted the volume of letters and wide geographic distribution of letter writers in 
Info.  Most letters arrived from the Uzbek SSR, but also from the RSFSR, Ukrainian 
SSR, Georgian SSR, Azerbaijan SSR, and other Central Asian republics.  For example, 
from February 15 to March 1, 1967, activists reported that Crimean Tatars sent 6,754 
letters to Moscow.   Brezhnev received 1,832 letters, while 1,766 went to Kosygin.  Of 
those letters, 2,839 originated in Samarkand oblast.52  From March 16 to 31, 1967, 
Crimean Tatars in Tashkent sent 844 letters, and school children wrote 121 letters.53  The 
Supreme Soviet, Soviet of Ministries, Party and Politburo got the most mail, with 
Brezhnev, Podgornii, and Kosygin being the most popular recipients.  In total, from 1964 
to 1967 the TsK KPSS, the Supreme Soviet, and the Soviet of Ministries received around 
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49 RGASPI, f. 17, op. 103, d. 2123, l. 28.  Doklad Vtorioi Sekretariia Krymskogo obkoma KPSS, A. N. 
Makukhinu.  March 6, 1967. 
50 Perechen’ Voprosov, l.l. 109-112. 
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tatarami v pis’makh, adresovannykh v tsentral’nye organy.  N. N. Kazakevich.  1967. 
52 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l. 59.  Info No. 40.  February 15 – March 1, 1967. 




100,000 letters, over 24 tons of mail.54  While Soviet authorities attempted to dispute the 
veracity of the signatures and letters, by 1967 the volume of mail outweighed any doubts 
about the validity of signatures.55   
As the movement expanded, another goal became getting as many Soviet officials 
and institutions as possible on record with their thoughts on the Crimean Tatar situation.  
In 1966 alone, representatives of the Supreme Soviet and other Soviet officials met with 
Crimean Tatar representatives in Moscow at least 33 times.56   For example, on March 
22, 1966, members of the Moscow lobby met with Georgadze and he made vague 
promises to address their concerns.57  Sometimes, officials gave very diplomatic answers, 
such as the rector of MGU, Petrovskii, who insisted that he “never had an opinion and 
never will” because he had never “lived in Crimea.”58  When several activists discussed 
Crimean Tatar history with the head of the Commission on Nationalities Relations at the 
Academy of Sciences, M. S. Dzhunusovyi, he claimed that he was in no position to 
“confront” Soviet policy.59   The assistant director of the Soviet Institute of Ethnography, 
S. I. Bruk, was more encouraging, stating that Stalin’s policy was “regrettable” and that 
the study of Crimean Tatars should be part of a larger rehabilitation project.60  The 
assistant to the director of the Institute of Nationalities History, L. S. Gaponenko, also 
                                                
54 In comparison, the Armenian letter writing campaign that preceded the demonstration of the 50th 
anniversary of the Armenian genocide in 1965 included 3,000 letters according to Zubkova.  See Elena Iu. 
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4 (2004): 22; “Perechen’ Voprosov,” 51-53. 
55 For example, Kazakevich suggested that Crimean Tatars collected signatures in “dishonest ways,” 
asking regular citizens to sign about one topic and then stapling the signatures to protest letters.  GARF, f. 
7523, op. 101, d. 640, l. 8.  Spravka “Osnovanye voprosy, postavlennye nekotorymi tatarami v pis’makh, 
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58 Ibid., l. 94. 
59 GARF, f. 7523, op. 101, d. 408, l. 73.  Information No. 42.  March 16-31, 1967.  




agreed that the repression of Crimean Tatars was “wrong.”61  Activists also approached 
cultural figures.  For example, in December 1966 activists met with the Abkhaz writer 
and Literaturnaia Gazeta editor, Georgii Gulina.  He said Crimean Tatars should be 
allowed to return to their homeland, but urged “patience.”62 
Along with the letter and petition campaign and meetings, Crimean Tatars began 
organizing street demonstrations.  Arsen Al’chikov, a party member and engineer in 
Tashkent Oblast, was one of the first street organizers.  After attending inconsequential 
meetings with Mikoyan on August 23 and 25, 1965, he and fellow activists Muaret 
Martynov and Dzheppar Akimov organized demonstrations in front of the Bekabad party 
headquarters where they gave speeches condemning the Soviet treatment of Crimean 
Tatars.  The party expelled him for participating, but this just caused him to spend more 
time in Moscow.63   
Akimov’s party expulsion is systematic of how Soviet authorities began relying 
on bureaucratic tools to discourage Crimean Tatar protest from expanding and individual 
Crimean Tatars from moving to Crimea.  These “legal” and extralegal efforts defined the 
consequences of participating in individual and group acts of resistance.   First, in the 
wake of releasing special settlers and Gulag prisoners, the Soviet Union strengthened the 
passport and registration regime to stem a flood of returnees to certain cities and 
regions.64   While most passport and registration violations were administrative offenses, 
there was a stipulation in the law that an individual with multiple violations could face an 
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“ugolovnoe” (equivalent of a felony) charge.    Another order in May 1962 further limited 
individuals who had served prison time for passport violations.65  In practice, authorities 
in Crimea and Moscow targeted Crimean Tatars by first refusing them registration and 
then finding other passport violations to threaten individuals with prison time or 
deportation.     
Another method of repression was “profilktika,” a series of “preventative” threats 
to expel activists from jobs and the party or Komsomol.  For example, the Kuibyshev 
district party in Tashkent gave Mustafa Selimov a “strong” warning to cease and desist 
activism or risk losing his party position and job.66  If an individual ignored these 
warnings, there was a chance Soviet authorities would act on their threats.  In addition to 
Akimov, Bekir Osmanov also ignored warnings and the Ferghana party revoked his party 
membership in December 1966.67  In similar fashion, the party expelled Arsen 
Al’chikov.68   From January 1966 to January 1967, Uzbek officials summoned at least 
766 Crimean Tatar activists and protest participants to profilaktika meetings “in order to 
acquaint them with the serious crimes of defaming the USSR.69  In the meetings, Uzbek 
officials such as Almalyk people’s deputy Iadgar Nasriddinov claimed that Crimean 
Tatars would never leave the Uzbek SSR.  She also accused activists of “stealing” from 
the Uzbek state by using their money and time to sustain the Moscow lobby and 
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described activists as “drunken rabble-rousers.”70  Activists claimed that by December 
1966, Uzbek party branches had expelled at least eleven Crimean Tatars.71 
The case of Mustafa Dzhemilev is a prime example of how advancement in 
Soviet society, resistance, profilaktika and punishment intertwined in practice.  
Beginning as a student and Komsomol member in the early 1960’s, his interests at 
TashGU shifted to activism.  Together with other Crimean Tatar students, Dzhemilev 
organized the “Union of Crimean Tatar Youth.”  The KGB disbanded the group within 
months, but Dzhemilev soon assisted the organization of other “initiative groups” 
throughout the Uzbek SRR.72  He then helped create the Moscow lobby and began 
coordinating the publication of samizdat text and the petitioning of Soviet authorities.  
Uzbek police and KGB repeatedly arrested and detained Dzhemilev for real and 
fabricated offenses.   On November 2, 1965, Moscow police arrested him for a passport 
violation at the Lenin Library, transported him to the Kazan train station, and forced him 
aboard a train to Tashkent.73  A few months later, in January 1966, a criminal complaint 
alleged that Dzhmeliev defamed the USSR during an intoxicated rant on a Tashkent city 
bus.  The Party and KGB gave him numerous chances to denounce his activism, but he 
refused and lost his place at the university in Tashkent and his Komsomol membership.74  
None of the warnings or punishments, including numerous prison sentences, stopped 
Dzhemiliev from becoming a prominent Crimean Tatar leader. 
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The intensity and popularity of the protest movement was its greatest strength and 
the repressions backfired for Moscow as arrests caused new protests.  For example, when 
Amet Umerov and Riza Izzetov entered the Central Committee building on July 16, 
1966, police officers detained them and locked them in a police station bathroom for nine 
hours.  According to activists, officers from Moscow’s 66th precinct often made such 
arrests.75  Moscow police also targeted apartments and hotels where Crimean Tatar 
activists congregated.  During the 23rd KPSS Congress of 1966, arrests shrank the 
Moscow lobby to only 21 representatives by early April, but more Crimean Tatars 
replaced those that police expelled.  Representatives also began picketing Moscow police 
headquarters and met with police officials on June 21, 1966.  Commissar Volkov insisted 
that Moscow police reserved the right to detain anyone for “passport violations and 
disturbing the peace.”76   Soon, the only area in Moscow where Crimean Tatars could 
register was in the VDNKh (Exhibition of Achievements of National Economy) district, 
particularly the Altai and Tashkent hotels.  Even under pressure, the lobbyists remained.  
For example, cramped into room number 146 in the second wing of the Altai, Emin 
Nemetullaev and six other activists spent a week in December 1966 drafting letters and 
compiling a new Info edition.77  
Crimean Tatar activists “were never shy” about their role in samizdat, organizing 
demonstrations, or participating in the Moscow lobby.78  As the KGB and police began a 
new wave of arrests, the detentions exacerbated the situation in the Uzbek SSR by also 
creating new protests over the arrests.  One such situation occurred when the KGB 
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arrested Timur Dagdzhi, a correspondent for Uzbek state radio, and another Crimean 
Tatar activist named Server Shamuratov.  The incident caused protests in Andijan, 
Ferghana, Angren, Bekabad, Tashkent and other Uzbek towns in September 1966.  When 
the Uzbek police arrested a Crimean Tatar farmer during one of these protests, ten of his 
colleagues from the Dal’verzin sovkhoz began a new protest at the local police precinct 
and the police captain requested assistance from the army.79  The arrest of Aisha 
Seitmuratova, at the time a high school history teacher in Samarkand and an acquaintance 
of Dagdzhi, caused further protest, propelling Seitmuratova to the forefront of the protest 
movement.80 
Repressing Crimean Tatars became a logistical problem because protests were so 
numerous and large.  For example, an October 6, 1966, a demonstration commemorating 
the Crimean ASSR drew more than 2,000 Crimean Tatars in Bekabad.  When police 
arrested El’dar Shabanov for speaking at the event, more than 1,000 Crimean Tatars 
protested his arrest at the Bekabad police headquarters.  Police called in soldiers and the 
KGB to disperse the crowd with force, and a melee ensued, injuring dozens of protestors.    
On October 18, 1966, Crimean Tatars picketed around the Lenin statue in front of the 
Uzbek Party headquarters in Tashkent.  Tashkent police reacted by walling off the Lenin 
statue with boards.  Crimean Tatars continued demonstrating until police dispersed the 
gathering and arrested several Crimean Tatars.  Soon, smaller Uzbek towns such as 
Kuvasak, Angren, and Bekabad were erecting barricades around Lenin statues and 
arresting dozens of Crimean Tatar protestors.  Police prepared paddy wagons (known as 
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“Cherniy Voron” or black birds) in advance as soon as they learned of protest plans.81   In 
addition to statues of Lenin, police stations, and public squares, Crimean Tatars 
demonstrated at cemeteries where Stalin’ victims were buried, at funerals for Crimean 
Tatar veterans, and at mosques during Islamic holidays.82  At the height of tensions, the 
suspicious police killing of a Crimean Tatar driver, Feti Alieva, caused a spontaneous 
protest of nearly 5,000 Crimean Tatars in Iangi-Iul’ and smaller protests across the Uzbek 
SSR.83  Throughout 1966 and the first-half of 1967 Soviet authorities detained hundreds 
of Crimean Tatars for protesting.  While they released many without charges, prosecutors 
in the Uzbek SSR charged and tried 59 Crimean Tatars for “anti-social activities” or 
“hooliganism” and tried another 76 Crimean Tatars on “petty hooliganism” charges.84 
Moscow was clearly worried by the summer of 1967.  When officials in Moscow 
read accounts of protests from Crimean Tatars and Uzbek officials, they often underlined 
the large participation figures and sent alarmed memos to their superiors.85  Uzbek 
authorities told Moscow that the situation was “rapidly deteriorating” and “becoming 
dangerous” in Uzbek oblasts.  In particular, Moscow fretted that the movement was “far 
too easily” capturing the imagination of Crimean Tatar youth.  Discussions over 
containing youth enthusiasm for the movement appear in central organ documents as a 
key catalyst in forcing the deliberations over reform during the summer of 1967.86  It was 
also hard to ignore the direct confrontation of the Moscow lobby that, between January 
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1966 and mid-1967, sent at least 3,000 Crimean Tatars to Moscow.87  In short, the will of 
Crimean Tatars to sustain mass protest forced the Soviet Union to explore solutions 
besides repression.  
The Moscow lobby surged to more than 400 Crimean Tatars in mid-1967 and 
when Moscow police arrested several activists, a tense standoff occurred outside several 
police stations.  After meeting with several KGB officials on July 17, activists arranged a 
meeting in the Kremlin with Georgadze, Andropov, Rudenko, and Shelkov for July 21, 
1967.  After several hours of delay, 20 Crimean Tatars, including previously detained 
activists Reshat Dzhemilev and Aishe Seitmuratova, sat down with Soviet officials and 
reviewed the Crimean Tatars’ multiple complaints.  Then Crimean Tatars asked about a 
member of the Supreme Soviet, Aleksandr Zharkov, who had assured them that reforms 
were imminent.88  Andropov revealed that the Politburo was considering a Supreme 
Soviet reform project, but Andropov admitted that Crimean Tatars “might not be 
satisfied” with the end-result.  Activists then asked if the Politburo would enforce any 
new reforms.  Andropov replied that Crimean Tatars could report “violations” to Moscow 
and continue their lobby in the city.89 
 
Creating the September 5, 1967 Decree 
 
 
The Soviet government understood that the Crimean Tatar movement enjoyed 
popular support and in response created a combination of reform and repression to relieve 
the pressure.  The final language and goals of this reform emerged from the central organ 
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office workers reading the materials and corresponding with activists, such as the deputy 
to the Chairperson of the Supreme Soviet, Mikhail Skliarov.   From 1963 to 1969, he 
coordinated the intake of mail and meetings with citizens at the Supreme Soviet offices in 
the Kremlin.90  He personally read countless Crimean Tatar letters, typed dozens of 
reports and met with Crimean Tatar representatives on numerous occasions.  While often 
giving Crimean Tatars a cold reception in person, his memos and reports indicate that he 
disliked discrimination against Crimean Tatar veterans and, at the very least, understood 
that the protest was a problem that Moscow had to address.91 
As protests increased, Skliarov and his colleagues immersed themselves in Info 
editions, letters, the historical treatises, and other documents.  These bureaucrats soon 
became de facto experts on the Crimean Tatar “problem.”  Their reports and opinions 
informed Soviet leaders such as Andropov, Podgornii and Georgadze and became the 
primary reference material in policy debates.92  As a result, throughout the spring and 
summer of 1967, Skliarov, Zharkov, N. Kazakevich and others at the office of the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet worked on a reform project at the request of the 
Politburo.    They drafted a list of key questions that Crimean Tatars asked and filled in 
answers based on current official and unofficial Soviet policy towards Crimean Tatars.93  
The initial goal was to give Soviet officials coherent answers to every Crimean Tatar 
complaint and identify areas where officials offered poor explanations of Soviet policy.  
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They then distributed the document to Soviet officials to formulate a reform that 
addressed the questions Soviet policy failed to answer in a convincing manner.94  Thus 
far, Crimean Tatar activists had exploited the inconsistencies in policy to their advantage.   
The actual document was a chart with Crimean Tatar questions, “thesis answers,” 
and information that was “critical to answering the question,” and the “source” of the 
answer.  The questions were as follows (paraphrased for brevity): 
1) What is your authority to speak on the Crimean Tatar issue and what 
central organ do you represent? 
 
2) Are you familiar with the history of Tatars that used to live in Crimea and 
the reason for their deportation from Crimea? 
 
3) Over the last several years Tatars, both individuals and selected 
representatives, have delivered a large quantity of letters to the central 
organs.  Are you aware of the quantity and contents of these letters? 
 
4) What decisions have been taken in regards to the following requests from 
the letters? 
 
5) Will there be an organized return of Tatars to Crimea? 
 
6) Will Tatars have national autonomy? 
 
7) When will those deported during the Great War have full political 
rehabilitation? 
 
8) When will political prisoners arrested for protesting be released? 
 
9) Ocherki Istorii Kryma (Nadinskii’s book) rewrote the history of Tatars in 
Crimea.  The Crimean branch of the Academy of Sciences published this 
book in 1951 and 1964.  This history poisons Tatar history, especially 
during World War II.  When will Moscow stop this slander? 
 
10) When can we expect the corrected historical record and facts to be relayed 
to Uzbek and Crimean authorities and all Soviet citizens? 
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11) Why have Crimean authorities refused to grant registration to couples 
when only one of the spouses is Crimean Tatar? (Or do Crimean 
authorities have the right to deny Russians and Ukrainians registration 
based on the ethnicity of their partner?) 
 
12) Why did Stalin enact GOKO order on May 11, 1944 to punish all Crimean 
Tatars when: a) from the first days of the war many Crimean Tatars fought 
in the ranks of the Soviet armed forces: b) other Crimean Tatars fought 
against the Nazi occupation as in the Crimean partisan organization? 
 
13)  Why were some Crimean Tatars who turned 16 after the April 28, 1956 
“rehabilitation” allowed to return to Crimea when Crimean Tatars who 
were children during the war or veterans were never allowed to return to 
Crimea? 
 
14) Will the Soviet government issue a decree, new law, or guidelines to 
answer the questions and concerns that Tatars have raised in their letters to 
Soviet central organs? 
 
15) Do Crimean Tatars who have traveled to Moscow and met with 
government, central organs, and cultural figures have the right to return to 
their home region (namely the Uzbek SSR) and inform local officials of 
the answers they received in Moscow? 
 
The questionnaire revealed the anxieties of Soviet officials and the inconsistencies 
in their Crimean Tatar policy.  On questions about discrimination and return to Crimea, 
the document instructed Soviet officials to acknowledge the validity of Crimean Tatar 
concerns, but counter that the economic and geopolitical aspects of returning to Crimea 
made “finding a quick solution” difficult.  However, they did stress that all Crimean 
Tatars had the right to travel to Crimean resorts for “credible health reasons.”  To 
questions about “Crimean Tatar autonomy” in Crimea, Moscow officials argued that 
autonomy was impossible because the Crimean ASSR was “multiethnic” (ignoring that 
the Crimean ASSR was both multiethnic and had guaranteed Crimean Tatars positions 




concerned arrests, saying that Soviet police would continue to arrest those who 
“disturbed the peace.”   
For several questions, there was either confusion or no official policy.  For 
example, the proposed answers to questions about the 1944 deportation and 1956 
rehabilitation cited documents that presented both justifications and condemnations of 
the deportation.  Skliarov and others noted that some Soviet officials agreed with 
Crimean Tatars that the deportation had been unjust, while others continued to argue that 
all Crimean Tatars were traitors.  Based on Crimean Tatar letters, this inconsistency 
gave Crimean Tatars an effective line of attack against the Soviet government.95   
Central organs had no response to complaints about the new Crimean narrative or 
anti-Tatar accounts of World War II and Stalin’s false mass treason charge.  They also 
had no answer for the clearly illegal act of denying Slavs residency because they were 
married to a Crimean Tatar.  Moscow was also unwilling to confirm that the opinions of 
central organs superseded the opinions of local officials in the Uzbek SSR and Crimea.  
Moscow officials also balked at debating the question of Crimean Tatars not born in 
Crimea because “there was no law saying that a Crimean Tatar born outside of Crimea 
could not live in Crimea.”  After all, the 1956 rehabilitation order stated that Crimean 
Tatars “could not return to their birthplace.”  Young Crimean Tatars argued that they 
had full rights in Crimea since they were not born there.  
Other general observations reveal further policy confusion on the part of Soviet 
leaders.  For example, the document starts with the politically safe terminology 
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(preferred by the Uzbek state) of “Tatars who formerly lived in Crimea.”  After several 
pages, even the Soviet bureaucracy tired of its own absurdities.  Authors switched to 
“Crimean Tatar,” an ethnicity that officially no longer existed.    Second, the document 
underscores the unwritten understanding that sometimes officials in Soviet republics and 
peripheral regions had a good degree of autonomy in how they interpreted and enforced 
directives from the center.  As was common throughout Soviet history, this distance was 
a deliberate attempt to shield leaders from the consequences of their policies.   Crimean 
Tatars understood this reasoning and forced Moscow to reckon with its own ability and 
desire to exert full control over its vast empire.   
A strict totalitarian regime would have never given credence to Crimean Tatar 
complaints, but the post-Stalinist USSR was a changed USSR.  The fact that Moscow 
debated how to answer these questions revealed a success of de-Stalinization.  Larger-
scale arrests and executions were never an option.  The Soviet Union was still going to 
arrest some individuals and deny an entire ethnic group some rights, but the mass 
murder of the Stalinist police was over.  Instead, the Soviet Union attempted to use 
target policies to undermine the accusations of hypocrisy and divide the main activists 
from the rest of Crimean Tatars.  Since the late-1950s, the Poliburo had assigned 
Georgadze the task of handling nationality questions and problems concerning both 
migration and immigration, and he mulled decree drafts during the summer of 1967.96   
Finally, Georgadze and the Supreme Soviet issued decree 1861 on September 5, 
1967.  As a result of this, Crimean Tatar individuals had the “right to live anywhere in 
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the Soviet Union,” including Crimea.  The decree confirmed that Stalin’s mass treason 
charges were false, and declared that the sins of some collaborators could not be 
“applied to the entire Tatar population of Crimea.”  However, in response to questions 
about mass return, the decree claimed that most Crimean Tatars had “put down roots” in 
exile so there was no need for a mass return plan.  Most of the decree focused on a 
limited rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatar language and cultural affairs in the Uzbek 
SSR.97 
In a separate order several weeks before the Supreme Soviet decree, the KPSS 
Central Committee instructed the Uzbek party and government to focus on Crimean Tatar 
cultural and economic advancement in exile.98  The Uzbek state established a Crimean 
Tatar publishing division at the Garfura Gulialga publishing house. This publisher then 
produced Crimean Tatar language textbooks, Crimean Tatar songs, and 39 books in 
Crimean Tatar language by the end of 1967, with the promise by 1970 to publish 180-200 
more books.   On the educational front, Crimean Tatars again had the right to learn the 
Crimean Tatar language in Soviet schools.99  Moreover, the party stressed that Lenin 
Bagaria and other party publications continue portraying Crimean Tatars’ proper place as 
the Uzbek republic.100 
 The goal of the reforms was to minimize the influence of activists, maximize the 
opportunities for Crimean Tatar cultural life in exile, and leave postwar Crimea intact.  
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Moscow hoped that the individual right to return to Crimea would appease veterans, 
students, and non-professional activists, and take a crucial talking point away from the 
Crimean Tatar movement.  Among mid-level Moscow government officials working on 
the reforms such as Skliarov, there was a genuine, if naïve, expectation that Crimean 
Tatar Veterans, party members, Komsomol members, and workers whose skills were in 
demand in Crimea could, in reasonable numbers, reintegrate themselves into the postwar 
Crimean social and economic fabric without disturbing the status quo.   
The Soviet Union could now answer much of the questionnaire and claim to both 
international and domestic audience that any Crimean Tatar had the right to live in 
Crimea or anywhere else in the USSR. In contrast to the United States, they could claim 
there was no racial or ethnic discrimination in the Soviet Union. Much in line with the 
idea of the “Good Tsar,” future discrimination was not the fault of the center, but the 
deviation of corrupt local officials.  Within weeks of the decree, thousands of Crimean 
Tatars embraced their new “rights” and moved to Crimea. 
 
The Battle to Return 
 
 
After September 5, 1967, Crimean Tatars claimed the legal right to return to their 
homeland, while Crimean officials used legal and extra legal means to stop them.  In 
essence, the reform shifted part of the responsibility of repressing Crimean Tatars from 
the Uzbek SSR to Crimean authorities and the Ukraine SSR.  Moscow began directing 
complaints about Crimean issues to the Ukraine SSR government in Kyiv, where 




often referred complaints back to Crimean officials.101  These “petty Stalins” of Crimea 
had many advantages.  Still, they could not stop every Crimean Tatar from returning and 
a fluctuating battle of returning and re-deporting would continue for the rest of Soviet 
history.   
Discrimination often had the legal cover of internal passport, residency, home 
ownership, and notary laws.  Of those, internal passport and residency laws were the 
most common discriminatory tool against Crimean Tatars.102  In fact, one cynical aspect 
of the Supreme Soviet decree was that Moscow enhanced Crimean passport laws two 
weeks before the reform.  A Soviet of Ministers order on the “organizing of the Crimean 
passport regime” extended strict passport control to the most remote Crimean regions and 
stressed the importance of “sanitary norms.”103  Instructions for Crimean police claimed 
that the order “was not meant to serve as a radical means to limit Crimean Tatars” 
because any citizen could receive registration if they followed the “legal” route.   In 
reality, the focus on “sanitary norms” presented another bureaucratic hurdle to Crimean 
Tatar return.104   
While passport laws favored Crimean authorities, the August 26, 1948 Soviet 
property law (discussed in Chapter Three) provided Crimean Tatars some cover when 
returning to Crimea.105  While this law was often meaningless to Soviet urbanites, the 
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mass home building effort for Slavic settlers repopulating Crimea after 1944 gave the 
peninsula a large pool of private homes.  By 1967, there were plenty of homes to buy and 
no legal obstacle to a Crimean Tatar buying a home in Crimea.  In practice, the ability of 
Crimean Tatars to purchase homes from Slavic homeowners had mixed results.  As the 
rest of this chapter demonstrates, thousands of Crimean Tatars did buy houses in Crimea.  
On the other hand, Crimean authorities often fabricated violations of internal passport, 
land use, private transaction, and notary laws to declare the home purchases illegal. 
With the reform and legal codes setting the ground rules, the struggle to return to 
Crimea began.  The number of Crimean Tatars who succeeded was largely dependent on 
how aggressive Crimean authorities were willing to discriminate against returnees and 
how much personal risk and abuse Crimean Tatars were willing to endure.  Another 
factor was that, while most of the Crimean officials were against Crimean Tatar return, 
there were exceptions.  This fact, combined with the goodwill of some Slavic Crimeans 
and the need for labor, assisted thousands of determined Crimean Tatars in gaining 
residency, homes, and work. 
Examining several personal accounts reveals how the complicated mesh of legal 
battles and discrimination developed after September 5, 1967.  Following residency 
procedures, Crimean Tatars often tried to secure housing before applying for registration 
and Crimean authorities targeted these transactions.  In Simferopol, Eksender Umerov 
and Emadin Shaikhametov purchased an apartment, but authorities refused to notarize the 
sale.106  Also in Simferopol, Remzi Umerov rented a room from a Russian woman, but a 
                                                





Simferopol KGB officer ordered the passport office to deny Umerov registration citing an 
invalid rental contract.107  
Older Crimean Tatars returned to their birthplaces where they sometimes found 
help or empathy from old neighbors, but the police and other officials often undermined 
these interactions.  Muarrem Martynov returned to his former village of Kapsikhor (now 
Morskoe) and purchased a home from Petr Shumaiko, but the kolkhoz notary rejected the 
sale.108  Seiiar Dzhemaletdinov returned to General’skoe in the Alushta district.  His 
long-time Russian friends found him a house that Ukrainian settlers had begun building 
but abandoned in 1965, and also provided paint and materials to finish the house.  After a 
week, Alushta district prosecutors and police detained and deported the Dzhemaletdinov 
family.109  Soon, Crimean authorities began to warn Russians and Ukrainians not to rent 
or sell property to Crimean Tatars.110  Crimean police even fined some Crimean residents 
such Marina Romanovna for selling space to Crimean Tatars.111 
When Crimean farm and factory managers were willing to hire Crimean Tatars, 
law enforcement again discouraged both management and employees.  Indris Khaitas and 
Izzet Kara left Gelindzhke, Uzbek SSR, and boarded a train for Crimea on September 17, 
1967.  They arrived with their families at their old village of Uskut (renamed 
“Privetnoe”) and approached the local kolkhoz about work.  While the Russian manager 
said they could use more farmhands, police refused to register Khaitas and Kara at a local 
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hotel and threatened to charge them with trespassing.  Next, several Russian and 
Ukrainian farmers offered to assist them and one elderly woman let them stay overnight.  
The next day the two families traveled to Simferopol to file a complaint at the party 
headquarters where a clerk told them that Crimean Tatars were not welcome in 
Crimea.112  Crimean authorities then detained the families for passport violations and 
demanded that the families to leave or receive jail time.113  
Mixed ethnicity couples had an equally tough time moving to Crimea, even when 
non-Crimean Tatar spouses tried to leverage their ethnicity to get residency.  For 
instance, Mariia Sarminoi, an ethnic Russian, and her Crimean Tatar husband, Fakhri 
Ismailov, moved to Crimea on April 8, 1968.  The family returned to Ismailov’s home 
village, Sinavnoe, in the Bakhchisarai district.  Ismailov’s former neighbor, Grigorii 
Avlakhov, found an elderly Russian woman, Maria Pogorelova, who owned a house, 
lived alone, and was willing to rent a room to the couple.  Despite meeting sanitary 
norms, the local farm director and the police refused to register the family citing sanitary 
violations.  The couple then spent 20 days searching for jobs before the Crimean oblast 
labor board found Ismailov a job with the Crimean Canal Construction Enterprise 
(Krymvodstroi) in the Belogorsk district.  However, Belogorsk officials refused to 
register Izmailov.  Afterwards, Sarminoi traveled to Alushta and, as a Russian, received 
work and registration at the “Kristall” buffet.  Despite her legal registration, Crimean 
police arrested Sarminoi when she went to find her husband at a Simferopol encampment 
of unregistered Crimean Tatars (her husband was out searching for work at the time).  
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Police deported her along with seven other Crimean Tatars to Baku, where police beat 
them and put them on a train to Tashkent.  In the meantime, Crimean police deported her 
husband later that week.114   
Similar to the experience of many Crimean returnees over the next several 
decades, the first deportation did not stop Ismailov and Sarminoi.  They reunited in 
Tashkent and again flew to Crimea on June 4.  The couple wrote letters to Moscow, 
participated in protests in Simferopol, and then Simferopol police arrested them for petty 
hooliganism.  After their release from jail on July 11, Crimean police forced them onto an 
airplane, flight 2270 to Tashkent.115  Sometimes, after enduring multiple deportations, 
families and individuals achieved registration.  For example, Fefzi Poska and his family 
faced deportation five times before receiving registration, while police expelled Asan 
Chobanov and his nine relatives twice allowing them to become legal residents.116 
Demobilized Crimean Tatar soldiers often found jobs in Crimea, further 
undermining the claim that there was no work for Crimean Tatars.  However, they 
encountered the same discrimination.  Enver Kapari was twenty-two years old in July 
1971 when he demobilized from the army, traveled to Crimea, and found a job at the 
Armory Factory in Simferopol.  Despite finding a job, the Simferopol police refused him 
residency and forced the factory administration to fire him.  Likewise, Eiiandin 
Dzhemetdinov left the army in May 1970 and found a job in the Evpatoriia city 
construction service, similar to the treatment of Kapari, the police refused to register him 
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and forced his boss to fire him.  The Evpatoria police also decided to send a signal to 
other managers and fined Kapari’s manager 50 rubles for hiring him in the first place.117 
Some Crimean managers tried to defend their new workers in the face of 
discrimination.  When Enver Asanov left the army, he found a job in the town of 
Armyansk and his boss provided him a dorm room to expedite his registration process.  
When Asanov and his boss approached the Armyansk passport table, officer Tachenko 
denied Asanov registration because there was “not enough room in the dorm.”  Asanov 
claims that his boss proceeded to argue at length with Tachenko because he needed 
workers and there was space in the dorm, but to no avail.118 
 Crimean authorities also destroyed or stole legal documents.  For example, 
Rustem and Nariman Ametov received registration on October 6, 1967, but three days 
later police in Belogorsk confiscated their passports and expelled the from Crimea.119   
This tactic became so common that activists warned returning Crimean Tatars to make 
copies of all documents.120    
As Crimean Tatar return increased, so did coordinated and violent deportations of 
families.  On May 27, 1968, a raid on an encampment on the shore of the Simferopol 
Reservoir involved 50 police officers.121  In letters to the UN Committee on Human 
Rights, Crimean Tatars related how police often conscripted local men as “muscle.”  For 
example, B. Kashka and his family returned to the town of Kizilovka in Belogorsk 
district and bought a home from M. F. Kravchenko in the Spring of 1969.  After police 
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refused them registration, on June 26, 1968 police and local men evicted the family, beat 
the adults, and stole several thousand rubles.122  In a similar case, Regber and Aishe 
Akhtemov described how drunken “people’s volunteers” beat them and the police forced 
them on a train to Baku.  As they waited to board the train, they met seven other Crimean 
Tatar families (39 people) awaiting deportation who had also been attacked by police-led 
mobs.123 
While Crimean authorities often preferred deportation to prosecuting Crimean 
Tatars in Crimea, by June 1969 Crimean authorities had convicted 26 Crimean Tatars for 
“crimes” related to their return, mostly for multiple passport violations.124  One of those 
cases was that of Mamedi Chabanov who moved to Crimea after army demobilization in 
late 1967.  Police arrested him for a passport violation in August 1968, and a Crimean 
court gave him a three-year prison sentence.125  People’s courts also sentenced hundreds 
of other Crimean Tatars such as El’dar Shabanov to bans from Crimea for periods of two 
years or more.126 
While the fluidity of the situation described above makes estimating return and 
deportation numbers difficult, both Crimean Tatar activists and Soviet authorities 
acknowledged the mass-return attempt.  Between September 5 and October 25, 1967, 
Crimean Tatar activists claimed that over 5,000 Crimean Tatars arrived in Crimea and 
attempted to get registration, jobs, and buy homes.  In one lone concession by the Uzbek 
                                                
122 HU OSA, 300-85-11, Box 5, Tom 12, AC No. 503, pgs. 1-4.  Obrashchenie Bekir Kashka-Komieteu 
zashchity prav Chelovaka pri OON.  July 1969. 
123 HU OSA, 300-85-11, Box 5, Tom 12, AC No. 504. pgs. 1-  
124 Crimean Tatars claimed that up to 12,000 returnees had propyska by June 1969.  HU OSA AC 137, pg. 
7. 
125 HU OSA, Box 5, Tom 12, AC No. 1882, pgs. 3.  Neoproverzhimye fakty iz zhizni krymskikh Tatar za 
period s 1967 po 1973 goda.  January 1973. 




KGB, Uzbek authorities allowed 148 Crimean Tatar families to relocate to Crimea with 
the Soviet resettlement and labor board in 1968   By June 1969, at least 12,000 Crimean 
Tatars, or around 900 families, had returned to Crimea and several thousand had received 
registration and bought homes.127  However, there is little doubt that Crimean authorities 
deported several thousand of those returnees.    
When Crimean officials finally tallied return totals a decade later, their count 
revealed lasting results.  Between September 1967 and February 6, 1979, Crimean 
officials believed that 10,316 Crimean Tatars (1,930 families) had resettled in Crimea.  
Of these, 6,869 people (1,212) families had received registration, while 3,447 people 
(718 families) remained without registration.128  Given the more sophisticated deportation 
and repression measures implemented by Crimean authorities from 1976 to 1979, it is 
reasonable to say that a majority of the 6,869 Crimean Tatars (1,212 families) with 
registration in Crimea in 1979 received their residency from 1967 until the early 1970s.  
This also indicates that Crimean authorities deported around half of the nearly 10,000 
Crimean Tatars that returned to Crimea from 1967 to 1972. 
Outside of Crimea, reform had the unintended consequence of expanding the 
geographical scope of Crimean Tatar population and activism outside of the traditional 
bases in exile and the Moscow lobby.  The fact that Crimean officials were in charge of 
deportations meant that they did not have the resources or authority to force many 
deported Crimean Tatars to return to their former residences in exile.  Many deportees 
from Crimea chose to live adjacent to Crimea in Krasnodar krai, Zhaporazhia oblast 
Kherson oblast and the Caucasus.  Smaller numbers of re-deportees relocated to Moscow, 
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Kyiv, Odessa, and other cities.  Crimean Tatars quickly established themselves in these 
locations and continued their activism.   
 While finding housing, registration and jobs in these regions was far easier than 
in Crimea, some local authorities did discourage Crimean Tatar immigration.  For 
example, the Odessa Morexodnoe Uchilishche (Odessa Naval School) originally admitted 
Asan Ablyazizov, but then expelled him when they realized he was Crimean Tatar.  E. 
Seitvapov had a similar experience at the Kievskoe Vyschee Voenno-Morskoe 
Politicheskoe Uchilishche (Kiev Higher Naval and Political School) in 1970.  After 
serving in the Soviet Armed Forces, Seitvapov’s commander enrolled in him the 
academy, but the school's administration removed him “because of his nationality.”129 
In some cases, authorities in these regions employed the same passport and 
housing laws to undermine Crimean Tatar rights.  Enver Ibraimov owned a home and 
received registration in the Kherson oblast town of Alekseveka, but the police refused to 
register his son after his army discharge.  In another case, Aider Mustafaev bought a 
house and registered in the Kherson oblast town of Genichesk.  In 1972 he left to study in 
Melitopol’, but when he returned police denied him registration at his home for violating 
“sanitary norms.”  The head of the Genichesk government, Gaidamaka, actually took the 
time to find the former owners of the house and remonstrated him for “selling to Tatars.”  
Mustafaev then bought a bigger house in Genichesk and Gaidamaka again refused to 
register Mustafaev he claimed that the city of Genichesk would just not allow Tatars to 
receive registration.  More Crimean Tatars had similar issues in Genichesk.130 
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 Regardless, the Crimean Tatar population grew and activism blossomed in these 
areas as many Crimean Tatars found jobs and homes, with deportations of Tatars outside 
of Crimea rare.  For example, in March 1972, Crimean Tatars in Kherson oblast wrote a 
letter to Moscow with 743 signatures.131   By 1979, Soviet authorities believed that the 
Crimean Tatar population in the Krasnodar krai was over 15,000 people.132  Crimean 
Tatar activists believed the actual number was pushing 30,000, which included many 
unregistered individuals by 1978.  For example, in the Krasnodar krai town of Nizhe-
Bakansky alone there were more than 6,000 Crimean Tatars by 1978.133   
Another unforeseen consequence was that the reform was important to more than 
just Crimean Tatars.  Meshketian Turks, Volga Germans, Kurds, Crimean Bulgars and 
smaller ethnic and religious groups modeled their own petitions, letters, and lobbies on 
the Crimean Tatar example.  For example, in a January 1968 letter, Meshketian Turk 
activists cited the September 5, 1967 decree as a “hopeful sign of returning to Leninist 
nationalities politics” and requested a similar order allowing their small nation to return 
to the Georgian SSR.134   Another Meshketian collective letter said the decree meant that 
Moscow could no longer make excuses that reform was not possible.135  Bulgars deported 
from Crimea asked why the reform did not cover Crimean deportees of other 
ethnicities.136  Some Volga Tatar nationalists were impressed by the Crimean Tatar 
samizdat effort and began their own publications in the 1970s.137  After September 1967, 
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Skliarov and other authorities noted a sharp increase in letters from these groups and 
Kurds and other groups began their own lobbies in Moscow.  None of these groups 
received similar reforms, and memos hint that this was likely because after September 
1967 the center realized its citizens took decrees on civil rights quite seriously.138 
 
The Legacy of 1967: Crimean Tatar Protest in Crimea 
 
 
Moscow created a paradox by acknowledging Stalin’s false charges and allowing 
some individual Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea, while also letting Crimean officials 
continue anti-Tatar policies born of ethnic cleansing.  Land redistribution, resettlement, 
and the new Crimean narrative remained.  The failure of the Soviet government to offer 
neither Crimean Tatars a mass return plan nor allow Crimean authorities to deport all 
Crimean Tatar returnees guaranteed that the protest movement would continue.  
However, from a pragmatic point of view for Crimean Tatars, their resistance and the 
1967 reforms returned Crimean Tatars to the political and demographic landscape of 
Crimea nearly 23 years after Stalin’s total ethnic cleansing of the peninsula.  At least on 
paper, the September 5 decree “rescinded” the mass treason charge and made Crimean 
Tatars “full Soviet citizens” again.139  After the thaw ended, the Soviet Union did not 
want to have an “open dialogue” with its citizens.140  The dialogue was never truly open, 
but Crimean Tatars at least forced an uncomfortable conversation.  The accomplishment, 
however modest, was no small feat in the Soviet state, and would only grow in 
importance as Crimean Tatar resistance continued.    
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Crimea was now a key hub of Crimean Tatar resistance. By late October 1967, 
Simferopol’ police were expelling dozens of Crimean Tatars from the city for hooligan-
related offences.141  On April 11, 1972, at Park Pobeda in Simferopol, a tour guide began 
an excursion with the usual opinion that Crimean Tatars were traitors and illegitimate 
inhabitants in Crimea.  Several Crimean Tatar students in the crowd began arguing with 
the tour guide.  As the confrontation continued, several KGB operatives arrived and 
detained the students.  In a similar fashion, at the Livadia sanatorium, Crimean Tatars 
confronted the excursion leader, Stanovskii, for reading a lecture on partisans that cited 
Vergasov and Nadinskii falsehoods about Crimean history and World War II.142  Park 
Pobeda, Lenin statues and oblast party buildings became rallying spots for Crimean 
Tatars and confrontations with Crimean authorities increased.143  Activists in Crimea also 
collected job announcements and confronted Crimean officials over the availability of 
work.144    
Soviet officials argued that since Crimean Tatars had the right to live wherever 
they wanted, there was no longer a need for the Moscow lobby.145  On October 10, 1967, 
police expelled Crimean Tatars from several hotels and detained several demonstrators 
near Lenin’s mausoleum on Red Square.   Undaunted, activists in Moscow collected 
accounts of deportations from Crimea and insisted that Moscow uphold their right to live 
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anywhere in the Soviet Union.146   Just in the first two weeks of February 1968, Crimean 
Tatars sent 3,447 letters to Moscow.  By March 1968, there were 58 Crimean Tatars in 
Moscow and new editions of Info listed the names and residency of lobby members in 
Moscow over the given period.147   When Crimean Tatar activists met with the head of 
passport services, Lt. Colonel Bezrukov, at the MOOP headquarters in Moscow he 
expressed “dismay” that Crimean police were breaking the law and told Crimean Tatars 
to report the offenders.148  Bezrukov’s promise was insincere, but the point of such 
meetings was to inform Soviet law enforcement and other central organs that the divide 
between official policy and actual treatment of Crimean Tatars was on the record. 
In the Uzbek SSR, protest continued and became more confrontational.  When 
Crimean Tatars gathered around the Lenin statue in Chirchik during the Crimean Tatar 
spring holiday of Derviza on April 21, 1968, local police directed fire trucks to hose the 
crowd.  Dozens of soldiers and KGB operatives then beat protestors with batons before 
arresting more than 300 people.149   While letter writing and protest in the Uzbek SSR 
waned in intensity in early 1970s with only several hundred letters a month and smaller 
demonstrations, the campaign never ended.150  In fact, as underlined in the next chapter, 
the reforms and new repression inspired both collaboration with Soviet dissidents and a 
second wave of mass return in the mid to late-1970s. 
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Dissidents, Repression and a Second Return  
 
 
It was during the Brezhnev-era “stagnation” of the late-1970s that Soviet 
repressions against Crimean Tatars and Crimean Tatar resistance ironically reached their 
most radical forms.  While historians usually characterize this period as a combination of 
stalled political and economic reforms with general domestic stability, the relationship 
between Crimean Tatars and the Soviet state was overtly antagonistic and sometimes 
violent.1  Crimean Tatars never accepted ethnic cleansing, discrimination, and stalled 
reforms as “normal.”2  Throughout the Brezhnev-era, Crimean Tatar activists encouraged 
camaraderie with Soviet dissidents and international human rights activists in order to 
enhance their ability to put Soviet abuses and hypocrisy under the microscope.  Popular 
and international support encouraged Crimean Tatar activists to begin a second return 
attempt in 1976.  In response, for the first time since Stalin died, Moscow coordinated 
mass deportations of an ethnic group.  In the wake of enhanced repressions, Crimean 
Tatar activism reached the frustrating climax of self-immolation.  Nevertheless, the 
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persistence of Crimean Tatar resistance throughout this period and the return of several 
thousand more Crimean Tatars to the Crimea after 1976 helped create the national myths 
and pragmatic methods that they utilized a decade later when the final return began.   
Understanding the accomplishments and transnational aspect of the Crimean 
Tatar movement during their cooperation with Soviet dissidents requires examining how 
dissent on the Soviet periphery was much more extensive than in Moscow.3  In Dr. 
Zhivago’s Children, Vladislav Zubok describes Soviet dissidents as “rebels without a 
cause” in a “long decline” after the 1956 “thaw.”  Combined attacks during the late-
Khrushchev and Brezhnev-era from both the Soviet state and Russian nationalists 
decimated the dissident movement, making them irrelevant to the vast majority of Soviet 
citizens and forcing many into imprisonment or exile.  The accomplishments of 1970s 
activism that included creating Helsinki Watch and circulating samizdat were actually 
dead ends for Moscow-based dissidents.  Therefore, Zubok concludes, the era of 
stagnation meant defeat for intellectuals attempting to change the Soviet system.4  Zubok 
is correct concerning broad reform and the consequences in Moscow, but the Soviet 
dissident movement was not just about Moscow.   
For Crimean Tatars, a repressed ethnic minority on the Soviet periphery, the 
Soviet dissident movement was consequential.  Many observers at the time recognized 
Crimean Tatar-dissident cooperation as “a unique phenomenon in the dissident 
movement.”5 As the previous chapter highlighted, the late 1960s Crimean Tatar 
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4 Zubok, Dr. Zhivago’s Children, 259-334. 
5 See Peter J. Potichnyj, “The Struggle of Crimean Tatars,” Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue Canadienne 




resistance was a popular movement that sprang from the pages of samizdat and spilled 
into the streets.  This translation of written dissent into physical resistance impressed non-
Tatar dissidents.  They found a common cause with Crimean Tatar activism in a Cold 
World context where the Soviet Union paraded anti-colonial leaders through Crimea and 
Tashkent to highlight a “brotherhood of nations.”6  They realized that Crimean Tatars 
were pioneers in employing the language of the Nuremburg Trials and the UN 
Convention on Human Rights to describe their fate.  Together, Crimean Tatars and 
dissidents helped establish an international “language of dissent.”7  As such, Crimean 
Tatars and their activism on the Soviet periphery were essential to the dissident 
movement' that, in the words of Donald Raleigh, “subjected the Soviet Union to critical 
scrutiny on the world stage, and posed a fundamental challenge to the Soviet myth 
economy.”8 
 Moreover, the Crimean Tatar partnership with Soviet dissidents such as Andrei 
Sakharov, Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Petr Grigorinko, Grigorii Aleksandrov and others helped 
sustain Crimean Tatar resistance at certain points when many Crimean Tatar leaders were 
imprisoned.  This partnership was essential in documenting the repression of Crimean 
                                                                                                                                            
Reddaway, “The Crimean Tatar Drive for Repatriation: Some Comparisons with Other Movements of 
Dissent in the Soviet Union,” in Allworth, The Tatars of Crimea, 227.  Some observers were skeptical 
about the collaboration’s productivity: see Elizabeth Pond, From the Yaroslavsky Station: Russia Perceived 
(New York: Universe Books, 1981), 129. 
6 While Crimea severed as an example of Soviet military might and Soviet tourism, Stronski argues that 
Tashkent became a “model” of socialist transformation and “progressive” urban development in a 
postcolonial state.  Stronski, Tashkent, 234-250. 
7 On the creation and “internationalizing” of dissent during the Cold War see, Suri, Power and Protest, 
121-130. 
8 By the mid-1960s, Western political scientists such as Fredrick Schuman cited Crimean Tatars as one 
example where “Soviet practice” does not conform to the “Soviet theory” of national self-determination 
and anti-colonialism.  Leonard Shapiro also underlined how the Crimean Tatar situation was a clear 
violation of article 123 of the Soviet constitution on “the equality of all Soviet citizens regardless of race or 
nationality: see Fredrick Schuman, Government in the Soviet Union, Second Edition (New York: Thomas 
Y. Crowell Company, 1967), 115; Leonard Schapiro, The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union, 
Revised Edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 89; Donald J. Raleigh, Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral 




Tatars in Crimea, Central Asia and Moscow. They scrutinized Soviet authorities after the 
signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 and pressured the Soviet government into new 
concessions in 1976 that fostered the second return effort from 1976 to 1979.  When 
Soviet authorities repressed the second mass return, the Crimean Tatar-dissident 
partnership again recorded the consequences and, despite arrests and imprisonments, 
assisted the Crimean Tatar return movement success in surviving the most reactionary 
period of post-Stalin Soviet politics.   
This chapter in addition argues that participation in Crimean Tatar resistance was 
a key reason that the Soviet state vigorously repressed dissidents. As Zubok admits, 
Slavic dissidents paid a price for their support of non-Slavic groups during a time of 
growing Russian nationalist sentiment.9  Moscow saw dissident support of Crimean Tatar 
agitation in Crimea, Moscow and Central Asia as a direct threat to Soviet stability and 
international messaging.   To be certain, Slavic dissident support of Crimean Tatars was 
never absolute or without complications, but both Crimean Tatars and the Soviet state 
recognized their contribution, albeit in very different ways.   
Finally, Soviet efforts to stop the new return attempt by Crimean Tatars reveal 
that Crimean Tatars did not just receive support from Soviet dissidents, but also ordinary 
Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea.  Oftentimes this took the simple form of a home sale 
or sheltering a returning Crimean Tatar and usually involved providing some money, but 
these seemingly mundane acts were nevertheless subversive.  This suggests that, despite 
decades of anti-Tatar agitation, not every Crimean resident had strong anti-Tatar feelings.  
In fact, anti-Tatar Crimean officials viewed the willingness of some Slavic Crimeans to 
accept and even aid Crimean Tatar return as a threat.  As a result, the late 1970’s attack 
                                                




on Crimean Tatar return included the arrest, imprisonment, and, in some cases, even the 
deportation of non-Tatars along with Crimean Tatars.   
This chapter has three sections.  The first will trace the growth of the dissident 
movement and Crimean Tatar collaboration.  Chronologically, this section overlaps some 
with previous chapters but focuses on the pinnacle of transnational and inter-Soviet 
cooperation during the 1970s.  The second section will examine the second major 
Crimean Tatar return attempt from 1976 to 1979 and how dissidents, human rights 
activists, and even Western Cold War radio recorded and informed this saga.  The final 
section reviews the consequences of the new return and repressions on the protest 
movement, dissident allies, and Crimea.   
 
Common Ground: Crimean Tatars and Soviet Dissidents 
  
 
In October 1962, Zaziev Gaziev walked into the Almalyk (Uzbek SSR) party 
headquarters and destroyed his Komsomol membership card.  He was protesting the 
arrest of Grigorii Aleksandrov before Khrushchev’s visit to the Uzbek SSR.10  Gaziev 
was a Crimean Tatar activist, student and Komsomol member.  Aleksandrov was the son 
of a Red Army officer and an MGU professor, and an exiled Russian dissident.   
However, the two young men shared a dorm in Almalyk.  Most importantly, Aleksandrov 
was perhaps the first Soviet dissident to recognize the scope of Stalin’s ethnic cleansing 
in Crimea, and his support of Crimean Tatar return began a decade before and continued 
                                                
10 After Zevid renounced his Komsomol membership, on November 3, 1962, the Uzbek Komosomol 
journal (Komsomolets Uzbekistana) published an article denouncing both Alexandrov and Zevid.  In 
response, ten more Almalyk komsomol members quit in protest. Uzbek authorities detained Aleksandrov as 
a precaution during the trip that, according to William Taubman, was Khrushchev’s attempt to escape the 
fallout over the Cuban Missile Crisis.  Taubman, Khrushchev, 556-557 and Komsomolets Uzbekistana, No. 




until his death.   In July 1942, when Aleksandrov was fourteen-years old, he became a 
German prisoner.  The Red Army liberated him in 1944 and, as with millions of Soviets 
imprisoned by the Nazis, arrested him.11  His mother, a MGU professor, gained his 
release and admission to the MGU law department in 1946, where he studied until 1950.  
However, the experience of imprisonment sullied his view of Soviet justice and he began 
writing poetry critical of Stalin and about the fate of Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, Chechens 
and other deported groups.  The head of the archives at the Lenin Library was a family 
friend, and he had access to both deportation accounts and the proceedings of the U.N. 
and Nuremburg Trials.  In particular, he studied a Russian language translation of the 
U.N. deliberations in which Western governments accused the Soviet Union of genocide.  
Through contacts, he smuggled his writings to both Paris and Ankara.  The Berlin-based 
émigré journal Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik and the Turkish journal Emel published his 
writing on Soviet deportations in the mid-1950s.12  Because of these articles and other 
samizdat publications, Soviet authorities arrested him and sentenced him to 25 years hard 
labor.  The MVD released him in 1955, but he continued to write and the KGB sent him 
to Tashkent and then to Almalyk.13   
As the first Crimean Tatar “initiation groups” grew in the Uzbek SSR, 
relationships such as that between Aleksandrov and Zevid blossomed.  For example, after 
                                                
11 During the war, his two older brothers and older sister died in service.  GARF, f. 10148, op. 1, d. 26, l.l. 
1-11. Stat’i Ali Khamzina, interv’iu posviashchennye pamita G. M. Aleksandrova.  June 5, 2003. 
12 Emel first published the writings in 1953 and then republished the material in 1993. Based in Ankara, 
Turkey, Emel is one the oldest journal of Crimean Tatar affairs published by Crimean Tatar diaspora: see 
Emel No. 196, 198 (1993).  For more on Emel, see Lowell Bezanis, “Soviet Muslim Emigres in the 
Republic of Turkey” (The United States Department of State: Washington DC, 1993).  Available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a251103.pdf. Accessed on February 25, 2017.  Sotsialisticheskii 
Vestnik  was originally a Menshevik exile journal based in Berlin. The information also appears in Svetlana 
Chervonnaia, “Kogda eshelony s deportirovannymi narodami ukhodili na vostok,” As Alan 1(10), 2003. 
13 GARF, f. 10148, op. 1, d. 26, l.l. 1-11. Stat’i Ali Khamzina, interv’iu posviashchennye pamita G. M. 




his release, Aleksandrov married Galina Aleksandrova, a bibliographer at Tashkent State 
University (TashGU).  At the university, Galina noticed a “young and determined student 
of non-Russian ethnicity by the name of Mustafa Dzhemilev” and introduced the student 
to her husband.  From this point onwards, Aleksandrov became a de facto member of the 
Crimean Tatar return movement.  This early display of unity between Crimean Tatars and 
a non-Tatar dissident was the beginning of a collaboration that would continue in various 
degrees until 1991.14  
As soon as Dzhemilev and other Crimean Tatars established the permanent lobby 
in Moscow, they built working relationships with Soviet dissidents such as Ludmilla 
Alexeyeva, General Pyotr Grigorenko, Andrei Sakharov and others. Their paths 
intentionally crossed because the two parties saw their relationship as mutually 
beneficial.  For these dissidents, Crimean Tatars brought energy and stories of how the 
Soviet system repressed ordinary Soviet citizens on an everyday basis.  For Crimean 
Tatars, the samizdat network and the growing connections with the West facilitated better 
communications with each other and the world.15    
Much of the early interactions focused on finding a common language to discuss 
the 1944 deportation of Crimean Tatars their and mass deaths.  For example, by the mid 
1960s, Crimean Tatars were using direct quotes from the Nuremburg Trials and the U.N. 
convention on genocide.  Soviet authorities wondered how they even had copies of the 
materials in Central Asia.  The answer is that Aleksandrov illegally copied the texts at the 
Lenin Library in the early 1950s and smuggled them to the Uzbek SSR.  By the mid-
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1960s, both Moscow dissidents and Crimean Tatars were smuggling texts to the West 
accusing the Soviet Union of “genocide” against Crimean Tatars during the 1940s.16   
Crimean Tatars and Soviet dissidents argued that contemporary Soviet policy in 
Crimea was anti-anti-colonialism. They identified which sections of the United Nations 
charter and Declaration of Human Rights that the Soviet Union violated with 
discriminatory polices in the 1960s and 1970s.17  Their writings often compared Soviet 
policy to the U.S. and European treatment of Africans, African Americans and Native 
Americans, complete with references to Jim Crow laws and reservations.  For example, in 
Info reports from 1967 and 1968, they argued that the “hunting of negroes during the 17th 
century was similar to the hunting of Crimean Tatars during the May 16-18, 1968 
protests.”18  One report smuggled to Munich compared Soviet police to Tom Loker, the 
“slave catcher” character in Uncle Tom’s Cabin.19 Activists in Crimea claimed that 
Crimean police intimidation and harassment reminded them of articles about the Ku Klux 
Klan (Kukluklanovtsev).20  Another article, titled “Uzbekistan: The Bulwark of National 
Discrimination and the Cruel Repression and Degradation of the Crimean Tatar Nation,” 
argued that Stalin’s “great power chauvinism” and ethnic cleansing were similar to 
                                                
16 As Naimark notes, the specifics of Soviet policies towards Soviet minorities fit the USSR’s own 
definition during U.N. deliberations.  Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides, 22.  On dissident use of genocide in 
regards to Crimean Tatars see, HU OSA, Otkrytoe pis’mo v zashchitu krymskikh Tatar podpisannoe 
“Russkie druz’ia Krymskikh Tatar.”  January 1969. 
17 HU OSA, 300-85-11, Box 1, Tom 2, Samizdat Archive Association: Sobranie Dokumentov Samizdata 
(SAA:SDS) AC no. 137, p. 12).“Obrashchenie krysmko-tatarskogo naroda k kommunisticheskim i 
rabochim partiam i k liudiam kobroi voli.”  June 1969. 
18 RGASPI f. 17, op. 142, d. 2038, l.l. 62-69.  Prilozhenie No. 3 k punktu Postanovlenie No. B-111 
“Vyderzhki iz klevetnicheskikh dokumentov izgotovlennykh i raspostranennykh krymsko-tatarskim 
avtonomistami.”  April 1974. 
19 HU OSA, 300-85-11, Box 1, Tom 1 (SAA:SDS, AC no. 91, p. 6). 





“American imperialism and racism.”21  Writings also targeted Soviet Muslims and 
Islamic nations across the globe, arguing that Moscow would someday have to 
“apologize to the Uzbek nation” for forcing them to house “the national reservation” of 
Crimean Tatars.  Other comparisons included the situation of Palestinians after the 1967 
Seven Days War and the Chinese occupation of Tibet.22     
As Sarah Snyder argues, the burgeoning transnational human rights network 
helped make human rights “an important element of Cold War diplomacy and a central 
component of détente.”23  Crimean Tatar and dissident collaboration was an important 
element of the pressure that brought the Kremlin to the Helsinki Accords in which the 
Soviet Union and dozens of other countries agreed to language defining “human rights” 
and pledged (albeit in a non-binding agreement) to uphold these rights.  To Crimean 
Tatars and their partners, the “third basket” of the accord on human rights codified the 
language of human rights and dissent concerning ethnic rights and the right to 
“movement” that they had been articulating for two decades.24  When the Moscow 
“Helskinki Watch” group held its first meeting May 15, 1976, the group’s first document 
protested the conviction of Dzhemiliev.25  From 1975 until 1982, the Moscow Helsinki 
                                                
21 RGASPI f. 17, op. 142, d. 2038, l.l. 62-69.  Prilozhenie No. 3 k punktu Postanovlenie No. B-111 
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23 Sarah Snyder, End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), I-X, 1-13. 
24 Signed on August 1, 1975.  For the full act, see http://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act.  Accessed on 
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Watch monitoring of “Soviet compliance” put Soviet violations of the act at the forefront 
of the international human rights movement.26     
Cooperation between Crimean Tatars and dissidents was also logistical.  From the 
mid-1960s until the end of the Soviet Union, Crimean Tatars arrived in Moscow and 
often stayed with or visited dissidents.  They brought with them letters, reports, opinion 
pieces, photographs and copies of Info.  In apartments and hotel rooms, Moscow 
dissidents collected Crimean Tatar materials, and both reprinted them for distribution 
inside the Soviet Union and forwarded them to Munich, New York and other centers of 
tamizdat publication.  As Andropov complained in a 1971 KGB memo, “Crimean Tatars 
visit Sakharov’s apartment frequently to complain to him about the refusal to give them 
residence permits and jobs in Crimea.”27   
Once dissidents collected Crimean Tatar materials, a small group of Western 
journalists, diplomats and academics acted as “couriers” and stuffed documents into 
suitcases and handbags or used diplomatic mail.  For example, one of the first Western 
academics to publish work on the Crimean Tatar movement, Peter Reddaway, was an 
experienced courier who trained younger academics such as Robert van Voren in the 
art.28 The KGB was also convinced that American journalist Lars-Erik Nelson, who 
published an article on Crimean Tatar protests in 1969, was a conduit of Crimean Tatar 
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27 Document 31, Andropov to Suslov: Another update on the activities of the Human Rights Committee.  
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documents to the Western world.29  Alexander Nekrich, for example was able to smuggle 
out an entire book, The Punished Peoples, in 1975.30  Dissidents in exile then published 
documents in hybrid samizdat-tamizdat publications such the Chronicle of Current 
Events (hereafter Khronika).  In particular, Nekrich and exiled Crimean Tatar activist 
Aisha Seitmuratova worked in the West to publish and distribute Crimean Tatar accounts 
after they fled the USSR in the mid-1970s.31  Moreover, workers at RFE/RL and the 
Samizdat Association Archives (hereafter SAA) in Munich bound and published the 
materials.32  This included thousands of pages of Crimean Tatar materials.33  The 
RFE/RL and the Voice of America then selected compelling pieces to use in its 
ideological campaign against the Soviet state.34  As radio broadcasts and other Western 
newspapers increased their coverage of Crimean Tatar repression, Crimean Tatars 
increased the flow of Crimean Tatar documents to Helsinki Watch.35  
While their condemnation of Stalinism united dissidents and Crimean Tatars, they 
sometimes disagreed over tactical issues.  Crimean Tatar activists and Moscow dissidents 
often disagreed about the characterization of the Soviet state.  Some partners such as 
                                                
29 His articles, Russian language knowledge, and Moscow posting support this assumption: see Timothy P. 
Cross, “Lars-Erik Nelson ’64: A Subversive Among Cynics,” Columbia College Today, May 2001. 
http://www.college.columbia.edu/cct_archive/may01/may01_profile_nelson.html.  Accessed on February 
27, 2017. 
30 Nekrich then left the USSR for the U.S. in 1976.  Nekrich, The Punished Peoples, IX-X.  
31 Aishe Seitmuratova Report, New York, March 3, 1979.  HIA, A. M. Nekrich Collection, Box 47, Folder 
2, pp. 1-6. 
32 One the anti-communist ideology of RFE/RL, its connection to the CIA and the establishment and 
operations in Munich during the Cold War see Robert H. Cummings, Cold War Radio: The Dangerous 
History of American Broadcasting in Europe 1950-1989 (London: McFarland & Company, Inc. Publishers, 
2009).  
33 The full collections are available at HU OSA, 300-83-11, Box 1 Tom 1-3, Box 2 Tom 4-5, Box 3 Tom 7, 
and Box 5 Tom 12. 
34 RGASPI f. 17, op. 142, d. 2038, l.l. 53-61.  Prilozhenie No. 2 k punktu Postanovlenie No. B-111 “Dlia 
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Aleksandrov viewed the entire Soviet state as toxic.36  However, many Crimean Tatars 
used the few tools the state gave them (veteran status and Party and Komsomol 
membership and critical jobs) as leverage.  In particular, the vigorous participation of 
Crimean Tatar veterans became a defining aspect of Crimean Tatar resistance.  After 
1975, another dispute erupted over dissidents drawing similarities between the Crimean 
Tatar right to return to Crimea and the right of Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel.37  
While such tensions persisted, there is little evidence that the disputes seriously effected 
cooperation.    
Crimean Tatar and Soviet dissidents also had contact with Crimean Tatar diaspora 
populations in Turkey, but this was a hazard that caused conflict with dissidents and 
many Crimean Tatar activists avoided or concealed extensive contact.  As chapter one 
underlined, elements of the Crimean Tatar diaspora from Turkey had worked with the 
Nazi occupation and had participated in organizing Nazi collaborations brigades before 
the Third Reich abandoned the effort.  Even the most accomplished Crimean Tatar writer 
and historian outside the Soviet Union, Edige Kirimal, spent most of his adult life in 
Germany, worked with the Third Reich to secure Crimean Tatar rights, and then spent the 
rest of his life teaching and writing in Munich.38  If Crimean Tatars in the USSR did have 
contact with Kirimal or read his work, they concealed his influence. 
                                                
36 Ibid., 63-64. 
37 The State of Israel discouraged Soviet Jews from coordinating with Moscow dissidents because the 
approached downplayed the Zionist ideas.  However, this did not stop many Soviet-Jewish activists, 
including Iuri Shcharansky, from working with Moscow Helsinki Watch. Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The 
Thaw Generation, 292. 
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Studies in Group Destruction (Munich: Institut zur Erforschung der UsSSR, 1958).  Online at  
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The example of Petr Grigorenko highlights the confluence of ideological and 
logistical cooperation between Soviet dissidents and Crimean Tatars.  For Crimean Tatars 
in Moscow, Lt. General Petr Grigorenko and writer Aleksei Kosterin served as dissent 
consultants.  They organized petitions to international bodies such as the UN and ensured 
that Crimean Tatars were able to smuggle materials out of the USSR.  After Kosterin 
suffered a heart attack in Moscow on March 17, 1967, Grigorenko gathered with nearly 
250 Crimean Tatars in the Hotel “Altai” and began drafting documents to send to the 
West.39  From that date forward, Grigorenko took extraordinary steps to record and 
disseminate Crimean Tatar materials.  While Grigorenko’s efforts were numerous, two 
specific aspects highlight his personal effort.  First, through his military status (and 
before his first arrest) he had access to documents that Crimean Tatars and dissidents did 
not, and he made them public.  For example, on March 10, 1969, he wrote an analysis of 
two Uzbek KGB documents.  The first was a 1968 letter in which the Uzbek MVD and 
Uzbek KGB Lt. General S. I. Kiselev discussed the fact that Uzbek archives housed proof 
of Crimean Tatar mass death from 1944 to 1946.  The second memo exposed how the 
KGB lied to the public about the death tolls.  Grigorenko argued that this was proof of the 
continued Soviet effort to conceal Crimean Tatar mass death during the deportations.  By 
1972, couriers had delivered both the KGB documents and analysis to Munich where the 
SAA and Cold War radio stations further disseminated the damning materials.40 
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Another important aspect of Grigorenko’s work was forwarding Crimean Tatar 
petitions and individual testimony to the United Nations.  During the summer of 1969, 
individual testimonies of Crimean Tatars began arriving at the United Nation’s 
Committee on Human Rights and the SAA began documenting these efforts.  In these 
letters, Crimean Tatars such as Shevket Beitullaev and Aishe Akhmetova described how 
the Soviet Union was violating the United Nation’s charter in Crimea.41  Andropov and 
the KGB were aware that Grigorenko had orchestrated these contacts, and Andropov 
cited this activity as probable cause for the surveillance and arrest of Grigorenko.42   
A second example of this cooperation is the story of Halich Dilyara, a Crimean 
Tatar mother of seven.  In April of 1974, Crimean officials had denied her family 
registration in Crimea and refused to notarize their home purchase: 
“On April 1, 1974, my family and I left the Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan 
and moved to the town of Pushkino in the Sovietskii region of the Crimea.  
We tried to buy a house for 1,500 rubles, but the notary office refused to 
finalize our contract because we were not registered.  From the first day, I 
systematically worked at getting propiski, going to every government 
branch I could, but our problem with propiski remains unsolved.  Our 
family has nine people, I have seven children, and they need to be 
supported, and without a prosiska I can’t get a job.” 
 
Two years later, her family remained unregistered and they squatted in a house without 
work, healthcare or schooling.  In mid-1976, Dilyara wrote to the Supreme Soviet in 
Moscow to complain. Crimean Tatar activists passed the letter to Moscow Helsinki 
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Watch and a courier smuggled the letter to Munich.  RFE/RL then broadcast the story 
back into the USSR.43   
World War II Veteran, Lt. Colonel Chalbash, heard a VOA broadcast and wrote 
several letters to the Soviet of Ministries protesting the treatment of Dilyara in November 
1977.44  As Chalbash’s letters and other petitions mentioning Dilyara suggest, the story of 
individual Crimean Tatars humanized the return movement and helped maintain its 
popularity with everyday Crimean Tatars.45  Equally as important, Soviet authorities did 
not ignore the story or the requests of Chalbash.  In fact, these specific documents helped 
begin the debate between Kosygin, other Soviet of Ministries officials, and Crimean 
officials over what to do with the new surge of returning Crimean Tatars from 1976 to 
1979.  As Chalbash underlined, the situation that Halich described was the reality for 
thousands of more Crimean Tatars and Soviet authorities needed to address the 
situation.46   
The depth of Crimean Tatar-dissident cooperation is also evident in the KGB 
response.  The Soviet Union took the coordination of Crimean Tatars and dissidents 
seriously, especially their comparisons of the Soviet Union to European empires and 
United States and their reports to the United Nations about “Soviet genocide.”  The KGB 
concentrated on uncovering the “enemy actions” of Crimean Tatar leaders and their 
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dissident partners.47  KGB investigations into Crimean Tatar-dissident connections began 
during the protests of 1967, and the secret police increased surveillance and arrests during 
the early 1970’s.  Viewing the Crimean Tatar movement as a Western “fifth column” and 
“quiet counter revolutionary force,” KGB investigators read Khronika and Info and 
transcribed radio broadcasts to corroborate how stories passed from the individual 
Crimean Tatars, to the Moscow lobby, to Khronika, and on to RFE/RL and VOA.48  As a 
result, collaboration with Crimean Tatars ended with jail for some Moscow dissidents as 
well as Crimean Tatars.  By May 1970, the “Tashkent Process” arrests of Dzhemilev and 
Crimean Tatars coincided with the arrests of Grigorenko and other Moscow dissidents.49   
However, Soviet repressions of leading activists failed to quash Crimean Tatar 
resistance and these arrests sometimes became international incidents.   For example, the 
third arrest of Dzhemilev in June 1974 underlined the international dynamic and just how 
committed Soviet dissidents were to defending Crimean Tatar comrades.  Sakharov, 
Elena Bonner, Grigorenko, and others organized an international protest campaign that 
included academics and politicians from France, the U.S., Turkey, and Italy.  The 
Ministry of Soviets received letters from across the globe.50  The fact that Soviet 
authorities had arrested Dzhemilev for an alleged plan to deliver a petition to U.S. 
president Richard Nixon underlined the increased Soviet scrutiny of international 
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contact.51  Soviet prosecutors and the Central Committee even studied Western radio and 
media coverage of the trial, and complained that the Western press treated them unfairly.  
They argued that the US was hypocritical on minority rights and referenced the trials of 
Angela Davis and other African American activists.52  Although the trial ended in 
Dzhemilev’s conviction, the attention likely kept the Soviet Union from prosecuting other 
high-profile Crimean Tatar leaders. 
The KGB often designed investigations to simultaneously entrap both Crimean 
Tatars and dissidents.  For example, in late August 1973, the KGB arrested Pyotr Iakir 
and Victor Krasin for being members of the “Narodno-Trudovoi Soiuza,” after they had 
given a press conference in Moscow in support of repressed Soviet citizens.  According 
to the investigation, they had helped Crimean Tatars collect and publish events and 
stories in the Khronika.  These dissidents had regular meetings with the Moscow lobby of 
Crimean Tatars, especially Mustafa Dzhemilev, his brother Reshat, as well as with 
Grigorenko.  Moreover, the KGB charged that Krasin had worked with Crimean Tatar 
activists Rolan Kadyev and Zampir Asanov to write a Crimean Tatar Declaration to the 
United Nations and then smuggle the materials to New York City using “foreign 
correspondents.”53   
  In addition to repression, the Uzbek SSR created counter arguments to dissident 
and Crimean Tatar claims.  In state media and international correspondence, the Uzbek 
party increased the attention to Tashkent’s role in the “anti-imperialist” effort of the 
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“national liberation movement” around the globe.54  Uzbek diplomats even enlisted 
several Crimean Tatar party members to travel with Uzbek delegations in visits to other 
communist countries.  In another effort, the Uzbek KGB borrowed from the new Crimean 
narrative and argued that the Soviet state could not have committed genocide against 
Crimean Tatars because the nation had no national claim to Crimea.55   
The Uzbek party and government also began publishing reports on “Tatar equality 
and progress.”  They highlighted the example of Dzhafer Memetov who followed the 
common social ladder for many Crimean Tatars in exile.  After army service he had gone 
to university, become a party member, and then worked as the assistance to Dzerzhinskii 
Technical Kombinat in Ferghana.56  Uzbek authorities stressed that Memetov was just 
one example of the larger trend in “Tatar” social and economic mobility.  In 1975, the 
Uzbek party reported that 128 Crimean Tatars had been elected to oblast, city, and district 
party organizations, and eight were serving in the Uzbek and USSR Supreme Soviets.  A 
further 861 Crimean Tatars served in village Soviets and over 1,800 Crimean Tatars held 
bureaucratic positions in Uzbek party, government and economic enterprises.  Similar to 
the 1950s and 1960s, the Uzbek party highlighted that thousands of Crimean Tatars 
continued to finish university and received training in various skilled industries and jobs 
such as “doctors, agronomists, engineers, and technical work.”57  Tashkent also ordered 
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local party branches to allow more Crimean Tatar language publications.58  According to 
Uzbek officials, there could be no discrimination if Crimean Tatars had gained important 
positions in the Uzbek republic and “cemented” themselves in exile.59   
As earlier chapters demonstrated, the social mobility of Crimean Tatars did not 
end Crimean Tatar resistance.  In fact, it increased Crimean Tatar leverage, the ability to 
organize, and Uzbek authorities remained convinced that universities remained a conduit 
for “enemy elements.”60  No matter what the Uzbek government claimed about Crimean 
Tatar assimilation, most Crimean Tatars never “put down roots” in the Uzbek SSR. 
While certainly many Crimean Tatars had attained decent jobs and even party 
membership, chronic problems in the Uzbek republic such as a housing deficit continued 
to plague residents.61  Crimean Tatars understood that problems existed in Crimea, but 
those who continued to petition for return or return would rather fight such battles in their 
homeland instead of in exile.   
Despite arrests, ideological assault, and the efforts of the Uzbek party, from 1967 
to 1980 the vigorous cooperation between Crimean Tatars and Moscow dissidents 
persisted.  This coordination between Crimean Tatars and Soviet dissidents resulted in a 
new mass-return attempt in the late 1970s, the near panic of Crimean and Moscow 
authorities, and the most extensive mass repression campaign of the Brezhnev-era.   
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Crafting a Reactionary Reform 
  
  Although Crimean Tatar return attempts waned in the mid-1970s amid rampant 
discrimination, dozens of Crimean Tatars continued to return each month.  The Crimean 
Crimean oblast MVD, KGB, and prosecutors worked to streamline for repression the 
discrimination cocktail regarding residency, housing, notary, work, sanitation, and other 
legal codes for repression, and Moscow supported this effort with several orders.62  In 
1974, the KPSS Central Committee gave Crimean authorities a new repressive tool by 
ordering that any person moving to Crimea had to go through the “proper labor force 
organs” to gain employment.   In practice, this made destroying a Crimean Tatar’s work 
history book just as effective as other repressive methods.  Moreover, the Central 
Committee ordered the Uzbek and Ukraine KGB to intensify the repression of “Crimean 
autonomists” before May 18, 1974, the thirtieth anniversary of Crimean Tatar 
deportation.63  As is evident with Halich’s story, these methods often worked.      
Still, after a decade of investigations the Crimean Tatar network was still 
extensive and the oppressors were weary.  Uzbek KGB operatives knew that every time 
they arrested one activist, others would take his or her place.  In Ferghana, Bekir, Iurii 
and Muksim Osmanov ran one activist group.  Seidamet Memetov operated a group in 
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Margilan.  Shevki Mukhteremov organized in Samarkand.  Amza Ablaev gathered letters 
around Iangiiul and Mustafa Khalilov coordinated protest in Tashkent.64   
If Uzbek authorities knew the identity and activities of so many Crimean Tatar 
activists, why did they simply not arrest them all?  As discussed in the last section, the 
1974 Omsk trial of Dzhemeliev had taken time, effort, and was in the Western press.  It 
certainly appears the attention caused caution with outright oppression, especially jail 
time.  Uzbek officials may have stated in public that Crimean Tatar activism was the 
work of a small group of  “anti-social” and “anti-Soviet” radicals, but they understood the 
popularity of the movement and so decided that arresting thousands of people was not an 
option.65   As such, protest and return attempts continued throughout 1974 and 1975 
despite the discomfort of Uzbek and Crimean officials.     
With the movement surviving the above repressions, Crimean Tatar activists and 
dissidents partners viewed the XXV Communist Party Congress from February 24 to 
March 5, 1976 as another chance to push for full Crimean Tatar rehabilitation.  Leading 
up to the congress, Crimean Tatar letters spiked and the Moscow lobby size increased.  In 
Moscow, the Uzbek SSR, and Crimea, activists confronted people’s deputies and 
demanded that the congress discuss an organized return to the Crimea and force Crimean 
officials follow the September 5, 1967 decree.66  In response the Central Committee, 
ordered Crimean officials to grant “several families” registration before the congress 
opened.  Moreover, the Central Committee promised “widespread registration to 
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thousands after the closing of the congress.”67  In other words, Moscow asked that 
Crimean authorities make some concessions by registering Crimean Tatars such as 
Halich Dilyara who had returned to Crimea multiple times and had faced repression and 
deportation.  While some Crimean authorities complied, many were furious.  Local party 
and government leaders organized protests and meetings to warn residents that the 
returning Tatars will “take over all the schools and jobs.”  The rhetoric became virulently 
anti-Tatar, focusing on how “dirty feet” were soiling the Crimea.  After the Party 
Congress, and continuing into 1977, thousands of new Crimean Tatar returnees 
converged on Crimea.68  By 1978, Moscow had to either enforce the 1967 decree and 
Crimean Tatar rights or condone the deportation of unregistered Crimean Tatars.   
Moscow concluded that since the Crimean Tatar movement was sending 
thousands of people to Crimea, the situation required mass repression on an 
unprecedentedly greater scale than with other repressions of the Brezhnev era.  On 
August 15, 1978, the Soviet of Ministers issued secret decree 700.  The decree (which did 
no stay secret for long) stated, “people who have arrived in the Crimean region in an 
unofficial manner and live there without passports, invalid passports, or without permits 
or registration… SHALL BE BANISHED from the region by organs of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD).”69  To undermine Crimean Tatar home rentals and purchases, 
attachments to the decree instructed Crimean law enforcement to use specific articles of 
the Ukraine SSR criminal code to inundate returnees with red-tape.  For example, the 
instructions cited article 48 that allowed police to confiscate a home purchased with a 
                                                
67 Ibid., 12. 
68 Ibid., 19-21. 
69 Decree of the USSR No. 700 USSR Council of Ministers, “The Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, and 
Meskihetians”- Soviet Treatment of Some National Minorities, Report No. 6: Third Edition, ANC, Box 




voided contract.  As a result, Crimean notaries became clearinghouses for Soviet legal 
matters and they could usually find a pretext to void Crimean Tatar documents.  The 
instructions suggested that Crimean authorities use the Ukraine SSR land code to stop 
Crimean residents from selling private plots to Crimean Tatars for home building.70  The 
explicit goal of combining these laws was to make housing discrimination just as 
effective as passport/registration discrimination 
The author of the decree, senior prosecutor N. Goncharenko, also sent unofficial 
instructions that encouraged Soviet law enforcement to get more creative with 
discrimination and deportation.  At Goncharenko’s behest, Crimean prosecutors created a 
clandestine “special division for the fight against Tatars.”  These prosecutors developed 
new tactics “because they better understood the particularities” of Crimea.  First, 
“confiscating Crimean Tatar land purchases” became essential because it “removed any 
profit” they could earn from farming the land.  Second, Crimean officials began (often 
illegally) bequeathing confiscated Crimean Tatar homes to kolkhozes.  Next, prosecutors 
identified at least 2,000 uninhabited homes in Crimea they considered in danger of being 
“stolen by Tatars” and had police periodically inspect the homes for Crimean Tatars.  In 
addition, the KGB ordered the Soviet Railroad and MVD at railroad stations to stop 
“shipping containers” from Crimean Tatars and only allow them to travel with hand 
luggage.  For security, Goncharenko required Crimean police to have 100 to 120 officers 
on hand during deportation raids and that each deported family should be escorted by 20 
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police officers on the train to their place of exile.71  In case Crimean officials had any 
doubts, in memos Goncharenko articulated that Crimean officials now had a mandate to 
“reverse” Crimean Tatar rights granted by the September 5, 1967, decree.  Crimean 
Tatars could no longer “live anywhere,” and Crimean authorities should not worry about 
legal contradictions.  Goncharenko also admitted that Crimean Tatars were going to 
complain about these violations, and instructed Crimean officials to dismiss complaints 
with varies legal pretexts.72   
With the 1975 Helsinki Accords and the activity of Moscow Helsinki Watch in 
mind, Soviet authorities began the new repressions with a public display touting that 
Crimean Tatars still had rights in Crimea even while Crimean authorities simultaneously 
decimated these rights.  Alexeyeva is right that in the late-1970s Moscow had determined 
that repressions against dissidents and protests “outweighed the costs in terms of lost 
international prestige,” but the large-scale effort against Crimean Tatars required some 
cosmetic cover.73   The Crimean Oblsipolkom therefore passed a resolution on October 6, 
1978 to “resolve” passport issues for Crimean Tatars who had returned to Crimea before 
October 15, 1978, and still did not have registration.  At the very least, the Politburo 
wanted some war veterans and party members to gain registration so Soviet authorities 
had examples to counter complaints about discrimination.  To fill this quota, Moscow 
prosecutors identified 27 families for registration. However, indicative of the strength of 
anti-Tatar sentiment among Crimean officials, the Crimean Obkom, led by first secretary 
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V. S. Makarenko, refused to register the 27 families.74  For his part, Goncharenko 
reminded Crimean officials that their new government and party decrees aimed at 
Crimean Tatars could not “mention just Crimean Tatars, because this would be a 
politically dangerous statement.”75   Crimean authorities did “comply” in this regard, and 
publicized that the mass deportations for passport violations could affect “anyone” not in 
compliance.76   
Regardless of such shallow attempts to disguise anti-Tatar policy, in 1978 
Moscow supported the destruction of the Crimean Tatar right to return to Crimea.77  The 
repression began in 1967, but the decree codified the methods and emboldened the 
perpetrators.  Goncharenko had supplemented older repressive tools with new ideas and 
created a more effective discriminatory regime in Crimean.  This was the largest 
deportation and confiscation operation against a Soviet minority since Stalin. 
  
Return and Re-deportation during the Height of Brezhnev’s Stagnation 
 
Crimean Tatars characterize the new repressions as a period of “political, 
physical, judicial sadism” for those stuck in the “closed circle” of living without 
registration.  Crimean police officials and vigilantes launched an assault on Crimean 
Tatars that combined “legal” arrests with extra-legal violence, home demolition, 
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kidnapping, theft, vandalism, rape, and then deportation.78  This campaign began in 
spurts after the Party Congress in 1976 and peaked in late 1978 after decree 700.  The 
following detailed accounts of this discrimination are the results of the dissident network 
and Crimean Tatar complaints to Crimean prosecutors.   
In 1977, Zera Mustafeva bought a house in the town of Molochnom.  When she 
attempted to register and notarize the contract for her home, discrimination began: 
“On September 10 I went to the head of the local collective farm, T. 
Gaidaichuk, and said that I had bought a house and that I needed to get the 
contract notarized and that I would agree to any work on the farm. On 
September 13 Gaidaichuk and a policeman came to my house and 
delivered a warrant for my arrest for violations of the passport regime.  I 
told them that I had not broken the law on my own accord, but rather I was 
waiting for my propiska.” 
 
Fours days later, while “on her way to the police station in an attempt to get registered,” 
Gaidaichuk detained and deported her for violating the passport regime.79  Another early 
victim of the repression campaign was Enver Ahmetov. He returned to the Crimea in 
June 1976 and bought a home in the town of Melihove.  On July 1, he went to the local 
farm to register his passport and find work.  Officials refused him registration and told 
him that his family was an “unwanted element.”  Then, on August 9 at 5:00am, local 
KGB evicted his family, broke their furniture, and stole their valuables.”80  In another 
example, on June 17, 1976, “Major Pisklov and Lt. Sinyalovskii oversaw the bulldozing 
of the Refamova family’s home” in Belogorsk despite protests by Russian and Ukrainian 
neighbors.  In the same neighborhood on August 9, police Lt. Harchenko “broke into 
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Mustafa Abdulova’s home and destroyed the interior.”  Then, on August 25, police 
evicted the family of Ya’ly Kendzhametova and bulldozed their home.81  Against the 
wishes of Moscow, Crimean authorities also deported party members, although some 
such as Emirali Asanov received the home purchase money back after being “voluntarily 
deported.”82  Moscow Helsinki Watch declared, “the deportation and repression of 
Crimean Tatars was occurring according to the schedule of the KGB and police.”83   
Crimean Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev experienced the same discrimination as 
regular Crimean Tatars. After his 1978 release from prison, he “asked that he be 
registered at his parent’s new house in the town of Myromskoe.”84  Lt. Colonel Tsapenko 
in Belogorsk responded that, “the parents of the convict Mustafa Dzhemilev reside in the 
territory in gross violation of the passport laws.”  He also claimed that they would never 
get a residence permit in Crimea because they are “special settlers.”  For Crimean police, 
once a special settler meant always a special settler.  To no one’s surprise, Crimean 
police refused Dzhemilev a residence permit.85 
Returning Crimean Tatars sometimes stayed with or bought homes from Crimean 
Tatars who had already had registration, but this was dangerous for both parties.  When 
Lila Medzhitova and Derbish Derbishev returned to the Crimean village of Khlebnoe, 
they bought a house from Vait Ismailov.  Ismailov was Crimean Tatar and sold the house 
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after moving to Belogorsk.  In January 1979, the Belogorsk government declared the 
home sale illegal, and deported Medzhitova, Derbishev and Ismailov from Crimea.  Local 
authorities then transferred ownership of the house to the Khlebnoe sovkhoz.  The family 
of Diliaver Adzhiumerov met the same fate in February 1979 after he sold a house to 
fellow Crimean Tatar returnee Sadyk Usta.86   
Crimean officials and the culmination of decades of anti-Tatar rhetoric 
encouraged an increasing majority of Slavic Crimeans to view Crimean Tatars as a new 
Turkic “horde” threatening their villages and neighborhoods.  Violent confrontations 
began to pit returning Crimean Tatars against their neighbors.  In the village of Balki in 
the Belogorskii district for example, a fight broke out between Dani Asan and the 
Cherniakov family when Asan and his relatives began building a home on fallow land on 
the Zelenogorsk sovkhoz.  A melee ensued when the Cherniakov family claimed the land 
and commandeered a tractor from the farm to bulldoze the home on October 15, 1978.87   
At the same time, some Russians and Ukrainians in Crimea still had no problem 
with Crimean Tatars, and even came to their defense when Crimean police evicted 
families. As in the case of Enver Ahmetov in Melihov, Russian and Ukrainian neighbors 
sometimes protested and attempted to intervene when police deported their Crimean 
Tatar neighbors.  Sometimes truck drivers refused to be deputized by police for 
deportation operations.  In 1978, 26 Slavic farmers from the town of Bogatoe wrote and 
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signed a petition “complaining about the treatment of the Abimov family” after they were 
kidnapped from the farm in the middle of the night in 1976.88   
Moreover, thousands of Slavic Crimeans did not hesitate in selling Crimean 
Tatars homes or renting them space.  These arrangements often made sense for elderly 
Russians and Ukrainians who had settled in Crimea after World War Two and either 
hoped to return to their old region, live with relatives, or supplement their pensions.  
After moving to Voroshilogradskii oblast in 1978, E. S. Kovalevoi sold his house in the 
village of Zuia, Belogorskii district, to Nadyr Medzhitov for 16,500 rubles.89  N. A. 
Shcherbatiuk sold his house in the village of Novozhilovsk to E. Suleimanov in 1978 
when the pensioner decided to move to live with his son.90 
As transactions between Slavic Crimeans and Crimean Tatars increased, Crimean 
authorities began to target both parties for deportation or prosecution.  Adherents to the 
new Crimean narrative considered these Russians and Ukrainians to be “race traitors” to 
Slavic homogeny on the peninsula.  Isolated incidents of targeting Slavic-Tatar 
interactions had occurred after the 1967 decree, but during the late-1970s these 
punishments became crucial to anti-Tatar discrimination.91  Crimean prosecutors 
considered both the “distributors and receivers” in each transaction guilty of passport, 
land use, and other violations.  They targeted Slavic “distributors” with administrative 
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fines and/or deportation to discourage future home or land sales to Crimean Tatars.92  For 
example, Liudmila Taranova sold her house to Ebazer Iunusov in December 1978 after 
moving in with her son in Simferopol.  In response, Crimean authorities deported 
Iunusov and his family, and then fined Taranova for passport violations, confiscated the 
house and stole the 8,000 rubles she earned from the sale.  Ekaterina Kuz”minicha was 
luckier and kept ownership of her house after paying administrative fines for selling to 
Crimean Tatars.  Crimean prosecutors even pursued Tamara Cherkasova to Murmansk 
oblast to fine her for selling her house to Crimean Tatars in the Pervomaiskii district.93 
According to prosecutorial records, Crimean police began deporting Slavic 
Crimeans who sold homes to Crimean Tatars as early as 1977.  After all, Crimean police 
could deport anyone for passport violations.  Eini and Anife Ablaev for example bought a 
home from Mikhail Drinevskii in the village of Bogatoe on November 29, 1978.  They 
paid 7,000 rubles for the property, but made an agreement that Drinevskii could continue 
to live in the house.  The next month police deported both the Ablaev family and 
Drinevskii to Krasnodar krai and seized the home.  That same month, the police in 
Krasnogvardeiskii, Sovetskii district, deported Anatolii Reunov for selling his home to 
Enver Khalil.  Vladimir Gidulianov faced a string of charges in January 1979 for selling 
his home to Crimean Tatars, and Crimean police deported him a month later.  In some 
cases, Crimean authorities targeted Slavic Crimeans who sold homes years before the 
current repressions.  Anatolii Zubov had sold his home to the Abliakimova family in 
April 1977, and Crimean authorities deported him as punishment on January 23, 1979.  
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Evgenii Potachkin had sold his home in October 1975 to Enver Memetov and Crimean 
police deported him over four years later for the “crime,” on December 26, 1978.94 
The relationships between the Slavs sellers and Crimean Tatar buyers were not 
always good, and these disputes had consequences.  In at least one case, with homeowner 
Tamara Cherkasova and the Crimean Tatar family of Lenur Memetov, the arrangement 
whereby Memetov bought the house, but Cherkasova remained a resident, turned sour.  
Cherkasova asked local authorities to evict and deport the family and get her money 
back.95 
Crimean Tatars and dissidents complained about the repressions.  In 1978, 
Crimean Tatars filed 16 complaints for wrongful prosecution using article 196 of the 
Ukrainian criminal code.  For example, Remen Saidametov and his wife moved to the 
village of Zemlianichnoe in August 1977.  On April 28, 1978, a people’s court convicted 
Saidametov of violating article 196 and deported him.  His wife then wrote a complaint to 
the KPSS Central Committee that forwarded the material back to Crimean prosecutors 
who dismissed the complaint as frivolous.96  As the stories of discrimination multiplied 
and the text of the secret order leaked, Andrei Sakharov wrote a scathing letter to the 
Supreme Soviet decrying the “cruel acts” against the Crimean Tatars and “the 
prosecution of Crimean Tatars who live without residence permits because of illegal, 
discriminatory policies of the local organs of power.”97  As repressions continued, human 
rights organizations tried to collect data on arrests and deportations.  One report to 
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RFE/RL details the imprisonment of 34 Crimean Tatars sentenced to one and two year 
terms in labor camps for the failure to obtain registration, and their appeals.98  As 
Goncharenko instructed, Crimean prosecutors dismissed the complaints.  
The most dramatic reactions came from Crimean Tatars themselves.  In Besh 
Terek on April 28, 1978, Musa Mahmut lit himself on fire in protest after police refused 
to register him.  Afterwards, there were several copycats and Musa’s “protracted legal 
battle for registration” and death by immolation became a national symbol of both the 
determination and the desperation of Crimean Tatars.99  Mustafa Dzhemilev passed on 
the story to Aleksandrov, who penned the poem “Torch over Crimea (Fakel nad 
Krymom)” to both commemorate the tragedy and condemn the new wave of repression.  
Sakharov, Grigorenko, Bonner, and others wrote scathing letters about the incident and 
the RFE/RL and other Western press outlets reported on the escalation in the Crimean 
Tatar return campaign and Soviet repression.100    
    As intended, the wave of repression of the late 1970’s effectively stopped 
Crimean Tatars from moving to Crimea until 1986.  From 1973 to January 1979, Crimea 
prosecutors had charged 140 people with felonies for passport violations, charging 40 
people in 1978 alone.  They charged a further 4,250 Crimean Tatars with “administrative 
crimes” over the same period, with 1,732 charges in 1978 and 68 in January 1979.  Police 
deported all Crimean Tatars with administrative violations.101  By late 1978, the chance 
of new arrivals gaining residency was near zero.  From October 15, 1978 to February 1, 
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1979, 29 new families (139 people) arrived and the police and KGB had deported 27 of 
the families by February 6.102   This included the Khalilov, Aliev and Ametov families 
that Sovetskii district police deported in December 1978.  In total, Crimean authorities 
deported at least 6,000 Crimean Tatars from 1976 to 1979.103 
 Despite the end of Crimean Tatar return in 1979, the final numbers of Crimean 
Tatars that returned between 1976 and 1979 was significant.  In 1978, Crimean Tatar 
activist Ashe Seytmuratova estimated that by 1978 there were more than “700 
unregistered families” in the Crimea.104  KGB and Soviet Prosecutor figures suggests that 
the only area of agreement between Crimean Tatars and the Soviet government was on 
how many Crimean Tatars had returned to Crimea by the late 1970s and the extent of 
prosecution and deportation.  By February 6, 1979, Crimean officials believed that 
10,316 Crimean Tatars (1,930 families) were living in Crimea.  Of these, 6,869 people 
(1,212) families had received registration, while 3,447 people (718 families) remained 
without registration.  Out of those that remained without registration, 442 returned in 
1976, 1,649 in 1977, and 936 in 1978.   Unregistered Crimean Tatars included 2,050 
people of working age, 1,125 children, 272 pensioners, 27 World War II veterans and 40 
KPSS members.105 
By district, Crimean Tatar return concentrated in Belogorskii (2,327 people), 
Leninskii (1,238 people), Kirovskii (1,126 people), Sovetskii (1,001 people) and 
Simferopol’skii (757 people).   The portion of those Crimean Tatars with or without 
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registration varied in each district.  In Belogorskii district, 1,015 people had registration, 
while 1,312 did not.  In Kirovskii district, 412 people had registration, while 714 people 
did not. Sovetskii district was the most liberal with Crimean Tatar registration, with 808 
registered Crimean Tatar to 193 unregistered Crimean Tatars.106 
Although Soviet officials usually undercounted Crimean Tatars in any context, 
nothing in activist materials in the late 1970s suggests that the actual return numbers were 
any larger than the Soviet count.  Therefore, whereas over 6,000 Crimean Tatars 
managed to stay in Crimea after returning during the first wave from 1967 to 1972, the 
enhanced repressions of the late 1970s halved the success of the second return wave, with 
roughly 3,000 Crimean Tatars returning and avoiding deportation.107  Again, both 
Crimean Tatars and the Soviet government agreed that there were now over 10,000 
Crimean Tatars in Crimea.  The Crimean Tatar population in Krasnodarskii Krai and 
Kherson Crimean Tatar also continued to grow, while the Zaporozhsk oblast Crimean 
Tatar population reached 1,600 people.108 
By 1979, Soviet and Crimean authorities hoped that they had settled the Crimean 
Tatar “problem.”  Moscow claimed that because thousands of Crimean Tatars were living 
in Crimea, that there was no ethnic discrimination in the Soviet Union.  Those Crimean 
Tatars that faced deportations had broken laws and faced punishments no different from 
any other Soviet citizen.  Although, Crimean officials were not pleased that now over 
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10,000 Crimean Tatars lived in Crimea, Moscow assuaged their discomfort with order 
700 and the robust support that ended the new surge of Crimean Tatar return. 
  
The Repressive Calm, Before the Storm 
 
 
If Grigorenko was walking down a street in Simferopol, a Russian patriot would 
“punch him in the face” wrote Russian nationalist historian Aleksandr Shirokorad in 
2014.   To Russian nationalists, the Soviet dissident support of Crimean Tatar return was 
one of the movement’s unforgivable sins.  Crimean Tatars themselves erected a statue of 
Grigorenko in Simferopol to honor of his service to their nation.109  In short, the Soviet 
government, Crimean Tatars, and now many Russian nationalists recognize the 
importance of the dissident-Crimean Tatar coordination in bolstering the protest 
movement and Crimean Tatar return for more than a decade.  This effort was the fruit of 
Crimean Tatar and dissident collaboration that individuals such as Gaziev and 
Alexandrov initiated.  Through the inter-Soviet network, radio broadcasts, Khronika, and 
other samizdat, Crimean Tatars across the Soviet Union received detailed accounts of 
those returning to Crimea.  In 1976, Crimean Tatars returning to Crimea knew which 
police officers to avoid, which farms hired Crimean Tatars, and other useful information 
that, if they were lucky, allowed them to stay in Crimea. 
The international coverage of the repressions led the Soviet Union to decimate the 
key collaborators from 1976 until Glastnost began.  Soviet authorities had a litany of 
reasons to repress Soviet dissidents, from ideological general condemnations to attacks 
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for their support for Refusniks in the mid-1970s.  However, from the late 1960s until the 
end of the Soviet Union, the KGD, MVD and Soviet prosecutors cited dissident contact 
and coordination with Crimean Tatar resistance as one of the main causes (sometimes the 
sole cause) for charges against Soviet dissidents.110  Again, this contact alarmed the KGB 
and central organs because it was a unique instance when dissident actions had 
consequences in the form of street protests and the movement of people destabilizing a 
strategic region.  Dzhemilev faced a sixth prison term in 1984 for his continuing contacts 
with dissidents and Crimean Tatar activists in New York City.  The Soviet government 
forced Sakharov and Elena Bonner into internal exile in Gorkii. Gorigorenko, Alexeyeva, 
Nekrich and other dissidents left the USSR under the threat of imprisonment.111  Moscow 
police arrested the remaining Moscow Helsinki Watch members in September 1982 and 
Khronika ceased publication after 64 editions.112   
 Although the loss of this coordination and the repressions in Crimea and 
elsewhere worked to a large degree, they again failed to completely stop the protest 
movement.  In Crimea, the Uzbek SSR, Moscow and elsewhere activists and regular 
Crimean Tatars continued advocating for their rights.  Crimean Tatar protests endured for 
the very reason that had attracted non-Tatar attention in the first place- it was a popular 
movement that could not be completely stopped without violence or incarceration on a 
Stalinist scale.  That was something even the most reactionary Soviet officials of the late-
Brezhnev period were not willing to replicate.   
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This last return attempt created the Crimea that existed when Gorbachev’s 
reforms began.  Several thousand more Crimean Tatars had returned to Crimea, a fact 
that would be key in the late 1980s mass-return.  At the same time, Crimean authorities 
dedicated themselves to the streamlined repression methods and increasingly racist tone 
that followed Goncharenko’s instructions to decree 700.  Moscow orchestrated these 
repressions and condoned illegal arrests and deportations.   The anti-Crimean Tatar 
ideology that Partisan histories and the new Crimean narrative created in the 1940s 
remained a defining belief for Crimean party, government and police officials.  While the 
good will of some Slavic Crimeans never ended, this period popularized anti-Tatar 
sentiment in a more visceral way because Crimean officials and police encouraged 
regular citizens to participate in the repression.  Moreover, supporting or interacting with 
Crimean Tatars became dangerous as police threatened, fined, jailed, and sometimes 
deported Crimean residents who were neither Crimean Tatars nor dissidents. 
In July 1979, the Crimean party and government celebrated the 325th anniversary 
of “Russian and Ukrainian Unity” with festivals celebrating Pushkin and Tolstoy.113  The 
Crimean party ordered new youth programs to instill “the best traditions of the Russian 
and Soviet people.”  Nearly all party and government positions remained in the hands of 
Russians and Ukrainians.  The new Five Year Plan included the construction of a Pepsi 
Cola plant, a new bread factory, new canal construction, and other projects.114  New 
home construction for non-Tatars continued.115  Crimean officials did not invite Crimean 
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Tatars with registration to participate.  Some Crimean Tatars may have returned, but the 





Chapter 8  
 




 The Soviet Union attempted to reverse engineer ethnic cleansing in Crimea from 
July 1990 to December 1991.  Soviet of Ministries order 666 was one of the most radical 
political projects during an era of unprecedented Soviet reform.  Crimean Tatar activists 
and individuals forced this policy by restarting mass-return to Crimea and a new wave of 
protests across the Soviet Union in 1987.  Decades of resistance had taught Crimean 
Tatars that return was difficult, but possible, and they had created an extensive activist 
network and Crimean beachhead of around 10,000 returned Crimean Tatars that assisted 
new returnees.  By 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev had a choice: support the 1978 mandate of 
Crimean authorities to arrest and deport new Crimean Tatar returnees or let them stay.   
 After some hesitation and even one reactionary order, Gorbachev relented.  The 
resulting Soviet policy, order 666, was a repudiation of Stalin’s 1944 deportations and 
ethnic cleansing and an acknowledgment that Crimea’s largest indigenous population, 
Crimean Tatars, had the right to return to Crimea en masse without fear of deportation.  
As a creation of Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika, order 666 failed in tandem with 
the Soviet Union.  Yet, to discount the reform because of the Soviet collapse is wrong 
because its one success was important.  Crimean Tatars returned by the tens of thousands 
over the next several years and Crimean authorities could no longer use the Soviet police 




from 1989 to 1991, they could have undermined or stopped Crimean Tatar mass return 
similar to the two previous return attempts.  At a crucial moment, Gorbachev rescinded 
Soviet support of maintaining ethnic cleansing in Crimea. 
Bekir Osmanov, the decorated partisan and protest organizer that Crimean 
historians slandered, died on May 26, 1983, just a year after finally receiving registration 
in Crimea.  Enshrining the importance of protests and sacrifice for both activists and 
regular Crimean Tatars, he ordered his relatives to bury him beside Musa Mahmut, the 
father who had self-emolliated in protest of anti-Tatar discrimination.1  Unlike other 
small Soviet peoples with national movements that coalesced around “the preservation of 
a way of life,” the deportation, mass death, survival in exile, protest and political 
assertiveness in Crimea became the unifying elements of Crimean Tatar national identity.  
As reforms began, Crimean Tatars focused on gaining a share of the “spoils” (economic 
and government positions) as their only hope in securing reasonable access to jobs, 
education, and making some cultural perseveration possible.2  The extremity of the ethnic 
cleansing and the precariousness of their physical presence in the region limited 
expectations and forced pragmatic compromises.  This led to their initial support of 
recreating the pre-1944 Crimean ASSR with its ethnic quotas in government and party 
leadership for Crimean Tatars and other minorities. 
At the same time, order 666 created a political crisis in Crimea, and the Soviet 
Union did not have the control or assets to implement many of the practical and political 
parts of the return plan.  Crimean Tatars were at an extreme disadvantage compared to 
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the Slavic majority in determining the evolution of Crimean governance during 
Gorbachev’s reforms (and in the post-Soviet period).  As was the case in the 1960s and 
1970s, there was immense and sometimes violent opposition to Crimean Tatar return, and 
the plan caused a deep resentment towards Gorbachev and reform in Crimea.  There 
actually was common ground between Crimean Tatars and Russians in Crimea, but the 
dissolving of Soviet institutions and ideology altered the conversation.  While remaining 
under Ukrainian control, Crimea became a battlefield between Russian and Crimean 
Tatar nationalism.  Russian leaders in Crimea clung to the new Crimean narrative 
assertion that Crimea was unquestionably Slavic and that Stalin had liberated Crimean 
from both Nazis and treasonous minorities.   
The Crimea officials attempted to halt Crimean Tatar enfranchisement by holding 
a referendum to reiterate who had political, economic and demographic control of the 
peninsula.  The referendum did imply a possible return to Russia from Ukraine 
contingent on new Soviet law.  However, the immediate, and deliberate, goal of the vote 
was a reactionary countermeasure to Crimean Tatar demands for positions in the 
government, party, and economic institutions, and the allocation of land and subsidized 
homebuilding.  The referendum created a “new version” of the Crimean ASSR that 
ensured ethnic Slavs retained the levers of government in Crimean, and was devoid of 
Soviet nationalities policies of affirmative action.  The Soviet Union collapsed just as 
mass Crimean Tatar return peaked and the new Crimean ASSR became an autonomous 
republic inside the new Ukrainian state.  Few Crimean residents were happy with the 
result.  
 





 The fate of the Crimean Tatar return movement was caught up in the larger drama 
of a failing Soviet economy, growing nationalist tensions, and the widespread calls for 
reform.  Gorbachev’s “glasnost” and “perestroika” reforms began after the XXVIIth 
Party Congress in 1986 and energized nationalist and dissident movements all over the 
communist world.3    As Ronald Suny argues, by 1988 Soviet politics were no longer 
“within the corridors of the Central Committee in Moscow.”  The “streets began to 
speak” and the “elements of civil society that had been developing during the 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras” found themselves liberated.4   
 No other Soviet protest movement had more experience taking to the streets and 
protesting from the 1950s to the 1980s than Crimean Tatars.  Both old and new Crimean 
Tatar activists took action.  Released political prisoners involved in the movement such 
as Mustafa Dzhemilev, Edie Dzhemilev and Grigorii Aleksandrov traveled to Crimea.5  
With Crimean Tatar activism now legal, activists coalesced around two often-competing 
organizations, the National Movement of Crimean Tatars (NDKT) and the Organization 
of the Crimean Tatar National Movement OKND.6  The NDKT was the larger and more 
moderate organization and it demanded that the Supreme Soviet admit NDKT members 
such as Mustafa Dzhemilev as special representatives for Crimean Tatars.7  In Tashkent, 
the more radical OKND held their first and second “all-Union meetings” in April and 
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June 1987 and demanded immediate return to Crimea and reparations for genocide.  
While disputes between the two organizations and other activists would grow with time, 
from 1987 to 1991 the popularity of Crimean Tatar return among the ethnic group was 
near universal and overshadowed internecine conflict.  The Moscow lobby swelled from 
a few dozen representatives to over 700 Crimean Tatars during the summer of 1987.  
When Reshat Dzhemilev organized mass protests on Red Square, the police surrounded 
them, but some protests lasted nearly an hour and there were few arrests.  Lobbyists met 
with hundreds of Soviet officials.  In a petitions addressed to Gorbachev activists made 
familiar demands: all Crimean Tatars should be allowed to return to Crimea and exercise 
their rights and the Soviet state should release all political prisoners.8   
Outside support included older Soviet dissidents and human rights activists, but 
also new groups.  Volga Tatar nationalists demanded that the Soviet Union end the 
“genocide and suffering of this people (Crimean Tatars).9  Crimean Tatar diaspora in 
Turkey began making more vocal demands for the Soviet Union to admit to “genocide.”  
In Ufa, a meeting of Soviet Muslim leaders donated 5,000 Korans for distribution to 
returning Crimean Tatars.10  In Moscow, 30 Supreme Soviet deputies from Latvia, 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Chechnya and other republics urged Gorbachev to create 
a return plan and place liberal experts in charge of the project.11  The remnants of the 
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Helsinki Watch Group formed “Memorial” in late October 1988 and discussed “the 
struggle for the fastest possible return” to Crimea.12 
 At the same time, Crimean and Uzbek officials condemned Crimean Tatar 
agitation in their respective regions.  The “politically safe” Crimean position remained 
the same: returning Crimean Tatars would destabilize a strategic region.  Crimean 
officials cited the lack of housing and water and the fear of ethnic tensions in their 
opposition to return.13  However, the Russians in Crimean leadership had fought Crimean 
Tatar return for decades and they were conservative communists from military 
backgrounds who opposed Gorbachev’s reforms outright.14  As the Ukrainian 
independence movement began, Crimea became a conservative Russian nationalist 
stronghold within Ukraine.15  By 1989, there were around 1,717,500 Russians and 
732,500 Ukrainians in Crimea.16  Moreover, many of the Ukrainians had undergone 
Russification from living in a Russian majority region.17 
 Uzbek officials faced rising ethnic tensions, and they viewed Crimean Tatar 
activism as a threat to stability in the towns and regions where Crimean Tatars were 
concentrated.  Tashkent had spent four decades containing Crimean Tatar protests and 
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attempting to integrate Crimean Tatars into Uzbek economic and state institutions.  
Crimean Tatar return meant that these policies had failed to dissolve the Crimean Tatar 
nation and that the Uzbek state had wasted a huge amount of money and effort.  Uzbek 
officials reacted to glasnost by ordering an increase in Soviet “patriotic and proletarian” 
propaganda directed at Crimean Tatars and by attacking the idea of returning to Crimea 
with old arguments.  One Uzbek decree stated that Crimean Tatar return was “egotistical” 
and contradicted the Soviet “brotherhood of nations.”  In an article for the journal Soiuz, 
Uzbek party historians argued that Crimean Tatars could not claim the right to return to 
Crimea because Russians had “spilt more blood” on the peninsula and were therefore 
entitled to Crimean “blood rights.”18  ITAR-TASS issued an official message on July 24, 
1987, that insisted Crimean Tatars could not return because Crimea was overcrowded.19  
The weekly Sobesednik ran an interview with the dissident historian Aleksander Nekrich, 
who, despite having advocated for Crimean Tatar rights, believed that they had missed 
their “historic chance” to return home in the 1950s.20    
 The Nationalities Soviet of the Supreme Soviet also proposed the creation of 
Crimean Tatar “national districts” in several Uzbek regions.21  Following the suggestion, 
in 1989 the presidium of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet proposed creating Crimean Tatar 
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A. Nekrich in Sobesednik No. 11, 1990g. Reprinted in “O budushchem krymskoi ASSR.” March 30, 1990; 
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“schools, national clubs, and cultural centers” in regions with concentrated Crimean Tatar 
populations.22  However, by 1990 the deterioration of interethnic relations and security in 
several Uzbek regions overshadowed any such conciliatory projects aimed at convincing 
deported minorities to remain in the Uzbek state.23   
To the dismay of Crimean Tatars, Gorbachev initially supported the positions of 
the Uzbek and Crimean governments.  On December 24, 1987, the Soviet of Ministries 
issued a reactionary decree designed to discourage Crimean Tatars from returning to 
Crimea.   The order forbade “people returning to Crimea” from receiving residency 
permits in the seven largest Crimean cities and the seven districts where the vast majority 
of Crimean Tatars had resided before the deportation.  In addition, the order forbade 
Crimean Tatars from moving to regions adjacent to Crimea.24   
Regardless of the order, around 60,000 Crimean Tatars returned to Crimea from 
1988 to early 1990, and thousands of Crimean Tatars accumulated in illegal 
encampments on the outskirts of towns in Crimea, Krasnodar krai, and several Ukrainian 
oblasts.  Crimean authorities returned to old tactics of harassing Crimean Tatars with 
registration, home, and notary laws, but Crimean law enforcement was soon 
overwhelmed.  As these tent cities grew, Crimean Tatars sent thousands of letters and 
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petitions to Moscow.25  A. Bekirov wrote that he had fought the Nazis at Stalingrad, 
Briansk, Kursk and along the Belorussian front.  The NKVD deported him in 1944, but 
he had retained his communist party membership.  He and 25 other Crimean Tatar 
veterans gave a simple message for Moscow in 1990: they and the younger generations of 
Crimean Tatars were going home and staying.26   
Not all Crimean officials took a hard line.  Iurii Tsavro, a people’s deputy to the 
Supreme Soviet representing Yalta’s 485th voting district, accepted that Crimean Tatar 
mass return was inevitable.27  On November 14, 1989, he wrote a letter to the chair of 
Nationalities Committee of the Supreme Soviet, Refik Nishanov.  In the letter, Tsavro 
explained how at least 58,000 Crimean Tatars had already returned to Crimea.  On the 
outskirts of Alushta near the village of Zaprudnom, he had just met with 29 Crimean 
Tatar families living in tents.  All of the families were originally from Zaprudnom, but 
officials refused to allow them to buy houses and receive residency permits.  Tsavro 
complained that five of the families included World War II veterans with medals.28  
At the same time, hundreds of letters to Moscow from Russian-speaking 
Crimeans and inter-Crimean communications reveal a growing divide between rural and 
urban residents in Crimean.  While urban party and government leaders supported the 
1987 law to restrict Crimean Tatars from certain cities and districts, by the end of 1989 
some rural Crimean residents argued that Moscow should allow Crimean Tatars to live in 
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urban areas.  These rural residents claimed that Gorbachev’s order placed an unfair 
burden on their farms and villages.29  Soon, the protests of Crimean Tatars and rural 
Crimeans against the 1987 decree, combined with the general chaos of massive tent cities 
in Crimea, forced Moscow to act.  Another letter by Tsavro to the Supreme Soviet on 
November 24, 1989, summed up Crimean Tatar sentiment: the Soviet government 
organized the deportation in 1944 and it was now Moscow’s responsibility to “undo the 
deportation.”30  While not enthusiastic, by 1989 Gorbachev agreed that Crimean Tatars 
had the right to “return to the Crimea, gain equal living conditions, and have their 
political prisoners freed.”31   
 
The Parade of Commissions and Order 666 
 
 
 By the advent of glasnost and perestroika, the Soviet Union had become the most 
bloated, complex state bureaucracy in the world.  As a result, the Soviet state created over 
a dozen commissions on the union, republic and oblast levels in order to solve the 
Crimean conundrum.  Even if the Soviet state had been efficient, the task was daunting.  
Crimean Tatar return was what Lewis Siegelbaum and Leslie Moch describe as “Soviet 
transnational migration,” or the “movement across a border that defined the home of a 
national group” that had logistical and ideological perils for any Soviet ethnicity even in 
better circumstances.32  The Crimean situation was more complicated because the debate 
over which nations could claim Crimea as a “home” was just beginning, and the Ukraine 
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SSR, RSFSR, and Crimean authorities had more political capital than Crimean Tatars.  
With the combination of the above problems and the intransigence of Crimean officials, 
many of these commissions were repetitive, confused or pointless.  Still, taken as a whole 
they represented a profound sea change in the Soviet acceptance of Crimean Tatar return. 
 Crimean Tatar activists began meetings with Soviet officials at all levels in 
autumn 1989, and thousands of letters, telegrams, and meetings supported the effort by 
calling on the Supreme Soviet SSSR to create an official return plan.33  For instance, 
during Boris Yeltsin’s 1989 tour of Central Asian republics, Crimean Tatar factory 
worker Dilver Mustafaev pressed Yeltsin to support Crimean Tatar return (Yeltsin replied 
that he could not comment on the situation).34   This new onslaught of Crimean Tatar 
activism and a sharp uptick in Crimean Tatar return to Crimea forced the Soviet Union to 
act.35  In early 1989, the Supreme Soviet in Moscow created a commission to study and 
recommend solutions to the “Crimean Tatar problem.”  In response, the Crimean Obkom 
created a “Commission on Inter-ethnic Relations” to debate the eminent Crimean Tatar 
return.  At the commission’s first meeting on July 8, 1989, Crimean Party Secretary A. N. 
Girenko invited five Crimean Tatars and instructed them to elect representatives to the 
Supreme Soviet commission.  However, Crimean Tatars immediately became suspicious 
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because Crimean officials required that the representatives already be residents of Crimea 
and gave them only two days to hold the election.36   
 Crimean Tatars debated the usefulness of participating in commissions, but most 
activists believed that, at the very least, the bodies could serve as a platform for protest.37  
Moreover, as even the more radical activists admitted, “Crimean Tatars on their own did 
not have the power” to return and confront the “massive great-power bureaucracy” 
simultaneously.38  On July 9, 1989, Crimean Tatars elected activists Mustafa Dzhemilev 
and Akseit Seitmemetov as their representatives.  At the election meeting, Crimean 
Tatars also reiterated their specific goals.  Above all, they desired full political 
rehabilitation, return to Crimea, and the reestablishment of the Crimean ASSR according 
to the October 18, 1921, Crimean constitution.39 
 The Crimean Obkom took the nominations to the Nationalities Soviet of the 
Supreme Soviet in Moscow.  On July 12, 1989, the Nationalities Soviet created “The 
Commission on the Problem of the Crimean Tatar People” with the goal of finding 
“realistic” solutions to the Crimean Tatar issue.  As head of the Nationalities Soviet, 
Refik Nishanov had final say over the commissions and appointed Genadi Ianaev, the 
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First Secretary of VTsSPS and a peoples’ deputy, to head the Crimean Tatar commission.  
The 13 non-Crimean Tatar commission members included economists, journalists, and 
bureaucrats from Crimea, the Uzbek SSR and Moscow, each assigned with studying a 
specific aspect of the Crimean Tatar issue.40  
 Crimean Tatars’ early suspicions of the Supreme Soviet commissions proved 
correct.  Nishanov, who had veto power over the commission’s members and 
recommendations, was already notorious among Crimean Tatars for his leadership in the 
Uzbek party during the 1960s and 1970s.   On his watch, the Uzbek KGB had imprisoned 
Dzhemilev, while Uzbek party branches had expelled Crimean Tatars and economic 
managers had fired Moscow lobby participants from their jobs because of their activism.  
He also once told Crimean Tatar activists that, if they wanted to go “home,” they should 
go to Kazan.41  Nishanov, who remained wary of Crimean Tatar activism, rejected 
Dzhemilev’s nomination and replaced him with Crimean Tatar activist Dzhul’vern 
Abliamitov.42  Angered at the snub of Dzhemilev, Abliamitov and three other Crimean 
Tatar activists traveled to Moscow and sought a meeting with Nishanov on July 17, 1989.  
Nishanov agreed to the meeting, but during the visit explained that “reasonable” people 
and experts were going to determine solutions, and Crimean Tatar influence would be 
minimal because “extreme and passionate” activists such as Dzhemilev would not allow 
for “constructive” solutions.  Abliamitov and the other Crimean Tatars replied that this 
approach would fail because, like it or not, most Crimean Tatars were passionate about 
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the subject.  Moreover, with just two seats on the commission, meeting attendee Reshat 
Kenzhe quipped that the Crimean Tatar future was bleak if their “fate was going to be 
decided by a show of hands.”  Nishanov replied that Crimean Tatars did not “have the 
right to distrust” the Soviet government.43  
Regardless of the question of trust, the commission’s work on “solutions” began.  
Ianaev and the commission toured Crimea, Russia and the Uzbek SSR.  They met with 
hundreds of Crimean Tatars and gauged their desire to return.  In general, Crimean Tatars 
relayed to the committee that the return had to be a “deliberate economic operation” that 
would provide returnees with jobs, both in new home construction and long-term careers 
in agriculture, tourism and industry.44  Upon returning to Moscow, Ianaev argued to 
Nishanov that Moscow should declare all acts against Crimean Tatars illegal and 
immoral, reestablish the Crimean ASSR, and not consign Crimean Tatars to some 
“national region” or “reservations” outside of Crimea.  In addition, he argued that 
Moscow should create a body that represented Soviet republics and relevant ministries to 
devise a return plan with a “significant financial element.”45   
After September 1989, the number of commissions boomed as the scope and scale 
of the return project became clear.  When Ianaev’s commission made a recommendation, 
republics and ministries created new commissions to study the recommendations and 
soon the process stalled.  By December 1989, in all its bureaucratic glory, Moscow and 
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republic governments had created “commissions on the Crimean Tatar problem” to 
address the dysfunction of earlier commissions.  The new commissions then 
recommended the creation of more commissions.46 
 While the commissions failed to produce a return plan in 1989, other 
developments were positive.  On November 19, 1989, the Supreme Soviet declared that 
the deportations of ethnic groups had been unlawful, and that the Soviet government had 
to reinstate the full rights of individuals and nations.47  A further order created a list of 
Stalin’s “illegal” policies in Crimea that included the deportation order and the order 
dissolving the Crimean ASSR.48  Crimean Tatars also began publishing the newspaper, 
Avdet, in Simferopol to “unite all Crimean Tatars with the ideas of a progressive society 
and human democracy” and chronicle the return to Crimea.49   
Soon the combination of liberalizing politics, bureaucratic dysfunction, the 
situation in Crimea, and unrest in Central Asia reached a critical point.  On May 18, 
1990, the 46th anniversary of the Crimean Tatar deportation, Crimean Tatars in Moscow, 
Crimea, the Uzbek SSR, Kiev, Kransodar krai and other regions protested the Soviet 
failure to implement a concrete return plan.50  In Uzbek towns with large Crimean Tatar 
populations such as Chirchik, hundreds of workers went on strike with demands for 
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Uzbek authorities to reinstate the jobs and party memberships of Crimean Tatars expelled 
over the previous decades.  In Almalyk, strikers demanded material help for the move to 
Crimea.51  As the commissions debated possible solutions, the Crimean Tatar return 
population grew, along with the tent cities and the anxiety of everyone in Crimea.  By 
March 1990, rumors were circulating among Russians that Crimean Tatars were 
smuggling weapons into the camps to begin an uprising.  While this rumor was false, 
increasing violence in the Caucuses and the Ferghana Valley heightened tensions.52    
The situation in and around Simferopol, Bakhchisarai, and Alushta were typical 
of the summer of 1990 in Crimea.  Simferopol district authorities refused to grant 
returnees land plots and registration so Crimean Tatars created massive tent cities in the 
villages of Fontany, Sofievka, Mar’ino, Kamenka, Lozovoe, and the Zapadnaia 
neighborhood.  On July 15, Il’im Umerov helped organize a demonstration and the 
construction of a “mini-camp” on Simferopol’s Lenin Square to showcase the living 
conditions of returning Crimean Tatars.53  In the Bakhchisarai district, after registering 
over 300 Crimean Tatars in some villages, officials refused the registration of 33 
applicants at one passport table.  Afterwards, newly arrived Crimean Tatars to the district 
refused to apply for registration, arguing that they did not need police permission to 
return to their homeland.  In addition to refusing Crimean Tatars registration and land, 
authorities in Alushta and several other areas blocked access to drinking water.  
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Confrontations and fights between Crimean Tatars, police and other residents increased 
and further stoked the fears of armed conflict.54   
Despite his reservations, Nishanov believed Moscow needed a concrete plan.  
Gorbachev had to either support total Crimean Tatar return or mobilize police or military 
units to stop Crimean Tatar repatriations and perhaps begin a larger version of the 1978 
deportations.55  Even though he soon lost control of the situation, Gorbachev chose 
liberalization.  On July 11, 1990, the Supreme Soviet issued order 666, a twelve-point 
plan of “initial measures” to reverse the ethnic cleansing of Crimean Tatars.  In the short 
term, the order reversed the 1978 and 1987 decrees and directed all Crimean authorities 
to provide registration stamps to Crimean Tatars regardless of home ownership, and the 
Ukraine SSR had to assure that all returnees received land, jobs, and building materials.  
Moreover, an addendum to the plan required the Crimean government to find housing for 
8,400 Crimean Tatar families who had already returned.  In the long term, Ianaev’s 
commission had work to with the relevant republics and ministries to finalize a 10-year 
plan for future returnees and then present the project to the Council of Ministries by 
September 1990.56   
It was the responsibility of all Soviet Republics with Crimean Tatar populations to 
draft detailed plans to find Crimean Tatars, ask if they desired to return, and then oversee 
the logistics of return in their perspective republics.  For example, the RSFSR Sovmin 
issued a decree on September 12, 1990, that gave dozens of RSFSR ministries different 
tasks to complete over the course of the next year, with an emphasis on creating list of 
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potential returnees and finding funds for their travel.57  Ministries and republics had to 
complete the above preparations by January 1, 1991, when the first Crimean Tatars 
would begin arriving as part of the official return plan. 
 
The Reality of Reform:  Failure, Radical Change, and Resentment 
 
 
The plan was radical.  All Crimean Tatars could return and reside in Crimea.  
Crimean authorities could no longer arrest and deport Crimean Tatars because of passport 
violations.58  This reversed decades of Soviet policy that had protected Stalin’s ethnic 
cleansing.  However, the plan’s radicalism could not ensure total success.  At first, 
Gosplan and Crimean Tatars activists surveyed Crimean Tatars and created cost 
estimates, but the implementation quickly stalled.59  The official return plan had three key 
problems, best categorized as financial, geographic-demographic, and political-
ideological, and these failures undermined the enfranchisement of Crimean Tatars after 
they returned.  The death of the Soviet Union in December 1991 killed the Crimean Tatar 
return plan.  Still, the history of the plan’s implementation is crucial to understanding the 
post-Soviet political, ethnic and demographic fissures of Crimea. 
The financial failure was indicative of the larger Soviet economic crisis and 
political fragmentation.  As a Ukraine SSR oblast, Ukrainian enterprises were responsible 
for new home and infrastructure construction.  While many Ukrainian politicians 
supported the spirit of the project on paper, they did not believe that the Ukrainian state 
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should pay for the effort because orders from Moscow, and not Kyiv, deported Crimean 
Tatars.60  Moreover, the Ukrainian Rada was surprised to learn how many Crimean 
Tatars actually lived in the Uzbek SSR and that most wanted to return to Crimea 
immediately.61  As reports from other republics on Crimean Tatar populations reached 
Kyiv, the potential cost of the project increased.62  Kyiv also argued that cleaning up the 
Chernobyl disaster was still draining the Ukrainian budget.  Crimean Tatar activist Refik 
Muzafarov best summed up the Ukrainian position on funding Crimean Tatars: the 
government (Ukraine SSR) “wants the bird to sing, but does not want it to eat (chtoby 
ptichka pela, no ni ela).”63    
The only government entities that funded their part of the return program were the 
Ukrainian Cultural Fund and Ukrainian Ministry of Culture.  They helped establish the 
“Vatan” (homeland) Crimean Tatar Cultural, Educational and Academic Research Center 
in Prikorskiiin 1991.  As the center’s director, professor Muzafarov began work on a 
Crimean Tatar encyclopedia in Crimean Tatar and Russian.64  In Bakchisarai, funds 
helped Crimean Tatars establish the Crimean Tatar Musical-Drama Theater.  The first 
production was of “Fakel nad Krym,” the Grigory Aleksandrov poem that chronicled the 
1978 self-immolation of Musa Makmut.  The Crimean Tatar director, Bilial Bilialov, cast 
Crimean Tatar actors and actresses to play Crimean police declaring to Musa, “there is no 
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place for Crimean Tatars in Crimea.”65  Aleksandrov attended the premier on May 16, 
1991.66  Other cultural centers opened in Evpatoria, Starii Krym and other towns, and 
Crimean Tatar women organized the Crimean League of Tatar Women.67  In other words, 
Kyiv provided some funds to Crimean Tatar cultural activities and return, but this was 
not enough to rebuild the Crimean Tatar nation.  
Further debate revealed that no Soviet entity was willing to pay for the project.  In 
August 1990, the Ukrainian Council of Ministers drafted a 10 million-ruble bill for the 
RSFSR.68  The RSFSR refused to pay and argued that the Soviet state budget, and not 
individual republics, should pay for the program because the Soviet government was 
responsible for the deportation.69  Next, Kyiv pressed Gosplan to find the money 
elsewhere, but there is no evidence that the Ukraine SSR ever received funds for the 
project.70  With no money for the project forthcoming, the State Committee for 
Construction (Gosstroi) proposed a radical solution: market forces.  To be precise, 
Gosstroi suggested that Crimean Tatars receive expedited privatization of their homes, 
apartments, dachas, and private plots in their places of exile.  Crimean Tatars should then 
sell the privatized property and use the capital to purchase land and build homes in 
                                                
65 GARF, f. 10148, op. 1, d. 7, l.l. 1-20.  G. Aleksandrov, “Fakel nad Krymom” (Bakhchisarai: Avdet, 
1991).  Originally written in 1978. 
66 GARF, f. 10148, op. 1, d. 7, l.l. 21-22.  Programma “Fakel nad Krymom.”  Min. Kul’tury Ukr. SSR, 
Krymskotatarskii Muzykal’no-dramaticheskii Teatr.  May 16, 1991. 
67 Center for Civil Society International Collection, box 114, folder 4.  HIA. 
68 This bill amounted to transferring the sum from the RSFSR budget to the Ukraine SSR budget.  GARF, 
f. A-259, op. 49, d. 2479, l.l. 10-10ob.  Protokol Peredachi kapital’nykh vlozhenii i stroitel’no-
montazhnykh rabot na 1991 g.  August 1990. 
69 GARF, f. 10026, op. 7, d. 759, l. 47.  Pis’mo Direktor Tsentra Professor Refik Muzafarov- Prezidiuma 
Ver. Sov. RSFSR Vorotnikobu.  April 26, 1990. 
70 GARF, f. 10121, op. 1, d. 21, l.l. 3-4. Pis’mo Predsedatel’ Sovmin Ukr. SSR V. Fokin- Sovmin SSSR.  




Crimea.  It was a plan that wed Gorbachev’s political and economic reforms, but no such 
reforms occurred before the Soviet Union collapsed.71   
The general deficits of goods during the late-Gorbachev, especially of building 
materials, food, and other household items, exacerbated the funding problems.  By 
August 1990, there were not enough building materials to meet the requirements of order 
666 even if Ukrainian construction enterprises had received funds.72  As a result, Crimean 
Tatars and Crimean officials built only a few officially sanctioned houses before 
December 1991.73 
The 1989 Crimean Tatar census by Crimean Tatar activists and Gosplan also 
revealed the developing disputes over Crimean geography and demography.  Even with 
funds, the task of placing Crimean Tatars into appropriate housing in their desired return 
locations would have been daunting.  Moreover, the parties involved disagreed on where 
in Crimea the Crimean Tatars were going to live.  
As they had done since the 1950s, Crimean authorities claimed that there was not 
enough land for Crimean Tatars.  This was simply not true.  In 1988 alone, Crimean 
authorities distributed over 100,000 plots of land to Slavic settlers and to current Crimean 
residents to build dachas.  At the same time, Crimean enterprises were building new 
apartments in Feodosiia, Kerch, Simferopol, and Dzhanko.  In 1989, as Crimean Tatar 
return increased, Crimean Tatars received only 4% of the land plots, and most returnees 
had to squat.  One Crimean district party boss summed up the sentiment:  “While I am the 
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owner of Crimea, not one Crimean Tatar is returning here.”74  As Donald Raleigh notes, 
Soviet housing access often depended on the “class considerations, the whims of local 
authorities, party membership, an individual’s value to the state, and corruption.”75  In 
Crimea, that “whim” was undermining Crimean Tatar return in spite of order 666. 
The geographic and demographic considerations overwhelmed planners and 
Crimean Tatars.  Mass death, special settlement and exile had transformed the economic 
life of the Crimean Tatar nation from 1944 to 1990, but not changed what Crimean 
districts they called home.  Ukrainian officials had hoped that 70 percent of Crimean 
Tatars would agree to move to the arid, sparsely populated steppe.76  However, before the 
deportation nearly 70 percent of Crimean Tatars (approximately 151,200 people) lived on 
the Southern Coast of Crimea, while around 30 percent (nearly 64,000 Crimean Tatars) 
had lived on the steppes.77  By 1989, the Crimean Tatar population had rebounded to 
271,715 people officially, but chronic undercounting means that the actual population 
was perhaps between 350,000 and 420,000 individuals in the USSR.78   Not surprisingly, 
surveys revealed that over 70 percent of Crimean Tatars wanted to return to Crimea’s 
southern coast, either in or near ancestral towns and villages.79  Moreover, most Crimean 
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Tatars of working age were no longer the agriculturalists of the deported generation.  As 
one Academy of Sciences researcher observed, a “paradox” of the situation was that 
Crimean Tatars were deported as farmers, but returning as an urban population.80  In sum, 
several hundred thousand Crimean Tatars were going to return to the cities and towns in 
the most populous region of the peninsula, and they needed non-agricultural jobs. 
Faced with imminent Crimean Tatar return, the Crimean government suggested 
dispersing the Crimean Tatar population to dilute the political leverage of Crimean 
Tatars.    Acquiescing to the desires of Crimean authorities, the original return plan kept 
the Crimean Tatar population in any one Crimean district or town to less than 25 percent 
of the total population.  Even in historic Crimean Tatar regions, Slavs (with the majority 
Russian and minority Ukrainian) would have demographic dominance.  For example, in 
1939, Crimean Tatars made up 65% of the population in the Bakichisarai district, but the 
return plan would have the renewed Crimean Tatar population at just 24.6%.  In Sudak, 
where in 1939 Crimean Tatars were 70.5% of the population, the plan called for Crimean 
Tatars at 16.7%.81  At the same time, Crimean Tatars knew that their population had 
rebounded enough to recreate the previous Crimean ASSR demographic proportion 
Tatars to Russians in a least some districts.82  Most economists at the Ukrainian Gosplan 
and Soviet Gosplan agreed and articulated that the forced dispersion of Crimean Tatars 
was bad policy and a naked attempt by Crimean officials to disenfranchise the returning 
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minority.  As economist V. K. Papisov remarked, “why should they (Crimean Tatars) not 
have the right to return to the villages of their fathers?”83 
 In this context of diverging opinions between Slavic Crimeans, Crimean Tatars, 
Kyiv and Moscow, the ideological/political failure of the project became obvious.   
Activists had studied anti-Tatar historians, books, Crimean tour guides and museum 
exhibits for decades and had a list of all works that had perpetuated anti-Tatar narratives.  
Crimean Tatars also turned to the archives, gaining access to transcripts of the Crimean 
party during the postwar Crimean transformation.84  They were pleased Moscow 
denounced Stalin, but demanded that Moscow also condemn all the above anti-Tatar 
efforts and Crimean leaders such as Kabanov and Tiulieva and academics such as 
Nadinskii who had key roles in the transformation of Crimea from 1944 to 1954.85   
Activists also complained that Pravda and other central press outlets refused to explain 
the project in detail and that the Crimean Tatars were now politically rehabilitated.86  
Crimean Tatars had good reason to believe that they would have no real 
enfranchisement in Crimea without a pro-Tatar agitation campaign to counter decades of 
anti-Tatar propaganda.  They understood that many Crimea officials viewed the 
condemnation of Stalin’s policies as a threat to their position in Crimea and Crimea’s 
prominent place in the Russian nationalist myth.  Slavic Crimean residents (the forced 
                                                
83 Papisov proposed a program whereby the head of the household would return to their ancestral village 
first, find housing or build a house, and then arrange for the full family to return.  RGAE, f. 4372, op. 67, d. 
9982, l.l. 79-81.  Zakliuchenie Doktor Ekonomicheskii Naiuk V. K. Papisov.  October 1990. 
84 Bekirova, Krymskie Tatary, 73-74. 
85 For example, activist Ali Khamzin found the Crimean party transcripts for the plenum during which 
Kabanov and Tiuleva declared a “new Russian Crimea” (Новым Крымом со своим русским укладом) 
after the deportations.  GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l.l. 29-32.  “Zaiavlenie” Ali Khamzin-Ver. Sov. 
SSSR, sredstvam massovoi informatsii i chlenam komissii po problwmam krymsko-tatarskogo naselenii.  
July 31, 1989. For the original transcript see RGASPI f. 17, op. 44, d. 759, l.l. 103, 194-201. November 27-
29, 1944 Plenum of the Crimean Obkom. 
86 GARF, f. A-664, op. 1, d. 176, l.l. 19-20.  “Zapros NDKT za Leninskoe reshenie natsional’nogo voprosa 




and volunteer settlers who came after the war) increasingly echoed these concerns and 
began considering the return plan to be “anti-Russian.”  Several prominent Soviet 
ethnographers argued that the return plan would cause an “increase in inter-ethnic 
conflict and anti-Crimean Tatar feelings.”87  Thus, the Soviet Union faced the dilemma of 
any liberalizing state attempting to enfranchise a repressed ethnic or social group: how to 
promote the rights of the minority without offending the majority.  The fact that the 
Soviet Union had created a unique strain of Russian nationalism in Crimea and stressed 
the importance of Crimea to Russian national identity exacerbated the situation.  The 
“relatively moderate” strain of Russian nationalism that promoted “Russia as the 
dominant nation within a multiethnic state” was incompatible with the version of Russian 
nationalism in Crimea that was by definition anti-Tatar.88   
As such, in the late-1980s Russian nationalism in Crimea combined a politics of 
resentment and racism with a disdain for Gorbachev’s reforms.  One handwritten note to 
Yeltsin explained that Stalin was right to deport Crimean Tatars because they were 
“terrible people” and “speculators and corruptible” cowards who “fled the Nazis like 
Jews.”89  Some Crimean officials held demonstrations against Crimean Tatar return and 
Gorbachev’s reforms. One demonstration in Alushta repeated the insult that Tatars 
“remove their dirty feet” from the town square.90  Another demonstration organized by 
the Dzhanskoii City Communist Party in the village of Azovsk descended into chants 
against Gorbachev (doloi Gorbacheva) and against Crimean Tatar “autonomy” in 
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Crimea.  Allegedly, the Secretary of the Dzhanskoii party even threatened returning 
Crimean Tatars with violence just as “good as in the Ferghana incidents” (referring to 
pogroms against Crimean Tatars and other non-Uzbeks in the Uzbek SSR).91 
 Resentment grew over the “special privileges” Crimean Tatars were going to 
receive in the form of land plots, loans for housing, and bypassing the Crimean waitlist 
for housing.  While most Crimean Tatars never received the above benefits, many non-
Tatars believed that even the ability of a Crimean Tatars to arrive and squat in Crimea 
was “reverse discrimination.”  After the beginning of glastnost, Crimean authorities had 
received thousands of letter from Slavic Crimeans complaining about the slow pace of 
housing construction, and many residents viewed Crimean Tatar return as an event that 
would worsen the situation.92  Moreover, some Slavic Crimeans claimed that they were 
angry about benefits for returnees because Crimean Tatars were “returning to Crimea in 
new “Volgas” (perhaps referring to some of the Crimean Tatar urbanites from Tashkent).  
The appearance of Crimean Tatar single mothers with multiple children also disconcerted 
many Slavic farmers.93   Finally, since Crimean officials denied Crimean Tatars work, a 
myth that Crimean Tatars did not work also developed.94  This popular portrayal of 
Crimean Tatars getting rich off government benefits took on a similar tone to the myth in 
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the United States of “welfare queens” and underrepresented groups using material 
assistance to accumulate wealth.95  This was a myth in Crimea and the United States, but 
was still a powerful rhetorical tool.   
By 1989, Crimean officials and the majority of Russians in Crimea detested 
Stalin’s transfer of Crimean to Ukraine, but continued to support his ethnic cleansing.  
Similar to the “party and state bureaucracies” in many non-Russian republics, local 
Crimean leaders created a “concentrated opposition” to Gorbachev’s policies.96  In a 
1989 interview, the Secretary of the Crimean Obkom, L. Grach, said that, while he was 
“preparing for Crimean Tatars to return, he still believed in the mass treason charges and 
that all Crimean Tatars shared the guilt as a collective whole.97  The head of the Yalta 
city government, B. P. Chernenko, disagreed with “letting you Crimean Tatars come back 
here (Yalta)” and would do everything in his power to “remove Crimean Tatars from here 
(Yalta).”  On the farm, town, and city level, Crimean leaders and Slavic Crimeans 
organized citizens’ councils that echoed these beliefs.  Some villages and districts created 
armed “civil defense committees” to stop the “illegal actions” of Crimean Tatars.98  In 
Alushta, one such “counter defense” protest including slogans such as “this is our land 
and the land of our children.”99  Focusing on the material situation, the “Russian Society 
of Crimea” claimed that Tatar return was worsening their standard of living.100  Many 
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Crimean Tatars recognized this backlash as a marriage of anti-Tatar and “anti-
perestroika” sentiment in Crimea.101 
  Russian nationalists in Crimean also received support from outside of Crimea.  
In one example, a doctor living in Sweden, V. P. Shuiski, wrote an article for the journal 
Chasavoi that essentially restated the new Crimean narrative argument that Tatars should 
never return to Crimea because they had always been occupiers of Russian lands.102  
Writing from Baku, one Russian letter writer argued that, with the return program, 
“Gorbachev was giving Crimea to Tatars.”103  As journalist Anna Reid underlined, even 
some Muscovites who were “otherwise impeccably democratic,” held a militant belief 
that “Crimea is Russian, Russian!”104   
To counter the backlash, Crimean Tatar activists argued that Crimean Tatar return 
to Crimea was not anti-Russian. Iurii Osmanov noted how many Russian nationalists 
were themselves critiquing the Soviet government because those “who suffered and 
continue to suffer from Russian rule are often Russians themselves.”105  Moreover, some 
activists proposed a restoration of the Crimean ASSR inside the RSFSR in which 
Crimean Tatar autonomy and Russian rights in Crimea had not been mutually exclusive.  
Crimean Tatars wrote specifically to RSFSR officials declaring that they themselves were 
former citizens of the Russian republic and sought solidarity with Russians in reversing 
Stalin’s crimes.  For example, G. S. Seidalieva, a Crimean Tatar veteran living in the 
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Uzbek SSR, explained that she was angry that “Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian 
settlers are living in our homes,” but she believed that the deportation of Crimean Tatars 
and the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR were all part of the same criminal 
process.  Seidalieva further stated that, “we (Crimean Tatars) lived with Russians side by 
side in Yalta, Guzufe, Simferopol, Sevastopol, and other parts of Crimea without 
conflict” and supported the transfer of “our homeland” back to the RSFSR.106  A large 
group of Crimean Tatars in Novorossisk (waiting to return to Crimea) told Yeltsin in a 
letter that “the struggle for Russian sovereignty and the equality of all nations within 
Russia” had to include Crimean Tatars because “our national territory” will be in the 
“future sovereign Russia.”107  This was perhaps a naïve hope for Crimean Tatars at the 
time, but they had little other choice to make this argument.     
While never a popular opinion, in the late-1980s some Slavic Crimeans desired 
common ground between the groups or at least understood that the return project needed 
a media campaign.  For example, one Russian letter-writer from Crimea, Mikhail 
Iunasheva, argued that returning Crimea to Russia and returning Crimean Tatars to 
Crimea should be part of the same project addressing all of Stalin’s orders in Crimea.108  
Even before order 666, Tsavro pleaded with Moscow to use all “Crimean mass media and 
the central (Moscow) print press and television channels” to immediately explain “the 
scope of the problem facing Crimean Tatar return and the realities for non-Tatar Crimean 
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residents.109  The First Secretary of the Crimean Party, N. V. Bagrov, claimed that 
“nobody” disputed the right of Crimean Tatars to return and that Stalin’s treason charges 
had been a lie.110  Perhaps Bagrov believed this, or perhaps he was telling Moscow what 
it wanted to hear.  Regardless, pro-Tatar agitation largely failed.  
Given the above failures of the initial plan, Crimean Tatars observed that the 
resurrection of their rights in Crimea required Moscow to force Crimean authorities to 
comply.111  Crimean Tatars wrote directly to Yeltsin seeking changes with the plan.  For 
example, on September 27, 1990, several Crimean Tatars in Moscow and a philosophy 
professor from Moscow State University explained to Yeltsin that order 666 did not 
provide enough financial and material resources or guarantee political equality.  They 
argued that the plan was so devoid of reality that it was actually slowing down the return.  
Without ensuring Crimean Tatars some degree of political power on the peninsula, 
Crimean authorities remained free to use the police, registration laws, notaries, building 
codes, and other bureaucratic tools to harass returnees.112 
In response to the continued disenfranchisement, Crimean Tatars created their 
own governing body.  The Crimean Tatar national assembly, the Kurultaia, established 
the Crimean Tatar national governing body, the Mejlis, on September 28, 1991.  As 
political scientist Andrew Wilson underlines, the Mejlis was the work of the OKND, with 
the NKDT arguing that the “formation of the proto-state” would have no real political 
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influence.113  In general, the NKDT was right and the 1991 Crimean referendum was 
proof that Crimean Tatars had little leverage in Crimean politics.  However, the Mejlis 
became a champion of Crimean Tatar rights, not unlike Western civil rights organizations 
such as the NAACP and LULAC.  The first declaration of the Mejlis supported both the 
Supreme Soviet declaration restoring the full rights of deported peoples and international 
declarations of human rights.  They sought full enfranchisement and “national 
sovereignty” in Crimea, but denounced violence and the confiscation of land from 
Russian settlers, even those who had occupied Crimean Tatar villages.114  The Mejlis also 
argued that the influx of skilled labor and specialists in fields such as health, agriculture, 
and industry would boost the Crimean economy in the long-term.115  For Crimean Tatar 
national culture, the Mejlis created a Crimean Tatar flag, a national hymn and declared 
that the Crimean Tatar language should move from the Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet.116   
With the state failing, Crimean Tatars themselves became the coordinators of 
mass return.  They scraped together building materials, occupied vacant land, and built 
homes.  By December 1990, the Ukrainian Sovmin estimated that Crimean Tatars had 
already built over 1,500 such houses and hundreds more were under construction.117  
Despite growing anti-Tatar sentiment, by October 1, 1990, over 5,500 new Crimean Tatar 
families had bought homes and 1,700 families had bought apartments from Slavic 
Crimeans.  At least 434 families had signed contracts with construction enterprises to 
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build homes on land plots, and around 5,000 Crimean Tatar families were able to legally 
purchase land plots before the Soviet collapse.  This again underlines that disdain for 
Crimean Tatars was never absolute and some Slavic settlers had decided to return to their 
old oblasts.   Another 1,220 Crimean Tatars had applied for land, but local Crimean 
Soviets and farm directors undermined this land distribution at every turn.    Crimean 
Tatar activists told Moscow that while some Crimean officials slowly cooperated, other 
refused.  Not surprisingly, Crimean Tatars flocked to locales with the more sympathetic 
leaders, and this in turn placed a huge burden on the more humane Crimean officials and 
agitated many of their non-Tatar constituents.118  
These financial and logistical failures combined with political and ideological 
shortcomings to create a standoff between Crimean Tatars and other Crimeans who were 
now mutually suspicious neighbors in a failing state.  Soviet authorities understood this 
conundrum, best summed up by the last order that the Soviet of Nationalities issued 
concerning Crimean Tatars.  The order contained bullet-points highlighting the above 
problems and urging different republics and ministries to work together and with the 
media to promote the plan as a progressive step forward for all Crimeans.119  However, as 
1991 began, the last order was more an admission of the Soviet government’s failure to 
finance and support Crimean Tatar return.   
A special commission at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was the last Soviet 
body that attempted to save the plan.  The research, surveys, and deliberations of the 
Ukrainian commission are thoughtful and well-presented.  The effort included the 
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participation of dozens of academics, Crimean Tatar activists including Refik Dzhemilev 
(the brother of Mustafa Dzhemilev) and Iuri Osmanov, and Crimean officials.120  
Committee members wrote reports that identified the above failures of order 666 and 
presented reasonable solutions and a timeline over the next several years.121  Realizing 
the earlier plan’s unrealistic expectation that most Crimean Tatars would settle in steppe 
areas, the new plan sought the resettlement of Crimean Tatars in their ancestral districts.  
The plan offered incentives for Crimean Tatars to return only after they had purchased a 
home, creating a gradual option that would extend to 1998, with a possible extension 
until 2005.122  Economists also began studying what state enterprises or potential new 
private sectors Crimean Tatars could bolster.  In short, the effort recognized that the full 
enfranchisement Crimean Tatars and future Crimean economic and political development 
should be inseparable.123   Had the Soviet Union not collapsed, this body would have had 
the best chance at addressing some of the plan’s failures, but such counterfactual 
speculation was irrelevant to Crimean Tatars by 1992.   
 
Referendum and Crimean Tatar Reaction 
 
 
Despite the plan’s collision with the messy Crimean reality, the political 
precedent of order 666 was clear.  Crimean Tatars could return as a group and Crimean 
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authorities could not re-deport them, as had been the case from 1944 to 1989.124  Before 
the plan, the repression of Crimean Tatar return was a conspiracy of federal, republic and 
regional officials.  By July 1990, both the Soviet government in Moscow and the 
Ukrainian government in Kyiv had relented, and the remaining 300,000 Crimean Tatars 
in exile soon returned.125  Without the backing of Moscow, Crimean officials no longer 
had the resources or mandate to re-deport Crimean Tatars, despite their increasing anti-
Tatar hysteria.  The physical return of Crimean Tatars was extraordinary.  By December 
1991, the Ukrainian Rada believed that at least 108,000 Crimean Tatars had returned and 
activists argued that the number was closer to 160,000 and increasing everyday.126   
 Physical Crimean Tatar return to Crimea and political and economic 
enfranchisement in Crimea were two different projects.  Order 666 helped complete the 
first project, but the Soviet government never had the time, resources or will to make 
Crimean authorities concede some political power to Crimean Tatars.  Decentralization of 
Soviet power was good for many repressed nations, but it also meant there was no muscle 
behind the plan’s most radical points as the economic and political decentralization of 
perestroika and glasnost increased the logistical nightmare.127   The Soviet bureaucracy 
stalled and what little cooperation that had existed between federal, republic, and regional 
authorities completely broke down.128   
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The desire of the Russian majority to secure their political monopoly produced the 
January 1991 referendum to recreate the Crimean ASSR.   As Ronald Suny argues, 
people no longer feared the regime in Moscow, and they “now had a means to be 
heard.”129  With a transfer of Crimea to Russia looking unlikely and the Ukrainian 
independence movement surging, the hard line-communist and Russian nationalist 
alliance wanted to maximize local control of Crimea and minimize the political power of 
returning Crimean Tatars.  Co-opting human rights language for themselves, Crimean 
officials and Russian activists argued that Russians in Crimea were a minority (counting 
themselves within Ukraine) per the European Convention on the Protection of 
Minorities.130 
The process creating the referendum began over the summer of 1990 with 
Crimean government discussions on the future status of Crimea.  The first proposal that 
Crimean officials considered was designating Crimea an “All-Union Resort” that had a 
special autonomous status.  Under this plan, the Crimean government would investment 
in new resort construction that would exploit returning Crimean Tatar laborers, 
simultaneously growing the Crimean tourist industry and finding work and living space 
for returning Crimean Tatars.  However, only the liberal minority of officials (including 
Tsavro) supported this idea.  As deliberations on Crimean autonomy and Ukrainian 
independence intensified, Nishanov backtracked on his “support” for Crimean Tatar 
rights in the new Crimean government.  In one letter to Crimean authorities, Nishanov 
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agreed with Crimean authorities calling for a snap referendum to recreate the Crimean 
ASSR with no mention of the Crimean Tatar representation that had existed before 1944.  
The subsequent exchanges on the referendum discussed the fact that, if it had been 
ratified, the New Union Treaty would have given the new Crimean ASSR the right to exit 
the Ukraine SSR at a later date, an appealing prospect for Russian nationalists.  However, 
fear of Kyiv or Moscow attempting to force Crimean authorities to share power with 
Crimean Tatars was the urgent matter.  The sooner the referendum occurred, the less 
Crimean Tatars could participate and protest.  Under pressure from Crimea and 
Nishanov, on November 9, 1990, the presidium of the Rada declared the right of Crimean 
authorities to call a referendum deciding the “autonomy or special status of Crimea inside 
the Ukraine SSR.”131   
Crimean Tatar activists argued that they should have a special role in deciding the 
“administrative ownership” of the new Crimea.  They pointed out the irony that Leninist 
ideas of national self-determination had inspired indigenous national movements across 
the globe, but the state Lenin founded denied the same right to repressed Soviet nations.  
Crimean authorities ignored these calls and began preparing for the vote.132  
The hasty referendum ensured a vote before the majority of Crimean Tatars 
returned.  Crimean Tatar leaders understood this fact, and called an emergency meetings 
in December and January.  At gatherings in the Uzbek SSR and other republics, Crimean 
Tatars argued that the recreated republic should guarantee them 36% percent of Supreme 
Soviet SSSR seats in Crimea (as in the Crimean ASSR from 1921 to 1944) and that 
Crimean Tatars outside of Crimea should be allowed to vote.  This was essential to 
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guaranteeing the right of the majority of Soviet Crimean Tatars who could not return 
before the referendum.  Crimean officials objected, saying that having Crimean Tatars 
outside of Crimea voting in the referendum violated the Soviet constitution.133  When the 
vote occurred on January 20, 1991, Slavic Crimeans overwhelmingly voted to recreate 
the Crimean ASSR without any Crimean Tatar positions in the government or party.  
Crimean government officials simply declared all the existing oblast authorities to now 
be positions in the new Crimean ASSR.134  The “new” government did allow Crimean 
Tatars seven People’s Deputies in the Crimean Supreme Soviet, but this was out of 163 
total deputies and far from the pre-war proportions.135    
After the referendum, the Rada approved the results and recreated the Crimean 
ASSR on February 12, 1991, making no mention of the previous balance of ethnic-based 
people’s deputies.136  The Crimean Supreme Soviet convened on March 22, 1991 to 
formally declare itself the Crimean ASSR and pass a litany of orders giving the new 
republic more control in local affairs.  The Crimean Committee on Deported Peoples 
protested and sent letters to Gorbachev, Anatolii Luk’ianov (the leader of the Supreme 
Soviet at the time) and other Moscow officials arguing that two Crimean Tatar deputies 
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in exile (F. Sefershaeva from Fergana and V. Ia. Kariagina from the Tajik SSR) should 
also be included in the new Crimean ASSR Supreme Soviet.  Luk’ianov agreed with the 
Crimean Tatar argument, and sent a memo to Nishanov instructing the multiple 
committees on Crimean Tatar return as well as Crimean officials to include a provision 
that guaranteed the 36% representation quota for Crimean Tatars.137  Nishanov had never 
respected the Crimean Tatars right to return, and in response to Luk’ianov he essentially 
argued that significant Crimean Tatar representation in Crimea would be bad for the 
region, was not constitutionally protected, and would give Tatars disproportional 
representation per current Crimean demographics.138  Crimean officials agreed with 
Nishanov.  They claimed that the March 7, 1991 Supreme Soviet order that condemned 
Stalin’s “actions against deported peoples” did not require the restoration of Crimean 
Tatar political autonomy and representation.  Rather, the Crimean Supreme Soviet would 
“discuss” the matter later.139   
In other words, Crimean Tatars would have no significant political voice in their 
homeland.  True, Crimean Tatars could now celebrate romanticized versions of pre-
Revolutionary Crimean Tatar history such as the life of the Jadid reformer Ismail 
Gasprinski.140  Reopened mosques allowed an Islamic revival.  In monuments, libraries, 
museums, and theater productions such as Aleksandrov’s play, Crimean Tatars 
commemorated the nationalist idea, which focused on the creation and execution of 
resistance and return during the Soviet period.  However, the “spoils” of Crimea, farms, 
resorts, vineyards, orchards, and most land, remained in the hands of non-Tatars. 
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The Mejlis had little choice but to attempt to work with the new Crimean ASSR 
government, but it proved unsuccessful.141  Crimean leaders loathed the Mejlis, and 
turned to the Soviet judicial ministry to undermine its legality.  The assistant to the Soviet 
Minister of Justice, N. A. Ostrov, received the assignment to de-legalize the Mejlis.  He 
listed several points in the Soviet and Ukrainian constitutions that claimed any body 
outside of the Soviet government was illegal.  He also took human rights law, and argued 
that Crimean Tatars could not claim Crimea as their national homeland because the claim 
violated the rights of Russian residents.  Crimean Tatar leaders again called meetings in 
Crimea as well as local meetings across the Soviet Union to protest the vote.  In unison, 
they demanded that the Gorbachev either void the referendum result or ensure that 
Crimean Tatars had guaranteed positions in the government that the 1921 Crimean ASSR 
constitution had created.142  On June 28, 1991, the Kurltai began a series of requests to 
the United Nations asking the body to recognize their right to national self-
determination.143  The larger drama of Ukrainian independence loomed and by December 
1991 the Crimean government no longer answered to Moscow.  With the uncomfortable 
relationship with Kyiv and Crimean authorities, Ukraine was not willing to advocate for 
more Crimean Tatar enfranchisement and the geopolitical issues of the Black Sea Fleet 
and Ukraine’s nuclear weapons overshadowed the treatment of Crimean Tatars.  By 
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1992, the referendum had served to guarantee that the Russian majority had the ability to 
deny the indigenous population of Crimea any real power in Crimea.144 
 
Return without Representation  
 
 
The longest and most intense protest movement in the Soviet Union achieved the 
primary goal of returning Crimean Tatars to Crimea.  By the mid-1990s, over 260,000 
thousand Crimean Tatars had returned to Crimea.145  The Soviet Union’s condemnation 
of Stalin’s Crimean ethnic cleansing and creation of a plan to reverse engineer ethnic 
cleansing were extraordinary steps for any twentieth century state.  Crimea became a 
strategic region where one nation-state (Ukraine) controlled a region with a majority 
population (Russians) who considered themselves members of another nation-state 
(Russia).  At the same time, the long-exiled indigenous population continued to return, 
but remained disenfranchised.  This outcome created political ire between Russia, 
Ukraine and Crimean Tatars and shaped the events of 2014.   
However, continued discrimination and disturbing recent developments should 
not overshadow the fact that Crimean Tatars accomplished what most ethnic and 
religious minorities that faced such total ethnic cleansing from their homeland will never 
accomplish.  With non-violent resistance, they forced one of history’s most repressive 
states to hear their concerns through both domestic and international pressure.  Decades 
of protest, return attempts and learning to endure and combat discrimination prepared 
Crimean Tatars to take advantage of real reform after 1986.  Gorbachev’s reforms were 
not a forgone conclusion.  But if Crimean Tatars had remained docile and resigned to 
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total assimilation in exile for several decades, it is difficult to see how such a massive 
return movement could have taken place before Crimean authorities had time to devise a 








On January 21, 2016, Crimean General Prosecutor Natalia Poklonskaia issued an 
arrest warrant for Mustafa Dzhemilev for resisting the 2014 Russian occupation of 
Crimea.  Crimean authorities will never prosecute Dzhemilev because they already 
banned him from the Russian Federation and he now lives on the Ukrainian mainland.  
The warrant was symbolic.  Poklonskaia has become a hero of Russian hegemony in 
Crimea and Dzhemilev is the icon of Crimean Tatar resistance to Moscow.1  Russia now 
uses symbolism and force to assert their control of the peninsula.  However, the arrest 
warrant also is an indirect compliment to the legacy of Crimean Tatar activism.  The new 
Crimean government understands that Crimean Tatars have proven themselves capable of 
resisting ethnic cleansing and decades of ethnic discrimination.  Dzhemilev embodies 
Crimean Tatar perseverance and the ultimate failure to eliminate the Crimean Tatar 
nation.  From Stalin and Kabanov in the 1940s to Poklonskaia in 2016, authorities in 
Moscow and Crimea view Crimean Tatars as a threat to cultural aspirations, Russian 
national myths, and security.  
As this study demonstrates, this antagonistic dynamic is the direct result of 
Crimean Tatars resisting Stalin’s ethnic cleansing.  Crimea was where the Soviet Union’s 
geopolitical concerns, ideological foundation, ethnic diversity, Second World War 
victory, and postwar transformation collided.  Stalin’s ethnic cleansing in Crimea was the 
pinnacle of his project to “weed out” peripheral nationalities across the Soviet Union.   
He believed that creating ethnically homogenous Crimea would make this vital 
                                                




“assemblage point” of the Soviet empire easier to manage.    Few other empires ever 
attempted such a radical transformation of a peripheral region in such a quick manner and 
no other Soviet region was the subject of more orders from Moscow.  Crimean Tatars 
were the primary target of this policy because they were (and are) the region’s largest 
indigenous people.    
World War II was an opportune moment for ethnic cleansing because the 
impending victory legitimized Stalin’s rule.2  Despite this greater level of control and 
legitimacy, Stalin still lied to excuse the inexcusable treatment of targeted ethnic groups.  
Because of Marxism-Leninism, Stalin would not explain his ethnic cleansing policies in 
chauvinistic, strategic, or imperialistic terms.  Instead, any targeted group or individual 
became a traitor to Stalin and the state.  Crimean Tatars and other peripheral ethnic 
groups became ritualized sacrifices to a wartime leader who was equal-parts paranoid, 
ruthless, popular, victorious, and above all, obsessed with restoring and expanding the 
Soviet empire.   
As this study has stressed, Soviet archives can illuminate how and why Soviet 
officials lied, and how these falsehoods became part of the larger narratives of Crimean 
and Soviet history.  Stalin’s claim that the deportation was the result of Crimean Tatar 
collaboration was patently false.  Crimean Tatar service in the Soviet armed forces was 
extensive and became a defining experience for the nation, despite the treason charges.  
NKVD, party, and government documents and first-hand accounts reveal that Stalin’s 
police knew that the Crimean Tatars they deported were not collaborators.  How Ilia 
Vergasov lied about the wartime service of Iurii Osmanov is one example of how 
Crimean historians and tourism writers created evidence for the treason charges.  While 
                                                




lacking show-trials, the state media’s condemnation of the Crimean Tatar nation for 
treason became a public spectacle that many Soviet citizens, especially residents of, and 
visitors to Crimea witnessed.  The project of exaggerating collaboration numbers, and 
concealing Crimean Tatar service in the war, lasted a decade, and most Crimean 
authorities continued the charade for the rest of Soviet history.   
 This study should help eliminate any lingering doubts about how cruel the Soviet 
system was under Stalin.  The actual deportation of all Crimean minorities in May and 
June 1944 was an extreme example of Moscow’s control.    In particular, the NKVD 
knew how Crimean Tatars would die because they had extensive experience in 
facilitating mass starvation, disease, and exposure.  With this knowledge, Stalin and the 
Soviet state proceeded with the bureaucratic genocide of Crimean Tatars.  This atrocity 
differentiated itself from the “Terror” in executioners and methods.  During the terror and 
wartime policing, the NKVD usually shot people.  While they did shoot some Crimean 
Tatars in May 1944, the NKVD’s main task was delivering deportees to special settler 
divisions of the NKVD and MVD.  Once in special settlement, the NKVD and MVD 
observed, and sometimes encouraged, the bloodless brutality.   
Stalin’s police made the bureaucratic genocide possible, but the main purveyors 
of mass death from 1944 to 1946 were Stalin’s commanders, local officials, food and 
supply ministries, and farm and enterprise directors.  This was a “frightful slaughter,” but 
climate, heat, cold, viruses, and physical deterioration, not guns, killed.3  The state 
bureaucracy made decisions on food supplies, housing, land distribution, slave labor, 
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academics can argue about the accuracy of Conquest’s work with the opening of the archives, this original 
description of Stalin’s purges remains justified. See Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin’s Purges of 




medicine, dry goods, and other essentials.  They often lied about supplies and clashed 
with the NKVD and each other, killing Crimean Tatars with starvation and isolation from 
shelter and medical assistance.  Kabanov participated by confiscating food and livestock 
and then concealing the totals.  He and other authorities in Crimea and the Uzbek SSR 
never followed the instructions of the voucher and reimbursement plan for food, fowl, 
and livestock.  The Uzbek NKVD lied about death and illness as much as possible, but 
erred on the side of honesty when disease threatened to spread outside of special 
settlement regions.  Chernyshov and Beria reported on deteriorating conditions and 
demanded food and supplies.  The various food and supplies ministries and Molotov 
ensured that their pleas were inconsequential.  Crimean Tatar first-hand accounts, special 
settler labor statistics and research by Soviet academics during the Gorbachev-era 
confirm the obvious, that at least 40,000 Crimean Tatars perished from May 1944 to 
1946.   
In bureaucratic genocide, Stalin and his circle could always blame the 
bureaucrats, rogue NKVD officers, farm managers, and the geographic and 
organizational distances between their orders and the apparatchiks who implemented 
their policy.  However, this study exposes the extensive paper trail of this effort and 
reveals that all Soviet officials, from Stalin to a beet farm director, understood that mass 
deportations to remote and arid regions caused mass death.  In a sense, the Soviet state 
was efficient at killing its citizens with inefficiency, and understood and embraced this 
tool.  This was not total annihilation because Stalin’s crime against ethnic minorities 
lacked the ideological immediacy of Nazism.  The ideology came after mass death.   In 




Armenian and Circassian genocides, the U.S. ethnic cleansing of indigenous peoples, and 
countless other forced migrations.  
After the deportation, Stalin folded ethnic cleansing into the general rebuilding 
effort in Crimea.   Exemplifying Soviet waste, the deportation hobbled a Crimean 
recovery that had already begun with the participation of Crimean Tatars.  Stalin’s 
commitment to transforming Crimea, not the logistics of a plan, determined success.  At 
Stalin’s behest, Kabanov and Gosplan reordered Crimean land distribution, remaining 
homes, water resources and other remnants of the Crimean ASSR.  They renamed 
districts and 1,066 Crimean Tatar villages in just one order.  The post-deportation land 
rush attracted hundreds of farms, enterprises, ministries, and other Soviet organizations 
attempting to claim their share of the shattered peninsula.  Surviving Crimeans were often 
searching for a roof over their heads, while farms and Sevastopol military instillations 
were seeking farmland, orchards, vineyards, and water and grazing rights.  Ministries, the 
party, and Komsomol sought to retain and later expand their sanatoriums. 
 All Crimean officials and most Moscow ministries understood how the 
deportation further devastated Crimea.  To combat Crimean depopulation, Stalin ordered 
the rushed and often forced relocation of tens of thousands of Slavic settlers to Crimea.  
This effort was key in making the new Crimean society and economy function.  These 
settlers faced many of the same hardships as special settlers, but because their survival 
was essential to Stalin’s project, the food ministries actually supplied some food.  When 
conditions did deteriorate, Moscow allowed settlers to save themselves by leaving 
Crimea.  This was a key difference with forced migration that ended with bureaucratic 




Crimean water and electrical infrastructure to Ukrainian enterprises made sense in 
logistical and geographic terms.  He began this shift in 1947, and Khrushchev completed 
the “transfer” in 1954.  The state celebrated the transfer as Ukraine safeguarding a region 
that was now Russian in content.  For Crimean Tatars, this transfer was a distraction that 
often stole attention from their grievances, and the costs of the transfer for regional 
stability are still apparent today. 
As the demographic and economic situation in Crimea stabilized, Stalin ordered 
Crimean officials to create an ideology to justify and safeguard the Crimean 
transformation.  In response, Crimean academics wrote the new Crimean narrative, an 
anti-Tatar branch of Russian nationalism for Crimea.  This narrative denounced the 
Crimean Tatar national nation, from its origins with the Golden Horde to the legacy of 
veterans and partisans during World War II. This ideology revived imperialistic 
sentiment towards the region and allowed Crimean officials and relocated farmers to 
grapple with the total ethnic cleaning of an autonomous Soviet republic on the heals of 
defeating Hitler.  As chapter four argues, Moscow allowed Crimean academics leeway in 
writing the narrative, but attempted to encase the nationalist story in strange Marxist-
Leninist terms.  It was liberation politics for Russians on the periphery, many of whom 
Soviet authorities has also forced from their homes.  They had a mission to help free this 
hearth of the Russian nation from the taint of Tatars and Nazis. 
  Crimean tour guides, excursion writers, historians, and museum directors 
expanded and popularized this narrative in the postwar period.  As this study has 
underlined, Soviet officials were conscious that their work was erasing Crimean Tatar 




the wisdom of manipulating history.   The Glavlit censor Zotiev questioned the 
compatibility of the new Crimean narrative with Soviet nationalities policy and Marxism-
Leninism. Others such as Kirillov and Nadinskii hid any objections and embraced their 
job rewriting Crimean history.  Regardless of commitment and personal beliefs, all the 
above figures and a host of others created a new Russian Crimea.  By the 1960s, Crimean 
Tatars understood the significance of this transformation.  Crimean Tatars and Slavic 
Crimean officials alike admitted that the exiled nation would not receive a warm 
welcome because of this economic, demographic and ideological transformation.    
The ethnic cleansing and bureaucratic genocide of Crimean Tatars was 
catastrophic, but many Crimean Tatars survived and rebuilt their lives in exile   The 
peripheral nature of Crimean Tatar survival was crucial.  Stalin let the bureaucracy 
“implement” policy, and then placed the fractured survivors into positions where their 
former national or social identities should no longer matter.  Crimean Tatars survived by 
remaining in or rejoining the very state that had just committed the atrocity.  Crimean 
Tatar party members, veterans, and a newly educated young people replenished economic 
and party leadership jobs.  In the regions of exile, many factories and farms depended on 
special settler labor.  Some enterprises treated special settlers as slaves, others chronically 
underpaid them, and a few provided reasonable conditions.  After special settlement 
ended, most Crimean Tatars found jobs and homes.  It was contradictory and often 
confusing to have “traitors” running a Tashkent enterprise or voting in Supreme Soviet 
elections, but the Soviet Union commonly operated with such glaring contradictions from 




Crimean Tatar participation in the state was not an acceptance of Stalin’s crime or 
lies.  It was an effective survival mechanism for both Crimean Tatar individuals and the 
Crimean Tatar nation.  Crimean Tatars could have maintained an identity in exile had 
they not interacted with the state.  However, during the “Thaw,” Crimean Tatar activists 
decided that self-isolation was not an option.  They began a campaign to encourage the 
mass participation of all Crimean Tatars in arguments with the Soviet state over their 
rights as both individuals and a national collective.   This decision meant that national 
memory and identity would not be based on pre-revolutionary history and the “Surgun” 
alone, but combined with the active participation in resisting ethnic cleansing.   
In Soviet Baby Boomers, Raleigh underlines that a majority of Soviet baby 
boomers from Moscow and Saratov who joined the Komsomol and Communist Party did 
not participate in “nationalist or dissident movements.”  Most boomers were cynical 
about Soviet ideology, read samizdat, and joined the party because of family obligations 
and for social mobility purposes, but they had no interest in challenging or changing the 
Soviet system.4   This was not the case with Crimean Tatars.  Some (although not all) 
Crimean Tatars believed that party membership and activism were not mutually 
exclusive.  They knew that their position in the Soviet system enhanced their chances of 
gaining Moscow’s attention and initiating new reforms.   They were not excusing the 
Soviet crimes, but they accepted Leninist self-determination as important for their 
argument to return to Crimea.  Rather than wallowing in cynicism over the Soviet failure 
to create an equal “brotherhood of nations,” they viewed this Soviet shortcoming as a 
rhetorical tool to challenge the state and communicate with transnational human rights 
networks.  In other words, Soviet citizens’ relationship with Soviet state and ideology 
                                                




was not uniform across the Soviet Union.  Ethnicity, location, and Stalin’s legacy 
mattered in how individuals and groups understood the purpose and function of 
Komsomol and party membership, and the obligations that the state had to its citizens.      
By engaging both state and dissident actors and beliefs, the Crimean Tatar 
movement to return to Crimea became the longest, largest, and most organized protest 
movement in the Soviet Union.  The trauma of deportation, mass death, survival, and the 
frustration of remaining exiled from Crimea after 1956 united this devastated nation, 
giving them a common purpose.   It gained massive public support among Crimean 
Tatars.  The older leaders such as Selimov, with positions in the party and the authority of 
their veteran status, organized the first letter writing campaigns with younger students 
and Komsomol members such as Dzhemilev.    Crimean Tatars pioneered the use of mass 
petitions, letter writing campaigns, and postwar protest in the Soviet Union.  Activists 
overwhelmed Moscow governmental and party offices with mail.  Protesters in the Uzbek 
SSR, Moscow, and Crimea learned how to react to initial arrests with snowballing 
demonstrations that forced Soviet authorities into awkward defenses of their actions.  
Activists in Moscow and elsewhere put hundreds of officials on record, asking what they 
thought about Stalin’s charges, the deportation, and continuing repressions against 
Crimean Tatars.  Most significant of all, for four decades, the Crimean Tatar protest 
movement sustained popularity among its main constituents. 
 These efforts uncovered Moscow’s confusion over policy and disagreements 
about the future of Crimean Tatars and Crimea. Moreover, Crimean Tatars’ interaction 
with the state proved that many Soviet officials understood the absurdity of mass treason 




officials and government bureaucrats recognized and sometimes even acquiesced to the 
pleas and demands of Crimean Tatars and their protests.   As a result, after Stalin’s death 
the Soviet Union sustained Crimean ethnic cleansing with a combination of repression 
and policy adjustments.   As Oleg Khlevniuk argues, the Soviet system was “modified” 
after Stalin’s death.  “Modifications” included, less dictatorial rule, “social political 
activation, attempted economic reforms, and increased openness to the world.”5  In the 
words of Raleigh, for many Soviet citizens this was “decades of peaceful, evolutionary 
change” that was bolstered by normalized living conditions and an extensive welfare 
state.6  This study demonstrates how each of these “modifications” affected Crimean 
Tatars and Soviet domestic policy.  De-Stalinization and the “Thaw,” no matter how 
imperfect, allowed Soviet officials to experiment with governance.  Policy makers such 
as Georgadze, Andropov, and Skliarov met with Crimean Tatars and local officials and 
identified the main problems with Crimean policies.  They proposed reforms and mulled 
new repressions.  The overall strategy was similar to how other global powers dealt with 
unrest and protest in the 1960s and 1970s.   They hoped to stabilize the situation and 
dampen enthusiasm for protests.   
The ultimate example of this strategy was the September 5, 1967 decree that gave 
individual Crimean Tatars the right to return to Crimea.  Moscow never intended for all 
Crimean Tatars to return to Crimea, but the document was an important domestic and 
international message that, at least officially, Soviet officials could not discriminate 
against an ethnic group.  To prevent a mass return, Moscow relied on Crimean authorities 
to repress and harass Crimean Tatars.  Crimean Tatars understood this dynamic, and they 
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denounced Moscow’s half-measures and thousands of Crimean Tatars called Moscow’s 
bluff and returned.    
As Crimean Tatars returned in the late-1960s and 1970s, Crimean authorities 
became specialists in using internal passport and registration laws, notary laws, sanitation 
codes, and other legal routes to deny Crimean Tatars housing, land, jobs and education in 
Crimea.  In other words, Crimean officials learned that denying access to the Soviet 
welfare state was the most effective tool for ethnic discrimination.  In both legal and 
extralegal manners, Crimean police often deported Crimean Tatars for violating one of 
the above legal codes. 
In the face of another wave of mass return in the late-1970s, this arrangement was 
no longer enough. Moscow reacted by ordering the KGB, Soviet prosecutors, and 
Crimean prosecutors to begin a new wave of repression and deportation to punish 
Crimean Tatars and anyone who assisted their return.  This was not a new wave of ethnic 
cleansing and did not target all Crimean Tatars, but was a intended to stop further return 
once the Crimean Tatar population had reached around 10,000 people in Crimea.  Police 
and prosecutors also target ethnic Slavs who assisted returning Crimean Tatars by selling 
or renting homes. 
Throughout the post-Stalin period, Crimean Tatar resistance attracted Russian 
dissidents who found little in the way of popular support in Russia proper.  Although 
isolated in Soviet society to a small minority population, the Crimean Tatar movement 
and the crises it caused over the course of four decades showed Soviet bureaucracy at its 
most confounding and confounded.  It revealed how in corners of the Soviet Union the 




different things to different people, and Soviet nationalities policy helped create this 
situation.  On both the domestic and international stage, Crimean Tatar agitation and 
collaboration with Soviet dissidents and transnational human rights networks created a 
permanent headache for the Soviet state.  Crimean Tatars also intrigued Western “Cold 
Warriors” who were keen to highlight Soviet hypocrisy during the Cold War. 
Crimean Tatars were organized and prepared for another round of protest and 
return when Gorbachev began glasnost and perestroika.  Gorbachev first hesitated at 
allowing Crimean Tatar return, perhaps for the same geopolitical logic that led to the 
deportations.  However, Crimean Tatars protested and tens of thousands returned on their 
own from 1987 to 1990.  Finally, in 1990 Gorbachev signed Supreme Soviet order 666, a 
lengthy plan to reverse-engineer Crimean ethnic cleansing.  The substantial research and 
planning for Crimean Tatar return by Crimean Tatar and Gosplan economists highlighted 
the urbanization and industrialization of the Crimean Tatar nation in exile.  Order 666 
succeeded in at least one aspect.  The Kremlin ordered the KGB and Soviet police state to 
relent in the case of Crimea, robbing Crimean authorities of support battling Crimean 
Tatar return.  Without the entirety of Soviet law enforcement buttressing Crimean ethnic 
discrimination and deportations, Crimean authorities could not stop more than 200,000 
Crimean Tatars returning from 1990 to 1993. 
Crimean Tatar activists and Gosplan also identified the key reasons why the plan 
would likely fail to give Crimean Tatars political and economic enfranchisement in 
Crimea.  In general, Crimean authorities revolted against the radical ideas of distributing 
land, political positions, and material and monetary benefits to Crimean Tatars.  Crimean 




political and economic enfranchisement for the returned nation.  The romantic goal of 
returning home collided with the reality of Stalin’s Crimean transformation, and Crimean 
Tatar leaders struggle to define their role in a republic that was hostile to their return.  As 
the Soviet police state and bureaucracy disengaged from Crimea, there was no 
enforcement mechanism to implement order 666 and the plan failed to economically and 
politically rehabilitate the nation. 
While Crimean authorities lost the ability to conduct mass deportations, they had 
identified the various tools of ethnic discrimination and these mechanisms remained.  
Crimean police continued to operate many of the repressive tools such as residency 
registration.  By the 1980s, the hatred of Crimean officials towards Crimean Tatars 
transitioned from the Stalinist “enemy” of the state narrative of treasonous collaboration 
to an increasing focus on ethnic characteristics and stereotypes. Although not all Slavic 
Crimeans shared this view, the conservative Russian communists attacked any 
accommodations to Crimean Tatars and dominated the political discourse.  They 
pioneered a reactionary version of the modern “Russian World (Russkii Mir)” concept 
that encourages Russians stuck within the former Soviet Empire to promote Russian 
culture and political influence.7  But the Crimean room of the Soviet communal 
apartment was very different from other Soviet republics in the Baltics and Central Asia 
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party was willing to concede Crimea to either permanent Ukrainian control or greater power sharing with 
Crimean Tatars.  Putin understood this dynamic, and it has informed his message to Slavic Crimeans from 
2013 to the present: see Marlene Laurelle, The Russian World: Russia’s Soft Power and Geopolitical 




because Russians and Russian speakers controlled the government and economy.  As a 
result, they held a “popular” referendum to mandate their power in Crimea and exclude 
Crimean Tatars from meaningful power-sharing during the Soviet crisis and then in post-
Soviet Crimea. 
Many scholars characterized the January 20, 1991 referendum to reestablish the 
Crimean ASSR solely as a reaction to Ukrainian nationalism.  By doing so, they often 
miss the vote's immediate goal.8   The referendum created an anti-Tatar and chauvinistic 
bulwark in response to Crimean Tatar return.  During the referendum process, Crimean 
officials denounced the Mejlis and any form of Crimean Tatar self-governance or 
participation because it threatened the status quo. After the vote, Crimean oblast 
government and political institutions simply became the new republic’s structure.   By 
rejecting the precedent of the 1921 to 1944 Crimean ASSR structure of ethnic diversity in 
governance, Crimean authorities assured that during the coming privatization of Soviet 
infrastructure that Crimean Tatars would have little to claim.  After Ukrainian 
independence, Kyiv failed to assert much influence over the Russian majority.  Its 
preferred candidates lost in Crimean presidential and council elections, leading to near 
constant tension between Kyiv, Russophile Crimeans, and Moscow.  Crimean Tatars, 
with only a small number of Crimean Council seats, often quarreled as the unity of the 
return movement yielded to inevitable divisions over policy and participation in Crimea.  
Overall, Crimean Tatars tended to side with pro-Kyiv forces in Crimea because of the 
simple fact that that much of the Russian majority remained hostile to their presence and 
                                                




political demands.9  This dynamic only further complicated the Crimean Tatar position 
after Russia’s March 2014 occupation of Crimea. 
Scholars commonly focus on the contradictions in Soviet ideology and economics 
as the reason the state collapsed.  This study examined the specific contradictions of 
Soviet Crimea and Crimean Tatar policy versus Soviet nationalities policies, Leninist 
self-determination policy, territorial demarcations, economic problems and other topics.  
The Crimean case, while certainly not a driver in the ultimate Soviet collapse, is an 
important indicator that these contradictions did have long-term consequences.  Stalin’s 
plan to homogenize and “secure” multiple assemblage points of the Soviet empire, while 
drastically changing demographics and the landscape, never solved the problems of 
imperial control of the periphery.  It left a legacy of death and displacement and harmed 
economic development.  As this study argues, Crimea was an extreme example of this 
policy and, in the long term, Stalin’s methods failed to end questions of ethnic and state 
control over the peninsula.  The protest and crises from the 1960s to 1991 give specific 
examples of the Soviet inability to provide concrete and sustainable policy solutions to 
complicated questions on nationality, human rights, economics and the many 
consequences of inter-Soviet migration.  For Crimean Tatars, the legacy of these 
contradictions is the remaining political and economic disenfranchisement, but also a 
proud tradition of national resistance.  
Perhaps most importantly, as younger scholars of the Soviet Union in academia 
turn their focus to the postwar era, historians must research the similar crimes Stalin 
committed during World War II.  As “Resisting Ethnic Cleansing” has displayed, this 
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must begin with examining each individual nation’s memories and experiences of the 
period and comparing and contrasting that evidence with the actions and documents of 
the Soviet state. This combination of extensive archival research mixed with examples of 
resistance and resilience reveals the antagonistic relationship between the elites and some 
Soviet ethnic minorities.  By doing so, we can begin to draw larger conclusions about the 
nature of Soviet nationalities politics and ethnic discrimination from 1945 to 1991.   
 
The Future of Crimea 
 
 
As Crimean native and scholar Constantine Pleshakov argues, there is a post-
Soviet “fetish” over the status of Crimea.  To a large degree, this study supports 
Pleshakov’s point that, being the Crimean Tatar homeland, neither Moscow nor Kyiv 
should have the right to transfer or annex Crimea as occurred in 1954 and 2014.  At the 
same time, Pleshavkov and other scholars and pundits focus on NATO versus Soviet (and 
now Russian) foreign policy when debating the current crisis over Crimean control.   This 
focus on great power politics has transcended the Soviet Union’s collapse and the West’s 
premature and immature Cold War triumphalism in the 1990s.10  However justified, this 
focus obscures a discussion of Crimean populism.  
Putin’s March 2014 referendum reactivated anti-Tatar sentiment and made it 
visceral because, unlike in 1991, Crimea actually could “return” to Russia.  Any Crimean 
Tatar objecting to the nature of the referendum or occupation had to keep quiet or face 
the consequences.  Afterwards, the world’s attention turned to the war in the Donbas.   
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Soon, even when Crimea and Crimean Tatars entered the public debate, it was usually 
about their place in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.   
Many in the West and Russia find solace in the idea that, even if Putin was wrong 
to annex Crimea in a forceful manner, Crimeans were just expressing themselves in 1991 
and 2014.  Some have even supported a populist and democratic interpretation of both 
referendums.  Neither Moscow nor Kiev knows best, the narrative goes, so let Crimeans 
decide.  In this, Judy Brown and other scholars find an independent and laudable Crimean 
identity.  Besides, as Brown explains, there is no satisfactory answer to how or if 
Crimean Tatars or other Crimean minorities could claim national rights in Crimea.11  This 
is odd and disturbing, on par with supporting racist voter laws in the United States 
because the dominant party has a popular mandate.  Moreover, much of this discussion 
focuses on Sevastopol, rarely acknowledging that, until the ethnic cleansing, Moscow 
viewed policy, culture, and ethnicity in Sevastopol and the rest of the peninsula in very 
different terms.12   As this study has underlined, the period of ethnic cleansing and 
Crimean Tatar resistance carries immense political, economic, and ideological baggage, 
and was essential in developing the postwar “Crimean identity.”  The 1991 referendum 
may have been popular, but had the clear goal of solidifying control over the Crimean 
government, economy and territory for Crimean leaders and elites.  Crimean leaders 
privatized the Crimean communal apartment, and the referendum ensured continuing 
discrimination against Crimean Tatar power-sharing in the new Crimean ASSR.   
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regions to be Crimean Tatar: see Doris Wydra, “The Crimean Conundrum: The Tug of War Between 
Russia and Ukraine on the Questions of Autonomy and Self-Determination, International Journal on 




The populist and pro-Russian message of Putin’s 2014 referendum campaign in 
Crimea, like so much of the xenophobic and anti-Western, anti-globalist wave, has some 
roots in economic displacement.  In particular, Ukraine’s descent into corrupt and 
cutthroat capitalism in the 1990s gave many Crimeans numerous economic grievances.   
However, Putin’s most powerful tool was embracing nostalgia for Soviet Crimea.  The 
anti-Tatar, new Crimean narrative, or the steadfast belief that Crimea was Slavic, and 
particularly Russian, enjoyed a renewal.  Putin deployed this narrative to secure support 
and make historical justifications for his actions in Crimea.  He supported a reactionary, 
Russian nationalist government that unleashed a new wave of repression against Crimean 
Tatars.  As “Little Green Men” secured urban infrastructure and Ukrainian military bases, 
masked men harassed Crimean Tatars activists and kidnapped and killed several Crimean 
Tatars. Crimean officials shuttered Crimean Tatar cultural sites and most importantly, 
Crimean Tatar television.13   Putin did not have to directly order any such actions because 
the anti-Tatar sentiment was already in place.  He officially welcomed Crimean Tatars as 
a public façade, but the reality on the ground is very different.14     
That remains the hard truth in Crimea.  A popular mandate does not make 
discrimination and disenfranchisement less real.  The new Crimean administration may 
embrace a “Russian nationalist identity” that is genuinely and proudly non-Western.  This 
identity certainly has an independent streak that eschews Moscow at times.  However, a 
strain of Russian nationalism that has its roots in anti-Tatar agitation and ethnic cleansing 
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dominates this identity.  As Vladimir Ryzhkov argues, the Crimean Tatar situation is “the 
gravest ethnic and political conflict in Russia today.”15   
Crimean Tatars have proven that brutality against even a small nation can have 
long-term consequences for a large empire.   Geopolitical arguments and the 
nefariousness of Putin or NATO or Ukrainian nationalism will continue to dominate 
headlines.  However, if this study is any indication, it is likely that Crimean Tatars will 
continue to challenge Moscow.  Perhaps not for control of the peninsula, but, similar to 
their resistance in the Soviet Union, with a focus on demanding Moscow and Crimean 
authorities respect Crimean Tatar national, political and economic participation in their 
homeland.  The geopolitical importance of Crimea only makes each move more 
consequential for both foreign relations and the current domestic political realities in 
Russia and Ukraine.  In the end, all parties involved know that Crimean Tatars have 
always resisted Moscow’s plans for Crimea and underlined contradictions in policy and 
ideology.     
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